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51. Masks Off: Chinese Coronavirus Assistance in Europe

Author:
Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus crisis spread across Europe in March, several countries found themselves desperately short of masks, respirators, test kits, and even healthcare staff as they struggled to contain outbreaks. With the EU and the United States initially slow to respond, China stepped into the vacuum. This paper looks at prominent Chinese coronavirus-related donations to Europe between March 12 and April 20, 2020, as well as at the Chinese media coverage and narratives that accompanied them. The prominence of donations was assessed using open-source data on donations from the Chinese authorities or from Fortune 500 or similarly large Chinese companies to European national governments, sister cities, and individual clinics and institutions. Assistance came in many forms and included financial support for the procurement of personal protective equipment, the dispatch of Chinese doctors, free access to cloud-based coronavirus diagnostic tools, and donations of testing kits and ventilators. Three points emerge from this analysis. First, Chinese assistance stretched well beyond the high-profile cases of hard-hit Italy and Spain to countries large and small. During the five-weeks period studied, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and large Chinese companies made 70 prominent donations to 27 countries across Europe. The numbers and distribution of prominent donations of coronavirus-related assistance paint a picture of Beijing’s widespread “mask diplomacy” in which countries’ needs alone were not strictly reflected in the help they received. Coronavirus infection rates alone do not fully explain the variance in Chinese assistance, suggesting that alleviating the health crisis may have been only one of many purposes behind the CCP’s decisions. Second, the donations by Chinese authorities and companies coincided with China’s national and economic interests. China’s state apparatus at the state, province, and city levels made donations, but the majority of prominent ones were from the Chinese private sector and foundations connected to it. However, with the CCP exercising an ever-growing level of control over the private sector, the distinction between public and private donations is not clear-cut and Beijing typically trumpeted both as evidence of its generosity. The perception-shaping potential of the donations is likely to have been one of the main drivers behind Chinese coronavirus assistance in Europe. Finally, Chinese donations were accompanied by a sustained communications and diplomatic push aimed at a global audience. The vast majority of the coronavirus assistance to Europe was promoted via all available channels. On state media, embassy websites, and social-media platforms, the authorities used the Chinese donations to Europe to deliver the CCP’s story. The positive messaging was also a way to pivot discourse about the pandemic away from its own failures in the early months of the outbreak. In parallel to the “shared future for mankind” narratives promoted by embassies every time donated medical supplies arrived in Europe, the CCP also showed a harder edge during the pandemic, much to the irritation of many European countries. Furthermore, since the period covered by this paper, Beijing has been doubling down on its newly assertive public diplomacy in Europe and beyond.
Topic:
Pandemic, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

52. Five Authoritarian Pandemic Messaging Frames and How to Respond

Author:
Naďa Kovalčíková and Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus pandemic has spread around the world, authoritarian actors have engaged in robust information-manipulation campaigns. China—where the virus originated and spread due to the government’s initial cover up and mismanagement—became the champion of these efforts. Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, followed its lead, seeking to shift the global conversation from China’s and their own failures to confront the disease head on. They have also tried to place the blame to the United States and Europe, portraying these democracies’ responses as inadequate and highlighting their shortcomings. Their efforts have contributed to a coronavirus infodemic, which the World Health Organization has defined as “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.” This infodemic has fueled the ongoing public-health crisis by further undermining trust in democratic institutions, the independent press, and facts and data. The coronavirus infodemic is likely to continue to evolve, given that the fight against the pandemic is far from over, but its contours have already been drawn, making it possible to assess the information-manipulation efforts undertaken by malign actors during the last months. Understanding how and why they have engaged in information manipulation leads to an initial set of recommendations on how to contain the infodemic as well as how to prevent similar efforts that could stymie responses to future public-health pandemics. We identify five messaging frames used by China, Russia, and Iran in the first six months of the pandemic with implications for public health, democracy and governance, and transatlantic relations and offer recommendations to address them. Every crisis goes through several stages, and it is necessary to detect and monitor evolving tactics and frames used by malign actors in the globalizing information space early on. By doing so, democracies can ensure a more effective mitigation, robust preparedness, rapid response, and as painless a recovery as possible when facing public-health emergencies or potential economic, security, or environmental crises.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

53. The State Response to a Mystery Viral Outbreak in Central China

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In December, a mysterious outbreak of infectious disease emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan (Hubei Province). The epicenter of the outbreak was the Wuhan Huanan Seafood Market (武汉华南海鲜批发市场, Wuhan Haixian Pifa Shichang), which was closed by officials in Wuhan on January 1 pending further investigation of the origin of the disease (see accompanying images). As of January 11, public health officials in Wuhan stated that there were a total of 41 identified cases of infection, among which two persons had been discharged from treatment, seven were seriously ill, and one person had died; 739 other persons were identified as having contact with those infected, and were to be subject to medical observation (Wuhan Health Commission, January 11). Chinese researchers have identified the pathogen as a previously-unknown strain of coronavirus. This a large family of viruses—including the common cold, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)—that are zoonotic in origin (i.e., transferred via human-animal contact) and cause respiratory illnesses with widely varying levels of severity (WHO, undated). The viral outbreak in Wuhan inspired inevitable comparisons to the SARS pandemic that originated in southern China and swept through the country (and spread to other countries) in two waves in 2002-2003 and 2003-2004. It also follows on the heels of other recent infectious zoonotic disease incidents in China, such as a minor outbreak of pneumonic and bubonic plague in Inner Mongolia in November 2019 (AFP, November 28). The Wuhan coronavirus outbreak affords an opportunity to observe and compare the government’s handling of this latest public health crisis alongside those that have occurred in recent years. It also illustrates the continued contradictions faced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in attempting to improve its capacity for governance, while also maintaining a monopoly over the public dissemination of information.
Topic:
Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

54. The CCP Response to the Wuhan Coronavirus: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Ryan Oliver
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (冠状病毒, guanzhuang bingdu) emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan. The precise origin of the coronavirus remains unclear, although experts agree that it is zoonotic and likely originated at a now-closed marketplace that sold seafood and other animal products for consumption. After initial submissions to the World Health Organization (WHO) on December 31 reported that an unknown pneumonia virus had infected 59 people in Wuhan, cases soon began to surface in other Chinese cities (WHO, December 31). The disease—now officially designated “2019-nCoV”—has spread beyond China’s borders and is now present in 16 other countries. As of January 28, the Wuhan coronavirus has resulted in 4,599 confirmed cases of infection and 106 fatalities (Phoenix News, January 28). Faced with another spreading epidemic, the central government has responded with more speed and transparency than during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002-2004. Wuhan and several other cities in Hubei province have imposed quarantines that limit public transportation, and have initiated measures to isolate these cities’ populations. Major cities like Beijing and Shanghai have also imposed restrictions to manage the flow of travelers. Officials also closed many tourist sites and postponed or canceled many Lunar New Year events nationwide, while extending the New Year holiday for three additional days in support of response efforts (Xinhua, January 26). Questions remain as to how effective these control measures can be in limiting the movement of people in and around China—particularly in light of the size of the cities in question, and the mass exodus of holiday travelers typical for this time of year. Besides these quarantine measures, efforts to isolate and slow the spread of 2019-nCoV have also included sending significant financial and medical resources to Wuhan and other affected areas. In addition to the deployment of medical teams from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s National Health Commission has dispatched over 1,000 personnel in six medical teams from across the country to the Wuhan area (World Journal, January 26). The China Development Bank has issued a 2 billion yuan ($288.3 million) emergency loan, while the Ministry of Finance has allocated 1 billion yuan ($144.2 million) towards combating the 2019-nCoV virus (Sina, January 25). Alongside the official response from Beijing, China’s private sector—including companies such as Tencent, JD.com, Lenovo and Xiaomi—has also offered contributions of funds and medical supplies (SCMP, January 25).
Topic:
Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

55. How the Wuhan Epidemic Has Dented Xi Jinping’s Authority and Prestige

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In his telephone conversation with President Trump on February 6, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed confidence that Beijing can beat the coronavirus outbreak, and asserted that “the fact that China’s economy will be better in the long run will not change.” But at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) a few days earlier, Xi expressed fears about the adverse impact that the Wuhan pneumonia epidemic could have on China’s reform and open door policy (RTHK.hk, February 7; HK01.com, February 6; Ming Pao, February 4). Of even greater concern to the CCP leadership, however, is the sustainability of state power and Beijing’s ability to “uphold stability” (维稳, weiwen) in Chinese society. Much of this hinges on the performance of Xi—who is also state president, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the “life-long core” of the party leadership. That Beijing has failed to contain the alarming spread of the virus, however, demonstrates that Xi is facing the gravest crisis since he came to power in late 2012. It is clear that Xi is still in solid control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the regular police, and the police state surveillance apparatus. Both central CCP officials and supportive foreign dignitaries are projecting confidence. While visiting Beijing in late January, Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus praised China’s efforts against the coronavirus disaster, saying that Chinese authorities had displayed “Chinese speed and Chinese efficiency” (People’s Daily, January 29). After an unusual period of public absence in late January and early February, Xi has reappeared to assert his leadership and to declare a “people’s war” against the epidemic (Xinhua, February 11).
Topic:
Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

56. The CCP’s New Leading Small Group for Countering the Coronavirus Epidemic—and the Mysterious Absence of Xi Jinping

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The “2019-nCov” virus epidemic that first appeared in December in the central Chinese city of Wuhan continues to sweep throughout the country: as of February 11, there were over 43,000 official reported cases of persons who had fallen ill from the virus, and over 1,000 reported deaths (Johns-Hopkins CSSE, February 11). Aside from the human toll, the epidemic has resulted in large regions of Hebei Province being placed under quarantine, which is placing a severe strain on the Chinese economy. The crisis is also presenting a severe test of governance for the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—which, after being caught flat-footed in December and early January, is scrambling to stop the spread of the disease and to mount an effective medical response for those already affected. The second half of January saw a dramatic change in the posture of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) central government towards the epidemic. For the first three weeks of January, PRC state media organs downplayed the seriousness of the 2019-nCov outbreak, while emphasizing a steady stream of positive news stories: such as the successful achievement of government goals for poverty reduction, preparations for Lunar New Year celebrations, and the exalted status of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping as “People’s Leader” (人民领袖, renmin lingxiu) (China Media Project, January 30). This changed around January 20-21, when Xinhua outlets shifted to coverage of the epidemic by reporting on Xi’s “important directions” (重要指示, zhongyao zhishi) for responding to the viral outbreak (Xinhua, January 20). This was followed in turn by the announcement of special meetings focused on the crisis: State Council meetings on January 20 chaired by PRC Premier Li Keqiang, and on January 23-24 by Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan (PRC Government, January 20; PRC Government, January 24); and a Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) meeting on January 25 chaired by Xi Jinping (PRC Government, January 25). Then, on January 26 state media unveiled a newly-formed policy-making and coordination body at the top echelon of the CCP: the “Central Leading Small Group for Work to Counter the New Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia Epidemic” (中央应对新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情工作领导小组, Zhongyang Yingdui Xin Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu) (hereafter, “Coronavirus Leading Small Group,” or CLSG). In an unusual move for such a high-profile policy issue, Xi Jinping did not take direct ex officio control of the CLSG—instead delegating the chairmanship to the nominal #2 figure in the party-state hierarchy, State Council Premier Li Keqiang (李克强). Per commentary in state media, the purpose of the new body is to operate “under the leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee, strengthening unified leadership and unified direction for prevention and control of the national epidemic” (Xinhua, January 26).
Topic:
Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

57. Fair-Weather Friends: The Impact of the Coronavirus on the Strategic Partnership Between Russia and China

Author:
Johan Van de Ven
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In June 2019, during a visit to the Kremlin by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation announced that they had “agreed…to upgrade their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” (Xinhua, June 6, 2019). This continued the warming of bilateral relations nurtured by Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who have met at least 30 times during their respective tenures. The strengthening of ties has seen unusually relaxed encounters between the pair, such as when they made blini (traditional Russian pancakes) together in Vladivostok in September 2018 (People’s Daily, September 12, 2018). In more substantive terms, support from Chinese state-linked financial institutions has played a critical role in the construction of a new wave of Russian energy infrastructure, ranging from the Yamal Liquified Natural Gas Project to the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline. However, the ongoing COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak has opened a stress fracture in the bilateral Sino-Russian relationship. After weeks of gradually escalating restrictions, reports emerged in late February that Moscow public transit drivers had been instructed to call police if they witnessed Chinese passengers using the transit system (Wangyi Keji, February 25). The PRC Embassy in Russia warned that such actions “will harm the good atmosphere for developing Chinese-Russian relations” (Novaya Gazeta, February 25). While China was initially restrained it its public criticism of Russian measures taken in the course of the COVID-19 epidemic, the decision of the PRC Embassy in Moscow to highlight the discrimination being faced by Chinese citizens in Moscow is a reminder of just how quickly tensions can arise between the two countries, even in the age of “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

58. The Illicit Wildlife Trade in China and the State Response Following the Coronavirus Outbreak

Author:
Leo Lin
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 coronavirus (新型冠状病毒, xinxing guanzhuang bingdu) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), wildlife trade and consumption have become a top issue in the country. The disease, which has caused 3,215 deaths in China and over 6,500 total deaths worldwide (per official figures, as of March 15), has been identified as a zoonotic virus (i.e., one originating in an animal species) with a possible point of origin in the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan, Hubei Province (China Brief, January 17; WHO, February 28; Johns-Hopkins University, ongoing). China, as well as many other countries, suffered from the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. [1] SARS was also zoonotic in nature: its origin was traced to civet cats (CDC, January 13, 2004), which are considered a delicacy among some mainland Chinese citizens. Seventeen years have passed since the SARS epidemic, and it seems that history repeats itself. Experts in the field of infectious disease have warned that governments should take measures to regulate (or ban outright) the trade and consumption of many wildlife species. The Chinese government has taken several measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19, including a ban on the trade in wild animals—both those that are hunted or captured in wilderness areas, and those that are farmed by people. What lessons have the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Chinese public, learned about the potential consequences of the wildlife trade? This article examines the Chinese government’s policy response towards the wildlife trade in the wake of the COVID-19 epidemic, and what this might portend for the future.
Topic:
Trade, Illegal Trade, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Wildlife
Political Geography:
China and Asia

59. Limited Payoffs: What Have BRI Investments Delivered for China Amid the Coronavirus Outbreak?

Author:
Johan Van de Ven
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The coronavirus outbreak, now declared to be a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO, March 11), offers a prism through which to assess how China interacts with the rest of the world in a time of crisis—one that was at first confined to China’s borders, but has since become a global emergency. Some commentaries on the connection between the COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have portrayed Xi Jinping’s centerpiece foreign policy program as a dangerous vector enabling the pandemic—even though China was engaged in international trade and transportation prior to the commencement of the BRI in 2013 (Foreign Policy, January 24). For its part, state media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has linked BRI relationships to support for China amid the initial stages of the crisis, citing positive examples of support from media outlets in South Africa, Russia, and Pakistan (People’s Daily, February 20). More recently, as the spread of the disease has abated in China and increased elsewhere, Chinese authorities have sought to illustrate their support, via the “warmth” of the Belt and Road, for current hotspots such as Italy and Iran—while also criticizing the U.S. response to the crisis (Zhejiang News, March 12). Such developments in China’s foreign relations amid the coronavirus outbreak offer a window to assess the effectiveness of the BRI in one of its central goals: namely, expanding the soft power available to the PRC. Applying an understanding of soft power as a state’s ability to induce other states to take actions favorable to its own interests, available evidence across domains related to the initial phases of the COVID-19 pandemic—such as the issuance of evacuation orders, and restrictions on public transportation—indicates that BRI investments have had only modest success in building China’s soft power. International support for China was piecemeal and rhetorical, leaving China economically and politically isolated. Demonstrating the lack of soft power available to Chinese authorities, the state tabloid Global Times demanded on February 12 that countries that “have completely cut off traffic communications with China” should “reconsider and revoke these practices” (Global Times, February 12).
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

60. Disposing of “Zombies”: Why the Reform of Non-Performing State-Owned Enterprises Has Gotten Even Harder

Author:
April A. Herlevi
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Normally at this time of year, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government would be holding the large plenary meetings known as the “Two Sessions” (两会, lianghui). China watchers would be monitoring these meetings to assess whether and how the CCP is achieving its 2020 goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society” (小康社会, xiaokang shehui). However, the COVID-19 outbreak (China Brief, multiple dates) has not only halted key meetings (National People’s Congress, February 27), but has also put into question many of China’s economic goals. This includes key goals discussed at the Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) held in December 2019, which focused on “three categories of risk: financial, environmental, and external” and “identified six areas of priority for China’s 2020 economic policy agenda” (China Brief, December 31, 2019). The 2019 CEWC meetings identified at least 10 distinct issues to be pursued in order to move China on the path towards a more balanced economy (Xinhua, December 12, 2019). This article will focus on one aspect of China’s efforts to achieve “high-quality development” (高质量发展, gao zhiliang fazhan): the dismantling of “zombie firms” (僵尸企业, jiangshi qiye). CCP efforts to deal with non-performing and debt-ridden “zombies” has been an ongoing effort since at least 2015. The inclusion of policies to reduce non-performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy follows official guidance set forth in 2016, and several policy actions taken since. First, this article will discuss what “zombie firms” are, and why they are a drag on the economy; second, it will summarize the key policies intended to dismantle zombie firms. It will then examine why zombie firms are so difficult to dismantle, and conclude by noting that the COVID-19 outbreak and the resulting economic losses due to quarantines are likely to further disrupt the ability of provincial governments to deal with non-performing firms and accumulating debt. As a result of these factors, zombie firms are likely to linger for some time to come.
Topic:
Reform, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
China and Asia