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11. Fair Competition for an Evolving Economy

Author:
Keldon Bester
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Fair competition is essential to economic growth. Without it, corporate concentration takes over. Canada’s permissive merger law has allowed a small number of big corporations to dominate key sectors of the Canadian economy, resulting in limited consumer choice. Although Canada’s competition laws are currently under review, its global peers are taking steps to protect competition in their own economies. This paper recommends that Canada should focus on the role of fair competition in its competition law framework, specifically differentiating beneficial and harmful competition. Canada’s abuse of dominance provision protects against anti-competitive conduct, but it does little to protect new and emerging competitors. This paper suggests that Canada should look to international peers such as the European Union, Germany and the United States for cues to reform its own system.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Legislation, Corporations, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, Germany, North America, and United States of America

12. Merger Policy, Competition and Innovation Leadership: Implications for the UK’s Investment Attractiveness

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Oscar du Roy, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The UK’s competition regulator has adopted hard-sitting views in its assessment of transnational mergers and acquisitions. Since 2019, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has blocked a historic 59% of all mergers that were under investigation, which is double compared to the previous five years. With increased competence to set conduct requirements for large technology companies, aggressive enforcement by the CMA risks undermining Britain’s ambitions to become a leader in global trade, technology, and innovation.[1] Acquisitions in the technology sector have increasingly been scrutinised by competition authorities over the past decade, often based on the hypothesis that transactions involving large multinational companies tend to be anti-competitive. Authorities’ concerns are based on theories about post-acquisition market structures and the impacts of “killer acquisitions”. While their theories lack empirical justification, competition authorities have increasingly quoted them to assess cases through an ideological lens. Indeed, investigations into acquisitions show that competition authorities can come to markedly distinct conclusions when assessing the impacts on competition over time, especially in technology-intensive industries. The premise that acquisitions of small rivals by large tech companies inherently result in decreased competition lacks solid empirical evidence. Competition authorities often fail to adequately consider efficiency criteria and the resultant benefits for consumers. The proposed acquisition of Activision Blizzard, a video game maker, by Microsoft is a case in point. The UK CMA had initially found that the acquisition would reduce competition in gaming markets. EU and US competition regulators, by contrast, have cleared the transaction, highlighting the uncertain nature of merger review results for international transactions. Large multinational technology companies are major sources of innovation and productivity growth. The services they provide are increasingly pervasive across developed market economies, promising large productivity gains. Small, medium, and young companies in high-tech sectors are also important sources of innovation and productivity growth and, therefore, major targets for investment. Ideologically charged competition enforcement would have a negative impact on the UK’s investment attractiveness. The prospect of an innovative and commercially successful company being taken over by another company is an important precondition for investors to make early-stage and continued seed capital investments. Acquisitions also play an important role in driving investments in business growth and internationalisation. By contrast, there is no hard evidence to support the presumption that acquisitions by major tech companies result in decreased competition. A continuation of aggressive merger enforcement by the UK CMA would undermine investments in innovation-driven UK businesses and reduce access to funding for British venture capital-backed start-ups.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Leadership, Investment, Innovation, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

13. Strategic Autonomy and Long-term Innovation Competitiveness: On the Importance of Intellectual Property Rights for the Production of High-Value Medicines in the EU

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s political leaders have in recent months called for “European industrial autonomy”. Notions of dependency, sovereignty and resilience are now also referred to in policy proposals targeted at pharmaceutical companies, with “strategic autonomy” being the ultimate political ambition. The precise meaning of strategic autonomy in biopharmaceutical industries remains yet to be defined, although the current Pharmaceutical Strategy only refers to “open strategic autonomy” in the context of dependencies and supply chains. This is regrettable, as it does not take into account the importance of strategic research and innovation autonomy, allowing the EU to ensure a high degree of autonomy in innovative medicines and therapies. Current policy conceptions fail to account for businesses’ long-term international innovation competitiveness and Europe’s capability to attract investments in pharmaceutical research and cutting-edge production technologies. Present conceptions of strategic autonomy of Europe’s pharmaceutical industry disregard the fact that the EU is substantially lagging the USA and, increasingly, other parts of the word in pharmaceutical innovation. Clinical trials’ pipeline data shows that, in the future, EU Member States will very likely become increasingly dependent on innovative medicines that are temporarily protected by patents and market exclusivity rights held by non-EU rights holders in many therapeutic areas. This gives some urgency to Commission President von der Leyen ensuring that the European industry remains an “innovator” and “world leader” (Mission Letter by Commission President von der Leyen to Commissioner Kyriakides). The European Commission’s current understanding of sovereignty in pharmaceutical industries centres around one core theme: the reduction of dependencies from pharmaceutical suppliers outside the EU. At the same time, in an effort to achieve equitable access to affordable medicines and to foster research into unmet medical needs, it considers changes in the incentive structure for research in medicines for children and rare diseases, and new obligations for companies to achieve a more equitable access to medicines across Member States. While these objectives are generally merited, the Commission has established a narrow perspective about a concept that is aiming for ambitious long-term achievements for Europe’s pharmaceutical industry. The industry’s future innovation competitiveness and the capacity to develop and produce high value-added medicines, which should be at the core of any concept of long-term autonomy, have largely been ignored.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, European Union, Innovation, Medicine, Strategic Autonomy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

14. Taxing Digital Services – Compensating for the Loss of Competitiveness

Author:
Erik van der Marel and Peer Schulze
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Several countries around the world have implemented a tax on digital services, commonly called Digital Services Tax (DST). This policy brief takes a closer look at why some European countries have imposed DSTs but not others. Surely, there are economic explanations behind the fact that Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK have introduced DSTs – but not other countries in Europe. The five tax-imposing countries (here called DST5) have been losing trade competitiveness in digital services over the last 15 years. On the many trade competitiveness indicators we compute, the DST5 score lower values and show lower growth rates compared to other non-DST countries in Europe. Moreover, the differences between the DST5 and non-DST countries are stark, suggesting that digital services markets for the latter group of countries are a lot more dynamic and globalized. The difference between DST5 and other European countries in digital services competitiveness is striking. This is not to say that there should not be special taxes on digital services – that is a different issue – but it is important that the discussion about the DST starts from a better understanding of how such a tax relates to underlying patterns of digital service performance.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Tax Systems, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe