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101. Battle Lines in the Chinese Blogosphere: Keyword control as a tactic in managing mass incidents

Author:
Keegan Elmer
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This paper explores the role of keyword control, in other words the blocking and unblocking of search keywords, on Sina's popular microblog platform during media campaigns over politically sensitive issues in China. The author examines media campaigns in Chinese newspapers, television, microblogs and other media forms during two separate large-scale protests in December of 2011 in Guangdong province, one in the village of Wukan and the other in the town of Haimen. This paper uses these case studies to examine which acts of keyword control might be part of a set of coordinated directives in a broader media campaign over a particular politically sensitive issue. Observations based on these case studies suggest that changes in keyword control on microblogs might be the earliest detectable sign of shifts in the government's position in their response to politically sensitive issues.
Topic:
Human Rights, Science and Technology, and Mass Media
Political Geography:
China

102. Retail 2022: How the Economist Intelligence Unit sees the retail landscape changing over the next decade

Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Markets of the future—China, India, Brazil and Russia—will become the dominant retail markets l Africa, the final frontier—as BRIC opportunities diminish retailers will look to Africa as a driver of growth l Virtual marketplace— e-commerce, m-commerce and s-commerce—will transform the global retail landscape l Bricks and mortar will fight back as traditional retailers respond to change by integrating online with physical store offerings l Convenience will be king as shopping habits evolve into a multichannel approach rather than “one-stop shopping” l UK focus: polarised shopping habits could continue even when incomes recover, leading to an even greater squeeze on mid-market retail by 2022.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Science and Technology, and Communications
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, India, and Brazil

103. Global Technology Sourcing in China's Integrated Circuit Design Industry: A Conceptual Framework and Preliminary Findings

Author:
Barry Naughton and Dieter Ernst
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The paper examines the role of global technology sourcing, and its drivers and impacts in China's integrated circuit (IC) design industry. IC design is one of the priority targets of China's innovation policy, as codified especially in the ―Strategic Emerging Industries‖ initiative. At the same time, however, China's IC design industry is deeply integrated into the vertically disintegrated global semiconductor industry, through markets, investment and technology. The paper highlights a fundamental challenge for China's innovation strategy: How can China reconcile its primary objective of strengthening indigenous innovation with the benefits that it could reap from its deep integration into international trade and into global networks of production and innovation?
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China and Israel

104. The China Model and U.S. Energy Policy

Author:
Lee Lane
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Americans are right to be dismayed with U.S. energy policy. For forty years, presidents of both parties have backed a series of fanciful "breakthrough technologies." From synfuels to Solyndra, these schemes have turned out to be costly disappointments and the source of a recurring political drama. After failures become clear, Congress sometimes conducts oversight hearings. But it welcomes each new scheme as a pretext for pork barrel politics. Neither the executive nor the legislature ever learns from past failures.
Topic:
Energy Policy and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Germany

105. Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility in Cyber Attacks

Author:
Jason Healey
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For more than two decades, cyber defenders, intelligence analysts, and policymakers have struggled to determine the source of the most damaging attacks. This "attribution problem" will only become more critical as we move into a new era of cyber conflict with even more attacks ignored, encouraged, supported, or conducted by national governments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Terrorism, International Security, and Reform
Political Geography:
China

106. America's Voluntary Standards System--A "Best Practice" Model for Innovation Policy?

Author:
Dieter Ernst
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
For its proponents, America's voluntary standards system is a "best practice" model for innovation policy. Foreign observers however are concerned about possible drawbacks of a standards system that is largely driven by the private sector. There are doubts, especially in Europe and China, whether the American system can balance public and private interests in times of extraordinary national and global challenges to innovation.
Topic:
Development, Globalization, Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, and Governance
Political Geography:
China, America, and Europe

107. Storm Clouds on the Horizon: A Possible New Cold War With China

Author:
Paul Nash
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
“Red China’s sub fleet can prove a major threat to American ships,” wrote Albert Ravenholt for the Chicago Daily News Service in 1964, referring to Mao’s underwater menace to American naval forces assembling in the South China Sea off the coast of Vietnam. The communist submarines, supplied by the Russians, were stationed on Hainan Island, at the southernmost tip of the Chinese mainland, across the Gulf of Tonkin. At the time, China was estimated to have between 30 and 40 in operation, the fourth largest fleet after the U.S.S.R, the United States and Great Britain. Nearly 48 years on, much has changed and yet much continues on the same trajectory. When Ravenholt, who set about becoming a reporter in Shanghai in the 1940s during the Second Sino-Japanese war, died at the age of 90 in 2010, China remained Red, even though its ideological hue had turned arguably more nationalistic after three decades of rising prosperity. China has modernized its military in tandem with its economic growth. It has committed itself to significant military spending, endeavouring to catch up to the West’s technological prowess by building advanced precision-guided munitions, anti-satellite and cyber-warfare capabilities. Last year, it unveiled the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter jet, which is expected to go into service in 2017-19. It has also set up a land-based anti-ship missile system to limit the ability of other nations to navigate freely in regional waters, including those around the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands, which it estimates may contain the world’s fourth largest reserve of oil and natural gas.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

108. Cyberspace Governance: The Next Step

Author:
Adam Segal
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
After years of dismissing the utility of international negotiations on cyberspace, U.S. officials now say that they will participate in talks to develop rules for the virtual world. But which norms should be pursued first and through which venues? As a start, the United States should issue two “cyber declaratory statements,” one about the thresholds of attacks that constitute an act of war and a second that promotes “digital safe havens”—civilian targets that the United States will consider off-limits when it conducts offensive operations. These substantive statements should emerge from a process of informal multilateralism rather than formal negotiations. Washington should engage allies and close partners such as India first and then reach out to other powers such as China and Russia with the goal that they also issue similar statements. Washington should also reach out to the private corporations that operate the Internet and nongovernmental organizations responsible for its maintenance and security.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, International Cooperation, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, and Washington

109. Foreign Manufacturing Multinationals and the Transformation of the Chinese Economy: New Measurements, New Perspectives

Author:
Theodore H. Moran
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
What is the relationship between foreign manufacturing multinational corporations (MNCs) and the expansion of indigenous technological and managerial technological capabilities among Chinese firms? China has been remarkably successful in designing industrial policies, joint venture requirements, and technology transfer pressures to use FDI to create indigenous national champions in a handful of prominent sectors: high speed rail transport, information technology, auto assembly, and an emerging civil aviation sector. But what is striking in the aggregate data is how relatively thin the layer of horizontal and vertical spillovers from foreign manufacturing multinationals to indigenous Chinese firms has proven to be. Despite the large size of manufacturing FDI inflows, the impact of multinational corporate investment in China has been largely confined to building plants that incorporate capital, technology, and managerial expertise controlled by the foreigner. As the skill-intensity of exports increases, the percentage of the value of the final product that derives from imported components rises sharply. China has remained a low value-added assembler of more sophisticated inputs imported from abroad—a “workbench” economy. Where do the gains from FDI in China end up? While manufacturing MNCs may build plants in China, the largest impact from deployment of worldwide earnings is to bolster production, employment, R, and local purchases in their home markets. For the United States the most recent data show that US-headquartered MNCs have 70 percent of their operations, make 89 percent of their purchases, spend 87 percent of their R dollars, and locate more than half of their workforce within the US economy—this is where most of the earnings from FDI in China are delivered.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Israel

110. Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia