Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Brussels Publication Year within 10 Years

11. The UK’s potential role in enabling EU–NATO cooperation after Brexit

Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom, having expressed interest in a strong EU–UK security partnership and having indicated that, if anything, its commitment to NATO will be even stronger after Brexit, has an opportunity to be a leader and facilitator in the context of EU–NATO cooperation in meeting emerging threats. Several of the priority areas and action items defined by these two organisations, following a declaration to enhance their cooperation at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, play to the UK’s strengths: To increase the level of cooperation between the EU and NATO, and in order to implement the cooperation agenda, the UK should invest both financially and in terms of personnel, via voluntary national contributions to NATO. The UK taking on a leadership role in the area of inter-organisational cooperation would signal to EU partners that stronger support for NATO is not intended to weaken EU initiatives; it is an opportunity to stress the complementary nature of EU and NATO capabilities. Given its limited resources, the UK could, in effect, use engagement in EU–NATO cooperation to hedge its bets on both organisations. Stronger support for NATO can directly benefit the EU’s security and defence initiatives, while making sure that cooperation results in added value in both multinational frameworks, rather than fostering institutional competition.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

12. Europe`s migration crisis: threats to Schengen

Author:
Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
2015 has been the year of refugees. Acording to ACNUR, around 1.006.768 migrants have arrived to the European Union running from war and poverty crossing the Mediterranean Sea. More than 850.000 asylum seekers arrived in Greece crossing the Egean Sea, standing for the 84,5% of the people who arrived in Europe in irregular conditions, while the number using the Italian route went slightly down from 170.000 in 2014 to 152.700 in 2015. Member states and EU institutions have a duty to respond to this situation under international law and agreed on an European Agenda on Migration that stated the “immediate imperative is a duty to protect those in need” adopting a substantial package of new measures: Setting out a common approach to managing Europe's external borders, migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development of a common Asylum and immigration policy withing the Schengen Area. Under this agreement, an Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) has been set up for the period 2014-20, with a total of EUR 3.1 billion for the seven years. As part of this strategy, the European Commission, in its attempts to push forward an EU agenda, has proposed to establish a European Border and Coast Guard to ensure a strong and shared management of the external borders. In this line, Frontex recently accepted a Greek request to deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) increasing the number of officers and technical equipment, such as boats and patrol cars, allowing to identify and register more migrants as soon after they arrive. In addition to 448 officers offered by Member States under thise mechanism, Frontex deploys 16 vessels and more than 260 officers assisting in new arrivals, as well as border surveillance officers, and document experts. However, and due to the lack of political commitment, after this serie of so-far unsuccessful attempts to address the stream of migrants and refugees the EU has opted to push the problem out of its borders following in Greece the model implemented in the West African migration route. According to EU data, the fact is incontestable: through subsidizing third countries to block the route to keeping migrants out of EU borders; express readmission agreements, reinforcing border control, guards and fences whilst dismantling camps at third countries soil; irregular immigration to Spain by sea decreased to very low levels. However, as in tthe Spanish case, this is not only illegal under international law. Human Right Watchdog organizations report gross and systematic violations of human rights since those measures may represent "an unjustified militarization of the border" and "an outsourcing of the control of external borders of the EU to a country that does not respect human rights". Following this strategy, in March 2016, the EU sealed an agreement with Turkey, temporary home to more than 2 million Syrians, to stop commuting to Greece. In return, Turkey will double the 3,000 million euros of aid approved by the European Union in exchange for their commitment to 6,000 million € to “improve border control and to cooperate in the fight against traffickers. Besides allowing the express devolution of irregular migrants and refugees to Turkey, the deal will cap the number of Syrian refugees resettled from Turkey at 72.000. Far from the 850.000 that arrived last year and even far from the 160.000 agreed last year. Undoubtedly, the agreement represents the last attempt to save Schengen after the continous EU failure to set up a common response to the crisis. The EU Parliament -which action is very limited due to the lack of compentencesis officially discussing the agreement in addition to the future of the Schengen zone; the rights of refugees under international law; and racism and violence suffered by these incomers. Many MEPs have expressed grave reservations about the deal, questioning whether the agreement with Turkey violated international conventions.
Topic:
Migration, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Asylum, and Schengen
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels

13. A new step towards a common European defense

Author:
José Enrique de Ayala Marín
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
EU security has reached a critical point unparalleled since the end of the cold war. The threat of Jihadism, instability in Eastern Europe, failing states and human trafficking are problems it must deal with at a moment at which the United States is seeking to play a lesser role in European defence. Although as many as 34 civilian and military operations have been conducted during the 16 years in which the CSDP has been active, this instrument is far from being sufficient to meet the EU's security requirements. Of the various areas in which the CSDP must now be strengthened – which range from strategy definition and the development of common capacities to financing and force structure – the most important is Command and Control, a point that has been resolved at the political-strategic level but remains pending at the military-strategic level due to the lack of a permanent European operational headquarters (OHQ) that obliges the Union to negotiate specific agreements in every instance that one is required. None of the three current options for establishing an OHQ satisfies the availability, rapid response and capacity requirements for conducting CSDP operations. The use of NATO assets contemplated in the Berlin Plus agreement has for all intents and purposes been blocked by the diplomatic deadlock between Cyprus and Turkey, the response provided by national OHQs (which are not exclusively devoted to EU defence) is slow, and the capacity of the EU Centre of Operations is severely limited. This problem can only be resolved by creating a permanent, joint, combined, modular and sustainable European Operational Headquarters (EOHQ) with the planning, command, control and coordination capacities needed to guarantee that a 6 military commander can carry out his responsibilities in close coordination with the commander of civilian operations and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. An EOHQ would give the CSDP the visibility and rapid response capability it must have to work effectively in an increasingly unstable environment in which heightened security measures are essential and the launch of new operations is inevitable. Its establishment would have a multiplier effect in that it would lead to other initiatives that would pave the way for the expansion of the CSDP – a crucial step towards the common European defence envisioned in EU Treaties that should be a key EU objective. Promoting the creation of this structure and participating in its realisation should be one of the priorities of those Member States, including Spain, that are in favour of strengthening the CSDP as part of a process of political convergence, and consider such a measure to be the most appropriate, urgent and effective action to afford European citizens a higher level of security and a collective contribution towards the achievement of the paramount goal of peace.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Violent Extremism, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and Brussels

14. NATO’s Future: A Tale of Three Summits

Author:
Hans Binnendijk
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
NATO tends to make progress on key policy issues and capability from summit to summit. Major shifts in the orientation of the Alliance can be traced to significant summits like London (1990), Washington (1999), Prague (2002), and Lisbon (2010). During the past two years, NATO has held a summit in Wales (4-5 September 2014) and one in Warsaw (8-9 July 2016). A third minisummit is planned for Brussels in 2017. These first two summits taken together again significantly shifted the focus of the Alliance in the face of a series of new and dangerous challenges in the East and South. They shifted NATO’s posture in the East from benign neglect to allied reassurance to some degree of deterrence. The proposed force posture is inadequate to defeat a determined Russian short warning attack. Considerable increases in forward deployed forces (perhaps seven brigades) plus strengthened reinforcements would be necessary for NATO to hold its ground. But the Warsaw formula does provide what might be called “deterrence by assured response.” In the South, Allies recognized the complexity of the threats to Europe and sought to define NATO’s role in dealing with them. The third summit next year in Brussels could set the stage for further progress on both fronts. Much more still needs to be done. But with these fairly dramatic changes, NATO is in the process of once again restructuring itself so that it will not be “obsolete” in the effort to provide security for the transatlantic allies. This paper briefly analyzes 20 key issues now facing the Alliance and highlights the progress made in Wales and Warsaw. It also suggests some directions for the Brussels summit and beyond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Brussels, Warsaw, and Wales

15. The New European Parliament: Towards Economic Recovery

Author:
Michael Dauderstädt, Jose Enrique de Ayala, Domenec Ruiz Devesa, Vicente Palacio, and Vicente Palacio
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
The new European Parliament (EP) elected in May 2014 is facing a state of emergency in Europe. As 2014 draws to a close, austerity policies and the threat of populism are jeopardizing the present and the future of the European project. Unemployment rates in Europe are double the unemployment rate in the US and growth in the Eurozone is expected to fall below 1% in 2015. Although “the worst of the crisis” would appear to be behind us, Europe continues to be vulnerable to further economic shocks going forward. In fact, the EU could well be teetering on the brink of a third recession, the immediate threats on the horizon being current deflationary trends and a growing periphery crisis that is already manifest in Greece and could well spread to France and Italy. There is much uncertainty about the short- and medium-term future. It is not clear whether institutions such as the EP or the European Central Bank (ECB) will exercise their powers to the limit in order to counterbalance those of the governments of Member States and the Council, whether and when Germany will step up and assume a more active role in Eurozone stimulus, whether some kind of reform of the Lisbon treaty is in the cards or what kind of solutions will be provided to countries like Greece whose economies remain on the verge of collapse. ECB Governor Mario Draghi’s July 2014 speech in Jackson Hole, during which he strongly emphasized job creation rather dwelling on inflation and alluded to the possibility of implementing demand-side policies, structural reforms linked to a rise in 5 productivity, and enhancing competitiveness on a basis other than lower labour costs, was a very good sign. More recently, ECB authorities announced a new round of quantitative easing (QE) to take place in early 2015, and EC President Jean Claude Juncker made a commitment to devote €315 billion to infrastructure as part of his investment plan. Although we cannot expect a radical shift in economic policy any time soon, at least a minimal “Brussels consensus” if the EU is ever to put itself on the sure track towards a sustained recovery, structural reforms will need to be accompanied by fiscal stimulus. The time looks ripe for revising the economic policies that failed to achieve the objectives for which they were devised: pulling Europe out of the crisis and accelerating growth and employment. The time also looks ripe for a deep political and institutional shift: restoring the role of EU institutions – mainly the EP and the Commission – in forging the destinies of European citizens. If we accept the viewpoint that the EP is the institution that best embodies the concept of a European democracy built on the will of average citizens, the question we must subsequently ask ourselves whether the incoming EP elected in May 2014 will be able to bring about the change of tack that Europe needs. If viewed from a strictly quantitative perspective, the final outcome of the May elections was less damaging than originally feared. The European People’s Party once again won a majority (with 221 seats compared to 265 in 2009), and the breakdown for the rest of the parties and groups, in order of representation, was: the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (191/184); the Conservatives and Reformists (70/51); the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (67/84); the Greens (50/55); the European United Left (52/35), the Non-attached Members group (52/27) and the anti-Union Europe of Freedom and Democracy (48/32). Voter turnout across the EU fell very slightly from the 43% registered in 2009 to 42.5% in May, but did not break the crucial “psychological barrier” of 40%. 6 Table 1. Current distribution of seats and Parliamentary Groups in the EP (2014- 19 legislature) Source: Europarl http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/electionresults-2014.html If one takes a tally of only the seats now held by the traditional “big three” (the European People’s Party, the Socialists and the Liberal-Democrats), it is obvious that the pro-European forces still enjoy a solid majority in the EP – a very welcome majority in the sense that it signals that a majority of European voters continue to believe in a more united Europe, even in the context of the current economic, social and institutional crisis. The good news, therefore, is that there may be a sufficient “critical mass” in favour of going forward with the integration process rather than reversing it. Moreover, if the big three are successful in building ad hoc alliances with other parties such as the European Left and the Greens regarding a social and economic platform for a better Europe, it might even be possible to muster a majority willing to go even further in a federalist direction. However, these new distribution figures reveal only a small part of the entire story. Firstly, they should not keep us from recognizing the qualitative significance of the rise of a heterogeneous group of anti-integration and anti-European forces in the EP that represent a growing number of Europeans willing to cast their votes for Eurosceptic, nationalistic, populist, or xenophobic parties. The rising tide of Eurosceptics and Europhobia within the EP could well be perceived as a potential Trojan horse that could eventually undermine the stability of the EU and its very existence. Even if divided by 7 country, ideology, opportunity and other criteria and unable (or unwilling) to forge strong, sustained parliamentary coalitions, taken together, these forces hold 170 out of 751 seats in the current EP – an impressive 22%. The number of MEPs of the French National Front increased from 3 in 2009 to 24 in 2014, the new German right-wing antiEuro party Alternative for Germany (AFD) won 7 seats, and UKIP - which won the popular vote in Britain - moved up to 24 (from 13 in 2009). The situation is more worrying if we take into consideration that an overwhelming number of European citizens (almost 58%) did not go to the polls to vote. Had they chosen to make their voices heard, their vote would have supposed a turning point for Europe in one direction or another. Secondly, Euroscepticism and Europhobia are also having a considerable impact on the national politics of Member States (MS), and the most alarming examples of this phenomenon have surfaced in the major, “hard core” countries upon which European construction heavily depends such as France, Italy, Germany, or even for that matter, the UK. What these diverse parties ultimately have in common is their fierce defence of national sovereignty. They have reached the point of setting national policy agendas throughout the EU. As of the end of November 2014, the National Front was still ahead in voter intention polls in France, the AFD was gaining support according to polls conducted in Germany, and similar surveys in the UK showed that support for the anti-immigration UKIP was holding strong. The rise of UKIP is putting David Cameron’s government under intense pressure to hold a referendum on Britain’s exit from the EU. The victory of Matteo Renzi’s centre-left Democratic Party in the May EP elections does not obscure the fact that the fiercely populist and Eurosceptic Five-Star movement remains the largest party in the Italian Chamber of Deputies since February 2013. Sweden’s xenophobic Democratic Party could hold the key to governance in that country after the March 2015 elections. For the first time, a majority of citizens in both France and Germany regard the EU as a problem. Parallel to these developments, the anti-Muslim street demonstrations are becoming more and more frequent in Germany and the Netherlands. Should the economic situation in Europe worsen, the diverse range of tensions originating in northern and southern MSs, not to mention the tensions between them, could ratchet support for populist movements to dangerously high levels.
Topic:
Economics, Europe Union, Election watch, and Unemployment
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Germany, and Brussels

16. Digital Single Market. SMEs and the Juncker Investment Plan for the European Union

Author:
Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
A few months ago (25/11/2014), the European Commission disclosed the mechanism for its much-heralded €315 billion investment plan, revealing how a a scarce €21 billion of initial public money is intended to lift fifteen times as much in capital. In March 2015, EU finance ministers agreed upon delivering on the commitment they took at the European Councils in October and December 2014, to wind-off Juncker's flagship investment plan. The idea was to create a new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), with €5 billion coming from the European Investment Bank and an €8 billion guarantee from existing EU funds designed to secure a further contribution of 16 billion Euro from the institutions. The €8 billion guarantee will come over a three-year period from the Connecting Europe Facility (€3.3 billion); Europe’s research programme Horizon 2020 (€2.7 billion) and socalled “budget margin”, or unused funds, worth €2 billion. On the one hand, the EFSI plans to generate investments into the European economy of about €315 billion, by providing guarantees for higher-risk projects which aim at developing telecommunications and transport infrastructure, energy efficiency projects, research, education and innovation activities to finally generating about 240 billion in long-term investments, showing a timid responsiveness for the claims against austerity over the past years. On the other hand, the alternative purpose of the Fund is to provide financing to SMEs to enhance the viability of new venture capital injections, loan guarantees, securitisations and seed financing designed to offer micro-loans to SMEs, to fund start-ups or offer mid-cap companies venture capital, projected to generate €75 billion for those SMEs and mid-cap firms over the period 2015-2017. In addition, the Commission aims to attract private investors to the Fund. Nevertheless, private investors seem sceptical about investing and assuming greater risks when the returns are not guaranteed. In fact, the basis for most longterm infrastructure or energy efficiency projects will most likely remain public funding -his is especially true of the newer EU member states, where the private sector is not strong enough-. In fact, the EU executive believes that more financing can be provided by individual member states. Two ways are being discussed: Capital contributions, which are not limited to the respective Member State and may entail voting rights and a claim on the fund´s return (if any); and that participation in investment platforms that can be restricted to the Member State itself. As an incentive, this amount will be then discounted from the calculations of their deficits within the European Semester. There is a rising concern between Member States that the new fund will turn into a parallel EU budget -where voting rights could be purchased- not subject to enough democratic control, since this is fund is expected to be managed by Commission and the EIB and. In order to prevent such situation, the Commission has announced that the fund will not consider to make investments on the basis of geographical distribution, but rather based on quality and viability. This may convince member states who fear the introduction of a parallel budget, but it might also raise problems of transparency and for those countries who wish to contribute voluntarily to the EFSI. Several alternatives to the current functioning of the EFSI -that still need to pass the European Parliament filter- has been tabled: e.g. the possibility that the EFSI regulation could establish mandatory national contributions in order to increase the credibility of the ratio 1:15; also, transforming the fund into a permanent financing system with legal personality, so it could access financial markets for funding; and that but not least, turning the EIB's contribution to EFSI into a regularly one rather a one-off, as it has been agreed so far. In any case -often accused of relying on leverage private investment unrealistic projections, lacking ambition, means and clear goals- this Juncker's investment plan goes along with several batteries of measures seeking to facilitate a boost in business activity, removing the obstacles hampering private investment in Europe.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Budget, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels

17. The EU facing asylum and migration: more ambition, more compromise Authorship: Juan Antonio Pavón

Author:
Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
The number of asylum seekers in 2014 was the highest since 1992, when the Bosnia-Herzegovina war began. Nowadays, the Syrian civil war, the migratory transit through the Mediterranean Sea (218.0001 economic migrants and refugees), the alarming figures of deaths, and the increasing social pressure, made the EU step forward to review the current migration and neighborhood policy framework, whilst fostering a communitarian dimension, inexistent so far. Amongst other measures, stands out the European lifesaving mission "Triton2", depending on Frontex, which has been given the same budget as the Italian government gave to "Mare Nostrum" in order to prevent new maritime disasters. The European Commission also proposed to improve legal channels to prevent asylum seekers (economic migrants are excluded) from putting their lives at risk by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, exposing themselves to mafias, or being victims of illegal border controls (like in the case of Ceuta and Melilla in 2014)3 . This is planned to be implemented by triggering an emergency mechanism, laid down in the treaties, to resettle 40,000 asylum seekers from Italy, Greece and Malta; and take 20,000 others out of conflict areas in the next 24 months. According to report from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ACNUR)4, the 28 member states of the European Union (EU) recorded 570 800 asylum applications in 2014, 44% more than in 2013 (396 700). -Germany and Sweden received 30% and 13% of EU applications respectively. Sweden, with a population of 10 million, received a total of 75,100 requests of which 77% were approved. -Followed by France and Italy (10%) and Hungary (7%). -Compared to the population of each country, the highest rate corresponds to Sweden (8.4 applications per thousand inhabitants), well ahead of Hungary (4.3), Austria (3.3), Malta (3.2 ), Denmark (2.6) and Germany (2.5). -In Spain, 5,941 people (1%) called for international protection in 2014, representing an increase of 31.7% compared to 2013 when 4,513 applications were registered. Of the nearly 6,000 applications, only about 1600 were approved. Even from alternative sources such as Eurostat5, Spain is, among the countries of the European Union, where fewer asylum applications were received, with only 0.1 applicants per thousand inhabitants. Only Portugal, Slovakia and Romania recorded lower rates. According to Eurostat, in 2014, the number of asylum seekers in Spain stood at 5,615. However, out of this figure, only 31% were accepted, which represents 0.9% of all requests for international protection in the EU. The main countries of origin of those seeking asylum in Spain are Syria (1,680 applicants) and Ukraine (942), followed by Mali (620), Algeria (309) and Palestine (209). To better understand whether those positions are suitable or not, a careful analysis needs to be done. In early 2015, the EU population was about 5076 million, 13, 4% of those came from third countries (about 20 million). In 2014, EU states received 1 http://www.acnur.org/t3/recursos/estadisticas/ 2 http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-launches-joint-operation-triton-JSYpL7 3 https://twitter.com/malmstromeu/status/434307240796094464 4 http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2015/10010.pdf 5 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics 6 http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm 1 Opex Memorandum Nº196*/2015_______________The EU facing asylum and migration: more ambition, more compromise about 600,0007 asylum applications, of those only 160.0008 were approved. Of these approved applications, 56% (89710) received the refugee status, 34% (54845) subsidiary protection and 10% (15510) were given asylum condition due to humanitarian reasons. At first instance only 35% were approved, which meant an increase of 0.03% over the total population and a less than minimal reduction in indicators of GDP per capita or rising of the unemployment rates. In contrast, the total number of asylum applications in 2014 raised to almost 200,000 more applications. In the past four years, these numbers have grown steadily. The highest number of applicants are coming from Syria, which is still suffering the ravages of a civil war, and has not changed (50 470, 12% of the total). On the one hand, given the figures of that period9, when there were less asylum claims, there were 12,425 unaccompanied minors who requested international protection; most of them were accepted in Sweden, Germany, the UK, Austria and Italy. On the other hand, 23,632 victims of human trafficking in the EU during the period 2008-2010 were identified, 80% of them women and girls, and 20% men and boys. In most cases they suffered sexual exploitation (62%), followed by forced labor (25%) and other forms of trafficking as organ harvesting, criminal activities or sale of children (14%).
Topic:
International Cooperation, Migration, Immigration, Europe Union, and Asylum
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels