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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography Europe

51. When Parallel Red Lines Meet: Recent Events in Syria in Various Contexts

Author:
Assaf Orion and Amos Yadlin
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
At the strategic level, the convergence in time and space of the events following the chemical weapons attack in Duma by the Syrian regime portend a dramatic development with substantial potential impact for Israel’s security environment. The attack on the T4 airbase, attributed to Israel, falls within the context of the last red line that Israel drew, whereby it cannot accept Iran’s military entrenchment in Syria. The attack in Duma reflects the Syrian regime’s considerable self-confidence at this time. As for Trump, the attack provides him with another opportunity to demonstrate his insistence on the red lines that he drew and take a determined stance opposite Putin. Thus, Israel’s enforcement of its red line and the United States’ enforcement of its red line have met, while Russia finds itself exerting efforts to deter both countries from taking further action that could undermine its achievements in Syria and its positioning as the dominant world power in the theater. However, the strategic convergence does not stop at Syria’s borders, and is unfolding against the backdrop of the crisis emerging around the Trump administration’s demands to improve the JCPOA, or run the risk of the re-imposition of sanctions and the US exiting the agreement. Indeed, the context is even wider, with preparations for Trump’s meeting with North Korean President Kim on the nuclear issue in the far background. Therefore, the clash between Israel and Iran in Syria on the eve of deliberations on the nuclear deal could potentially lead to a change from separate approaches to distinct issues to a broader and more comprehensive framework with interfaces and linkages between the issues.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North Korea, Syria, and North America

52. Rising Tensions Between Policy Brief the West and Russia: What Role For Arms Control?

Author:
Peter van Ham
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Today, political relations between the West and Russia have entered a new mini-Ice Age, existing arms control arrangements are either dysfunctional or simply not used, and both sides are improving their military readiness. The obvious question that needs to be raised is whether, and if so how, these escalating tensions can be contained, or even reduced? This Policy Brief offers insight into the most pressing concerns, focusing on areas and issues where matters could escalate fastest. It asks what role can still be foreseen for arms control and concludes with a call for transatlantic unity and a stronger role for NATO to counter Russia’s military and geopolitical gambit. It suggests that the classic two-pronged “Harmel approach” (based on deterrence and détente) should be restored. This includes a mix of US-Russian high summitry and the revitalisation of the NATO-Russia Council as part of a broad and far-reaching (military) risk reduction process.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

53. The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The instruments of cooperative security created during and since the Cold War to foster mutual confidence and reduce the risks of war, inadvertent escalation, and arms races, in and around Europe, have come under increasing strain. The European security architecture has been – and is being – weakened by renewed geopolitical competition, technological and military developments, and states violating or bypassing international law, or walking away from previous commitments. Against this backdrop, it is crucial to reassess the meaning and requirements of crisis and strategic stability in Europe. This report looks at some current and future sources of strategic instability, and focuses in particular on how the Russian way of waging modern conflict could, through the importance given to strategic ambiguity and operational opacity, fuel escalatory dynamics in Europe. It argues that strengthening strategic stability in Europe requires a two-pronged approach, combining a sustained effort to reinforce deterrence and defense in Europe with new confidence- and security-building and arms control measures to reduce reciprocal fears, incentives to escalate rapidly during a crisis, and risks of conventional and nuclear war in Europe.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

54. From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe

Author:
Nicolas Florquin and Benjamin King
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Criminals purchase weapons unable to fire live ammunition legally and at low costs across Europe, converting them into lethal firearms with little to no training or expertise. The Small Arms Survey report From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe provides a detailed examination on the topic. Users of converted firearms include petty criminals, organized crime groups, and terrorist actors. Certain conversion techniques require some level of technical skills, but converters also make use of online, open-source tutorials to convert weapons relatively easily. While Europe has faced a range of converted weapons over the past decades, two main types of readily convertible firearms have entered into the illicit arms market in recent years: Slovak-origin acoustic expansion weapons (AEWs)—as used by Amedy Coulibaly in the Montrouge and Hypercacher Paris attacks in 2015; and Turkish-manufactured alarm pistols—currently the most prevalent converted firearm in Europe. Smuggling these weapons to and within Europe involves: ant trafficking: the movement of small-scale shipments of converted and converted-to-be weapons across borders, typically involving fewer than a dozen firearms per shipment, which are transported in private vehicles, boats, or buses; and online trade and the use of parcel and postal services: the procurement of deactivated or imitation firearms or their parts and components online, shipped through parcel and postal services. Strengthened European Union regulations and coordinated law enforcement operations have succeeded in reducing some specific sources of converted firearms but these efforts have been mainly reactive, and existing record-keeping systems and statistics do not always allow for the sufficient monitoring of trends to enable early warning of new threats. The European experience in dealing with the issue of converted weapons is relevant beyond the continent as it is clear that the proliferation of these firearms takes place in other global sub-regions as well.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, Weapons, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

55. A Non-Ideological Reframing of the US-Russian Arms-Control Agenda

Author:
Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
US-Russian nuclear arms control has remained deadlocked since the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010. The absence of progress hasn’t, however, been a major concern in either country. Although the United States could benefit from additional reductions as it considers the wholesale replacement of its strategic delivery vehicles, that interest appears rather marginal. Russia, already in the midst of its own delivery-vehicle replacement program, seems even less interested.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

56. The Return of Geopolitics to Southeast Europe

Author:
Sandro Knezović
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
A few months ago, the newspapers in Southeast Europe reported extensively on an arms race in the region, sparked by Croatian attempts to acquire the US artillery system M270 MLRS and Serbia’s reaction to that event. Of�icials in Belgrade found the aforementioned move assertive and, by way of response, announced the procurement of Russian-made S-300 within the wider programme of rearming with Russian military equipment. Those who wanted to dig more deeply into trying to �ind evidence for a developing arms race cited the fact that Serbia, on the occasion of the visit of Russian President Putin, had organised a military parade to commemorate the liberation of Belgrade from Nazi occupation. That was followed by Croatia’s military parade on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the military-police operation ‘Storm’. The display of military strength, they concluded, was another sign of growing military rivalry between the two states which had the capacity to dramatically destabilise the fragile peace in the region. Those with more detailed knowledge of the region remind us that neither Croatia nor Serbia - especially the latter - had the political, economic or human capacity to engage in a military con�lict, especially given the existing international presence and strategic set-up in the region. Numerous experts rightfully pointed to the prevailing low level of cross-border political dialogue and the fact that political elites in the region had frequently used populist rhetoric to fuel the support of their electorate, focusing less on the real substance of the dispute with the neighbour. Lastly, but certainly not of least importance, was the fact that, both countries, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, had taken on international obligations to safeguard a stable military balance, thus preventing any potential escalations and destabilisation in the region. The so-called 1996 Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, derived from Article IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, set the basic framework for negotiations on the limitation of arms. The Amendments to that agreement, signed at the 21st OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel (December 2014), imposed full responsibility on signatory states for regional stability and arms control.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Populism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

57. Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Author:
Gene Gerzhoy
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When does a nuclear-armed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? Although the established security model of nuclear proliferation posits that clients will prefer to depend on a patron's extended nuclear deterrent, this proposition overlooks how military threats and doubts about the patron's intentions encourage clients to seek nuclear weapons of their own. To resolve this indeterminacy in the security model's explanation of nuclear restraint, it is necessary to account for the patron's use of alliance coercion, a strategy consisting of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain compliance with the patron's demands. This strategy succeeds when the client is militarily dependent on the patron and when the patron provides assurances that threats of abandonment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices. Historical evidence from West Germany's nuclear decisionmaking provides a test of this logic. Contrary to the common belief among nonproliferation scholars, German leaders persistently doubted the credibility and durability of U.S. security guarantees and sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Rather than preferring to renounce nuclear armament, Germany was compelled to do so by U.S. threats of military abandonment, contradicting the established logic of the security model and affirming the logic of alliance coercion.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Germany, and West Germany

58. Las armas biológicas. Perspectivas de futuro

Author:
Nieva Machín
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
La valoración de bajo riesgo de sufrir un ataque con armas biológicas realizada por la estrategia nacional de seguridad resulta errónea ya que España como miembro de la OTAN debería recoger en su estrategia nacional de seguridad del año 2013 esta amenaza ya considerada como tal por la OTAN en el año 2002. Para una valoración efectiva del nivel de esta amenaza resulta preciso considerar que esta ha trascendido el ámbito militar. En el presente artículo se presentará la vulnerabilidad de España derivaba de las políticas y protocolos de seguridad de carácter reactivo y no preventivo establecidas en España así como aspectos mutidimensionales que requieren un replanteamiento y mejoras acordes a una valoración de riesgo más precisa.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, Chemical Weapons, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and Global Focus

59. Nuclear Scholars Initiative: A Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
This paper will examine the pressures, incentives, and restraints that form the politics of multilateral nuclear export control arrangements by examining the evolution of nuclear supplier arrangements from the 1950s to the 1990s. Focusing on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), this paper identifies six key pressures that shape the form and behavior of multilateral nuclear export control regimes. A deeper understanding of these pressures and how they resulted in the NSG offers a more nuanced backdrop against which to consider future policies for nuclear export control.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe and Washington

60. European Missile Defense and Russia

Author:
Andrew Monaghan and Keir Giles
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the primary justification. Despite widespread and well founded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile defense capability, stemming from a continued failure to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and Russian fears.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe