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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography Europe

121. Reinvigorating Multilateral Arms Control

Author:
Herbert Wulf and Michael Brzoska
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Security Information Service
Abstract:
Institutionalised or negotiated arms control at the multilateral level within the United Nations system and the bilateral level between the US and Russia fell into a state of crisis in the mid 1990s. Several factors contributed to this crisis. Firstly, with the slow but continuous disintegration of Russia's military apparatus the US emerged as the dominant power in international security relations. It has increasingly come to believe that it can control smaller states by military means and its interest in arms control has waned accordingly. Secondly, traditional arms control has proven too rigid in light of emerging post-Cold War security concerns. Regional and internal conflicts have resulted in more emphasis on UN peacekeeping operations and controlling or eliminating the weapons most commonly used in these wars (such as landmines, small arms and light weapons). When it became clear that it would not be possible to negotiate the landmines ban within traditional arms control institutions, so-called 'friendly states' began to develop new parallel fora. The Ottawa Process, which consisted of fast-track diplomatic negotiations culminating in the signing of the Landmines Convention, is an example of this new type of arms control initiative. Thirdly, the main aim of arms control is no longer stability, whereby states aim to maintain parity and build trust. Instead, the focus has turned to limiting the costs of armaments acquisition and disarmament
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

122. Special Policy Forum Report: Europe and the Campaign Against Terror

Author:
Josef Joffe
Publication Date:
11-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On November 6, 2001, Josef Joffe addressed the Institute's Special Policy Forum about the many faces of European politics and policy in the context of September 11. Dr. Joffe, a special visiting fellow of The Washington Institute, is publisher-editor of the German weekly Die Zeit, and a contributing editor of Time (International). A frequent commentator on U.S., British, and German radio and television, his essays and reviews have appeared in such publications as Foreign Affairs, the National Interest, New York Review of Books, Times Literary Supplement, Commentary, New York Times Magazine, New Republic, and the Weekly Standard. The following is a rapporteur's summary of his remarks.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, and Arab Countries

123. Confusing Signals Out of Saudi Arabia

Author:
Simon Henderson
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On Friday in Europe, Secretary of State Colin Powell is set to meet Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia. Washington's relationship with the world's largest oil exporter has become strained for reasons more complicated than Crown Prince Abdullah's recent reluctance to meet President Bush at the White House, allegedly because of perceived U.S. bias toward Israel and against the Palestinians. Saudi diplomacy suffers a credibility problem because contradictory statements by top Saudi officials often leave diplomats guessing as to what is the real Saudi position.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arab Countries, and Saudi Arabia

124. START II Nears Ratification, Implementation Still at Risk

Author:
Jon Wolfsthal and Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Seven years after President's George Bush and Boris Yelstin signed it, the Russian Duma is on the verge of ratifying the START II arms reduction treaty. The agreement, ratified by the United States Senate on January 26, 1996, would cut the number of U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 3,000-3,500.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

125. The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material

Author:
Matthew Bunn
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states. If plutonium and HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed. Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. The tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of plutonium and HEU that remain in the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

126. Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive

Author:
Charles V. Peña
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the ability of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a second strike with the other superpower's surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other's defenses.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

127. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

128. A Verification Regime for Warhead Control

Author:
Liu Suping
Publication Date:
01-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
After a brief period of progress, the U.S.-Russian nuclear reduction process has reached a stalemate. This situation causes us to rethink the following issues: What is the motivation for the two nuclear superpowers to conduct nuclear reductions? How can the focus of the nuclear arms reduction process be changed from verification of reduction of delivery vehicles to verification of reduction of warheads and nuclear materials? What is the objective for future nuclear reductions? What kind of verification regime will be required for future nuclear reductions?
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

129. Rep. Tauscher on Winning the Post-Cold War

Author:
Jon B. Wolfsthal
Publication Date:
10-1999
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia's nuclear weapons complex is spread across 10 remote, closed and formerly secret “nuclear cities,” which employ almost 1 million scientists, engineers and technicians. Moscow's economic collapse has left these former “jewels” in the Russian nuclear crown struggling to survive, and workers with access to nuclear materials and expertise routinely go for months without getting paid. The U.S. Department of Energy, as part of the Clinton Administration's cooperative threat reduction efforts, has launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) to reduce the proliferation risks created by the poor economic conditions in these closed cities. By promoting the development of private industry in these cities, NCI seeks to prevent a brain drain of Russian nuclear experts to would-be nuclear-weapon states.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

130. The Nonproliferation Regime under Siege

Author:
George Bunn
Publication Date:
09-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The nuclear nonproliferation regime was challenged in 1998 by nuclear-weapon tests in India and Pakistan, by medium-range missile tests in those countries and in Iran and North Korea, by Iraq's defiance of UN Security Council resolutions requiring it to complete its disclosure of efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and by the combination of “loose nukes” and economic collapse in Russia. Additional threats to the regime's vitality came in 1999 from the erosion of American relations with both China and Russia that resulted from NATO's 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia—with additional harm to relations with China resulting from U.S. accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage and Taiwan's announcement that it was a state separate from China despite its earlier acceptance of a U.S.-Chinese “one China” agreement. Major threats to the regime also came from the continued stalemate on arms-control treaties in the Russian Duma and the U.S. Senate, from a change in U.S. policy to favor building a national defense against missile attack, and from a Russian decision to develop a new generation of small tactical nuclear weapons for defense against conventional attack.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, Government, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, South Asia, Middle East, Israel, East Asia, Asia, and Korea