Search

Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography Balkans

1. Trump’s tinderbox: US politics and the next war in the Balkans

Author:
Adnan Ćerimagić and Majda Ruge
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Over recent years, Serbia’s government and Serb nationalists elsewhere in the Western Balkans have increased their revisionist agitation in the region. They recently adopted an “all-Serb declaration” that seeks to overturn the post-Dayton settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and claims Kosovo as an inseparable part of Serbia. Though some international observers have criticised the Biden administration for its concessions to Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia’s president, it deserves credit for containing Belgrade’s ability to realise its ambitions and preventing two worst-case scenarios: the disintegration of the Bosnian state and armed escalation between Serbia and Kosovo. That fragile status-quo would come under significant threat from a new Trump presidency in the US. Among other risks, his second administration may seek to reverse sanctions that have constrained separatist appetites among Bosnian Serbs and to revive dangerous proposals for a Serbia-Kosovo land swap. Peace in the region is at stake. Particularly in the event of a Trump victory on 5 November, the EU should prepare a package of new deterrence mechanisms that it can apply in the Western Balkans independently from the US and spoiler member states like Hungary. And in either eventuality, it should take more responsibility for stabilising the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Donald Trump, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Serbia, Balkans, North America, and United States of America

2. Surviving the War: Russia-Western Balkan Ties After the War in Ukraine

Author:
Maksim Samorukov
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 pushed Europe into a new era of instability. The fundamentals of the continent’s political and economic order are shifting as Russia’s brutal methods of war undermine the prospects of the slightest cooperation between Moscow and European states. Decades-old trade links have been severed, transport corridors rerouted, and people-to-people contacts have become more scarce than ever. Europe is reshaping its security architecture around Russia as the main threat, while Moscow frames its aggression against Ukraine as an existential defensive war with a duplicitous West. The only European region that stands out in this process of growing mutual alienation is the Western Balkans. More than a year into the war, Russia’s relations with several Balkan states appear to have undergone little change. Serbia is eagerly continuing with energy deals with Gazprom, Bosnian Serb leaders frequent Moscow on official visits, and some leading Montenegrin parties are sticking to pro-Russian slogans. It would appear that time stands still in the Western Balkans, with petty local grievances overriding major global developments This publication was produced with the support of the Open Society Foundations (OSF). Responsibility for the content of this publication belongs solely to Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Trade, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

3. A Feminist Foreign Policy in Practice: Introducing an Institutional Framework for Implementation in the Post-Yugoslav Sphere

Author:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
In the past few years, a growing number of policy- and decision-makers seem to have heeded the tireless efforts of gender advocates: there is a strong interest in feminist perspectives and gender equality efforts, at least rhetorically. In their 2021 coalition agreement, the German government announced that they wanted “to strengthen rights, resources and representation of women and girls globally and support social diversity” […] “in line with a feminist foreign policy” (Bundesregierung 2021), picking up on a model of Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) first introduced by the Swedish government in 2014. On International Women’s Day in 2023, Slovenia also rhetorically committed to FFP, being one of the most recent countries to announce a feminist approach to foreign policy and the first in Central-Eastern or Southeast Europe. While feminist foreign policies are mushrooming across the globe, strong anti-feminist alliances and anti-gender discourses are simultaneously re-gaining meaningful influence and mainstream appeal with palpable legal consequences, for example, through restricting reproductive rights for women.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Feminism, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

4. Russian influence on the European Integration process of the Western Balkan countries: A comparative analysis

Author:
Alfred Marleku and Dafina Aliu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article explores the correlation between Russian influence and the European Union (EU) integration process in the Western Balkans. The focus is on analyzing the impact of Russian influence expressed through political, economic and cultural means on the region’s integration into the EU. The article argues that the Russian foreign policy toolkit inhibits the EU accession process for the six countries of the Western Balkans, as it interferes with the internal functioning of these countries, which, in turn, affects their ability to fulfill EU requirements. Using a comparative case approach this study has found evidence that Russian cultural, political and financial support negatively affects the Western Balkans’ European integration process, hindering progress towards accession. Additionally, the findings support the argument that Western Balkans countries with Slavic populations are more susceptible to Russian influence. The article highlights the significant impact of Russia on the EU integration process in the Western Balkans and underscores the need for EU policymakers to address this issue to ensure a smooth and successful accession process for the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Balkans

5. China-US Competition in the Balkans Impact, regional responses, and larger implications

Author:
Ivan Lidarev
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This strategic update from Sotirov Visiting Fellow Dr Ivan Lidarev analyses the competition between China and the US in the Balkans, striving to answer three broad research questions about its impact on the region. The paper analyses how the China-US competition has shaped the strategic framework in which Balkan states operate; how Balkan nations have responded strategically to this competition; and what the long-term implications of the regional US-China competition are.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and United States of America

6. Between Emotions and Realism: Two Faces of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans

Author:
Srdan Hercigonja and Vuk Vuksanović
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
Turkey’s more assertive posture towards the Balkans is neglected compared to the commentariat that deals with Russia and China. To fill this policy gap, the research team of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) has conducted research based on the analysis of secondary source material and, even more importantly, on fieldwork interviews that involved 16 sources, academics and think tank researchers based in Istanbul and Ankara. Although the consulted sources have different backgrounds and political sympathies, the research established a presence of common themes. Namely, Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans has two aspects. The first is based on emotions. Turkish foreign policy towards the region is framed by Turkey’s special ties with the region based on shared history, social connections, identity factors and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan country most frequently mentioned in the context of special ties with Turkey is Bosnia and Herzegovina, in light of socio-cultural ties and the fact that it is a country in which the Ottoman legacy is felt most strongly. The second approach is rooted in traditional foreign policy realism derived from an objective and calculated assessment of the regional balance of power and one’s own interests. Within this approach, Turkey is trying, for security and strategic reasons, to act pragmatically and be effective in the Balkans without entangling itself in crises that could impede its regional influence. This approach leads Turkey towards engaging Serbia, the region’s strategically consequential country because Ankara is deeply convinced that if it wishes to be effective in the Balkans, it needs to have a partnership with Belgrade. In doing so, it must strike a balance between emotions and realism. It needs to walk the fine line between nurturing ties with communities with cultural and religious ties, like Bosniaks and Albanians, while avoiding alienating countries whose partnership Ankara needs to succeed in the Balkans, such as Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Emotions, Realism, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Asia, and Balkans

7. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

8. Leaving Stabilocracy Behind – Rethinking the French Approach to the Western Balkans

Author:
Luka Steric
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
In this paper, BCSP researcher Luka Steric calls for the U-turn in the French and EU approach to the Western Balkans, calling for the end of support for stabilocracy. The spring elections have resulted in regime continuity in both France and Serbia. President Macron has secured the second term with a convincing victory in the second round against the archrival Marine Le Pen. Simultaneously, President Vucic has stroke another landslide victory in the first round of the elections, with his Progressive Party holding on to power although losing absolute majority in the Parliament for the first time since 2014. However, the political landscape has changed radically since their previous victories five years ago. The war in Ukraine has shifted the focus of the European Union toward geopolitics, pushing the Western Balkans, seemingly forgotten, back on the European agenda. The threats of instability and the rising influence of third powers in the region have rung the alarm in the new global context, opening the floor for the discussion on how to revamp the European strategy which has been largely inadequate for the past decade. In contrast to previous periods in which France had a more passive approach and appeared mostly indifferent to the developments in the Western Balkans, during the first term of Macron’s presidency the official Paris has retaken a major role on the regional stage. As part of his ambition to become the political leader of Europe, Macron has launched several initiatives attempting to modify the European enlargement policy. Based on the consequences of these initiatives, we can conclude that the goal was to stop the enlargement process for a foreseeable future, substituting it with an economic and political presence that would ensure the stability of the region within the European sphere of influence. For this purpose, Macron was more than ready to collaborate with autocratic regimes such as the one in Serbia which he believed to be crucial for keeping the Western Balkans relatively stable. This strategy has contributed to the region steadily becoming both less secure and less democratic, eroding the once unquestionable European credibility and influence. The tectonic shifts we are witnessing on the European continent should be a wake-up call to critically evaluate and rethink the French policy in the Western Balkans, including a U-turn in the relationship with the current regime in Belgrade.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Balkans

9. Toward a New Youth Brain-drain Paradigm in the Western Balkans

Author:
Marjan Icoski
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Youth brain drain is one of the most worrisome problems for the Western Balkan Six countries (WB6)—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. The pace and intensity of youth brain drain, rank the WB6 among the top brain drain leaders in the world, with estimations to lose a quarter to half of its skilled and educated young citizens in the forthcoming decades. A situation that cast serious doubts on the democratic and economic progress of WB6, and their prospective membership into the EU. Youth brain drain is a historically rooted topic in the culture and tradition of the WB6, provoking huge sentiments and heated public debates. Due to its sensitivity, it is prone to politicization and misuse by the political parties that did not manage to find a compromise for its full acknowledgment as a separate policy field. Therefore, to date, the policy approach to youth brain drain is declarative and inconsistent, tackled as part of bigger policy areas such as youth employment, education, and diaspora engagement. Although formally, all WB6 countries have policies and institutional mechanisms in place, youth emigration and the desire to leave are constantly on the rise, underlining their limited scope and impact to keep youth home. This paper analyzes the conceptual shortcomings of the current policy approach. In line with the latest trends and tendencies of youth brain drain, it offers fresh policy options for utilization of the potential of the regional youth diaspora as the new WB6 development doctrine. The paper sees the youth diaspora not only as a source of remittances but also as a source of investments, know-how, skills, and connections as per the examples of several EU member states. The paper further announces the necessary paradigm change grounded in the shift of the public narrative and redesign of return and circulation policies through deepening regional cooperation and establishing a new migration deal with the EU under the framework of the WB6 accession processes.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, Brain Drain, and Youth
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Central Europe

10. In support of a new approach with the Western Balkans: Staged accession with a Pierre MIREL consolidation phase

Author:
Pierre Mirel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
In his “Strasbourg Speech” to the European Parliament on 9 May 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron put forward the idea of a European Political Community, to organise Europe from a broader political perspective than the European Union. He was targeting the membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. He nonetheless created a stir in the Western Balkans, even though he made it clear in his press conference that "for the Balkans, the path is already mapped out", by which he meant membership. This concern is understandable given the European perspective they were offered twenty years ago at the European Council of Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003, and that many voices are now being raised in favour of granting the new candidates to the East this formal membership status, or even of opening negotiations already. The European Council of 23-24 June will be important for two reasons: what is the European future of the three new candidates? Will Bulgaria lift its veto on the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and Northern Macedonia? Maintaining it would further weaken the credibility of the European Union at a time when China and Russia are making their ambitions clear.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, and European Council
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, and Balkans