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3241. Refugees and the Myth of the Borderless World

Author:
William Maley, Greg Fry, Alan Dupont, Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, James Jupp, and Thuy Do
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian National University Department of International Relations
Abstract:
Refugees are quintessentially victims of the states system. If the moral justification of the territorial state is to provide an authority accountable for the well-being of a designated citizenry, then the failure of individual states to discharge this task creates a responsibility on those who otherwise benefit from the system of states to aid those who suffer persecution in the territories in which they are nominally owed a primary duty of care. The number of refugees and other displaced persons in the world is extremely small—roughly 0.3 per cent of the world's population—but each is a precious being, and the way they are treated is a measure not of their worth, but of the moral capacity of those who are in a position to come to their assistance. Life chances in the present world order are to a significant degree arbitrarily determined by the accident of birthplace. Afghans and Iraqis, strongly represented in the world's present refugee population, are not refugees as punishment for their own failings. And ministers and bureaucrats in Western countries, typically enjoying lives of considerable luxury, are rarely well-off in recognition of their outstanding moral virtues; many simply had the good luck to be born in the right countries. If there is a global refugee crisis, it is not in terms of the number of refugees, but in terms of the willingness of wealthy and prosperous peoples to reach out to them. In the following paragraphs, I shall do three things. First, I offer brief overviews of the meaning of 'refugee' and of the current state of the world's refugees. Second, I outline the framework of institutions and measures which has evolved for the management of refugee protection and refugee needs. In conclusion, I offer some observations on the challenges which the refugee regime faces, and on the steps which need to be taken to improve the refugees' positions.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Asia, and Australia/Pacific

3242. Recommendations for Democratization Assistance in the Caspian Region

Author:
Vladimir Shkolnikov
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This paper discusses Western democratization assistance programs to Caspian states over the last ten years and the lessons policy makers should learn from these programs. It makes the following points: The euphoria of the early 1990s over the end of the Cold War caused Western organizations to have unrealistic expectations for democratic development in the former Soviet Union. Western democracy assistance programs have often failed to take the perspective of “the ordinary person on the street” in recipient countries into consideration. Instead, these programs usually reflect external, Western-imposed priorities. Western democracy-promoting organizations have often failed to appreciate the extent to which traditional institutions in Caspian societies (such as kinship networks) managed to survive the Soviet period and still influence the societies of the region. Western democracy-promoting organizations have failed to take into consideration the security challenges that Caspian states have had to confront during their first decade of independence. The war against global terrorism gives the West an opportunity to reevaluate its policies towards the Caspian region. Rather than relying solely on experiences of North American and Western European democracies, Western democracy-promoting organizations need to draw upon the recent experiences of new democracies of Central Europe in creating new models for the Caspian region.
Topic:
Democratization
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Central Asia, Asia, Soviet Union, and North America

3243. Black Sea Defense Ministers Forum (Event Summary)

Author:
Victor Bannykh, Victor Gaiciuc, Armen Kirakossian, and David Tevzadze
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
On May 2, the Black Sea Security Program held a public forum at the Kennedy School of Government that featured leading representatives from the governments of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. This panel was moderated by Graham Allison, chair of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Moldova, Eastern Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Georgia

3244. Russia Watch No.7, March 2002

Author:
Duncan DeVille, Danielle Lussier, Melissa Carr, David Rekhviashvili, Annaliis Abrego, and John Grennan
Publication Date:
03-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Russian support for U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism has surprised many Western observers. But this was not the only recent surprise from Moscow — Western advocates for the rule of law in Russia also had much to celebrate in the closing months of 2001. Under strong prodding by President Vladimir Putin, the Duma passed several impressive pieces of reform legislation, including an entirely new Criminal Procedure Code, a potentially revolutionary land reform law, new shareholder protections in amendments to the Joint Stock Company Law, and the first post-Soviet Labor Code.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Moscow

3245. Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway System

Author:
Robyn Pangi
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
In the early to mid 1990s, a group known as Aum Shinrikyo amassed, and used against innocent civilians, an arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. A large body of literature details the evolution of Aum Shinrikyo, its shocking attacks on a housing complex in Matsumoto and on five subway lines in Tokyo using a chemical weapon, and Japanese society's reaction to the attacks. Not much analysis, however, has been done on the lessons learned about consequence management from the first significant terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction to occur in modern times. Recent events in the United States including the dispersal of anthrax spores through the mail and scores of hoaxes alleging use of anthrax have brought the issue of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) closer to home. The handling of the Aum Shinrikyo attacks offers the opportunity for policymakers, emergency response personnel, and other relevant professionals to learn about WMD consequence management.
Topic:
National Security, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, Asia, Tokyo, and Matsumoto

3246. The Prospects for Peace in Chechnya (Event summary)

Author:
Ilias Akhmadov
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Observers of the situation in Chechnya know that the "prospects for peace" that Akhmadov's title refers to are virtually nil, as Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chechen rebel leaders continue to lock horns on how to end the hostilities that broke out in war over two years ago. Akhmadov devoted considerable time in his discussion to the problems confronting Chechnya since the development of a Bush-Putin alliance to combat "Islamic fundamentalism." He also challenged Putin's insistence that the conflicts in Chechnya are domestic and therefore not subject to international monitoring or mediation. Akhmadov opened his talk with the assertion that the destruction he had discussed at the Davis Center in January 2000 had grown more serious, with levels of physical devastation and civilian casualties on the rise and the world community more supportive than ever of armed Russian intervention. To illustrate his point that the Russian Federation is unfairly using the international war on terror to justify actions in Chechnya, Akhmadov said that two days after FBI agents found diskettes containing flying instructions which had belonged to the terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the US, Russian FSB agents reported finding similar diskettes belonging to Chechen terrorists in the woods near a pilot-training school. Akhmadov considered the presence of such a school in those woods unlikely. He added that a high casualty rate among Chechen civilians is now officially connected to the search for members of Al Qaeda. Akhmadov reminded the audience of a speech made by Putin on September 24, 2001, in which the Russian president expressed support for the United States' war on terror and urged Chechen rebels to disarm and abandon their separatist fight. Akhmadov's response to that speech was that disarmament could not be a condition for starting peace talks. As for the November meeting between Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's envoy to Chechnya, and Akhmed Zakayev, a prominent representative of Chechnya's rebels, Akhmadov said it "left no room for illusions about their relations, or about the Russian government's position on Chechnya." The talk ended when Zakayev refused to comply with Kazanstev's request that the rebels disarm. Akhmadov addressed allegations of ties between the rebels and Osama bin Laden in the question-and-answer session, restricting himself during his talk to criticism of what he considers unwarranted BBC and CNN reports about the "thousands of Chechens fighting in Afghanistan." While Akhmadov allowed for the possibility that a few Chechens could be fighting for the Taliban, he stressed the unlikelihood that Chechens played a critical role in Taliban efforts and reported that nobody yet had been able to provide any "concrete facts to verify that Chechens are fighting for the Taliban." Putin's affirmations that Chechnya belongs to Russia apparently strike Akhmadov as oxymoronic, as indicated by his remark that "the Russian Federation wants to integrate the territory of Chechnya but not the people." To convey the extent of destruction wrought by the Chechen-Russian conflicts, Akhmadov cited data culled by Russians showing that before the first war in 1994, there were 1 million Chechens; 100,000 people were killed between 1994-6; that casualty figure has been greatly exceeded during the fighting that started in 1999. In addition, 400,000 Chechens have emigrated or become displaced persons. Akhmadov pointedly remarked that "we don't count as refugees, because that only happens during a war . . . What is happening in Chechnya is, according to Russia, 'a small, minor anti-terrorist operation.'"Finally, Akhmadov stated that impartial monitoring groups were needed to observe the conflict. He also asserted that a one-on-one dialogue with Russians was not a realistic solution and that intermediaries were needed to promote discussion between Russian and Chechen leaders. Following his prepared talk, Akhmadov replied to questions from the audience about issues including Chechen rebel fighting in Abkhazia, hostage-taking, and Russian bombing of civilian and industrial areas. In response to a question about Maskhadov's ability to rebuild the war-torn region, Akhmadov said that "neither Maskhadov nor any other Chechen can do anything with Chechnya's meager resources." He also said that the international community should aid Chechnya in future attempts to rebuild the war-torn republic and that visiting Ground Zero in New York had given him the "feeling that I had seen that [kind of devastation] somewhere before, only on a larger scale." Finally, Akhmadov answered an audience member's question about Russian and Chechen military strategy by saying that it was hard forhim to believe that "someone is sitting at a map plotting points . . . We're [Russians and Chechens] just killing each other . . . Russians see us, they kill us, and vice versa. It's a snowball effect."
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

3247. Assessing Russian Democracy (Event Summary)

Author:
Grigory Yavlinsky
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Mr Yavlinsky began by thanking the Belfer Center for the invitation and said that the main topic of his talk will be to explore the progress of Russian Democratization. According to Mr. Yavlinsky, the process of democratization involves not only creating some set of democratic procedures, like free elections or free press. It is necessary to look behind the formal democratic institutions to ask what people applying and using them have in mind. Only after analyzing such motivations is it possible to understand how essentially democratic and legitimate institutions produce results contrary to their nature. The value of freedom of speech is nonexistent, if people have nothing to say, the freedom of action is needless if people are only willing to march in military ranks. Hence democracy can only work if the society enacting it has some basic democratic values, education, beliefs or moral principles. The democratic institutions and procedures per se are merely tools, able to transform these ideas and beliefs into reality. That is why the benefits of mere democratic procedures are so limited. It is for this reason that the economic base of any democracy is one of its crucial elements, providing for independent individuals as its basic members. In Mr. Yavlinsky's opinion, these facts represent the main challenge for Russian democracy. Russia's small and middle business enterprises are important for its democracy. Mr. Yavlinsky called them a "conditio sine qua non" for any democratic society. Only if the economy of the country can ensure the independent economic behavior of its citizens and only if these citizens have a certain level of democratic education and democratic values, only in this case the democratic procedures can work for the common benefit. From Yavlinsky's point of view the main challenge for the Russian reforms is that the country has to perform an acrobatic act, similar to riding a bicycle, where it must accomplish two operations simultaneously: the Russians have to engage in actions preparing democracy and at the same time practice this democracy with no reference to any previous historic democratic record. After presenting these general thoughts Mr. Yavlinsky moved on to a deeper analysis of the present Russian situation. He assumed that the present political elite consists of people coming from the Soviet administrative system and still thinking in Soviet categories. To achieve their goals they use a democratic cover "quasi democracy," a somewhat modernized version of the famous "Potemkin villages." Just like Stalin's constitution, which was considered to be one the most progressive democratic constitutions, the present formally democratic institutions in Russia do not constitute real democracy. Yavlinsky described the present state of political life in Russia as a controlled or managed democracy. This is a state where the democratic tools are used to achieve any result desirable for the leader of the country. The most recent example of this type of manipulation was a recent proposal drawn up by the parties close to the Russian president. According to this proposal, elections should only be considered valid if voter participation was at least 50 percent and only if one of the candidates was able to achieve more then 50 percent of the votes. In the opinion of Mr. Yavlinsky such a regulation would easily lead to an election deadlock, which would benefit the president. Mr. Yavlinsky underscored the difference between this type of controlled democracy and a totalitarian rule. While the latter destroys all the democratic institutions directly and openly, the main strategy of controlled democracy is not to destroy, but to adjust the institutions to serve the goals of the ruling elite. If any adjustment of institutions is impossible, the government prefers to replace the people controlling these institutions (like replacing the owners of the free TV stations) or substitute these institutions with new, more easily manageable organizations (as happened in the case of the Media Union, which was created to weaken the influence of the Union of Journalists). Speculating on the future of the Russian democracy, Yavlinsky stressed the special and very important role of bureaucracy in implementing this new "vertical of power." However as any bureaucracy, it will lead to more corruption. In order to keep the corruption under control, the government will have to use intense enforcement mechanisms, which might go as far as creating a police state. Of the three core democratic elements — free press, free elections, and an independent judiciary — Mr. Yavlinsky specifically spoke about the press. Yavlinsky said that the situation with the press in today's Russia is certainly not comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union. Everyone can read anything in the press, even the most incredible and slanderous information about most prominent political figures. Restricted is any systematic explanation or critical analysis of the political events. For example, state television stations have a list of people who are not to be shown on the air. The same is true for the list of forbidden topics. Certainly there still are a some newspapers who still cover critical topics (e.g. Obschaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta). However, they unfold their activities in a kind of a glass box, their presence is not really essential, and is only useful for the government in order to demonstrate to foreign observers that free press exists. As a result of such media control, the Russian population is subject to the management and manipulation of human choice. According to Mr. Yavlinsky this ability to manipulate and control is actually one of the main results of the last 10 years: it is not hard to manipulate the choice of the Russian public. Just like one could convince it to vote for Yeltsin or vote for a totally unknown newcomer Putin, you can always manipulate the public opinion. In the question and answer section Yavlinsky addressed various issues. In speaking about the best way western countries could assist Russia on its way towards democracy, Yavlinsky rejected any form of financial credits or subsidies. He is convinced that the help must be conducted in a smart way and this means in the first place the west should give up any policy of double standards towards Russia and address Russia as an honest and valuable ally. Regarding Putin's intentions, Yavlinsky mentioned two of them: the intention to make Russia a strong state and to protect his own power. The question is not whether these goals are good or bad, but rather which instruments Putin is prepared to use to implement those goals.
Topic:
Security and Human Rights
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

3248. The IMF's Dilemma in Argentina: Time for a New Approach to Lending?

Author:
Carol Graham and Paul Robert Masson
Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
In recent years, the international financial system has faced tremendous challenges, from the Asia, Russia, and Brazil crises in the late 1990s, to Argentina's default and ensuing economic collapse in 2002 to new worries about a possible default in Brazil. An increasing number of observers are questioning the way the international financial institutions manage these crises. An alternative approach that is endorsed in principle by many—including Horst Köhler, the new managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—is a move toward more selective lending with fewer conditions, with the decision to lend based on a more general and ultimately political assessment of the recipient government's capacity to deliver on its promises. Argentina provides a potential test bed for this approach.
Topic:
International Organization and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, Brazil, Argentina, South America, and Latin America

3249. Strengthening Financial Sector Governance in Emerging Markets

Author:
Robert Litan, Michael Pomerleano, and V. Sundararajan
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
Policymakers and analysts are still sifting through the wreckage of the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the subsequent crises in Russia, Turkey, and Argentina to discern key lessons so that similar crises will not recur. Some lessons are by now well understood. Pegged exchange rates can encourage excessive borrowing and expose countries to financial collapse when foreign exchange reserves run dry. Inadequate disclosures by both private companies and public bodies can lead to similar dangers. Although many factors undoubtedly contributed to these crises, it is now widely recognized that each suffered from a failure in “governance,” and in particular a failure in governance in their financial sectors. Accordingly, the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Brookings Institution devoted their fourth annual Financial Markets and Development Conference, held in New York from April 17-19, 2002, to the subject of financial sector governance in emerging markets. This conference report summarizes some of the highlights of the conference, whose full proceedings will be published as a Brookings book in the fall of 2002.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Russia, New York, Turkey, Asia, and Argentina

3250. Summit with Substance: Creating Payoffs in an Unequal Partnership

Author:
Andrew Kuchins
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin have an important opportunity at their upcoming meeting to reach key agreements, remove major irritants in U.S.–Russian relations, and initiate a genuine partnership less burdened by Cold War legacies. In Europe last summer and in the United States last November, the two leaders established personal chemistry and trust—but the meetings lacked substance. Although Putin's leadership position will not be made or broken on his foreign policies, this time it will be important for his pro-Western orientation to produce a concrete payoff for Russia. As for President Bush, if the summit fails to produce results, then his vaunted Russia policy will be seen to be drifting. Thus both men require real outcomes such as a signed, legally binding nuclear arms reduction agreement and a new institutional relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Perhaps just as important, however, Putin and Bush each must explain to his own country why this partnership is important and what are its key elements.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, and Asia