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61. The Centrality of Karabakh in Caucasus Geopolitics

Author:
Svante Cornell
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s ability to reassert its territorial integrity in the 2020 war with Armenia was a major event in the modern history of the Caucasus. This war, commonly called the Second Karabakh War, showed the continued centrality of Karabakh in the geopolitics of the Caucasus. Even more specifically, the citadel of Shusha is the center of the Caucasus: the capital of the former Karabakh Khanate, Shusha lies at the center of this conflict and thus of the region’s geopolitics. Surprisingly, very few scholars have underlined this critical point; in fact, only two studies spring immediately to mind. The first is by Elchin Amirbayov, who in 2001 wrote a report for the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center on Shusha’s “pivotal role” in any future Karabakh settlement; the second is by Faris Shafiyev, who in 2021 contributed a chapter on the “paramount significance” of Shusha in a book co‑edited for ADA University Press by the Co‑Editors of Baku Dialogues. (Amirbayov is presently an adviser to the First Vice President of Azerbaijan; Shafiyev is presently the chairman of the Center of Analysis of International Relations. Both are former Azerbaijani ambassadors.) To reiterate: Shusha has been—in military and symbolic terms—the center of the Armenia‑Azerbaijan conflict, with wide implications that have gone beyond that. For example, it was the loss of Shusha in May 1992 that spelled the end of the first post‑Soviet government of Azerbaijan. Conversely, it was the occupation of Shusha that same year that sealed the Armenia‑Russia alliance, which formed one of the major geopolitical axes of the post‑Soviet Caucasus. But it was also Azerbaijan’s retaking of Shusha that ended the Second Karabakh War. On a deeper level, the Armenia‑Azerbaijan conflict (which centered on but was not limited to Karabakh) formed the main dividing line in the Caucasus. This conflict ensured that the Caucasus was composed of states that were suspicious of each other or in conflict with each other, instead of developing statehood and sovereignty and cooperation together.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Geopolitics, Regionalism, and Statehood
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Asia, and Azerbaijan

62. Trade Flows Between the European Union and the Eastern Partnership Countries: Dynamics and Prospects

Author:
Tomasz Grodzicki
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The Eastern Partnership is a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy focusing on the EU’s Eastern neighbours. Its main objective is to deepen the political and economic integration of the EU with six countries in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The aim of this paper is to assess the development of EU trade relations with Eastern Partnership Countries from 2002 to 2021 and to indicate its prospects. The results show that the EU is in a group of main trading partners of the Eastern Partnership countries. The EU noticed both: a trade surplus with Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia (except in 2005); and a trade deficit with Azerbaijan. The volumes of imports and exports had increased over the years which also led to better economic integration with the EU. However, the future EU-Eastern Partnership trade characteristics and dynamics remain unknown due to the Russian invasion on Ukraine that caused troubles in trade flows in Ukraine and economic sanctions on Russia and Belarus.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Exports, Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus

63. Prospects for Pax Caucasia? The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Initiative

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The 3+3 format for regional cooperation is an initiative that was first proposed by the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, building somewhat on an idea that originated in Iran during the war itself. This grouping covers the three countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) plus the three most important countries neighboring this region (Russia, Turkey, and Iran). Thus in December 2020, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the initiative at a joint press conference with his Azerbaijani counterpart, President Ilham Aliyev, during his visit to Baku in which he reviewed the military parade marking Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the aforementioned war—a war that heralded the fundamental transformation of regional geopolitical and geo‑economic realities. On this occasion, Erdoğan called 3+3 a win‑win initiative for all actors in the region. Given its obvious potential to promote peace and security in the South Caucasus and facilitate the normalization of relations between former belligerents, some local experts believe that the 3+3 initiative could be instrumental for the emergence of Pax Caucasia. Four of the six countries immediately reacted positively to the initiative, with Armenia and Georgia expressing some reservation. While Armenia initially sounded skeptical, the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan eventually confirmed its participation in this format. For now, the only country that retains distance from the Pax Caucasia process is Georgia which, due to its ongoing territorial dispute with Russia, refuses to participate in this platform and proposes an alternative 3+2 format (the countries of the South Caucasus + the EU and the United States). Tbilisi has called its counterproposal the “Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative” but has taken no concrete action to set it in motion. Neither Aliyev nor Pashinyan have yet to publicly comment on the 3+2 format. Others have also remained silent. Hence, the likelihood it can prevail over the 3+3 framework in geopolitical substance is low, given that it excludes major active regional players like Russia and Turkey and substitutes them with two Western actors that are evidently less engaged in the region. The advent of the present phase of the conflict over Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has also not increased the prospects of the Georgian idea being adopted, either.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

64. Repatriating Azerbaijani IDPs Policy Priorities and Recommendations

Author:
Fariz Ismailzade
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The conflict over Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which started in 1988 and resulted in the occupation of some 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories, produced a massive humanitarian catastrophe in the region. Around 350,000 ethnicAzerbaijanis were driven from their homes in the Republic of Armenia in 1988‑1989, becoming refugees in the Republic of Azerbaijan. At the same time, the armed conflict in and around the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) resulted in the ethnic cleansing of an additional 650,000 ethnicAzerbaijanis from their homes in 1992‑1993. By some estimates, back in 1993 Azerbaijan was one of the largest refugee‑ and IDPhosting countries in the world, given that 1 out of every 7 of the country’s Azerbaijani population fell into one of those two categories. In addition to that, Azerbaijan also hosted large numbers of Chechen, Afghan, and Meskheti Turks. Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs mostly came from towns and villages outside the former NKAO part of the Karabakh region. Forcibly driven from their homes, they first settled in temporary tent camps, railway wagons, university dormitories, public buildings, and old sanatoriums. After being ethnically cleansed, their houses in Karabakh were looted and destroyed by Armenian occupational forces. Towns like Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Agdam, Gubadly, and Zangelan were entirely raised to the ground. During the last 30 years, refugees and IDPs received significant humanitarian assistance from various foreign donors, a plethora of national charity organizations, and, of course, the Azerbaijani government. The latter had even launched a housing program for them with the funds accrued by the State Oil Fund, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, which enabled many families to move from tent camps into purpose‑built single‑family home developments that oftentimes included land plots for agricultural activities. When Ilham Aliyev first ran for president in 2003, he had promised to eliminate the need for all tent camps in the country—a promise that he fulfilled in 2007 thanks to the priority allocation of resources from increasing oil revenues. Nevertheless, large number of refugees and IDPs continued to live in temporary housing in Baku and other urban centers that sometimes had significant safety issues and subpar sanitation facilities. Despite the fact that refugees and IDPs receive many welfare benefits from the government of Azerbaijan (e.g., free education, free utilities, monthly remuneration for food and other social payments), their living standards remain suboptimal, and the rate of poverty, health risks, and other social problems among the refugee and IDP community remains higher than the country’s average. At the same time, serious concerns remain regarding the employability and religious education of young people belonging to refugee and IDP communities, with many analysts fearing that this part of the population can be more susceptible to recruitment by foreign radical sects and similar such groups.
Topic:
Ethnic Cleansing, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Repatriation
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Asia, and Azerbaijan

65. Mine Action and the Environment in Karabakh

Author:
Emil Hasanov
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The now‑liberated areas of Azerbaijan are contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the clearance thereof being one of Baku’s highest post‑conflict priorities. Before proceeding any further, we must provide proper definitions of these terms, since they are technical in nature and thus may not be familiar to the general reader. According to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti‑Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction that was adopted in Oslo in 1997 and entered into force in 1999 (it is colloquially called the AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Convention, or APMBC), an anti‑personnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” An antivehicle or antitank mine is effectually the same thing, except that it is designed to explode when triggered by a vehicle. Together, they fall under the catchall term mine, which the same document defines as a “munition designed to be placed under, on, or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle.” Furthermore, explosive remnants of war (ERW) are defined as explosive munitions left behind after a conflict has ended. They include unexploded artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air‑dropped bombs, and cluster munitions. If such weapons fail to detonate as intended for whatever reason, they are called unexploded ordnance (UXO); if, on the other hand, they have not been used during an armed conflict and have been left behind by the party that brought them to the battlefield, they are called abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). Lastly, cluster bombs or cluster munitions, which are defined as weapons containing from several to hundreds of explosive submunitions. They are dropped either from the air or fired from the ground and are designed to break open in mid‑air, releasing submunitions and saturating an area that can be as wide as several football pitches. Based on past practice, the failure rate of cluster munitions to explode as intended stands at between 10 and 30 percent.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Environment, Mining, and Recovery
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Asia, and Azerbaijan

66. Understanding the Baku-Tehran Relationship

Author:
Nina Miholjcic
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Even though Azerbaijan and Iran have maintained cordial ties over the years, this has been punctured by evidently turbulent periods of constrained diplomatic and political rhetoric, which has produced occasional volatility in the bilateral relationship. Ever since Azerbaijan regained its independence in 1991, Baku and Tehran have remained cautious and circumspect in their interactions whilst managing to avoid open conflict. Such vigilance is due for the most part to the effects of contrasting foreign policies, divergent choices of allies and foes, different constitutional arrangements, and contrary ethnic‑ and identity‑based perceptions and postures. Such and similar points of friction explain why Azerbaijan and Iran continue to be wary of one another in their bilateral communication and diplomatic relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Azerbaijan

67. Time to Get U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations on Track Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War has created a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region.

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War has created a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region. This new geopolitical reality creates challenges and opportunities for the United States. Azerbaijan’s victory in the war means that NATO member Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus, and by extension Central Asia, is on the rise. If Washington and Ankara can get their bilateral relationship back on track, Turkey’s ascendancy in the region can benefit broader U.S. strategic interests. In the aftermath of the conflict there is also an opportunity for America to increase and deepen regional economic and energy cooperation. However, Moscow now has troops—either by invitation or by occupation—in all three countries of the South Caucasus and in Kazakhstan on the other side of the Caspian. From the American point of view, this does not help bring stability or security to the region. Azerbaijan is in a strategic region where many U.S. geopolitical interests converge. Since 2001, Azerbaijan has proven to be a reliable partner for America against terrorism as well as in the war in Afghanistan. With the new geopolitical reality in the region, U.S. policymakers would be remiss to ignore this limited window of opportunity for improving Washington’s relationship with Baku.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Asia, Azerbaijan, North America, and United States of America

68. Azerbaijan in the Struggle for Eurasia Restoring America’s Geostrategic Approach

Author:
Michael Doran
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan is “geopolitically critical” to the United States, argues the 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard, by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor to former President Jimmy Carter. Counterbalancing Russia is a primary duty of the United States, and the mere placement of Azerbaijan on the map makes it a crucial partner in that effort. The benefits of partnership extend well beyond Azerbaijan’s immediate neighborhood, the South Caucasus. The country is the sole gateway to the West of the former Soviet states of Central Asia. The independence of those states, Brzezinski explains, “can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow’s control.” Brzezinski was not alone in championing this view. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, American foreign policy professionals on both sides of the political aisle espoused the same perspective, which we shall dub the “the geostrategic approach.” Its influence generated significant American support for the creation of an East‑West land bridge, across which rail tracks and energy pipelines now stretch—the Silk Road region’s only terrestrial supply lines from Asia to Europe that Russia cannot control. This land bridge opened the way for an air corridor which, during the war in Afghanistan, allowed planes from America’s military bases in the Middle East to reach the battlefield by a route much shorter than any alternative, and one that required no haggling with difficult partners, such as Russia. As it emerged defeated three decades ago from the First Karabakh War (1988‑1994), Azerbaijan was virtually a failed state, inundated with hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. Today it is the wealthiest, most prosperous, and most influential country in its neighborhood. Its victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War also revealed the startling power of its military. The rise of Azerbaijan has vindicated Brzezinski and his cohort, but even as the country grows stronger and fulfills the role envisioned for it, the geostrategic approach grows weaker. Supporters of this perspective in Washington today are few and far between. Are we witnessing the temporary eclipse of an influential foreign policy doctrine, or its total demise?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Asia, Azerbaijan, North America, and United States of America

69. Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations in the Wake of the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Agil Rustamzade and Anar Valiyev
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The Second Karabakh War was more than a war between two belligerents; essentially, it represented a war between two strategic paradigms: one belonging to the twenty‑first century and the other a relic of twentieth‑century military thinking. Azerbaijan’s achievement of air supremacy with the help of drones was not only one of the crucial factors that decided the outcome of that particular war; it will almost certainly contribute to the further development of the military art in armed conflicts of various scopes across various theaters in the time ahead. At the same time, referring to this war as a “drone war” does not reflect reality. In this, as in much else, impressionable journalists got it wrong: this could be a proper designation only if the drones had fought also on the ground instead of soldiers. Certainly, the use of drones was decisive; but the laurels of victory in this war do not belong solely to this contingent of the Azerbaijani military: the mobile groups of special forces were also decisive. Each played a critical part in the country’s military achievement. We begin with an examination of the area of hostilities and the respective dispositions of the parties to the conflict before getting into a discussion about some relevant aspects of Operation Iron Fist—the official designation used by Azerbaijan for the Second Karabakh War. We conclude with remarks of a more geopolitical nature.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

70. Terms, Conditions, Intersecting Interests Turkey and Regional Cooperation After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Ayça Ergun
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
This essay should be understood as a series of reflections on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War and how this has provided Turkey with a great opportunity to revisit, redefine, and even consolidate its newfound role and mission in the region. It is predicated on the assessment that, starting in July 2020, Turkey became more proactive and involved in the region, which in turn laid the foundation for a game‑changing development; Turkey’s stature then grew even further in the wake of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War. Now Ankara is taking on a balancing role—if not quite a mediating one—in the region. The situation is not straightforward: the well‑consolidated empowerment of the Russian Federation in the wake of the war has ensured its continuing status as the main mediator in conflict resolution as well as open the possibility for it to become a genuine peacemaker. Turkey is considered the main balancing power to potentially check or restrain Russia’s dominant position, at least down the road. But for now, Russia can be considered as “being fully back” on the ground: its armed forces are present in each of the three South Caucasus states—by invitation or otherwise. This lends a certain pallor of instability to the newly achieved status quo, although this is not widely recognized, much less pronounced in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. It is thus too early to speak about full‑on regional integration, which will take time to bring about. Yet already today there is potential for the realization of regional cooperation. The ideas related to the latter are being discussed in various fora, yet the feasibility of the implementation of these ideas remains open to interpretation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan