Number of results to display per page
Search Results
2182. NATO and the new US "Af-Pak" Strategy
- Author:
- Christopher M. Schnaubelt
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Operations in Afghanistan pose a strategic challenge for NATO, not only because it is the largest and longest duration combat operation in the history of the Alliance, but also because of the fissures that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has exposed among NATO members. These difference include questions on how to characterize and approach the violence in Afghanistan and the relative military contributions by member states to the first and thus far only operation conducted by NATO under Article V. Allegations that some members have not been carrying their fair share of the burden have raised the specter of a "two-tier" alliance.
- Topic:
- NATO, International Security, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and Asia
2183. Are Chinese Exports Sensitive to Changes in the Exchange Rate?
- Author:
- Shaghil Ahmed
- Publication Date:
- 12-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
- Abstract:
- This paper builds a model of two types of Chinese exports, those processed and assembled laregely from imported inputs ("processed" exports) and "non- processed" exports. Based on this model, the sensitivity of Chinese exports to exchange rate changes is empirically examined. Unlike previous work, the estimation period includes the net real appreciation of the renminbi that has occurredoverthepastthreeyears. Theresultsshowthatgreaterexchangerate appreciation dampens export growth, both for non-processed and processed ex- ports, with the estimated cumulative price elasticity being substantially greater thanunity. WhenthesourceoftheincreaseintheChineserealexchangerateis appreciations against the currencies of other emerging Asian trading partners, the e§ect on processing exports is positive but insignÖcant, while the e§ect on non-processing exports is signiÖcantly negative. By contrast, when the source of the increase in the Chinese real exchange rate is appreciation against Chinaís advanced-economy trading partners, the e§ects on both types of exports are negative. These results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Counterfactualsimulationsbasedontheestimatedmodelstronglysug- gest that if the trade-weighted real renminbi had appreciated at an annual rate of 10 percent per quarter since mid-2005, Chinese real exports would have been roughly 30 percent lower today. Thus greater exchange rate áexibility could contribute to lowering Chinaís huge trade surplus through restraining growth of exports.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Trade and Finance, Exchange Rate Policy, and Exports
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
2184. China's Transition to a Knowledge Economy (pdf)
- Author:
- Sangaralingam Ramesh
- Publication Date:
- 02-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
- Abstract:
- The Coastal regions of China have benefited more from reform policies associated with China’s research and educational sectors. These reforms were put in place to ensure that the results of knowledge creation activities from universities and research institutes ‘spilled over’ into the entrepreneurial economy. Human Capital is important to any knowledge activity whether creation or transfer. The development of Human Capital is through education .This factor may ultimately be responsible for long term growth by technological innovation .In this context it is necessary to discuss the two dominant schools of thought regarding economic growth before considering other aspects of knowledge spillovers.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Reform, Capitalism, Human Capital, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
2185. Infrastructure, Knowledge Creation and Spillovers and Economic Growth in China
- Author:
- Sangaralingam Ramesh
- Publication Date:
- 03-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
- Abstract:
- The economic prosperity associated with the Coastal regions of China has not ‘trickled’ down to the Western and Central regions sufficiently enough to eliminate the disparities in income between the regions. Indeed, the disparities between China’s Coastal regions and its other regions continue to deepen to the present day. In the Mao period the Central planners held the mistaken belief that investment in the railways and development of heavy industry in the interior parts of China would bring prosperity. In the reform period and beyond, the focus of economic development in China has been to take advantage of China’s low labour costs. In the earlier part of the reform era the focus of economic reforms centred on the development of Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) .In the second phase of reform policies were centred on the High Technology Development Zones [NHTIDZ’s].A characteristic feature of both SEZ’s and NHTIDZ’s is that they represent a concentration of infrastructure within a predefined spatial area. The framework of analysis in this paper is the New Economic Geography [NEG] .The NEG addresses the formation of agglomeration economies accruing to physical linkages in one location. However, the NEG does not address the issue of how agglomeration economies form due to knowledge creation linkages which are location independent. The main facet of this approach is that it will allow for a qualitative analysis of the spatial aspects of the infrastructural and knowledge creation factors affecting China’s economic growth. Previous approaches which have been used to study infrastructure and economic growth in China have been based on Econometric techniques. These approaches use measures such as length of railway, length of roads and telephone density, while in reality the concentration of infrastructure in the SEZ’s and NHTIDZ’s as significantly contributed to China’s post 1978 economic growth.
- Topic:
- Infrastructure, Income Inequality, and Economic growth
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
2186. Moving From a North Korean Nuclear Problem to the Problem of North Korea
- Author:
- Chaesung Chun
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- North Korea, in conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, is repeating its earlier pattern of nuclear diplomacy: raising the level of military tensions by launching a long-range rocket and performing a nuclear test, and then searching for the most favorable position once negotiations resume. This vicious circle, composed of North Korea's brinkmanship and other countries’ multilateral sanctions will continue without any prospect of solving the North Korean nuclear problem in the near future. The so-called action-to-action paradigm cannot succeed, because the most fundamental principles of North Korea and the countries conflict with each other. Japan, South Korea, and the United States hope that a "stick and carrot" approach will elicit concessions from North Korea during the process of negotiations, but North Korea will not take steps toward giving up its nuclear program, unless its leaders feel sure that they are being given reliable, material guarantees for the survival of their entire regime, system, and state. Because their nuclear program is their ultimate bargaining chip, “sticks and carrots” focusing only on specific issues of the negotiations will be fall far short of solving the problems of North Korea as a whole. Sixteen years have passed since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. The Geneva System, based on the Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea in Geneva in 1994, lasted for eight years (from October 1994 to October 2002), but failed to manage the problems of nuclear proliferation and the normalization of relations. The success or failure of the new system of Six-Party Talks is yet to be seen, but as of now in 2009, negotiations based on the approach of the George W. Bush administration and, more specifically, the February 13 agreement of 2007 seem to be in a stalemate. The North Korean problem is older than the North Korean nuclear problem. From the perspective of North Korea, the latter is its desired solution to the following questions: How will North Korea survive in the post-Cold War world, in which most socialist countries are no longer socialist? What kind of regime and system can North Korea sustain in this environment? How will North Korea compete with South Korea and resist absorption by the South? North Korea developed a nuclear program and pursued militaristic diplomacy as the most plausible shortcuts to solve the problems indicated by these questions. For countries outside of North Korea, diplomacy has failed to solve either the North Korean nuclear problem or the more general North Korean problem. The Six-Party Talks that have been held by South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russian Federation, and North Korea are stalled at the last phase of the second stage of what is termed “disablement,” and participants are now struggling to find a way to get into the third stage of the agreement of February 13. Reaching the issue of North Korea’s declaration and verification of its nuclear program is critical, because it will demonstrate a genuine intention to begin the process of giving up its program. Yet North Korea is desperately trying to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Obama administration by first launching a long-range rocket and then by testing a nuclear weapon for the second time, reversing the achievements of the disablement stage and rejecting the Six-Party Talks altogether. North Korea desires to strike a comprehensive deal with the Obama administration through bilateral talks, and seeks a variety of political, economic, and diplomatic rewards such as a peace treaty, diplomatic normalization, economic assistance, the lifting of international economic sanctions, and possibly light-water reactors. The five countries in the Six-Party Talks except North Korea have tried to evade facing up to the North Korean problem, because it is difficult to know how best to influence the future orientation of the North Korean regime, system, and diplomatic position. The structure of the Six-Party talks has also been narrowly focused on the problem of the nuclear program, leaving broader questions aside. The Northeast Asian international order, which is based on a strict and competitive balance of power, will be gravely influenced by the future orientation of North Korea, and therefore it is appropriate for the five countries most affected to deal with the North Korean problem directly. But by focusing so narrowly on the North Korean nuclear issues, these countries have maintained only minimal agreement on how to manage the nuclear problems that are involved, sometimes showing strategic and tactical differences on various specifics. In spite of the five countries’ agreement on the Six-Party presidential statement criticizing North Korea's rocket launch on April 9, they have had a hard time finding common ground to deal with future North Korean problems. The United States has been determined to impose economic sanctions on North Korean firms by using a specifically targeted list, as well as to punish North Korea diplomatically by refusing to give serious and close attention to the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea and Japan have maintained a policy of neglecting North Korea for different reasons. The two countries seem to continue minimal interactions with North Korea even if the North fails to meet the conditions suggested by these countries. China and Russia do not want to take the initiative either to punish or to side with North Korea, and only reluctantly facilitate cooperation among the other countries.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
2187. A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity
- Author:
- Seongho Sheen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States today faces a complex security environment, in which the threats it confronts are more diverse, more complicated, and require a more delicately balanced approach than ever before. In particular, expectations—even demands—are growing for South Korea to contribute to world peace and stability as a global partner for the United States in pursuing their mutual security interests (Campbell et al. 2009). Do the ROK and the United States share enough strategic interests to sustain such an alliance in the twenty-first century? And should South Korea assume an increasing role in maintaining regional and global peace? During the Cold War, the two countries' alliance was a military one, focused on the clear and direct threat from North Korea. Now, in the twenty-first century, the two security partners must transform their hard alliance into a "smart" alliance to meet more diverse security challenges together. A different set of hard and soft approaches are required, and a smart alliance will call for a more flexible combination of roles played by each partner, depending on the circumstances.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
2188. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`
- Author:
- EAI Security Net
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
2189. Muddling along with Missiles
- Author:
- Dongho Jo
- Publication Date:
- 07-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- On April 5, 2009, North Korea carried out a rocket launch. North Korea argued that it was a satellite launch vehicle rather than a warhead-carrying ballistic missile, and portrayed the launch in innocuous and civilian terms, even naming the rocket “Unha,” which means “Galaxy” in Korean, to emphasize its space-oriented function. However, most nations, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, suspect that these words were only a cover for a test of North Korea’s long-range missile technology. In addition, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, followed by several launches of short-range missiles from its east coast. Furthermore, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles on July 2 and additional seven missiles on July 4, despite the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1874 on June 12, condemning North Korea’s hostile activities in the strongest possible terms. Why has North Korea gone ahead with its provocative actions in the face of serious opposition from most of the outside world? To date, analysts have focused on the political aspects of the missile launch. They speculate that its purpose was to push the United States toward bilateral dialogue or to pressure the South Korean government to return to its more positive stance known as the “sunshine policy.” Others argue that the launch was meant to strengthen leadership’s weakening hold inside the country and to ensure its dynastic line of succession. All of these explanations are plausible, and North Korea, of course, may have had multiple goals. But observers seeking to understand the North Korea’s actions are missing one critical component: the economic factor. The North Korean economy was in very poor shape in the 1990s and is still experiencing difficulties. This economic hardship, however, has not only been evident in recent decades but had already begun in the early 1970s, mainly due to lack of capital. Since then, the country’s top economic priority has been to determine how to encourage foreign capital to help the North Korea escape from economic shortages. One alternative pursued since the mid-1990s has been to develop the missile program as an effective means of earning foreign exchange. Understanding the part played by the economic situation in North Korea’s decisions about its missile program is the purpose of this brief article.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
2190. Japan between Alliance and Community
- Author:
- Yul Sohn
- Publication Date:
- 08-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- In a series of town hall meetings during the winter of 2005–2006, Aso Taro, then Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Koizumi cabinet, introduced an interesting concept of Japan’s role in Asia. Japan can and should play the role of a “thought leader,” who through fate has been forced to face certain very difficult issues earlier than others. Because Japan has put great effort, both monetarily and socio-politically, into resolving issues that include ultra-nationalism, an aging society, and environmental protection, it has become the forerunner for other Asians to emulate (Aso 2005). This role as a soft power leader contrasts with the existing hard power–oriented (i.e., economic) discourse of international contribution as well as the conventional soft power discourse that is rooted in the Japanese culture and sensibilities, such as animation, fashion, and cultural products. Japan’s strength lies in the firstmover knowledge it provides for Asia, creating a network of knowledge available to others (Aso 2006). Three years later, Aso, this time as the Japanese Prime Minister, proudly announced a "Growth Initiative" that planned to double the current scale of Asia's economy by 2020 (Aso 2009a). This initiative, Aso’s first and thus far most important vision for Asia as Prime Minister, is aimed at moving Asia's economy from one driven by exports to one led by domestic demand, through encouraging region-wide development and expanded consumption. To make this effort, Japan has committed (a) US$20 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA); (b) US$20 billion for infrastructure development in Asia; (c) US$5 billion over two years for an initiative investing in Asian environmental projects; and (d) US$22 billion over two years to provide additional support for trade financing in order to underpin trade credit, and so on. Japan will mobilize all possible policy measures to support the efforts being made by Asian countries. In addition, Aso seeks to increase the attractiveness of Japan by utilizing cultural sources (such as manga, animation, fashion, authentic food) to create jobs in Japan and the region (Aso 2009b). Aso’s recent initiative appears to have tilted in a direction different from his earlier vision of Japan as a thought leader, a well thought out and creative idea. Today, given Japan’s rapid economic contraction caused by its “once in a century” crisis, Japan finds it difficult to attain the regional leadership it desires merely by spending more money. Utilizing cultural resources will yield only a limited outcome. Finally, the initiative is targeted at Southeast Asia and the Pacific, with few attempts to assist or engage the members of Northeast Asia such as China and South Korea. Japan has so far failed to play its desired role as a thought leader for Asia. The inconsistency between words and actions underlines the strategic dilemmas that Japan has faced as China has risen to be a formidable rival in the region.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, Culture, Alliance, and Community
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia