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161. The Sino-Russian Geopolitics in Eurasia and China-USA Disputes: Asia Pacific Great Eurasia vs Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lucas Gualberto do Nascimento and Marcos Cordeiro Pires
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
This article aims to analyze the main elements and processes underway in Eurasia, involving three essential actors: the United States, Russia, and China. At first, it is emphasized the importance of Eurasia as a space that has historically influenced the hegemonic disputes between Great Powers. Then, Eurasia is analyzed as a space for development cooperation, presenting the intersections of the Chinese BRI and the Russian EAEU. Last, the US approach to China is addressed, specifically the Indo-Pacific strategy. We conclude that despite the intense pressure to contain the rise of China and Russia in Eurasia, rivaling both powers is not feasible. In the current path, it will boost the cooperation between two giants, China and Russia.
Topic:
Hegemony, Geopolitics, Conflict, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

162. The French Military's Perception of the Turkish Military and Turkey's Expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Aris Marghelis
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In the summer of 2020, the Central and Eastern Mediterranean became the center of unusual tensions between France and Turkey. Given that these tensions were also military, which is uncommon for the two countries, the perception that the French military has of Turkey’s army and its doctrine is particularly relevant to address. From the interviews that were conducted with French officers, it appears that for the French military, 2016 and 2020 are two milestones in the evolution of both Turkish political and military Turkish attitudes. From 2016 onwards, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts uncovered diverging interests between France and Turkey, with military implications for France. In the same year, Turkish military behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean started shifting, but was at first seen as of little consequence. Additionally, the failed coup attempt against President R. T. Erdogan decreased the level and quality of communication and cooperation between both militaries. In 2020, Turkish aggressiveness openly manifested itself in the Eastern Mediterranean, including directly against France with the Courbet incident. This attitude was criticized by the interviewees who specified that such behavior, along with unilateral actions and faits accomplis, would not be tolerated in the future. Yet, it also appears that the French military show respect for the Turkish armed forces. The latter are generally accredited with professionalism, reliability, efficiency, and determination. The interviews revealed no sign of animosity by the French officers towards their Turkish counterparts: sometimes, even the opposite was detected.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Army, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, France, and Mediterranean

163. Starr Forum: The Future of US-Russian Relations: More of the Same or Something Different?

Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Barry Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science, MIT. His current research examines whether the diffusion of power away from the United States can best be understood as the emergence of a multipolar structure of power, and if so, how the United States should navigate this change. His most recent book is Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

164. Achieving Full Resolution to the Karabakh Conflict

Author:
Steven J. Klein
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s decisive de­feat of Armenia in the Second Karabakh War is certainly cause for optimism that any remaining issues be­tween the two countries can be resolved through diplomacy rather than military might. After all, Azerbaijan managed to re­cover all the territories outside the Karabakh enclave captured and occupied by Armenia since the 1990s—as well as parts of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast itself—in addition to forcing Armenia to withdraw all its troops from sovereign Azerbaijani terri­tory. However, past indisput­able successes in other conflicts indicate that Azerbaijan must be careful not to overestimate its capabilities to translate the recent military triumph into full resolution of the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. While it is tempting to declare the conflict over and to talk strictly of post‑conflict construction and development, a handful of coun­tries have painfully learned that such declarations can be prema­ture. For instance, in August 1982 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin predicted that the immi­nent defeat of the Palestine Liber­ation Organization (PLO) in Leb­anon portended 40 years of peace; and in May 2003 U.S. President George W. Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” after ousting Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Both of these declarations came back to haunt the respective countries that had believed they had put behind them the conflict at issue. The crucial element that both of the aforementioned leaders had missed was that they did not control completely the fate of the conflict they chose to treat as being resolved. In Israel’s case, the PLO relocated to Tunis, from where it was able to rebuild its power base and receive support from the Soviet Union, while Hezbollah—which didn’t even exist at the time of the defeat of the PLO in 1982—arose with the sup­port of Iran to become a much more formidable and menacing force in southern Lebanon than the PLO had been. In the case of America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the re­sulting power vacuum allowed nu­merous external forces to enter the picture and disrupt the plans of the United States. Moreover, corruption and disorganization within the gov­ernments established with American help contributed to the deterioration of stability in the region.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

165. Spotlight on Normalization Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations in the Wake of the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Gulshan Pashayeva
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
More than half a year has passed since the end of the Second Karabakh War and the signing of the Mos­cow‑brokered trilateral statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, and the President of the Russian Federation on a complete ceasefire and a ces­sation of all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict. These developments have ended the almost 30‑year‑long illegal Armenian occupation, restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. They have also contributed to the ultimate implementation of nu­merous decisions and resolutions adopted by various international organizations, including four resolutions of the UN Security Council (822, 853, 874, and 884) demanding the immediate, com­plete, and unconditional with­drawal of Armenian armed forces from the occupied Azerbaijani ter­ritories. At the same time, a new political reality has emerged in the region as a result of the war. This has brought about at least seven implications:
Topic:
Conflict, Peace, Normalization, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

166. Winning the Peace Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Reintegration Challenges

Author:
F. Murat Ozkaleli
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The Karabakh conflict was not resolved peacefully. Decades of unfruitful negotiations held under the aus­pices of the Co‑chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the United States) produced no dip­lomatic solution. The 30‑year‑long stalemate ended when Azerbaijan re‑gained its occupied territories with a decisive military victory after 44 days of fighting. After the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity in conformity with four UN Security Council resolutions. Formally, Azerbaijan’s sover­eignty over all Karabakh was re­stored through the signing of a tri­lateral settlement that was reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 10th, 2010, with Russia being the facilitator and third signatory. The settlement, which is more than a conventional truce but less than a full peace agreement, ensured the return of the remaining five occupied Azerbaijani areas immediately. A five‑kilometer‑wide corridor con­necting Armenia to Karabakh was opened through Lachin, with con­trol granted to a newly‑established Russian peacekeeping force, which also took over control of Khan­kendi and some surrounding areas populated by ethnic‑Armenians. Despite some delays, the trilat­eral settlement is being enforced and the Armenian occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territo­ries came to an end in early 2021. Other provisions of the settlement, such as the establishment of the free movement of all Azerbaijani persons, services, and capital to the region, is to follow.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, and Reintegration
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

167. Georgia After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The outcome of the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia significantly trans­formed the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, with im­plications for the wider Black Sea‑Caspian region. The unsettled political geography of the South Caucasus and the ethno‑political separatism fueled by external actors since the early 1990s left bleeding wounds on the bodies of the newly re‑emerged sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These conflicts have determined the trajectory of the geopolitical developments of the region for the last 30 years, including on the for­eign policy orientations of these new states. The conflicts in the South Caucasus were the primary challenge for transforming the strategic assets of this region into greater political and economic success. Three major conflict areas in the South Caucasus were former autonomous regions, created in the early Soviet period: Nagorno‑Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Tskhinvali region, what was called South Ossetia. (Briefly: the latter term was introduced by the Soviets in the 1920s as a name for the newly created autonomous area in Georgia, popu­lated by Ossetians alongside ethnic Georgians. The historic homeland of Ossetians is located to the north of the Greater Caucasus mountains. Following the Soviet tradition of planting ethno‑political time bombs, Ossetia proper—located in the Russian Federation—was named North Ossetia, while the Tskhinvali region of Georgia—with the Ossetian population at the time concentrated in the border areas with Russia—was named South Ossetia.) As of today, all three of these areas are self‑proclaimed indepen­dent states, are formally ruled by de facto governments, and saw fierce military confrontation in the early 1990s. In 2008, the Tskhinvali region became the battleground between Russian and Georgian forces. In 2020, Azerbaijan regained through a combination of military action and diplomatic brinksmanship all seven regions outside of Nagorno‑ Karabakh that had been occupied by Armenia, as well as one‑third of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh region. In the case of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, as of mid‑2021, these ter­ritories remain, in reality, governed by Russian occupational forces. The Russian military influence was in­serted into Karabakh after the war that ended on November 10th, 2020, with Russian peacekeepers playing an increasing role in the governance of the region. In terms of geopolitical orienta­tion, Armenia willingly allowed Russian troops onto its territory, seeing them as a security guar­antee and deterrent against Azer­baijan. Georgia aligned itself with the Western powers, determined to join NATO and the EU. The conflicts on Georgian territory are seen as punishment from Russia for Georgia’s pro‑Western focus. As a result, there has been a heavy Russian military presence in the separatist areas of Georgia since the Russian invasion to Georgia in 2008.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

168. Azerbaijan’s Pathways After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Laurence Broers
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
n the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan stands at a critical moment in its history. The war has re­solved many of the issues driving Azerbaijani grievances over the last three decades. Yet it leaves others both unresolved and entangled within a new regional configura­tion that more than ever hinges on the interactions of external great powers and the fractured local politics of the South Caucasus. The regionalization of the Armenian‑Azerbaijani conflict— meaning its transition to a Russian‑Turkish condominium— ultimately links the conflict to the vagaries of what Pavel Baev and Kemal Kirişci call the “serpentine” relations between Moscow and Ankara in the era of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin. The conflict is now one link in a string of conflict theatres where Russia and Turkey are involved, and across which Moscow and Ankara may negotiate trade‑offs that have little to do with the in­terests of local parties. To be sure, Azerbaijan’s closeness to Turkey assuages concerns over Russian in­fluence for now. And the strategic, rather than tactical, outlook on Azerbaijani‑Turkish partnership means that few in Azerbaijan be­lieve that Turkey would ever engage in trade‑offs that cross Azerbaijani red lines. This belief is reflected in the experience of the Turkish‑ Armenian “football diplomacy” normalization initiative that took place in in 2008‑2009. Nevertheless, while the Armenian‑Azerbaijani conflict is now seen by many in Azerbaijan as resolved, it has in fact been re­packaged and embedded in a new, highly complex, and unpredict­able web of linkages.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

169. From Struggle to Permanent Failure Why the Karabakh Attempt at Secession Failed

Author:
Azer Babayev
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
After 44 days of fighting, the Second Karabakh War came to an end on 10 November 2020 as a result of a Russian‑brokered ceasefire agree­ment. The most important questions here appear to be: what led to this dangerous military escalation, and what does it mean for the conflict, given that it seems to have now entered into a (new) political phase, again? In the declining Soviet Union, what was originally a status dispute over the autonomous Nagorno‑Karabakh region escalated into an international violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Following the end of a bloody war in 1994 (the First Karabakh War, 1992‑ 1994), a fragile situation around the conflict region took root: the “frozen conflict,” as it came to be known, lasted for nearly three decades and led to conditions of neither war nor peace. And during this period, it was feared that the longer the sides had to wait for a peace agreement to be reached, the more likely the conflict would re‑escalate and even­tually erupt again into a hot war. As it turned out, this is exactly what happened: an all‑out six‑week war erupted again unexpectedly between the conflict parties in late September 2020, and, as a result, the Armenian side more or less capitulated. But first things first: in the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan suffered a major defeat, ceding to Armenian forces not only the secessionist region itself but also seven surrounding territo­ries. These other lands were, as a whole, twice the size of Nagorno‑ Karabakh itself and contained five times the old oblast’s population, the entirety of which was expelled by the time an armistice was signed in 1994. And that is why during this war the UN Security Council re­sponded by passing four resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Arme­nian forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan. However, the UN res­olutions failed to have any effect. Since that time, no international protagonists felt a strong, compelling need to try to resolve the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. In addition, all in­ternational actors dismissed the idea of “power mediation.” Moreover, although Russia as a key international actor is directly involved in all the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, its involvement in the Nagorno‑Karabakh dispute has been rather indirect: in the Karabakh case, Moscow has been both a critical and a questionable actor. On the one hand, the Kremlin has taken a central position in me­diating a peaceful settlement to the conflict while, on the other hand, it has been delivering weapons to both sides. This last represents perhaps the most striking situation regarding the international dimension of the con­flict. Russia is militarily allied with Armenia and has a military presence in the country. It has provided secu­rity guarantees to Yerevan, primarily through their shared membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which neu­tralized to a certain extent the poten­tial effects of Russian arms being sold to financially strong Azerbaijan on a purely commercial basis.
Topic:
Security, War, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

170. There is No Easy Solution To The Western Balkans' Disinformation Challenge

Author:
Daniel Sunter
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The Western Balkan countries are currently among the most vulnerable to an intentional, Kremlin-supported campaign of disinformation within the European region. The vulnerability of the Western Balkans is exacerbated for several reasons: the countries are not completely integrated into European and EuroAtlantic structures; they harbor the legacy of ethnic and religious tensions from the conflicts of the 1990s; the region continues to experience dysfunctions within its information space; and it is plagued by the unresolved Kosovo issue. Tackling a problem of this magnitude demands a comprehensive approach by governments and media associations supported by the international community
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Disinformation, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Balkans