Search

Begin New Search Topic Cybersecurity Political Geography Europe

41. Protection of critical infrastructure in Norway – factors, actors and systems

Author:
Jakub M. Godzimirski
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The main aim of this article is to examine how the issue of protecting critical infrastructure is addressed in Norway. To answer this question, the article addresses two important sub-questions – what is to be understood in the current historical and the specific Norwegian context as important elements of national critical infrastructure and what is the current understanding of risks and threats that this infrastructure should be protected against? This article is based on a detailed quantitative and qualitative examination of the official Norwegian documents and statements on questions related to various aspects of protecting critical infrastructure in Norway. In section one, structural factors that have played a major part in shaping Norwegian thinking about critical infrastructure are discussed. Section two provides a short summary of the current discussion on elements of critical infrastructure in Norway. In section three, the article discusses official Norwegian perceptions of threats and how they address questions related to critical infrastructure. The fourth section looks at the current official approach to protection of critical infrastructure in the country. The process of building the existing system for protecting critical infrastructure in Norway has been driven by both domestic and international concerns. The system should make it possible for citizens to meet their needs through access to various important societal functions, but it also needs to make it possible to address challenges that stem from the international environment.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, International Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Norway

42. The importance of cybersecurity for Bosnia and Herzegovina Policy recommendations to support BiH’s cyber capabilities and international aspirations

Author:
Nicolo Miotto
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
Cybersecurity is a fundamental domain for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as it impacts the country‘s national security, its economic growth and its international commitments and goals. Despite the importance of cyberspace for the country, BiH lacks a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity, having instead a jeopardised approach which hinders its cybersecurity efforts. The country‘s cybersecurity capabilities are underdeveloped, exposing governmental bodies, private companies and citizens to potential cyber threats and risks. Limited cybersecurity capabilities can undermine BiH‘s efforts to access the EU and NATO as these international organisations require states to respect and adopt specific cybersecurity standards and legislation. Hence, BiH needs to improve its cybersecurity architecture to achieve its international goals. In addition, the country must enhance its cybersecurity to accomplish international obligations deriving from the country‘s membership of international organisations and its ratification of the Budapest Convention. Although the country presents embryonic cybersecurity capabilities, BiH public institutions are improving their cybersecurity awareness by providing public employees with workshops, seminars, and training courses on cybersecurity. As of this, international and domestic cooperation represents a pivotal opportunity for BiH to build and enhance its cyber capabilities; intergovernmental organisations, research centres and partner counties are providing BiH public institutions with funds and training opportunities in the field of cybersecurity.
Topic:
NATO, Crime, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

43. Cyber Defence in NATO Countries: Comparing Models

Author:
Alessandro Marrone and Ester Sabatino
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In 2016 NATO recognised cyber as a domain comparable to the air, land and sea ones, in consideration of the growing number of cyberattacks and of their negative impact on the cyberspace, as well as on the “real world”. Both NATO and its member states have launched initiatives to better tackle the cyber challenge both operationally and in terms of capability development. Nevertheless, among major NATO’s members a common approach to cyber defence is still missing, thus generating a division among countries that pursue a more active defence – US, UK and France – and those that prefer a more defensive approach – Germany and Spain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Spain, and United States of America

44. Small States, Different Approaches: Estonia and Norway on the UN Security Council

Author:
Kristin M. Haugevik, Piret Kuusik, Kristi Raik, and Niels Nagelhus Schia
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2021, Estonia and Norway served as elected members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both being relatively small states, defending multilateral cooperation and rules-based international order were important common goals. In the last decade, great power tensions have returned to the Security Council, and multilateralism has again come under pressure. The opportunities of elected members to substantially influence the UNSC agenda are arguably limited by power struggles, complex subject matter and inefficient working methods. In spite of these limitations, both Estonia and Norway achieved some important outcomes as members of the Security Council. Their experiences confirm above all the value of diplomatic experience and reputation-building for elected members. To some extent, the two states have also been able to assume ownership of matters on the UNSC agenda. As in any diplomatic setting, knowing how to “play the game” is key to the ability of small states to punch above their weight. Specific methods through which elected members work to influence the UNSC agenda include coalition-building, actively using the presidency function, organising special events, and assuming the penholder role in a specific country or thematic issue. Common priority areas of Estonia and Norway in the UNSC include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, protection of human rights and especially women’s rights, and addressing new security challenges in the fields of cyber and climate. The most significant experience of cooperation during 2021 was the Estonian-Norwegian joint penholdership of the Afghanistan file which brought the two countries to the centre stage of global diplomacy and reinforced their international profile as small states that make an active and professional contribution to multilateral cooperation. Looking at Estonia’s and Norway’s performance in 2021, some interesting differences can be identified. First, the two states assess the relative importance of the UN differently. In Norway’s foreign policy, there is a strong tradition of prioritising the UN and seeing an active role in multilateral cooperation as an important contribution to national interests and security. By contrast, for Estonia, the UN has not been a foreign policy priority in the past, and its contribution to national security continues to be seen as secondary to membership in Western organisations, notably NATO and the EU. Furthermore, Norway has generally worked a bit more behind the scenes, relying on its long experience and reputation as a constructive contributor to peace diplomacy. It has been active on issues such as the UNSC’s normative protection agenda and climate security, but also the Afghanistan, Syria and North Korea files. Meanwhile, Estonia has taken a rather bold approach as a newcomer visibly promoting its priorities, most notably the cybersecurity agenda. It has also focused on controversial issues of regional security, including the situations in Ukraine and Belarus, trying to use the UN to the advantage of national security through promoting its positions and strengthening coalitions with like-minded countries. Coordination between like-minded states is an integral part of the work of the Council. With Estonia and Norway both present, 2021 saw two Nordic-Baltic states concurrently represented in the Council for the first time. In the future, there may be scope for further strengthening Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the framework of the UN structures.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Cybersecurity, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Europe, Norway, Estonia, and Baltic States

45. Great Expectations: Defining A Trans-Mediterranean Cybersecurity Agenda

Author:
Patryk Pawlak
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
European Union (EU) cooperation on cybersecurity with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is conditioned by two competing claims. Due to the geographical proximity and broad security implications for the EU, the MENA region is one of the priorities of the EU’s external relations. Over the past two decades, and especially after the Arab Spring, the EU has invested significant resources to support the reforms in the region and align its policies with its own. At the same time, however, this ambition to cooperate closely with the region is often made more complicated by the situation on the ground. This is particularly the case of cyber resilience cooperation, where even despite overlapping interests – like the fight against cybercrime or improving the overall level of cybersecurity – the EU needs to exercise enhanced due diligence in order to avoid undermining the already fragile human rights protection in some of those countries. Reconciling these two elements – the willingness to engage in closer cooperation and the need for a cautious approach to cybersecurity cooperation – remains the key challenge. Against this background, the study aims to address two questions. First, to what extent are different initiatives and policies implemented across the region compatible with the EU’s own interests and values? Second, who are the key multipliers on cybersecurity in the region that could potentially align with the EU in certain aspects and help it achieve its policy objectives? Which of these relationships are mature enough or require further work in order to turn into concrete cooperation initiatives? These two sets of questions guide the discussion in each of the chapters.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

46. Brexit and Beyond: policy

Author:
UK in a Changing Europe
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Brexit is done. The formal negotiations are over — even though the Trade and Cooperation Agreement paves the way to many further negotiations between the UK and the EU. Our understanding of what Brexit does mean in practice is just beginning. This mini report is for those who want to dig deep on Brexit and policy looking at a wide range of policy areas including immigration, social care, cyber security and manufacturing.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Immigration, Cybersecurity, Brexit, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

47. The post-Brexit EU-UK relationship: an opportunity or challenge for cyber security?

Author:
Ellie Templeton and Robert Dewar
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With multiple post-Brexit pathways that could still be pursued following the recent adoption of the new security agreements, the EU-UK cyber security relationship is still evolving. Value must be placed on collaboration to tackle shared cyber threats, the role EU institutions play in bringing cyber security actors together, and Britain’s former contribution to European security. These factors strongly indicate that, although new opportunities may present themselves, there will likely be irreversible losses for collective cyber resilience due to Brexit. In order to work towards a new, valuable relationship model, it is recommended that both the EU and UK uphold professional, transparent and non- political security cooperation going forward, whilst remaining open to flexible operational support in the unpredictable and ever-changing cyber threat landscape. Ultimately, within an international system affected by “instability, insecurity and uncertainty”,61 it remains to be seen what opportunities and challenges arise, and if the resulting relationship, whether based on one specific pathway or a combination of all three, could constitute an effective EU relationship model for non-EU entities in the cyber security field.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

48. US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace: Are Rules of the Road Necessary or Possible?

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber “rules of the road” agreement. American political scientist Joseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, wrote in 2019 that, even “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable” in cyberspace, “it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewise argued that “even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward.” On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himself has called for “a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space,” comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations recommended several elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree “on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack” (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both “automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks” and “attacks on elements of another nation’s core internet infrastructure.” Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and experts called for “cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

49. Trusted connectivity: A framework for a free, open, and connected world

Author:
Kaush Arha
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Global affairs are increasingly shaped by three important and overlapping trends: 1) the unprecedented and growing demand for trillions of dollars’ worth of global digital and physical infrastructure; 2) the ideological battle between democracy and autocracy for the best path forward to achieve peace and prosperity; and 3) the world’s response to changing climate. As democracies address the global demand for a free, open, and connected world while ensuring that local and global emissions targets are met, they need an organizing framework: the concept of “trusted connectivity.” Democratic governments and institutions function with intricate checks and balances to ensure public trust. Unchallenged aggregation of power is antithetical to democracies and instinctively distrusted by their citizens. While holding unimaginable promise, today’s advancements in digital and physical infrastructure also embody new opportunities for malign actors in general, and authoritarian governments in particular, to accumulate and wield this power. Malign influence or control over data, communications, trade routes, energy, and transportation, all of which becomes possible when countries accept infrastructure investments from authoritarian states, could open potential vectors for coercion, disruption, or attack in times of crisis or conflict. In order to deny malign actors this influence over other countries’ infrastructure, democracies need to work together to ensure that the benefits and terms for the host country in building a bridge, port, rail, road, or telecommunications network are equitable and transparent, thereby leading to greater trust and security in addition to economic prosperity. US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., rallied the world’s leading democracies behind this cause at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in June 2021 in Cornwall, England. The G7 nations, comprising the world’s leading free economies and free societies, proclaimed that, as they aim to meet global infrastructure demand, among other goals, their efforts will be guided by shared democratic values. For China, the standard-bearer of an alternate, illiberal model, infrastructure investment serves a different purpose: to increase China’s global economic leverage for its political gain. To prevail in this competition, advance their values, and develop much-needed digital and physical infrastructure, the world’s leading democracies should adopt the principle of trusted connectivity.
Topic:
National Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

50. Strengthening the EU’s Role in Cybersecurity

Author:
Aleksandra Kozioł
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The ongoing pandemic has increased the use of digital technologies and intensified the threats they pose. Therefore, the EU faces the need to strengthen its ability to detect and respond to hostile cyber activities. New initiatives should, above all, improve the cooperation of EU institutions with Member States and private entities. However, their effectiveness will be limited by low and dispersed financing.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Europe