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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography Europe

21. A Non-Ideological Reframing of the US-Russian Arms-Control Agenda

Author:
Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
US-Russian nuclear arms control has remained deadlocked since the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010. The absence of progress hasn’t, however, been a major concern in either country. Although the United States could benefit from additional reductions as it considers the wholesale replacement of its strategic delivery vehicles, that interest appears rather marginal. Russia, already in the midst of its own delivery-vehicle replacement program, seems even less interested.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

22. Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Author:
Gene Gerzhoy
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When does a nuclear-armed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? Although the established security model of nuclear proliferation posits that clients will prefer to depend on a patron's extended nuclear deterrent, this proposition overlooks how military threats and doubts about the patron's intentions encourage clients to seek nuclear weapons of their own. To resolve this indeterminacy in the security model's explanation of nuclear restraint, it is necessary to account for the patron's use of alliance coercion, a strategy consisting of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain compliance with the patron's demands. This strategy succeeds when the client is militarily dependent on the patron and when the patron provides assurances that threats of abandonment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices. Historical evidence from West Germany's nuclear decisionmaking provides a test of this logic. Contrary to the common belief among nonproliferation scholars, German leaders persistently doubted the credibility and durability of U.S. security guarantees and sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Rather than preferring to renounce nuclear armament, Germany was compelled to do so by U.S. threats of military abandonment, contradicting the established logic of the security model and affirming the logic of alliance coercion.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Germany, and West Germany

23. Nuclear Scholars Initiative: A Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This paper will examine the pressures, incentives, and restraints that form the politics of multilateral nuclear export control arrangements by examining the evolution of nuclear supplier arrangements from the 1950s to the 1990s. Focusing on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), this paper identifies six key pressures that shape the form and behavior of multilateral nuclear export control regimes. A deeper understanding of these pressures and how they resulted in the NSG offers a more nuanced backdrop against which to consider future policies for nuclear export control.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe and Washington

24. Ten Ideas for Smarter NATO Missile Defense

Author:
Patrick O'Reilly
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO leaders have cited missile defense as an example of applying the principles of the Smart Defense initiative endorsed at the 2012 NATO Summit to enhance collective defense at minimum cost. As ballistic missiles continue to proliferate and become more accessible to both state and nonstate actors, it is important to foster global partnerships to pursue NATO's missile defense mission and protect North American and European interests. NATO should consider opportunities to further apply the principles of Smart Defense now to reduce future costs of deterring and countering missile proliferation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Asia, and North America

25. Prioritising European Defence Cooperation: The next step for the common security and defence policy

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The European council's decisions on the common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) in December 2013 and the process that now follows should be used by EU member states as a means to progressively empower the CSDP within a short-term future.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

26. European Missile Defense and Russia

Author:
Andrew Monaghan and Keir Giles
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the primary justification. Despite widespread and well founded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile defense capability, stemming from a continued failure to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and Russian fears.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

27. Las armas biológicas. Perspectivas de futuro

Author:
Nieva Machín
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
La valoración de bajo riesgo de sufrir un ataque con armas biológicas realizada por la estrategia nacional de seguridad resulta errónea ya que España como miembro de la OTAN debería recoger en su estrategia nacional de seguridad del año 2013 esta amenaza ya considerada como tal por la OTAN en el año 2002. Para una valoración efectiva del nivel de esta amenaza resulta preciso considerar que esta ha trascendido el ámbito militar. En el presente artículo se presentará la vulnerabilidad de España derivaba de las políticas y protocolos de seguridad de carácter reactivo y no preventivo establecidas en España así como aspectos mutidimensionales que requieren un replanteamiento y mejoras acordes a una valoración de riesgo más precisa.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, Chemical Weapons, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and Global Focus

28. Pool it, Share it, Use it: The European Council on Defence

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The December 2013 European Council will address the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Pooling Sharing of military capabilities will be high on the agenda. What should be expected from the Heads of State and Government? Capabilities now, capabilities in the future, and a common idea on what to use them for.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

29. The state of defence in europe: state of emergency?

Author:
Sven Biscop (ed.)
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
When a doctor calls for a thorough examination of the state of a patient's health, he hopes that everything will turn out to be alright, but it really means that he fears there is a serious problem. Likewise, when Herman Van Rompuy called for the European Council of which he is the President to examine “the state of defence in Europe”, he was asking for more than a routine check-up. In this joint Egmont Paper, the Institute for European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the Egmont Institute offer their diagnosis. In the opening essay, Claudia Major and Christian Mölling cannot but conclude that “the state of defence in Europe” is nearing the state of emergency. The “bonsai armies” that they fear we will end up with are nice to look at – on the national day parade for example – but not of much use.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Europe

30. Strategy and Its Role in the Future of European Defence Integration

Author:
Manuel Muniz
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
EU member states have proven incapable of clarity in their strategic planning, with their key strategic documents almost inevitably abstract and ambiguous. This is extremely unfortunate because without a clear catalogue of interests and an understanding of their location around the world it is impossible to determine a country's appropriate force structure, let alone conduct a coherent and effective foreign and defence policy. This lack of rigor in strategic planning is hurting European defence integration, as states are unable to have transparent and constructive debates about the interests they share. It would be wise to incorporate into the strategic planning process a model that allows for the capturing and quantifying of states' interests. Such a process might lead to the realization that EU member states share more strategic interests than is at first apparent.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe