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61. Strategic Foresight and the EU Cyber Threat Landscape in 2025

Author:
Valentin Weber, Victoria Cygne, and Lara Toriser
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
This report explores how the cyber threat environment of the European Union could develop in the next five years. It not only describes two plausible future scenarios for European policy-makers that are characterized by different levels of disruption, but also envisions strategies and mechanisms that the EU could deploy to overcome the various challenges that lie ahead.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Europe

62. NATO’s needed offensive cyber capabilities

Author:
Ion A. Iftimie
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, cyberspace was recognized as an operational domain in which NATO military forces must be able to maneuver as effectively as they do on land, at sea and in the air. Since then, Allies have conducted several successful offensive cyber operations against non-state adversaries, such as Daesh. Due to technological transformations in recent years, cyber is no longer viewed by NATO and its member states only as a hybrid threat, but also as a weapon in its own right and as a force multiplier in current military operations. Over the next two decades, NATO will look for new ways to integrate cyber weapons (or offensive cyber capabilities) into its operations and missions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Non State Actors, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and Global Focus

63. Broadening the Transatlantic Partnership to Address the China Challenge

Author:
Carisa Nietsche
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a turning point in Europe’s calculus regarding China. Beijing’s ham-fisted mask diplomacy, attempt to rewrite the pandemic’s origins and use of the World Health Organisation to advance the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) underscored for Europe the nature of Beijing’s objectives. Europe has grown more attuned to the “strategic challenge” China poses in the economic, technology and global governance realms as a result. The growing convergence between US and European perspectives on China provides a solid foundation for future cooperation between the transatlantic partners. Yet, addressing the China challenge will require broadening beyond the transatlantic partnership and bringing Indo-Pacific partners to the table.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Communications, Partnerships, Cybersecurity, Transatlantic Relations, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

64. Alliance power for cybersecurity

Author:
Kenneth Geers
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
There is only one internet and only one cyberspace connecting individuals, enterprises, and nations all over the world. Ever more frequently, this shared space is coming under attack from malicious actors, both state and non-state, who are seeking to exploit cyberspace’s shared infrastructure for their own ends. Addressing cybersecurity threats is therefore an international problem that requires an international solution. But given the myriad of threats faced in the cyber domain and the ambiguous borders that exist there, how can states best address these challenges and ensure the safety of their own networks and people? In this new report from the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, Cyber Statecraft Initiative senior fellow Kenneth Geers argues that the best way for democratic states to defend their own cyber networks is to leverage the multinational strength of political and military alliances like NATO and the European Union. Alliances like NATO give democracies an advantage over their authoritarian rivals by providing already established mechanisms for multinational cooperation. Alliances are therefore better equipped to tackle the inherently international challenges of cybersecurity. To illustrate the impact of alliances on cybersecurity, Geers uses events in Ukraine as a case study, comparing the Ukrainian government’s efforts to defend against Russian cyberattacks shortly after the 2014 revolution with measures taken in cooperation with partners to defend the 2019 presidential election. Geers illustrates how collective action in 2019 produced improved security outcomes compared to efforts taken by Ukraine alone. Building on these lessons, Geers argues that the only structures likely to produce tangible results in cybersecurity are those within political and military alliances. Indeed, the only credible cyber superpower is a robust alliance. The report then offers a series of recommendations on how NATO and the EU can promote trust and collaboration among Allies and partners to build a more effective cyber alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Europe and Northern Europe

65. Hitting Home: Cyber-Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine and Its Impact on the United States

Author:
Yuriy Danyk, Chad Michael Briggs, and Tamara Maliarchuk
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The conflict in Ukraine has received renewed attention in Washington D.C., and it is worth considering the relevance of this conflict to US national security interests. The open conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014 has been part of a larger hybrid war, including political and information warfare, cyber warfare, assassinations, promotion of corruption, and traditional (kinetic) warfare carried out by destructive geopolitical actors (DGAs) [1]. The conventional conflict cannot be taken out of context, and it is the less visible and “dark” aspects of hybrid warfare that should particularly worry the United States. Hybrid warfare consists of a wide spectrum of attacks, from conventional to covert, carried out to destabilize one’s opponent. Rather than being isolated incidents, cyber attacks often represent part of a wide spectrum of coordinated, offensive strategies against countries like Ukraine and the United States.
Topic:
National Security, War, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

66. Cyber Conflict Uncoded: The EU and conflict prevention in cyberspace

Author:
Patryk Pawlak, Eneken Tikk, and Mika Kerttunen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
When the Supreme Leader of Iran promised revenge in response to the killing of General Suleimani in January 2020, the possibility of offensive cyber operations against US targets was suggested. Eventually, Iran resorted to a more conventional response, launching missiles against US military bases in Iraq. However, this episode points to a shift in our understanding of what conflict means. In January 2019, the French Minister of Armed Forces, Florence Parly, stated that “cyber warfare has begun and France must be ready to fight it” as she announced the new French Military Cyber Strategy. In a similar vein, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, announced in September 2019 that Britain is “at war every day” due to constant cyber-attacks from Russia and elsewhere and warned that with the evolving character of warfare, the distinction between peace and war no longer exists in the modern world. The proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), both the expansion of usage and the increased availability of harmful means, has brought about new ways of power projection. Political and economic contestation between states now involves targeted cyber-attacks against other countries’ utilities, financial networks, election infrastructure and governance systems. Cyber-attacks – a deliberate use of malicious software for exploiting or altering computer code, data or logic to cause harm – offer new methods to target internet infrastructure, telecommunications networks, information systems, as well as computers and computer systems. Such activities might have the objective of destroying or affecting the proper functioning of these systems with adverse effects for their users – whether states, companies, public service providers or individuals. As a result, power projection does not have to involve tanks or missiles; nor does it have to result in direct death and destruction comparable to armed conflict. Confrontation is, however, a constant in states’ ambitions, attitudes and capabilities, blurring the line between war and peace. This Conflict Series Brief examines the current practices and future possibilities of preventive action in relation to conflict in cyberspace. When categorising state uses of ICTs as a form of conflict, attention should be paid to three considerations. First, hostile uses of ICTs rarely occur outside of a pre-existing or broader politico-military dispute. Second, a malicious state use of ICTs can lead to an escalation in pre-existing adversarial relations. Third, the use of cyber capabilities in a conflict situation often includes the targeting of civilian infrastructure and therefore has wide-ranging implications for the proper functioning of societies. Against this background, this Brief argues that the use of malicious cyber tools for power projection can and must be prevented.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Transnational Actors, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

67. The role of regional organizations in building cyber resilience: ASEAN and the EU

Author:
Eugenio Benincasa
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper explores the role of regional organizations in crafting solutions that are able to address both the scale and cross-border nature of cyber threats, as well as the challenges inherent to an anarchical international system. It focuses on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU) and the cybersecurity frameworks they have developed in the last few years. The EU has significantly improved regional cyber resilience and cooperation by setting out ambitious goals, enhancing information sharing and harmonizing practices across its member states. In contrast, ASEAN has a lack of a strong unifying governance or legal framework, which limits the collective capability of the region to capitalize on shared knowledge to prevent and mitigate cyber threats. The paper aims to elaborate on relevant measures that could be implemented in ASEAN based on a comparative analysis with the EU. Despite the stark differences between the two organizations, there is common ground in some areas for the development of policy recommendations aimed at enhancing ASEAN’s cyber resilience, eliminating the need to reinvent the wheel in key policy areas. To this end, this paper analyzes the two organizations’ cybersecurity frameworks in line with the four pillars of cyber capacity building identified by the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and adjusted to a regional context: overarching regional strategy, institutional framework for cyber threat prevention and response, harmonization of cybercrime and data privacy legislation, and cyber awareness and hygiene.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, ASEAN, and Regional Organizations
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

68. Moldova Cybersecurity Governance Assessment

Author:
Natalia Spinu
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
This report is a two-factor analysis of cybersecurity, including the legislative framework and key national actors in cybersecurity. The report presents the main cybersecurity threats in Moldova and the needs arising from national security objectives. After analysing the national cybersecurity strategy for Moldova, an identification and need for the main actors within the state who would be responsible for the implementation of the national strategy on cybersecurity was undertaken. A national action plan for cybersecurity was designed. It was understood that for a responsible and developed society there is a necessity to collaborate with the private sector and academia, and thus a robust cooperation and communication mechanism was described to include all the relevant stakeholders. The report reflects the conclusions and final remarks that have made the operational cybersecurity architecture in Moldova an elaborate framework.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Governance, Cybersecurity, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Europe and Moldova

69. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume I, Euro-Atlantic perspectives

Author:
Dr Vincent Boulanin, S. M. Amadae, Jean-Marc Rickli, Shahar Avin, Frank Sauer, John Borrie, Dimitri Scheftelowitsch, Justin Bronk, Page O. Stoutland, Magnus Hagström, Petr Topychkanov, Michael Horowitz, Anja Kaspersen, and Chris King
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This edited volume focuses on the impact on artificial intelligence (AI) on nuclear strategy. It is the first instalment of a trilogy that explores regional perspectives and trends related to the impact that recent advances in AI could have nuclear weapons and doctrines, strategic stability and nuclear risk. It assembles the views of 14 experts from the Euro-Atlantic community on why and how machine learning and autonomy might become the focus of an armed race among nuclear-armed states; and how the adoption of these technologies might impact their calculation of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional level and trans-regional level.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Risk, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

70. Denmark's China Challenge

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
A common refrain in Denmark is that China is too far away to be a threat to Danish economic, foreign and security policy interests. This is no longer the case. Danish policy-makers acknowledge that China’s rise as a global superpower presents Denmark with new challenges. However, transforming this strategic thinking into practice is no simple task. Recommendations Intensify cooperation between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to ensure Denmark’s initiatives in foreign policy, security and economic relations with China are more closely integrated. Beware of the bilateral. Beijing’s new assertive foreign policy and US-China strategic competition require that Denmark leverage its interests increasingly through the EU, NATO and other multilateral bodies. Assess the economic vulnerabilities of Danish industries in China and diversify trade and investment across Asia’s emerging markets and developed economies in the G7/EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark