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212. The state of China-European Union economic relations
- Author:
- Uri Dadush, Marta Dominguez-Jimenez, and Tianlang Gao
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- China and the European Union have an extensive and growing economic relationship. The relationship is problematic because of the distortions caused by China’s state capitalist system and the diversity of interests within the EU’s incomplete federation. More can be done to capture the untapped trade and investment opportunities that exist between the parties. China’s size and dynamism, and its recent shift from an export-led to a domestic demand-led growth model, mean that these opportunities are likely to grow with time. As the Chinese economy matures, provided appropriate policy steps are taken, it is likely to become a less disruptive force in world markets than during its extraordinary breakout period.
- Topic:
- Economics, Governance, European Union, Investment, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
213. Crisis management for euro-area banks in central Europe
- Author:
- Alexander Lehmann
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- The deep involvement of a number of euro-area banking groups in central and southeastern Europe has benefitted the host countries and has strengthened the resilience of those banking groups. But this integration has become less close because of post-financial crisis national rules that require banks to hold more capital at home, or other ring-fencing measures. There is a risk integration might be undermined further by bank resolution planning, which is now gathering pace. Regulators and banks will need to decide between two distinct models for crisis resolution, and this choice will redefine banking networks. Most efficient in terms of preserving capital and the close integration of subsidiary operations would be if the Single Resolution Board – the banking union’s central resolution authority – takes the lead for the entire banking group. However, this will require parent banks to hold the subordinated debts of their subsidiaries. Persistent barriers to intra-group capital mobility – or the option for home or host authorities to impose such restrictions – will ultimately render such schemes unworkable. The second model would involve independent local intervention schemes, which European Union countries outside the banking union are likely to call for. This will require building capacity in local debt markets, and clarifying creditor hierarchies. Exposure to banking risks will ultimately need to be borne by host-country investors. Bail-in capital issued by subsidiaries to their parents cannot be a substitute because it would expose the home country to financial contagion from the host. To sustain cross-border linkages, banking groups and their supervisors will need to make bank recovery plans more credible, and to strengthen cooperation in resolution colleges (platforms that bring together all relevant parties in resolution planning and execution). Within the banking union there is no justification for the various ring-fencing measures that have impeded the flow of capital and liquidity within banking groups.
- Topic:
- Governance, European Union, Regulation, Banks, and Macroeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Europe
214. Energy security in the Baltic Region: between markets and politics
- Author:
- Marc Ozawa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- NATO addresses energy security concerns in three ways, through strategic awareness, infrastructure protection and energy efficiency measures. However, what may be a concern for NATO is potentially a problem for member states with conflicting views on the issue, the politics of which impact their interactions within the Alliance. Nord Stream 2, the trans-Baltic pipeline connecting Ust-Luga (Russia) to Greifswald (Germany), is one such example because it is so divisive. This Policy Brief advocates a role for NATO as a constructive partner with the European Union (EU), the governing body for energy security issues in tandem with national governments, while avoiding the divisive politics of direct involvement. NATO and the EU have complementary perspectives on energy security. The Alliance’s view is directed at broad security implications and the EU’s Director- General for Energy (DG Energy) is more focused on market matters. In this complementarity of perspectives NATO could indirectly assist DG Energy in making better energy policies and help to avoid the politicization of projects that create friction within the EU, the type that can spill over into NATO. The strife around Nord Stream 2, for example, works against both EU unity and cohesion within NATO such that, what may not have originally been perceived as a problem for NATO, becomes one.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
215. “NATO@70”: still adapting after all these years
- Author:
- Julian Lindley-French
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- In April 1949, at the signing of the foundation doc- ument of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Treaty of Washington, the Western Allies had twelve active divisions. They believed, erroneously as it turned out, that Stalin’s Red Army had 175 di- visions on the other side of the River Elbe which marked the then inner-German border. At the time the West consoled itself with the monopoly that the United States had on atomic weaponry. Such com- placency ended on 29 August 1949 with a nuclear shock when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic device. The new NATO was also tied inextricably to Europe’s then recent past. Soon after the Treaty of Washington was signed the French newspaper Le Monde suggested that the creation of NATO repre- sent a big step down the road to German rearma- ment: “The rearmament of Germany is present in the Atlantic Pact as the seed in the egg”.1 April 1949 thus encapsulated both the ambition and the tensions that were to mark the three strands of post-World War Two European security and defence: transatlantic relations, the German Question and the road to European Union and how to both engage Russia and defend against it.
- Topic:
- NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Germany, and North America
216. NATO and EU training missions in Iraq – an opportunity to enhance cooperation
- Author:
- Niels Schafranek
- Publication Date:
- 08-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- For the past fifteen years, NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation has been expanding with mixed results. Fundamentally, the two organizations are different: NATO, as an intergovernmental military alliance, focuses on collective defence, crisis man- agement and cooperative security. The EU, on the other hand, is a political and economic union that has developed a security agenda under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, there are also overlapping security activities such as the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, involving the EU in peacekeeping, and potentially even tasks of combat for EU forces in crisis management.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
217. NATO and the EU The essential partners
- Author:
- Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy
- Publication Date:
- 09-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- The state of NATO-EU relations is currently high on the political agenda. There are at least three reasons for this. First, there is a genuine expectation that both organisations should increasingly work together and complement each other in an era where threats are multifaceted. There is a recognition that tackling such threats, while having to adapt their respective positions in light of geopolitical muscle flexing in other parts of the world, requires both organisations to strengthen the partnership. In 2016, the two institutions adopted a Joint Declaration that reflected on this necessity: “In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond”.1 Second, there are concerns over how NATO-EU relations are faring at a time when the transatlantic relationship is going through turbulent times. In particular, US relations with several EU member states and the EU in general are mired in disagreements on issues ranging from the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, to the possibility of introducing new tariffs on specific goods traded between the two sides. Looming on the horizon there are also concerns about the implications of Brexit for NATO-EU relations – in particular, whether it may inadvertently complicate both organisations’ ability to work together.
- Topic:
- NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
218. The 1948 German Currency and Economic Reform: Lessons for European Monetary Policy
- Author:
- Gunther Schnabl
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Twenty years after the introduction of the euro, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is at its crossroads. Following the outbreak of the European financial and debt crisis in 2008, the European Central Bank (ECB) took comprehensive measures to stabilize the common currency. Interest rates were cut to and below zero and several asset purchase programs have inflated the ECB balance sheet (Riet 2018). Within the European System of Central Banks, large imbalances have emerged via the TARGET2 payments system, which can be seen as quasi-unconditional credit in favor of the southern euro area countries (Sinn 2018). While the ECB terminated its asset purchase program at the end of 2018 and is expected to increase interest rates in late 2019, financial instability is reemerging. Growing uncertainty about the fiscal discipline of the Italian government has triggered a significant increase in risk premiums on Italian government bonds. In particular, in Italy and Greece, but also in Germany, bad loans and assets remain stuck in the banking systems. In the face of the upcoming downswing, European banks do not seem ready for new financial turmoil. In this fragile environment, the future path of the EMU is uncertain. To enhance the stability of the EMU, a group of German and French economists has called for a common euro area budget, for a strengthening of the European Stability Mechanism as lender of last resort for euro area countries and banks, as well as for a common European deposit insurance scheme (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018). In response, 154 German economists have warned against transforming the EMU into what they call a “liablity union,” which systematically undermines market principles and wealth (Mayer et al. 2018). In 2018, a French-German initative to introduce a common euro area budget faced strong opposition from a group of northern European countries as well as from Italy, symbolizing the political deadlock concerning reforms of the EMU. This article explains the different views on the institutional setting of monetary policymaking in Europe from a historical perspective. It begins with a description of the economic and monetary order in postwar Germany. It then discusses the positive implications for the European integration process and the economic consequences of the transformation of postwar German monetary order. The final section offers some economic policy recommendations.
- Topic:
- Economics, History, Monetary Policy, Reform, European Union, Banks, and Currency
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
219. Democracy and human rights agency for change: Alternative Democratic Practices in Southeast Europe
- Author:
- Vedran Dzihic, Gazela Pudar Drasko, Felix Henkel, Irena Fiket, Ivan Stefanovski, and Rastislav Dinic
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Almost twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, initial euphoria about democratic change in many countries in the East and Southeast of Europe has given way to growing mistrust of political institutions and politicians, and an increasing disaffection with democracy itself. This wide-ranging disaffection has many sources. One of them lies in the increasingly weak performance of governments and the fact that »democracy«, whatever the term meant at the beginning of the transition processes, has failed to deliver on its promises. Politicians and governments no longer seem able or willing to deliver tangible results to their voters. Politics in Southeast Europe produces no or too few goods »for« the people and instead of »delivering«, engages in populist nationalism, politics of fear, and serves particular power interests The contributions to this publication discuss several approaches to active engagement and thinking about alternatives. The first paper examines the question if and how the emancipatory energy found in social movements may help in renewing social democracy (Felix Henkel). The next paper combines theoretical thinking about democratic innovations as opportunities for channelling popular discontent with concrete inquiry into the situation in Southeast Europe (Irena Fiket). The third paper provides an analysis of the Sisyphean task of democratizing societies, using the example of North Macedonia (Ivan Stefanovski). Last but not least, the fourth paper focusses on local struggles and actions in the Serbian city of Niš (Rastislav Dinić). The mobilization in Niš, where activists are in everyday contact with citizens at the local level, creates a deeper foundation for political engagement inscribed into the living context of individuals. This »grounding« together with broader societal utopian horizons of progressive thought provides a framework for the democratic renewal of Southeast European societies, a renewal that should be high on the agenda of the EU and all international actors dealing with the region.
- Topic:
- Politics, European Union, Democracy, and Institutions
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Balkans, and Southeast Europe
220. Young Generations for New Balkans visit EU Institutions
- Author:
- Vedran Dzihic
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- In December 2019 we had another possibility to present our initiative Young Generations for the Balkans – Vision 2030 by visiting European Union institutions in Brussels. We had two days of fruitful meetings at the European Parliament and the European Commission, exchanging views on areas ranging from the state of democratic freedoms in the region to education policies and student performance in the Western Balkans Six. Furthermore, we presented a policy paper that has been developed as a result of this initiative that over the last two years has grown to include 25 members coming from all six EU aspirant countries plus Croatia. Our meetings in Brussels have proved the European Parliament’s and the Commission’s steadfast commitment to the European integration of the Western Balkans, despite the recent setback in this process when in October 2019 the decision to open the long awaited accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania was blocked by France, the Netherlands and Denmark. The upcoming year 2020 offers a number of opportunities to reinvigorate the integration process. Those opportunities come not without their own challenges and therefore need to be carefully considered. First, Croatia will hold the presidency of the European Union in the first half of 2020. Zagreb has already declared the European integration of the Western Balkans to be its number one external policy priority. The Western Balkans Summit will supposedly be held in May and some significant progress is expected to happen by that time, including the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania, as well as visa liberalization for Kosovo. It is nevertheless important for the EU and its member states to be vocal about the setbacks in democratic freedoms that Croatia itself currently experiences. Lack of reaction to these negative trends sets a bad precedent for other EU aspirant countries in the Balkans. Secondly, while the French veto for North Macedonia and the French, Dutch and Danish vetoes for Albania certainly undermined the EU’s credibility in the region, the discussion about these member states’ decision helped bring back the European enlargement back to the top of the EU agenda. The enlargement process, its positive aspects and deficiencies are being widely discussed across the Union and beyond. In this respect, the French proposal of an enlargement process reform has been one of the most discussed ones. It is clear from that document that the French government sets the priority on the rule of law in the Western Balkans Six and conditions any further progress on the integration path on the adoption and implementation of the European law in this area. While rule of law is indeed a special area of concern in the region, with many countries, such as Serbia or Montenegro, backsliding in this respect, it is not possible to make progress in one area of the European acquis without working simultaneously on many others. In other words, the French proposal sees the European integration as a linear process where one chapter of acquis communautaire can be closed after another. However, it does not work this way in reality. Progress on different chapters of the European law must happen in parallel. For example, one cannot complete the law and justice reform without starting reforms in the economic or environmental sectors. In addition, there are concerns about how the French proposal for the enlargement process reform might complicate and prolong it by opening further possibilities for Member States to veto the whole process after taking every new step. Another positive aspect that year 2020 brings for the Western Balkans youth is new educational opportunities in the European Union. The European Commission is set to double its funding of Erasmus+ programs for this region form EUR 33 million to EUR 66 million. National Erasmus+ offices in the region will further promote these opportunities, thereby reaching out to a broader public. This great support in education and training that the EU provides needs to be further enhanced by necessary reforms in the education system at home. In their discussions with the Members of the European Parliament and the European Commission representatives, young experts drew attention to a number of negative trends that will become major problems in future if they are not addressed already today. Thus, democratic backsliding in many countries of the region is worrisome. Journalists are attacked and threatened for expressing opinions critical of the government. In Serbia, for example, the government’s de facto monopoly on television coverage creates erroneous narratives about the role of the EU and its relations with Serbia. It is a common misperception in Serbia that Russia and China are the main foreign contributors to the Serbian economy while in reality and over the years it has been the EU. The EU thus needs to focus more on its communication strategy in the Southeastern Neighborhood. In this context, the Young Generations Initiative also had a discussion with leaders of the Serbian opposition which happened to pay a visit to the European Parliament on the same day. We discussed the intention of the opposition to boycott the next parliamentary elections. We fully shared their criticism of the lack of democratic behavior in Serbia, but many from our group had doubts about the usefulness of boycotting the forthcoming elections that are set to happen in spring 2020. However, it is also a responsibility of the EU to make it clear to President Vučić and his government that the authoritarian way to rule the country – including manipulating the media – is not in compliance with the EU principles and values. Even if progress is made on the issue of Serbian-Kosovar reconciliation, the EU cannot turn a blind eye to the democratic backslides in domestic policy, especially considering that Serbia and Montenegro are accession candidates. A point was raised about the ongoing democratic deficiencies in EU countries, like Hungary and Poland. The situation there is another reason why enlargement is not popular these days. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán is a good friend of Serbian president Vučić, former North-Macedonian leader Nikola Gruevski was granted asylum in Budapest even though he was convicted of corruption in North Macedonia. In addition, the new EU commissioner for enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi, is claimed to be a loyal companion of Viktor Orbán. These facts are worrisome for many people active in civil society and endanger their efforts to promote democracy and European values in the region. Another concern is an enormous outflow of (educated) people from the region who migrate primarily to Western Europe in search of a better life. In this sense, European enlargement to the Balkans is already happening. While the countries themselves are not members of the EU, young people from the region emigrate to the EU in large numbers, promting many observers to note ironically that if the EU doesn`t come to the Western Balkans, the Western Balkans will come to the EU. Unlike some decades ago, ‘better life’ is increasingly being defined today not in the material terms (people do not migrate primarily because of higher salaries), but as a demand for a stable political system, just and transparent public institutions, livable healthy environment, proper education and corresponding job opportunities. The governments in the region should thus look into creating incentives for professionals to stay in or return to their home countries. This can be done through special tax incentives, more favorable conditions for running businesses and adjusting education systems to the demands of the labor market. The European Union, in its turn, can encourage and offer its support to the regional governments in promoting circular migration among qualified workers. Education is a further problematic area in the Western Balkans. The latest PISA 2018 survey findings conducted by the OECD place four out of the six countries in the region at the bottom of the list. In Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia every second school student in functionally illiterate, while in Serbia and Montenegro it is every third one. One of the consequences of the failing educational system is the mismatch between what it offers and the demand of the markets. Despite numerous pressing concerns, the youth in the region feel hopeful about their future. They are ambitious and full of ideas, although sometimes they have wrong perceptions of what is possible. Thus, recent polls in North Macedonia indicated that about 60% of young people expect their country to become a part of the European Union. About 75% of those think that it will happen before 2025. This is a very unrealistic assessment that will lead to disappointment and possibly even higher motivation to migrate abroad in the very near future. 5.png6.png In order to create space for young people to realize their ambitions and ideas in the region, without leaving it for the rest of their lives, there is a number of specific issues that can be addressed by the EU as well as regional policy makers already today. In general, political will of the governments in the region is imperative for any genuine reform to be implemented. The EU should encourage this change in the attitude among those governments who still ‘tick the boxes’ just to showcase the result on paper but are not really willing to make thorough changes.
- Topic:
- Education, European Union, and Youth
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Balkans, and Southeast Europe