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552. Reducing demand for illegal timber: Targeting corruption in customs and procurement
- Publication Date:
- 01-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Transparency International
- Abstract:
- Corruption and illegal logging are well-known drivers of deforestation. In 2001 it was estimated that major timber exporting countries - Indonesia, Brazil and Cameroon - had an illegal logging rate of at least half of their total timber production. This illegal timber finds its way into the consumer markets, often unchecked or unidentified by timber importing countries and industries. As a result, it has been estimated that 20 per cent of wood-based products entering the EU are likely to be illegally sourced.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Crime, International Law, and Natural Resources
- Political Geography:
- Indonesia, Brazil, and Cameroon
553. Letter from the UN: After the U.S. Veto on Settlements
- Author:
- Graham Usher
- Publication Date:
- 05-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Palestine Studies
- Institution:
- Institute for Palestine Studies
- Abstract:
- Obama's first veto in defense of Israel at the UN was of a Security Council draft resolution that condemned Israeli settlements in language reflecting the administration's own stated policy. The draft, supported by all other UNSC members, forced the U.S. to choose between undermining its credibility internationally and alienating constituencies at home. For the Palestinians, insistence on tabling the draft in defiance of Washington was seen by some as a first step in an “alternative peace strategy” involving a turn away from the Oslo framework in favor of the UN. After reviewing the context of the resolution, the author analyzes the stakes for the various players, the repercussions of the veto, and the diplomatic prospects in its wake. On 18 February 2011, the Obama administration vetoed a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that would have condemned as illegal Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. Palestinian insistence on submitting the resolution incurred America's wrath. But the Council's fourteen other member states (including permanent members Britain, France, China, and Russia and nonpermanent powers Germany, Brazil, India, and South Africa) all voted for the resolution. And a colossal 123 countries cosponsored it, including every Arab and African state except Libya (which rejects a twostate solution to the conflict). Israel “deeply appreciated” the American veto—understandably so. Rarely had it been left so alone internationally, with even close allies like Germany ignoring appeals to abstain. For the Americans, Obama's first veto in defense of Israel at the United Nations came at a time when he wanted to appear at least rhetorically on the side of young Arab protestors who from Morocco to Yemen had been demanding change, rather than with the ancien régimes defending inertia. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice's contortions were palpable as she tried to explain a veto that violated elemental justice, international law, and until recently her administration's own stated policy on settlements—all in the name of a peace process that no longer exists. The veto “cost the Americans blood,” admitted Israel's Maariv newspaper, paraphrasing a “sharp” exchange between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the aftermath. It also cost Obama in the occupied territories. In Ramallah, some 3,000 mainly Fatah members staged a “day of rage” against the veto, with the West Bank Palestinian Authority's (PA) usually pro-American Prime Minister Salam Fayyad incandescent: “The Americans have chosen to be alone in disrupting the internationally backed Palestinian efforts,” he said. Smaller Fatah anti-America demonstrations occurred in Qalqilya, Hebron, Jenin, and East Jerusalem. The Palestinian and Arab decision to take the resolution to the UN was born of the beaching of the U.S.-steered “peace process” after the Israeli government's refusal last September to renew a partial moratorium on West Bank settlement starts. It was the first run of what has been called the PA's new “alternative” diplomatic strategy. Combined with the promise of new elections in the West Bank and Gaza, moves toward reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, and the approaching climax of Fayyad's state-building agenda in September, the alternative strategy involves freeing the Palestinian case from the grip of American tutelage in order to anchor it again on UNSC resolutions and international law. How serious is the alternative?
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, America, India, South Africa, Brazil, Palestine, and Germany
554. Assertive Brazil: An emerging power and its implications
- Author:
- Mikael Wigell
- Publication Date:
- 05-2011
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Brazil has risen to international prominence over the last decade. Now the 7th largest economy in the world, the country has started acting with greater confidence and authority on the international stage.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Emerging Markets, and Regional Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- United States and Brazil
555. Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations
- Author:
- Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, and Julia E. Sweig
- Publication Date:
- 07-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Abstract:
- Brazil has transcended its status as the largest and most resource-rich country in Latin America to now be counted among the world's pivotal powers. Brazil is not a conventional military power, it does not rival China or India in population or economic size, and it cannot match the geopolitical history of Russia. Still, how Brazil defines and projects its interests, a still-evolving process, is critical to understanding the character of the new multipolar and unpredictable global order.
- Topic:
- Development, Economics, Globalization, and International Trade and Finance
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, India, Brazil, and Latin America
556. Global Matrix: A conceptual and organisational framework for researching the future of global governance
- Author:
- Daniel Gros, Richard Youngs, Michael Emerson, Christian Egenhofer, Nathalie Tocci, Giovanni Grevi, and Jean-Pierre Cassarino
- Publication Date:
- 07-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
- Abstract:
- Conceptually, Global Matrix advances in a systematic and structured inter-disciplinary (matrix) framework a research agenda for examining the stance of major world actors on the key policy dimensions to world politics (political ideologies, economics, migration, climate change, security and world view); drawing out evidence of cross-cutting linkages (between sectors and among major actors); and evaluating the evolution and adequacy of existing multilateral institutions in relation to the emerging multi-polarity, and formulating recommendations.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Economics, Globalization, International Cooperation, International Organization, and Governance
- Political Geography:
- Japan, South Africa, Brazil, and Korea
557. Reflections on Brazil's Global Rise
- Author:
- Celso Amorim
- Publication Date:
- 06-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Americas Quarterly
- Institution:
- Council of the Americas
- Abstract:
- The man who led Brazil into its new global era discusses his diplomatic vision and Brazil-U.S. relations.
- Topic:
- International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Brazil, and Venezuela
558. The Other BRIC in Latin America: India
- Author:
- Jorge Heine and R. Viswanathan
- Publication Date:
- 06-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Americas Quarterly
- Institution:
- Council of the Americas
- Abstract:
- India emerges as a major partner for Latin America.
- Topic:
- Development and Government
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, India, Brazil, Argentina, and Latin America
559. One Foot in the Region; Eyes on the Global Prize
- Author:
- Matias Spektor
- Publication Date:
- 06-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Americas Quarterly
- Institution:
- Council of the Americas
- Abstract:
- Read any Brazilian foreign policy college textbook and you will be surprised. Global order since 1945 is not described as open, inclusive or rooted in multilateralism. Instead, you learn that big powers impose their will on the weak through force and rules that are strict and often arbitrary. In this world view, international institutions bend over backwards to please their most powerful masters. International law, when it is used by the strong, is less about binding great powers and self-restraint than about strong players controlling weaker ones. After finishing the book, you couldn't be blamed for believing that the liberal international order has never established the just, level playing field for world politics that its supporters claim. This intellectual approach is responsible for the ambiguity at the heart of Brazilian strategic thinking. On one hand, Brazil has benefited enormously from existing patterns of global order. It was transformed from a modest rural economy in the 1940s into an industrial powerhouse less than 50 years later, thanks to the twin forces of capitalism and an alliance system that kept it safe. On the other hand, the world has been a nasty place for Brazil. Today, it is one of the most unequal societies in the world. Millions still live in poverty and violence abounds. In 2009, there were more violent civilian deaths in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone than in the whole of Iraq. No doubt a fair share of the blame belongs to successive generations of Brazilian politicians and policymakers. But some of it is a function of the many inequities and distortions that recur when you are on the “periphery” of a very unequal international system. The result is a view of global order that vastly differs from perceptions held by the United States. Take, for instance, Brazilian perceptions of “international threats.” Polls show that the average Brazilian worries little about terrorism, radical Islam or a major international war. Instead, the primary fears concern climate change, poverty and infectious disease. Many Brazilians, in fact, fear the U.S., focusing in particular on the perceived threat it poses to the natural riches of the Amazon and the newfound oil fields under the Brazilian seabed. Perceptions matter enormously. It is no wonder that the Brazilian military spends a chunk of its time studying how Vietnamese guerrillas won a war against far superior forces in jungle battlefields. Nor should it be a surprise that Brazil is now investing heavily in the development of nuclear-propulsion submarines that its admirals think will facilitate the nation's ability to defend oil wells in open waters. But Brazil is nowhere near being a revolutionary state. While its leaders believe that a major transition of global power is currently underway, they want to be seen as smooth operators when new rules to the game emerge. Their designs are moderate because they have a stake in preserving the principles that underwrite Brazil's emergence as a major world player. They will not seek to radically overturn existing norms and practices but to adapt them to suit their own interests instead. Could Brazilian intentions change over time? No doubt. Notions of what constitutes the national interest will transform as the country rises. Brazil's international ambitions are likely to expand—no matter who runs the country. Three factors will shape the way national goals will evolve in the next few years: the relationship with the U.S., Brasilia's strategies for dealing with the rest of South America, and Brazil's ideas about how to produce global order. When it Comes to the U.S., Lie Low Brazilian officials are used to repeating that to be on the U.S. “radar screen” is not good. In their eyes, being the source of American attention poses two possible threats. It either raises expectations in Washington that Brazil will work as a “responsible stakeholder” according to some arbitrary criteria of what “responsible” means, or it turns Brazil into a target of U.S. pressure when interests don't coincide. As a result, there is a consensus among Brazilians that a policy of “ducking”—hiding your head underwater when the hegemonic eagle is around—has served them well. Whether this judgment is correct or not is for historians to explore. But the utility of a policy based on such a consensus is declining fast. You cannot flex your diplomatic muscle abroad and hope to go unnoticed. Furthermore, being a “rising state” is never a mere function of concrete things, such as a growing economy, skilled armies, mighty industries, a booming middle class, or a functional state that is effective in tax collection and the provision of public goods. The perception of other states matters just as much. And nobody's perception matters more than that of the most powerful state of all: the United States. Brazil's current rise is therefore deeply intertwined with the perception in Washington that Brazil is moving upwards in global hierarchies. Securing the acceptance or the implicit support of the U.S. while maintaining some distance will always be a fragile position to maintain. But as Brazil grows more powerful, it will be difficult to accomplish its global objectives without the complicity—and the tacit acceptance—of the United States. For Brazil this means that the “off the radar” option will become increasingly difficult. Not the Natural Regional Leader Brazil accounts for over 50 percent of South America's wealth, people and territory. If power were a product of relative material capabilities alone, Brazil would be more powerful in its own region than China, India, Turkey or South Africa are in theirs. But Brazil is not your typical regional power. It has sponsored layers of formal institutions and regional norms, but its leaders recoil at the thought of pooling sovereignty into supranational bodies. Yes, Brazil has modernized South American politics by promoting norms to protect democracy and to establish a regional zone of peace, but its efforts at promoting a regional sense of shared purposes have been mixed and, some say, halfhearted at best. Brazilian public opinion and private-sector business increasingly doubt the benefits of deep regional integration with neighbors, and plans for a South American Free Trade Zone have gone asunder. And yes, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 1998 to 2007, Brazil spent far more on its armed forces than Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela combined. Yet, Brazil's ability to project military power abroad remains minimal. The end result is that many challenge the notion that Brazil is a regional leader. From the perspective of smaller neighboring countries, it remains a country that is too hard to follow sometimes. If you are sitting on its borders, as 10 South American nations do, you find it difficult to jump on its bandwagon. This is problematic for Brazil. As a major and growing regional creditor, investor, consumer, and exporter, its own economic fate is interconnected with that of its neighbors. Crises abroad impact its banks and companies at home as never before. Populism, ethnic nationalism, narcotics trafficking, guerrilla warfare, deforestation, unlawful pasturing, economic decay, and political upheaval in neighbors will deeply harm Brazilian interests. Whether, when and how Brazil will develop the policy instruments to shape a regional order beneficial to itself remains to be seen. But curiously enough, Brazilian leaders do not normally think their interests in South America might converge with those of the United States. On the contrary, Brazil in the twenty-first century has geared its regional policies to deflect, hedge, bind, and restrain U.S. power in South America to the extent that it can. This is not to say that Brazil is a stubborn challenger of U.S. interests in the region. That would be silly for a country whose success depends on the perception of economic gain and regional stability. But it means that future generations of Brazilians might discover that if they want to unlock some of the most pressing problems in the region, perhaps they will have to reconsider their attitude towards the United States...
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Law, and Islam
- Political Geography:
- United States, America, Washington, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, South America, Venezuela, and Chile
560. The Opportunities and Challenges for President Dilma Rousseff
- Author:
- Roberto Setubal
- Publication Date:
- 06-2011
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Americas Quarterly
- Institution:
- Council of the Americas
- Abstract:
- Gradually and firmly over the past 15 years, Brazil has consolidated a stable democracy, broken free from macroeconomic instability, and taken remarkable steps toward alleviating poverty and reducing a historically high level of income inequality. The country that welcomed Dilma Rousseff as its new president on January 1 is also the country that will host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. Ms. Rousseff has a chance to push Brazil further along the road to development. To get there, she must maintain the achievements of the past and persevere in making the changes that Brazil needs. The opportunities are big—so are the challenges. Brazil's political, economic and social advances have paved the way for the development of a large consumer market. This puts the country in a position to benefit from today's global marketplace. Consumer spending in advanced economies is flattening out. At the same time, with their large potential consumer markets, emerging markets are becoming “consumers of last resort,” attracting an increasing share of global resources. Brazil is one of them. A new, larger middle class is now emerging. From 2003 to 2009, about 35.7 million people joined Brazil's middle-class income bracket. By 2014, Brazilian economists and business leaders estimate that another 30 million will have made that move. This development will have far-reaching implications for businesses, but also for society as a whole. Investment is very likely to rise in the years ahead. New projects now follow the expected consumer patterns of this new middle class. Investment is spurred by macroeconomic stability and other developments that have increased confidence and enabled a slow but steady decline in real interest rates. This has lowered the cost of capital and stimulated credit and capital markets. Investments will also increase for more specific reasons. First, the new deepwater oil fields will require vast financial resources and new technology, allowing Brazil's oil production to double by 2020. Second, pent-up demand for housing will be a catalyst for investment, since a significant number of Brazilians still live in sub-standard homes. Third, the World Cup and Olympics will require investments on a considerable scale. Preparing for these large sports events will benefit diverse sectors of the economy, through spending on ports and airports, urban transportation, sports facilities, hotels, telecommunications, energy, and security. Tourism is likely to benefit during the games, and also afterward. Nevertheless, with public and private domestic savings at their current low levels, Brazil will need to continue tapping external savings to finance growth. That means a larger current-account deficit and an exchange rate appreciated by capital inflows. Brazil will have to make the most of its available resources. It will be essential to create an environment that is conducive to private sector saving and investment. Ensuring stable macroeconomic conditions is critical. Remaining market-friendly in a well-regulated environment is also crucial for healthy and abundant financing. A well-established institutional design for regulatory agencies, which instills the necessary confidence that the private sector can undertake major, long-term projects, is indispensable. A great deal can be achieved through small but focused changes, instead of ambitious but often unrealistic regulatory agendas. The advance in credit regulation in Brazil is one such example. Developing a deeper market for private, fixed-income securities is important, but there needs to be a liquid secondary market, so that families have more confidence in extending the maturities on their investments. Just as we have such a market for equities, we can have one for fixed-income securities...
- Topic:
- Security and Economics
- Political Geography:
- Brazil