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1. NATO’s Futures: the Atlantic Alliance between Power and Purpose

Author:
Sten Rynning
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This NDC Research Paper argues that in spite of these warning signs, NATO can regain its balance between power and purpose and thus secure its future. NATO’s balancing act is ultimately a question of leadership: it is within the reach of Allied leaders to balance the interests and geopolitics of Europe and Asia, as well as the restrained and affirmative policies that represent Canada and Europe’s inclination for concerted diplomacy on the one hand and the United States inclination for strategic engagement on the other. Regrettably, these leaders may be drawn to some of the easy NATO visions that offer stringency of purpose, as in “come home to Europe”, or inversely, “go global”. Yet the reality of the Alliance’s geopolitical history and experience is that NATO is strong when apparently contrasting interests are molded into a balanced vision. Today, NATO can only encourage European investment in global, US-led policy if it secures stability in Europe, while inversely, NATO can only secure US investment in Europe’s security order if the Allies are open to coordination on global affairs. The report first outlines the basic geopolitical trends with which the Alliance is confronted: an Alliance leader questioning its heritage of overseas engagement, China’s rise as a great power, an emerging alignment between China and Russia in opposition to liberal order, and the track record of southern unconventional threats dividing the Allies on matters such as counter-terrorism, immigration control, stabilization and development. The Allies seem to be hesitating on the West-East axis and paralyzed as a collective on southern issues, which leads the report to sketch three NATO futures.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Liberal Order, and Investment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

2. China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International Relations

Author:
Alastair Iain Johnston
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Many scholars and policymakers in the United States accept the narrative that China is a revisionist state challenging the U.S.-dominated international liberal order. The narrative assumes that there is a singular liberal order and that it is obvious what constitutes a challenge to it. The concepts of order and challenge are, however, poorly operationalized. There are at least four plausible operationalizations of order, three of which are explicitly or implicitly embodied in the dominant narrative. These tend to assume, ahistorically, that U.S. interests and the content of the liberal order are almost identical. The fourth operationalization views order as an emergent property of the interaction of multiple state, substate, nonstate, and international actors. As a result, there are at least eight “issue-specific orders” (e.g., military, trade, information, and political development). Some of these China accepts; some it rejects; and some it is willing to live with. Given these multiple orders and varying levels of challenge, the narrative of a U.S.-dominated liberal international order being challenged by a revisionist China makes little conceptual or empirical sense. The findings point to the need to develop more generalizable ways of observing orders and compliance.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Military Affairs, Information Age, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

3. Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order

Author:
John J. Mearsheimer
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe—essential for building that order—faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders—one dominated by China, the other by the United States—poised for waging security competition between them.
Topic:
International Relations, International Relations Theory, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Europe

4. A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided

Author:
Charles L. Glaser
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Well before President Donald Trump began rhetorically attacking U.S. allies and the open international trading system, policy analysts worried about challenges to the liberal international order (LIO). A more fundamental issue, however, has received little attention: the analytic value of framing U.S. security in terms of the LIO. Systematic examination shows that this framing creates far more confusion than insight. Even worse, the LIO framing could lead the United States to adopt overly competitive policies and unnecessarily resist change in the face of China's growing power. The “LIO concept”—the logics that proponents identify as underpinning the LIO—is focused inward, leaving it ill equipped to address interactions between members of the LIO and states that lie outside the LIO. In addition, the LIO concept suffers theoretical flaws that further undermine its explanatory value. The behavior that the LIO concept claims to explain—including cooperation under anarchy, effective Western balancing against the Soviet Union, the Cold War peace, and the lack of balancing against the United States following the Cold War—is better explained by other theories, most importantly, defensive realism. Analysis of U.S. international policy would be improved by dropping the LIO terminology entirely and reframing analysis in terms of grand strategy.
Topic:
International Relations, Grand Strategy, International Relations Theory, Liberal Order, and Trump
Political Geography:
United States and China

5. The changing global order and its implications for the EU

Author:
Katja Creutz, Tuomas Iso-Markku, Teija Tilikainen, and Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The forms of global political transition contradict each other. The Western leadership of the world seems to be in decline, with the US political and military hegemony being challenged by the rise of China and other emerging powers and with global power structures evolving towards multipolarity. At the same time, however, there are increasing signs of a diffusion of state power. It involves a growing group of non-state actors challenging state power in very different forms and different capacities. This report focuses on the axis of state power considered the most important in terms of its global implications: the relationship between the US and China. This relationship is studied with the aim of assessing how the mutual interdependencies are evolving, and what the goals of the two actors look like in respect of their own global role. The im¬plications of this power transition in the key fields of global governance – also covering the simultaneous diffusion of power to non-state actors – forms another relevant topic under review in the global context. Lastly, the report analyses how the EU contends with these forms of power transition and safeguards its own influence in this changing environment. The project also addresses the international role and influence of one of the northernmost EU members, Finland. It investigates how the changes in the global and regional setting should be understood from the Finnish point of view and how Finland should act in order to consolidate its international role in economic as well as political terms.
Topic:
Power Politics, Non State Actors, Hegemony, Leadership, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America