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201. Adrift Without Dialogue

Author:
David G. Brown and Kevin Scott
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In February, President Trump told President Xi Jinping that the US would honor its one-China policy. This eased concern that the new administration would radically change US policy toward Taiwan, but it remains unclear how the Trump administration will deal with specific Taiwan issues. Relations between Beijing and Taipei have continued to be in an unstable but calm state in the early months of 2017. The formal channels of dialogue remain closed and no significant effort has been made to reopen them. In the meantime, practical issues have been dealt with, sometimes constructively but often in ways that exacerbate the lack of trust. This unstable and risky situation will likely continue in the months ahead.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

202. Two Koreas Defy Chinese Sanctions

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Pyongyang tested regional and domestic politics on six separate occasions by conducting missile launches between February and April. The latest tests coincided with the Xi-Trump summit in Mar-a-Lago and Vice President Pence’s visit to South Korea. They also marked the 105th birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung on April 15 amid intense speculation that North Korea might conduct a sixth nuclear test. In addition to supporting five UN Security Council statements on North Korea this year, Beijing on Feb. 18 announced a suspension of DPRK coal imports through December. DPRK military threats also catalyzed US-ROK plans to deploy THAAD, a source of mounting tension that affected all aspects of the China-South Korea relationship. Beijing’s retaliation took the form of restrictions from March on business and tourism. South Korea appealed to the WTO for redress and South Korean lawmakers passed resolutions condemning China’s retaliation. THAAD emerged at the center of domestic political debate in Seoul after Park Geun-hye’s ousting on March 10, following which PRC nuclear envoy Wu Dawei in April engaged major presidential contenders ahead of the May 9 elections. Beijing’s falling out with both Koreas presents a major challenge for coordinating regional policy with new administrations in Washington and Seoul.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

203. Could the G-20 Become Coherent on Climate?

Author:
Gwynne Taraska and Henry Kellison
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The G-20—a forum of 20 of the world’s largest economies—has a record of ambivalence on the topic of climate change. One case in point is the disconnect between the group’s efforts to address climate risks and its efforts to reduce the shortfall in global infrastructure investment. On one hand, the G-20 is aware that investing in projects that are high-carbon or vulnerable to the physical effects of rising temperatures carries risks that could have a destabilizing influence on the global economy. On the other hand, the G-20 is seeking to narrow the infrastructure gap in the absence of a guiding principle that infrastructure investments must be climate-compatible. Members of the G-20 Argentina Australia Brazil Canada China European Union France Germany India Indonesia Italy Japan Korea Mexico Russia Saudi Arabia South Africa Turkey United Kingdom United States In September 2016, world leaders will convene for the G-20 summit in Hangzhou, China. One focus of the climate agenda will be ensuring that the Paris Agreement takes effect in the near term. Negotiated by more than 190 nations and finalized in December 2015, the agreement set many collective goals, including limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels and ensuring that global financial flows are compatible with low-greenhouse gas development.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Japan, China, United Kingdom, Indonesia, Turkey, India, South Korea, France, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Italy, and Mexico

204. Charting a New Course for the U.S.-China Relationship

Author:
Melanie Hart
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The relationship between the United States and China is at a critical juncture. On the Chinese side, Beijing is shifting toward a more proactive foreign policy stance that aims to expand China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world. This proactive approach is opening up new opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation in some areas but creating new tension in others. On the U.S. side, Washington is trying to figure out how to deal with a new, more confident and engaged China at a time when U.S. leaders are also realizing that some of the assumptions that guided U.S. policy toward China for decades may no longer apply. It is increasingly unclear whether past U.S.-China interactions can be used as a blueprint for the future, and that is creating a new nervousness. At a time of rising uncertainty, one resource both nations can draw on is a strong cohort of U.S. and Chinese foreign policy experts who have dedicated their careers to understanding and guiding this critical bilateral relationship. Exchanges at the mid-career level are becoming particularly interesting. Today’s mid-career U.S.-China experts have had more opportunities to travel between the United States and China to live, work, and study than any generation before them. Many of these experts are bilingual: The Americans speak Mandarin, the Chinese speak English, and they can communicate in a mix of the two languages to get their points across as clearly as possible. Because they began their careers in an era of unprecedented openness on both sides, many have known one another for years and can debate sensitive issues with a frankness that can be harder to achieve at senior leadership levels.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

205. Brazil and the Regional Leadership Vacuum: The Chinese-American Advantage

Author:
Corival Alves Do Carmo and Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The first decade of the 21st century was characterized by Brazil’s action in South America. However, since 2011, there was a setback in the country´s strategic, economic and political investments in integration, allowing the projection of the US and China. The aim of this article is to analyze this context.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, Brazil, South America, and North America

206. China’s Global Rise Can the EU and U.S. Pursue a Coordinated Strategy?

Author:
Philippe Le Corre and Jonathan Pollack
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
China’s emergence as a global economic power and its fuller integration in the international order are among the principal policy challenges facing Europe and the United States in the early 21st century. At the time of Beijing’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China (though already growing rapidly) was in global terms an economic actor of limited consequence. A decade and a half later, China’s transformation is without parallel in economic history. Over the past 15 years, China has experienced an eightfold increase in GDP, enabling it to serve as the pri- mary engine of global economic growth in the early 21st century. It has leapfrogged from sixth to second place among the world’s economies, trail- ing only the United States in absolute economic size. In addition, China has become the world’s leading trading state and is now the second largest source of outward foreign direct investment. Change of this magnitude has enhanced China’s political power and eco- nomic leverage. It has also stimulated China’s internal economic evolution, simultaneously expanding the power of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) while also contributing to major growth in the private sector. China has also begun to think bigger, devoting increased attention to the rules of global economic governance. Although Beijing insists it has no intention of supplanting the existing international order, China contends that chang- ing power realities will require modification of global rules.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Political Economy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, America, and Europe

207. Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections: Economics, Politics, and Foreign Affairs

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Clay Ramsay, and Ebrahim Mohseni
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Summary of Findings 1. Views of the Rouhani Administration President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif enjoy high levels of popular support in Iran. Nearly 8 in 10 Iranians say they have a favorable opinion of Rouhani and Zarif. Yet the intensity of their popularity has substantially eroded since August 2015. With Iran’s parliamentary elections only about a month away, 6 in 10 Iranians continue to want Rouhani supporters to win, while a growing minority favors his critics. Though Rouhani receives high marks for improving Iran’s security and deepening Iran’s relations with European countries, views of the economy are mixed. An increasing majority of Iranians think that Rouhani has not been successful in reducing unemployment. Iranians are also substantially less optimistic about Iran’s economy, with less than half now thinking that the economy is getting better. 2. Iran’s February 2016 Parliamentary Elections Four in ten Iranians voice confidence that the upcoming Majlis (Iran’s Parliament) elections will be very fair, and another four in ten assume it will be somewhat free and fair. Two thirds are highly confident they will vote in the upcoming elections for the Majlis and the Assembly of Experts. The most important issues Iranians want the new Majlis to tackle are unemployment and Iran’s low performing economy. 3. Civil Liberties in Iran Two in three Iranians believe that it is important for President Rouhani to seek to increase civil liberties in Iran. However, only a small minority complains that Iranians have too little freedom. While only about a third thinks that civil liberties in Iran have increased during Rouhani’s presidency, a plurality expects that civil liberties will increase at least somewhat over the next two years. 4. Approval for Nuclear Deal Seven in ten Iranians approve of the nuclear deal, though enthusiasm has waned somewhat. The deal garners support from majorities of those who favor Rouhani’s critics in the Majlis election, as well as those who favor his supporters. Two thirds still think the Iranian leadership negotiated a good deal for Iran, though the number of those disagreeing has risen to one in five. The number who believes it was a win for Iran has also declined, while the number who believes it was a victory for both sides has risen and is now a majority. 5. Perceptions of the Nuclear Deal Substantial numbers of Iranians now have a more accurate picture of the deal than they did in August 2015. About half (up from a third) now realizes that Iran has accepted limits on its nuclear research. Almost half (up from a quarter) now knows that many US sanctions are not covered by the agreement and will continue. However, growing majorities continue to believe incorrectly that Iranian military sites cannot be inspected under any conditions. A majority also believes that the US has agreed to not impose new sanctions to replace the ones that were removed as part of the nuclear deal. 6. Expectations of Economic Benefits Three in five Iranians expect that the nuclear deal will eventually result in improvements in their own economic well-being. This sentiment is shared by a majority of those who support Rouhani’s critics in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Majorities expect to see, within a year, better access to medical products from abroad, more foreign investment, and significant improvements in unemployment and the overall economy, though these majorities have declined from August 2015. 7. The Nuclear Deal’s Effect on Iran’s Foreign Relations A large majority of Iranians thinks that Iran’s relations with European countries have already improved as a result of the nuclear deal, but only one in three thinks Iran’s relations with the United States have improved. 8. Views of US Cooperation in the Nuclear Deal Six in ten Iranians are not confident that the US will live up to its obligations under the nuclear agreement and do not think the US will accept other countries cooperating with Iran’s civilian nuclear sector, as provided for under the deal. Half assume the US will use pressure and sanctions to extract more concessions from Iran—up from only a quarter in August 2015. 9. Views of the Nuclear Program Just as in past years, four in five Iranians see the development of an Iranian nuclear program as very important, and three in four see this program as being for purely peaceful purposes. Four in five continue to favor the idea of a Middle East nuclear-free zone that would require all countries in the Middle East, including Israel, not to have nuclear weapons. 10. Iran’s Involvement in Syria and Fighting ISIS Large majorities of Iranians approve of Iran being involved in Syria and strongly support countering ISIS, preserving Iran’s influence in the region, and countering Saudi, American, and Israeli influence. Overwhelming majorities approve of Iran fighting ISIS directly. Large majorities also approve of Iran supporting Shiite and Kurdish groups fighting ISIS and providing support to Iranian allies in the region. Strengthening the Assad government gets more modest support and is seen as a secondary goal for Iran. Two in three Iranians approve of sending Iranian military personnel to help Assad fight against armed Syrian rebels, including ISIS. 11. Views of US Involvement in Syria A large majority of Iranians disapproves of US involvement in Syria. US involvement in Syria is widely perceived as being primarily motivated by a desire to topple the Assad government, to increase US influence and power in the region, to protect Israeli and Saudi interests, and to decrease Iran’s influence and power in the region. Views are divided about whether the United States is seeking to protect Syrian civilians, to end the conflict, to prevent the conflict from spreading, or to fight ISIS. A modest majority says US efforts against ISIS are not at all sincere. A bare majority supports direct cooperation with the United States to counter ISIS in Iraq. 12. Views of Other Nations Involved in Syria Large majorities of Iranians approve of the involvement in Syria of Russia and Hezbollah, and seven in ten express confidence that Russia’s efforts against ISIS are sincerely motivated. However, large majorities disapprove of the involvement in Syria of Turkey, France, and, especially, Saudi Arabia. Large majorities say that the Saudis’ efforts against ISIS are insincere; views of the sincerity of the efforts by Turkey and France are less negative. A large majority has a negative view of Saudi efforts to create a coalition against terrorism, primarily because Saudi Arabia is seen as a supporter of ISIS. 13. International Collaboration on Syria and ISIS Despite their suspicions of other countries operating in the region, eight in ten Iranians approve of Iran participating in the international talks on the conflict in Syria. Of those who know about the Vienna agreement, seven in ten approve of it. 14. Views of Other Countries Iranians view their country’s allies, notably Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Hezbollah, favorably, and view Saudi Arabia and Turkey increasingly unfavorably. Views of Russia and China are generally favorable and have improved considerably over time. Western countries, with the exception of Germany, are viewed unfavorably, with Britain and the US viewed negatively by large majorities in Iran. In contrast, a majority has a favorable opinion of the American people.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Geopolitics, ISIS, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Britain, Russia, United States, China, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria

208. Recalibrating U.S.-China Relations in Southeast Asia

Author:
Vikram Singh, Yuan Peng, Melanie Hart, Brian Harding, Zhang Xuegang, Chen Wenxin, and Zhang Fan
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Center for American Progress and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR, have partnered often over the years, working regularly on areas of cooperation between China and the United States and on options for managing areas of competition and tension. Together, CAP and CICIR have held or participated in many conferences, workshops, and symposiums that bring together Chinese and U.S. officials and scholars; we have worked on joint publications; and we believe that we have helped enable substantial cooperation between the United States and China. Mistrust complicates U.S.-China relations and can obscure areas where cooperation might be possible and beneficial. Negative dynamics also obscure from others the depth of U.S.-China cooperation in a wide range of areas. In this report, we try to cut through these dynamics and offer new options. In 2014, CAP and CICIR began to discuss how U.S.-China tensions might be obscuring areas of mutual interest in Southeast Asia, a region of tremendous importance strategically and economically to the entire region and the world. Prior to this project, in our respective organizations, the people who work on Southeast Asia did not work closely with colleagues working on U.S.-China bilateral relations. In most cases, our bilateral experts had spent little or no time in Southeast Asia, yet the tensions at play in the region featured prominently in their day-to-day work. Both the United States and China, meanwhile, were making investments and building new partnerships with Southeast Asian countries. Was Southeast Asia to be an arena of competition for China and the United States, or could there be areas of cooperation with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, that brought benefit to all? The potential for research by our teams with Southeast Asian counterparts was clear. It was our friend and colleague Nina Hachigian who proposed the concept that would make this a groundbreaking project. Now the U.S. ambassador to ASEAN, Hachigian is a diplomat and scholar of rare skill and creativity. She noted that CAP and CICIR could only do productive work in this area by doing two things: First, the organizations needed to join their stovepiped research teams into a single group with expertise on both Southeast Asia and U.S.-China relations. Second, CAP and CICIR had to partner with scholars in the region who study the United States, China, and ASEAN. And rather than holding a conference, why not travel through the region with local hosts?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

209. A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia

Author:
Mike Mullen, Sam Nunn, and Adam Mount
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
A new Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force report, A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia, finds that the United States’ policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea will neither halt that country’s recurring and dangerous cycle of provocation nor ensure the stability of Northeast Asia in the future. To the contrary, the Task Force warns, “If allowed to continue, current trends will predictably, progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national security interests and those of its allies.” Asserting that “China’s policy toward the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] will critically affect the fate of the region,” the Task Force urges U.S. officials to encourage China to work with the United States, Japan and South Korea to establish a nonnuclear and unified Korean Peninsula. “Encouraging a transformation of China’s policy toward North Korea should be the next administration’s top priority in its relations with China,” says the report. “If China, the United States, and U.S. allies can work together to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and mitigate its threatening military posture,” the Task Force contends, “a stable, prosperous Northeast Asia led by China and U.S. allies can emerge.” To the extent that China declines to cooperate and North Korea continues to refuse to negotiate, however, the report finds that United States will have no choice but to work with Japan and Korea to “consider more assertive military and political actions, including those that directly threaten the existence of the [North Korean] regime and its nuclear and missile capabilities.” The Task Force proposes that the United States take steps to sharpen the consequences for North Korea, by imposing escalating costs on continued defiance and offering incentives for cooperation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

210. Summits Galore, But (Mostly) Business as Usual

Author:
Brad Glosserman and Ralph A. Cossa
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
While events in Paris and San Bernardino refocused the international community’s attention on terrorism, it was largely business as usual in Asia, with the normal round of multilateral meetings – the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, US-ASEAN Summit, East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in Kuala Lumpur, plus the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting in Manila – going largely unnoticed. A few other summits did attract attention, including the first “Plus Three” (Japan-Korea-China) Summit in three years (which included the first direct one-on-one summit between ROK President Park and Japan Prime Minister Abe) in Seoul and the “non-summit” between Mr. Xi Jinping and Mr. Ma Ying-Jeou who just happen to be the presidents, respectively, of the People’s Republic of China and Republic of China, in Singapore. Chinese actions (and US reactions) in the South China Sea continued to dominate the news, while hopes that Kim Jong-Un was on the brink of behaving were quickly dashed as the new year began. All eyes remain on the Chinese economy and the impact the continuing slowdown there may have on global growth, even as the US pushes forward on the finally completed (but not yet Congressionally-approved) Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South China Sea