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1. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:
Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

2. Where Georgia's U-Turn Comes from and Where it is Heading

Author:
Kakha Gogolashvili
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
For 30 years, Georgian governments have pursued European integration, reflecting the will of the majority. They have implemented European standards and reforms, culminating in 2022 with the ‘European Perspective’ and EU candidate status in 2023. Then, unexpectedly, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party began to ignore EU recommendations, prioritizing state sovereignty and independent decision-making. This stance, reminiscent of Putin’s “sovereign democracy,” led to controversial actions like resisting judicial reforms and improving the election code. Instead of aligning with the EU, the government began strengthening its economic ties with Russia, even after the invasion of Ukraine. The most notable action was adopting the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, mirroring Russia’s 2012 law aimed at controlling civil society and the media. This provoked protests, divided society, and alarmed international partners, increasing Georgia’s isolation from the democratic world and its vulnerability to authoritarian powers, especially Russia. Thus, the key questions are: Why has GD chosen this risky path? With most Georgians supporting European integration, how should the EU and the international community respond to GD’s policies steering the country away from Europe?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

3. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship

Author:
Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

4. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?

Author:
Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

5. Two years of war in Ukraine: Will the West need another shock to act decisively?

Author:
Arkady Moshes
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The West is failing to provide Ukraine with sufficient resources to resist Russia’s invasion, and lacks a vision for the future of West-Russia relations. This may push Ukraine to the brink of defeat as early as 2024. Western capitals should realize the risks and stop procrastinating.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

6. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

7. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

8. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Until NATO Membership, Extending the Joint Expeditionary Force Is the Best Option

Author:
Benjamin Tallis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
There are no security “guarantees,” but NATO membership is as close as it gets – and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring ­Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine – and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European ­security in the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

9. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

10. Russia's Influence in MENA After a Year of War in Ukraine

Author:
Matthew Czekaj, Iulia-sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
MEI Managing Editor Matthew Czekaj speaks with scholars Iulia-Sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas on Russia's current standing in the Middle East a year since re-invading Ukraine. How has Russian aggression in Ukraine redrawn Moscow’s relationships in the MENA region? And as the Middle East increasingly becomes a key area of global great power competition, is Russia still a meaningful player there, politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa