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21. Public perception on Trust, Corruption and Integrity of Public Institutions in Kosovo

Author:
Plator Avdiu
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Security institutions in Kosovo are constantly maintaining, and in some cases, increasing their trust among the citizens, thus resulting as the most trustworthy institutions compared to other sectors. Kosovo Security Force is the most trusted institution with 83 percent of trust, followed by Emergency Management Agency with 73 percent, and Kosovo Police, which is trusted by 72 percent of respondents. Two other security institutions have marked significant increase in 2022: around 60 percent of respondents trust the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo and 51 percent trust the Kosovo Intelligence Agency. This is the first time that both institutions gained the confidence of more than 50 percent. The President of Kosovo, with 59 percent, and Municipalities, with 55 percent of trust, are ranked as the most trusted among the central and local institutions followed by Kosovo Customs with 46 percent.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Institutions, and Trust
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

22. Citizens perceptions of integrity of public institutions in Kosovo

Author:
Shpat Balaj
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The Kosovo Security Forces, the Kosovo Police, the President of Kosovo and the Municipalities are the most trusted public institutions in Kosovo, with over 50 percent of respondents declaring that they trust or completely trust these institutions. This is followed by the Kosovo Customs and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency with 45 percent of respondents sharing such an opinion. On the other hand, less than 40 percent of the respondents declared that they trust or completely trust Courts, Prosecution, Kosovo Correctional Services, the Government of Kosovo and the Kosovo Assembly. The results of the report show that citizens of Kosovo find the security institutions more reliable with a higher level of trust towards them, compared to other public institutions in Kosovo, such as the justice institutions which citizens perceive less trustworthy and with weak integrity. The citizen confidence in the institutions of the Courts and the Prosecution in Kosovo has been consistently in decline, and this is concerning. Citizens have higher confidence in the public institutions from the central level, especially when compared to the previous year (2020), however, the skepticism towards these institutions generally prevails.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Public Opinion, Institutions, and Trust
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

23. Forging European Unity on China: The Case of Hungarian Dissent

Author:
Ties Dams
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
EU Member states can be divided on China, even on issues such as human rights. Often singled out as an agent of division is the Hungarian government of prime minister Viktor Orbán. Hungarian dissent begs the question: how can the EU move forward on China given Hungary’s strategy of obstructive dissent? European cooperation ought not wait for unanimity, nor should it rely on value-politics: member states should play the power game to circumvent or break lingering impasses. Member States should support setting up a 27+1 Forum as the main platform for European China-policy, form a leading group tackling strategic corruption and corrosive capital, and initiative a track 1.5 dialogue on China with Germany and the Visegrád Countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Human Rights, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Hungary

24. Amidst Disinformation and Geopolitical Rivalry, Bulgaria Returns to the Polls July 11th

Author:
Kjell Engelbrekt
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
In the opinion surveys leading up to the elections, the same three biggest parties as in April enjoy support somewhere between 16 and 23 percent each, with another three-four trailing far behind and one hovering just at the 4 percent threshold. Few observers believe that the outcome will differ much from that produced on April 4th, which distributed 240 parliamentary seats among six parties. Ostensibly, the main problem in current Bulgarian politics arises from the unnecessarily sharp disagreements and mutual recriminations among the leaderships of the three main parties competing for power, aggravated during electoral campaigns. When the results were in, each of the three parties decided to reject cooperation with the other two and thereby precluded the establishment of a government tolerated by the parliamentary majority. The two top contenders are Boyko Borisov’s center-right GERB party, which has ruled the country almost uninterruptedly since it garnered 40 per cent of the popular vote in mid-2009, and There Is Such a People (Ima takav narod or ITN), run by TV personality Slavi Trifonov. The electoral campaigns ahead of either poll have largely revolved around Trifonov’s sweeping accusations of corruption directed at Borisov and his party, with the ongoing pandemic and the country’s weak economic performance featuring as issues more in the periphery. The corruption charges were also directed at the third frontrunner, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) with roots in the old communist elite. After Trifonov’s ITN party had reiterated that it would under no circumstances work with the BSP, two of the smaller parties with anti-corruption platforms similarly refused even initial consultations. From that point on the BSP was out of options as well. At a deeper level Bulgaria’s troubles stem from being a relatively small country with the lowest GDP per capita in the European Union (EU), frequently exposed to cross-pressures from Brussels, Moscow, Ankara, Washington DC and Berlin. This especially applies to the energy sector, where the country’s geographic location in the corner of southeastern Europe makes it a significant player. While the EU and NATO have repeatedly urged Sofia to align with collective approaches designed to reduce the continent’s reliance on individual providers, Russian energy corporations have skillfully utilized regional relationships and ties to Bulgaria’s political class to assertively negotiate terms that above all are favorable to Moscow. Germany, a sponsor of the Nord Stream I-II pipelines, has not been in a position to object.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Leadership, Disinformation, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe and Bulgaria

25. Russia’s Nationalities Policy before and after the 2020 Constitutional Amendments: Is the “Ethnic Turn” Continuing?

Author:
Veera Laine
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
In January 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a set of constitutional amendments, aiming to secure the continuity of his power in the years to come. At the same time, the amendments allowed ideological visions on national identity to be inscribed in the Constitution. Since summer 2020, the Constitution has enhanced the symbolic status of the Russian language, which is now not only the state language but also the language of those who speak it (i.e. of “ethnic” Russians or “Russian-speakers”), implicitly referred to as the state-founding people. These provisions, together with support for compatriots abroad, not only continue the turn observable since the 2010s in Russia’s nation-building from a civic vision towards an ethnic vision of nation, but also challenge the existing interpretations of state borders. The provisions on safeguarding the “historical truth” and establishing a single framework for education hinder the republics from pursuing their identity policies. This Working Paper argues that the amendments both adjust the earlier changes and signal new ones in the official discourse and nationalities policy.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Constitution, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

26. Russian Duma Election 2021: Kremlin Supremacy Achieved Through Unprecedented Pressure and Fraud

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Maintaining the ruling party’s overwhelming majority was an obsession for the Kremlin, regardless of the growing dissatisfaction. The election result, achieved through blatant fraud, further undermines the Kremlin’s connection with citizens.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

27. Dark money politics: Why Europe should join Biden’s fight against corruption

Author:
Chris Raggett
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Many Europeans and Americans believe that their political systems are corrupt. This disillusionment, combined with kleptocrats’ increasing use of “strategic corruption” in Europe and elsewhere, destabilises Western politics and damages the transatlantic relationship. US President Joe Biden has responded to these challenges by declaring that the fight against corruption is a core national security priority and part of his “foreign policy for the middle class”. European policymakers should draw on his approach to anticorruption to help rebuild the Western alliance and address the abuse of entrusted power in their own societies. They should set up high-profile, DfID-style national institutions that are charged with tackling corruption and capable of working within an international network.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, National Security, Public Opinion, European Union, Joe Biden, and Dark Money
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

28. People before politicians: How Europeans can help rebuild Lebanon

Author:
Carmen Geha
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Lebanon is in a deep crisis created by a corrupt and incompetent governing elite. The country is home to key strategic interests for the EU, which does not want another failed state on the Mediterranean. France has made an effort to resolve the crisis by negotiating with the political elite – but Lebanon’s leaders will never engage in genuine reform. The Lebanese people are already self-organising to fill the gaps in public service provision left by the government. The EU and other international bodies are right to withhold funding for high-level state institutions until real reform takes place. In the meantime, Europeans should support local institutions such as schools and hospitals to help ordinary people and create space for a new politics to emerge, including at next year’s parliamentary election.
Topic:
Corruption, European Union, Leadership, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Lebanon

29. The Era of Dis-and-Misinformation Volume XXII, Number 1

Author:
Nicole Kalczynski, Rebecca Blaser, Nicholas J. Cull, Peter J. Phillips, Gabriela Pohl, Michael Christensen, Leonie Holthaus, Bohdan Harasymiw, Feeza Vasudeva, Nicholas Barkdull, Arthur D. Soto-Vásquez, Nadra Hashim, and Vincent Chenzi
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
As the world continues to recover from the devastating fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, navigating the harms of misinformation and disinformation remain at the forefront of global conversations on paving the path forward. Preventing the dissemination of false information—particularly during a time where the ways in which we engage with information environments have fundamentally changed—is increasingly complex. Social media platforms have enabled users to not only engage with media but become distributors of it themselves. When coupled with bad actors, limited repercussions, and poor content regulation, social networks are easily weaponized. At all scales of governance misinformation and disinformation campaigns pose a multidimensional threat. In Myanmar and China, disinformation campaigns were leveraged to target minority groups, while in Central and Eastern Europe, they serve as the cornerstone of destabilizing operations between adversarial states. In yet another facet, countries like Turkey, China, Russia, and Iran have embraced digital authoritarianism and restrict policies on internet accessibility under the pretext of stemming the spread of “fake news.” This year’s issue seeks to shed light on the nature of these evolving threats from a variety of innovative and understudied perspectives. This issue explores the causes and effects of the spread of misinformation and disinformation throughout different parts of the world and will be timely for years to come given the ever-increasing role and breadth of new technologies infiltrating people’s everyday lives.
Topic:
Corruption, Human Rights, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Media, Internet, Social Media, Surveillance, COVID-19, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Fake News
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Sudan, Eurasia, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Eastern Europe, Asia, Myanmar, Central Europe, and United States of America

30. West African Elites’ Spending on UK Schools and Universities: A Closer Look

Author:
Matthew Page
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Political, business, and cultural elites from around the world have a strong affinity for the United Kingdom (UK) education system. Nowhere is this truer than in West Africa, where some families in Nigeria and Ghana have a long tradition of sending their children to private boarding schools and universities in the UK. These institutions are especially popular destinations for the offspring of prominent politically exposed persons (PEPs) from the region. Immigration officials, admissions staff, and UK law enforcement are not likely to scrutinize the conditions under which the children of PEPs enroll in British schools, even though the PEPs themselves may have modest legitimate earnings and opaque asset profiles that in other circumstances would raise serious financial concerns. This relative lack of review has allowed some West African PEPs to channel unexplained wealth into the UK education sector. It is not easy to estimate the overall value of this flow, yet it likely exceeds £30 million annually.1 Most of these funds emanate from Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Ghana; compared with these two countries, only a handful of students from elsewhere in West Africa seek an education in British schools. Tackling this small but significant illicit financial flow should be a priority for UK policymakers. In doing so, they would be helping to realize the UK’s global anticorruption objectives, advance its International Education Strategy, and close a troublesome anti–money laundering (AML) loophole. Failing to do so would exacerbate existing corruption challenges both at home and abroad and increase the UK education sector’s reputational liabilities.
Topic:
Corruption, Education, Law Enforcement, Higher Education, and Elites
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and West Africa