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1. The Mueller Report: What it Includes, What it Omits, and What it Teaches

Author:
Itai Brun and Tehilla Shwartz Altschuler
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
On April 18, 2019, the US Department of Justice released a redacted version of the full report (448 pages) submitted by Special Counsel Robert Mueller about Russia’s interference in the 2016 US presidential elections. The report consists of two parts: the first presents the outcome of the investigation into Russia’s involvement in the election and draws conclusions regarding the presence or absence of a conspiracy or illegal coordination between the Russians and the Trump campaign; the second part deals with President Trump’s possible obstruction of justice regarding the FBI investigation into the Russian intervention and the investigation by the Special Counsel himself. This essay deals with the first part, i.e., the results of the investigation into the connection between the Russians and Trump for the purpose of influencing the election results. The report reflects accurately the US criminal law that deals with conspiracy and illegal coordination regarding elections. At the same time, it exposes a gap in the nation’s conceptual, organizational, legal, and technological preparedness to confront the possibilities that the digital space provides to undermine – internally and externally – the democratic process. Israel suffers from the same gap, and it is therefore imperative that the state confront it before the next Knesset election.
Topic:
Crime, Elections, Election Interference, and Investigations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and North America

2. New Report on Abuse of State Resources Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Author:
Erica Shein
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Abstract:
This report details findings from an Abuse of State Resources Assessment conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). As part of a two-year research effort, IFES recently developed a detailed methodology for evaluating a country’s legal framework related to the abuse of state resources (ASR) in elections. Using this methodology, the report draws on detailed desk research as well as a field research mission to BiH in November 2017. Findings are focused on ASR legal provisions, oversight institutions, and enforcement mechanisms. To the extent possible, the report evaluates both the state (national) level of BiH and the entities of the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska. While in BiH, the team conducted 15 interviews in Sarajevo and Banja Luka with a range of stakeholders. Assessment participants were confident that public awareness of ASR was high. There was general agreement, however, that – more than two decades after the conclusion of a devastating war – the public is largely resigned to accepting such misuses in exchange for peace. The 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the war created a uniquely complex political and electoral structure for the country that remains in place today. This structure creates additional challenges to preventing ASR in campaigns, as ethnic divisions in society are replicated in the political system. Voting blocs are considered pre-determined, so parties representing a particular set of ethnic interests cater to their own constituencies at the expense of broad or programmatic-based coalition building. There is a limited “opposition” willing to advocate against ASR, as essentially all political actors are both beneficiaries and victims of the abuse. This report focuses on three principles for detecting, deterring, and remedying ASR abuses in a manner commensurate with international standards. Principle 1 evaluates the legal framework for addressing three potential avenues for ASR: state personnel, state funds and physical resources, and official government communications. Principle 2 of this report focuses on oversight of the ASR legal framework by independent institutions. Principle 3 of the ASR methodology analyzes the effective enforcement of sanctions and penalties. This report also delves into key contextual features that impact ASR: the public service framework, campaign finance mechanisms, civil society oversight and advocacy, media environment and public information, and public procurement. An overall environment of impunity for perpetrators of the misuse of state resources during elections is further enabled by a variety of factors external to the legal and administrative system, which are explored in this section of the report. The remainder of the report offers a detailed recommendations list and a brief overview of the ASR assessment methodology, as well as an in-depth analysis on each of the areas described above. Based on this analysis, recommendations have been made to strengthen the legal framework with an emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of civil servants, explicitly regulating the use of state funds and other resources, strengthening mandates of oversight and enforcement bodies, creating incentives for improved enforcement, and strengthening weaknesses in the enabling environment that impact ASR.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Voting, Election Interference, and State Abuse
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

3. An Evaluation of the United States’ Electoral Process

Author:
Chad Vickery and Heather Szilagyi
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Abstract:
he 2016 elections brought into view serious threats to the United States’ (U.S.) electoral process, though much recent attention has focused on cybersecurity and foreign interference. The U.S. has traditionally benefited from high levels of trust in the electoral process and its outcomes, but that inherent trust has been declining in recent years. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) routinely conducts comprehensive assessments and offers advice on how countries around the world can reform their elections to better align with international standards and best practices. However, more established democracies like the U.S. are rarely scrutinized by the election practitioner community in the same manner.
Topic:
Elections, Cybersecurity, Foreign Interference, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

4. Beyond Vote Rigging: Common Patterns in Electoral Malpractices in De-Democratizing Regimes

Author:
Adam Szymański and Wojciech Ufel
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
For the past decade in many countries in Europe and its close neighborhood we have observed different types of processes which can be named as “de-democratization”. The aim of the article is to analyze the state of elections as the crucial democratic institution which fairness and competitiveness have a substantial impact on the political regime. While Turkey as a “role model” for our analysis remains a main focus of the article, three Euro- pean countries were selected for a comparison based on their relative similarity to Turkey – Hungary, Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia. The following questions are posed: Are elections in these countries free, fair and competitive? Can some types of electoral malpractice and irregularities be identified? How does the state of elections in terms of their fairness and competitiveness influence the political regime? The main hypothesis is that in the analyzed countries elections competitiveness limited by incumbents can become a factor deciding about the change within the political regime in the long run (loss of democratic quality) and also change the regime (to a less democratic one).
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Election watch, Election Interference, and Illiberal Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, Macedonia, and Hungary

5. The Last Straw: Responding to Russia’s Anti-Western Aggression

Author:
Mieke Eoyang, Evelyn Farkas, Ben Freeman, and Gary Ashcroft
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
In this paper, we argue that Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election is just one part of a wide-ranging effort by Moscow to undermine confidence in democracy and the rule of law throughout countries in the West. Russia has engaged in this effort because, in both economic and demographic terms, it is a declining power – the only way it can “enhance” its power is by weakening its perceived adversaries. Because Russia’s aim is to erode the health of Western nations, we argue it is time for America and its allies to employ a comprehensive, non-kinetic response to contain Russia.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

6. New Report on Abuse of State Resources in Georgia

Author:
Erica Shein, Chad Vickery, Heather Szilagyi, and Julia Brothers
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Abstract:
his report details findings from an IFES Abuse of State Resources Assessment conducted in Georgia following October 2016 elections. This assessment served as the pilot test of the Abuse of State Resources Research and Assessment Framework assessment methodology, which was researched, developed, and peer-reviewed under the Global Elections and Political Transitions mechanism supported by the United States Agency for International Development. Using this methodology, the report draws on detailed desk research as well as a field research mission to Georgia in May 2017. Findings are focused on abuse of state resources (ASR) legal provisions, oversight institutions and enforcement mechanisms. ASR violations are a consistent feature of national and municipal elections in Georgia, and assessment interlocutors see the participation of civil servants in campaign activities as one of the most significant challenges. Also of concern is the perceived over-staffing of public service departments and legal entities of public law, especially at the local level. This report aims to provide actionable recommendations for improving the ASR environment in Georgia. The report focuses on three principles for detecting, deterring and remedying ASR abuses in a manner commensurate with international standards. Principle 1 evaluates the legal framework for addressing three potential avenues for ASR: state personnel, state funds and physical resources, and official government communications. Principle 2 focuses on oversight of the ASR legal framework by independent institutions. Principle 3 analyzes the effective enforcement of sanctions and penalties. The methodology applied for this assessment also acknowledges the need to account for contextual factors may impact the ASR in elections. As such, the report provides a narrative overview of challenges related to the public service framework, campaign finance framework, civil society oversight and advocacy, media environment and public information, and public procurement in Georgia. Based on in-depth analysis of each of the areas described above, the report offers detailed recommendations to strengthen the legal framework with an emphasis on clarifying the rights and responsibilities of civil servants, ensuring that ASR sanctions and penalties achieve a deterrent effect, and clarifying mandates of oversight and enforcement bodies.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Voting, Election Interference, and Rigged Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

7. Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As investigations into attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election continue, more aspects of Russia’s approach to information warfare are coming to light. A steady stream of new disclosures is revealing a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten societal tensions. Moscow’s hostile actions are driven by the belief that Russia is already in a state of conflict with the West, led by the United States, and that the internet is a domain for waging this conflict. From the earliest stages of the internet’s development, Russia has held a starkly different view from the West of its benefits and its potential. Russia’s national security establishment immediately saw connectivity as a threat and a potential weapon—and eventually as one that could help achieve regime change and deprive a country of its sovereignty—rather than as an enabler of economic development. The organization of Russia’s information-warfare capabilities, which include cyber operators, media outlets, and false flag entities, is shrouded in secrecy. In the West, generally only the intelligence community has a clear picture of how Russian capabilities are directed. Barring the sudden appearance of a Russian counterpart to Edward Snowden, the only view into Russia’s information toolbox is provided by cybersecurity companies and criminal prosecutions. The picture is further muddied because the Russian government keeps many of its cyberwarfare actors at arm’s length by employing contractors and former criminals through middlemen, giving Moscow a degree of deniability if caught. Nevertheless, both Western governments and private industry can take steps to mitigate Russian influence operations. Western governments should swiftly and decisively denounce Russian information activities as soon as they are identified, and their counterintelligence agencies should identify quantitative means to measure the effectiveness of Russia’s methods. Social media companies should more aggressively police their platforms for malicious state-sponsored content, and they should work with news organizations to promote verified and fact-checked content on their platforms.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

8. Honing Cyber Attribution

Author:
Justin Key Canfil
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
Concerns about state-directed cyber intrusions have grown increasingly prevalent in recent years. The idea that state principals can obfuscate their involvement in such attacks by delegating operational tasks to non-state agents poses a particularly significant challenge to international enforcement and remedies. Gaps in international law, coupled with obstacles to detection in such cases, may make it more difficult to bring sponsoring states to justice. This paper offers a roadmap for assessing the propensity of states to delegate to non-state actors and correct for false positives in standard (typically more technical) cyber attack attribution methods. I conclude that the conditions under which attacks are likely to have been backed by sponsoring states occupy a much narrower window than conventional wisdom suggests, and that the universe of transgressors can be identified when standard indicators overlap with specific conditions.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North Am