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1. Grand strategy: Alliances

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Alliances are usually temporary arrangements among states to counter—or “balance” against—a specific common threat. The United States’ Cold War alliances, by contrast, have become seemingly permanent. States tend to balance power when they face a major threat. Bandwagoning, by contrast, is a particularly poor option for states with the capability to put up a fight. When threatened, states tend to join forces in alliances rather than surrender their national survival to the whims of a more powerful aggressor. Alliances, however, entail costs and risks. These include the dangers of being drawn into war through entanglement and entrapment, the deleterious effect on deterrence by allies that neglect their defense by “free-riding,” and the moral hazard produced by enabling allies to act like “reckless drivers.” Over time, the United States has shifted from a deep skepticism of “entangling alliances” to a global network of security dependents that are treated as an end in themselves, rather than a means to an end. This posture has left the United States overextended, while encouraging allies to neglect their own capabilities and preparedness. The United States can and should significantly reduce its alliance commitments, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, where threats to the U.S. are remote and local powers can balance adversaries. In Asia, the United States should act as a backstop to the regional balance of power rather than a vanguard.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Grand Strategy, Alliance, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

2. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Evolution of Grand Strategy

Author:
Leonid Polyakov
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we are publishing a second series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the second brief of the series, Leonid Polyakov observes that while Ukraine’s strategic objectives have remained the same throughout the war, the ways and means to achieve them have shifted. Surprise and mass have become less relevant, but technology must be mobilised through society-wide efforts if Ukraine is to prevail. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s longer-term security requires the construction of a credible deterrence posture.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. ‘Appeasement’ and the Current Crisis: How ‘Munich’ Impoverishes Western Grand Strategy

Author:
Christopher J. Fettweis
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy loves to remind any Western leader who seems about to go wobbly that appeasing aggressors is not only dishonorable but strategically unwise and dangerous. When Henry Kissinger, for instance, suggested in May 2022 at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos that Ukraine may need to make territorial concessions to end the war, Zelenskyy said this: “It seems that Mr. Kissinger’s calendar is not 2022, but 1938, and he thought he was talking to an audience not in Davos, but in Munich of that time.” Indeed, Munich makes an appearance in every speech (and most off-hand remarks) that the Ukrainian president makes, as if the conference happened in 2018 rather than 1938. Zelenskyy knows his audience. The lessons of Munich and appeasement are deeply ingrained in the strategic consciousness of the United States and its allies. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the dangers posed by appeasing dictators is one of the central tenets of the Western foreign policy establishment. Those arguing for staunch opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin employ the analogy as much as possible, accusing anyone who disagrees of being ignorant of the most basic of lessons that history supposedly teaches. The word “supposedly” is doing a lot of work in that sentence. This brief essay begins by providing a historical overview of appeasement and explains how the lessons of Munich have been mislearned by generations of Western policymakers. That infamous conference did not lead to the Second World War, which was coming no matter what British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain did at the negotiating table. The essay then turns to the effect of misremembrance on U.S. foreign policy to this day, including its influence on the debates regarding Russia’s barbarous invasion of Ukraine. It would be best for everyone involved if the true history of the Munich conference was widely known, or barring that (since it is probably too late), that it was forgotten altogether. This essay provides a historical overview of appeasement, explains how the lessons of Munich have been mislearned by generations of Western policymakers, and then turns to the effect of misremembrance on U.S. foreign policy to this day.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Grand Strategy, Appeasement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

4. Masters of Grand Strategy

Author:
Samuel Boucké
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Grand strategy has principles that, when adhered to, will definitely benefit the state. In order to thrive, a grand strategy needs to be sustained by a strategic culture. A state’s strategic culture resides predominantly in its strategic establishment. This comprises different elites from the respective professions that bear upon the course of the state in the world, those that give shape to policy. These elites can be grouped in different factions within the strategic establishment, such as the military elite, the political elite, the administrative elite. Bad relations among these, such as bad civil-military relations, can be a sign of a fragmented and unhealthy strategic establishment. Such a strategic establishment will not generate a strategic culture that is able to sustain a grand strategy. In order to remedy, prevent, and generally improve upon this, the strategic establishment should conduct strategic simulations. Strategic simulations will instil the principles of grand strategy whilst moulding a healthy strategic establishment that will be able to generate a sustainable strategic culture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe

5. A German Digital Grand Strategy: Integrating Digital Technology, Economic Competitiveness, and National Security in Times of Geopolitical Change

Author:
Tyson Barker and David Hagebölling
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
This report systematically outlines the state of play in digital policy and Berlin’s current policy approach. It provides 48 recommendations for strengthening Germany’s efforts to build a confident, high-performing European digital economy embedded in an open, democratic, and rules-based digital order.
Topic:
Economics, National Security, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

6. The Strategic Argument for a Political NATO

Author:
Heather A Conley
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The 1949 Washington Treaty is a remarkably brief document consisting of a preamble and 14 articles. The Treaty describes only the po- litical commitments and obligations of the signato- ries. It does not articulate a requirement for NATO members to spend a certain amount of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense nor does it specify the military capabilities that a NATO member must possess to defend the Alliance. From 1949 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was the singular locus of geopolitical discus- sion between North America and Europe. These were not easy discussions, yet the Alliance weathered strident policy and geopolitical policy differences. NATO also endured its members temporarily ceasing to be democracies due to military coups or concern about Communist influence on NATO governments. With a political body standing on the shoulders of a credible military deterrence, Allies were able to deploy creative problem-solving skills to bridge political dif- ferences, such as the policy innovation of deterrence and détente, while pursuing other, quieter methods, such as the temporary suspension of sharing sensitive intelligence from compromised NATO governments. Unfortunately, NATO’s centrality as a political forum greatly diminished after the Cold War as the Alliance reduced its political consultations in a less demanding geopolitical environment. Despite occa- sional interruptions of intense political discussion re- lated to conflict in the Balkans and the September 11th attacks, US retrenchment, combined with Europe’s inward focus, minimized NATO as a political forum. NATO was increasingly consumed by tactical decisions on out-of-area operations and transatlantic policy divisions over the Iraq War which fueled both Europe’s desire for greater autonomy and America’s questioning of the military utility of its Allies. NATO leaders substituted tactical – albeit important – military decisions regard- ing troop contributions, placement, and caveats as a substitute for political discussion. This political drift has now become so great that NATO members have begun to withhold support for the defensive planning of other Allies and new disputes between NATO members have the potential to escalate.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

7. NATO, Strategy, and Net Assessment

Author:
Niccolo Petrelli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In late 2020, analysts recommended for the first time the establishment within NATO of a net assessment (NA) capability to deal with an in- creasingly complex strategic environment.1 The same recommendation was reiterated in the NATO 2030 report to address the problem of “strategic simultane- ity”: i.e. the emergence of multiple, simultaneous and interconnected threats. According to the Reflection Group appointed by the Secretary General, “NATO should consider creating a new net assessment office [...] with the mission of examining NATO’s strate- gic environment on the basis of agreed threats and challenges across the whole spectrum of military and non-military tools. [...] A net assessment function [...] would bring a systematic methodology distinct from horizon scanning. It would exist to analyse the organisation’s strengths and options [...]”.2 The term NA was first coined in the US during the early 1970s by national security official Andrew W. Marshall to refer to a constellation of concepts and techniques for evaluating relative power. In West- ern usage, however, and for some decades now, it has been employed in a broader sense to denote the function of combining the appreciation of one’s own strength against that of one’s opponents in interna- tional affairs at the highest level.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

8. Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it

Author:
Marc Franco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In many Western chancelleries, there still is a lot of hesitation and bewilderment on how to deal with Russia. A first step in defining a coherent policy vis-a-vis Russia, is trying to understand the motivation and objectives of Russian foreign policy, as well as its weaknesses.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

9. China’s grand industrial strategy and what it means for Europe

Author:
Frederico Mollet
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In its 14th Five-Year Plan, China has mapped out a grand economic and industrial strategy that upends many of the assumptions that underpin the EU's approach - how can the Union respond? With this new plan, the EU can expect tougher competition and greater protectionism in its economic relations with China. A further blurring of the public-private sector distinction in the country's economic model will make it harder to combat unfair Chinese competition. And while China is actively courting foreign investment, it is also signalling greater protectionism to products not made in China, which will lead to European investors' and exporters' interests diverging. To balance the scales, the EU should adapt its own strategy by: continuing to develop trade instruments to combat unfair competition at home and abroad; ensuring that these instruments and institutions can respond to unfair competition from private companies benefiting from state capital investment; ensuring that the extensive and often opaque government holdings in private firms are reflected in foreign direct investment and export controls; incorporating China's attempts to reconfigure supply chains into its own assessment of strategic dependencies, identifying areas that could become vulnerable; prioritising the improvement of access to the Chinese market for goods and services produced in Europe; developing alternative sources of growth, and boost demand and reduce barriers within the Single Market to offset greater Chinese protectionism; and ensuring that its industrial policy efforts will enable European industry to match China's developments. The present moment may mark a turning point in EU–China relations: in a little over three months, an agreement on an investment treaty was followed by sanctions and countersanctions. Geopolitical conflict ratchets up between China and the US. Beijing's new economic course will reshape its global relationships. China's protectionist turn and growing one-sided dependencies will threaten Europe's long-term strategic autonomy and undercut any attempts to construct a balanced approach to EU–China relations. If the EU's multi-track strategy is to work, a concerted effort is required to preserve economic parity and balance between the two powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Political Economy, European Union, Grand Strategy, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

10. The Logic (and Grammar) of US Grand Strategy: Implications for Germany and Europe

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Although President Biden has made US foreign policy more predictable, its medium- and long-term direction and concomitant implications for transatlantic relations are less certain. This report presents three scenarios of how US strategy might evolve. They provide insight into how the United States behaves in the spheres of security and international economy under different conditions and why, suggesting ways for the EU and Germany to preemptively mitigate risks and positively influence future policy.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Grand Strategy, Risk, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America