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31. New Developments in International Production Networks: Impact of Digital Technologies

Author:
Ayako Obashi and Fukunari Kimura
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
We conducted a standard gravity exercise using worldwide disaggregated trade data to shed light on the influence of the spread of digital technologies on network trade. We found that growing investment in industrial robots in relatively lagging countries, together with imported digitally deliverable services, is enhancing bilateral network trade flows in East Asia, but not necessarily in other parts of the world. This suggests that exploring complementarities between machines and human resources in production blocks supported by better service-link connectivity may allow newly developed economies to retain and expand the international division of labour.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Digital Economy, and Productivity
Political Geography:
East Asia and Asia

32. Technology Imports and Employment in Developing Countries: Evidence from Viet Nam

Author:
Thu Thu Vu and Duc Anh Dang
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Advanced machines and technology replace workers through automation. However, capital–labour substitution need not reduce aggregate labour demand, as it induces simultaneous contrasting effects within industries. To explore these effects, we examine the relationship between employment in Vietnamese manufacturing firms and imported capital goods in 2011–2017. To solve the problem of potential endogeneity and measurement errors, we used Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) imported capital goods as an instrument variable for imported capital goods in Viet Nam. We found that imported capital goods do not displace employment and even increase employment and labour productivity. The impacts of imported advanced technology are more pronounced in large firms. More imported technology increases labour productivity in state-owned enterprises and the number of workers in large firms and firms in industrial zones. However, the increase in the level of employment is lower in industries and firms intensively using machines.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Employment, and Imports
Political Geography:
Asia and Vietnam

33. Technological Advancement, Import Penetration, and Labour Markets: Evidence from Thai Manufacturing

Author:
Đoàn Thi Thanh Ha
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper examines the impacts of advanced technology on a possible change in workers’ skills, wages, and employment due to such technological advancement. Three proxies of advanced technologies are used in the study: (i) information and communications technology, (ii) intensity of robot use, and (iii) value of e-commerce. Our study compares the effects of technological advancements on labour market outcomes with import penetration, delineating into raw materials, capital goods, and final products. Our results show that in Thailand, the impact of advanced technology in pushing workers out of the job market is limited. Instead, it tends to affect reallocation of workers between skilled and unskilled positions. The results vary amongst proxies of technology and sectors. It seems that workers in comparatively capital-intensive industries, including automotive, plastics and chemicals, and electronics and machinery, are the most affected by advanced technology. Dampened wage/income is found only in some proxies of technology and sectors. Our results show less concern of negative impacts induced by imports, particularly imports of capital goods and raw materials, on employment status and income than technological advancement.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Employment, Manufacturing, Job Creation, and Labor Rights
Political Geography:
Asia and Thailand

34. Does Change in Intellectual Property Rights Induce Demand for Skilled Workers? Evidence from India

Author:
Pavel Chakraborthy and Prachi Gupta
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Do incentives to innovate create demand for skilled workers more than proportionately? We study the question using the implementation of the Patent (Amendment) Act in India in 2002 to comply with the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement. We find, first, stronger intellectual property protection has a sharper impact on demand for skilled workers for high patentable industries. Demand for skilled workers increased by 0.5%–2.9% for industries that are more patentable. The average compensation for skilled workers went up by 10% in high patentable industries but decreased for unskilled workers by about 2%. Second, the increase in wage inequality can partly be attributed to the increase in wages rather than incentives. Third, the increase in demand for skilled workers is due to both the increase in intensive margin (or price) and extensive margin (number). Fourth, the aggregate effect is completely driven by industries producing intermediate goods and big plants. Finally, the reforms led to a significant reallocation of resources between industries. The high patentable industries invested more in technology adoption, started to produce more product varieties at higher quality, and filed for more product patent claims. Broadly, we demonstrate that stronger intellectual property protection leads to higher wage inequality between industries.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Intellectual Property/Copyright, and Skilled Labor
Political Geography:
India and Asia

35. Robotics Technology and Firm-level Employment Adjustment in Japan

Author:
Bin Ni and Ayako Obashi
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Unlike studies that analyse the impact of robotics technology on employment at the industry or firm level, this study investigates cross-division employment adjustment within a firm in an industry with large penetration and diffusion of robotics technology. By examining the changes in the composition of employment, we measured job creation and destruction at the division level and explored whether robotics technology, as a leading example of automation, not only displaces workers but also introduces new jobs in favour of labour. We made use of unique, division-level employment data for Japan’s manufacturing firms, together with industry-level data on the installation of industrial robots. We found that industry-level adoption of robots positively affects the rates of firm-level job creation and job destruction. Because the magnitude of the impact is larger for job destruction, robot adoption has an overall negative impact on firms’ net employment growth. Our finding suggests that the labour displacement effect of robotics technology and the emergence of new jobs due to technological change coexist even at the firm level.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Artificial Intelligence, and Job Creation
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

36. Exposing the Financial Footprints of North Korea’s Hackers

Author:
Jason Bartlett
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
North Korea conducts intricate and sweeping cyberattacks against the United States and its allies to acquire funds to support its illicit nuclear proliferation efforts. Unlike more economically advanced nuclear states possessing domestic research, development, and deployment capacities to establish weapon of mass destruction (WMD) programs, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) must seek financial resources, assistance, and institutional knowledge, at least initially, from overseas. It has developed its cyber capabilities in order to circumvent financial sanctions and global safeguards, conducting elaborate online bank heists and hacking attacks; stealing funds through fraudulent bank transfers, Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) transactions, and ATM cash-outs; launching ransomware attacks demanding payment in cryptocurrency; and hacking cryptocurrency exchanges. The scale and sophistication of these innovative sanctions evasion tactics create a challenge that calls for stronger measures to confront them. In addition to providing policy recommendations for U.S. leadership and financial institutions, this report will outline the ways North Korea supports, expands, and utilizes cyber operations to acquire funds for its nuclear weapons program.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Finance
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

37. Digital Entanglement; Lessons Learned from China’s Growing Digital Footprint in South Korea

Author:
Kristine Lee, Martijn Rasser, Joshua Fitt, and Coby Goldberg
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The South Korean experience is an illustrative case study of digital entanglement with China. This paper focuses on South Korea’s 5G networks for the purposes of scoping, but the spotlight on telecommunications networks offers just one window into a broader trend of technology and economic interdependencies between Seoul and Beijing. In particular, the paper’s focus on 5G illuminates four central observations that could also apply to other technology areas: (1) the U.S.-China strategic competition has wedged South Korea between its most important ally and its largest trading partner; (2) geopolitical risk assessments are not top of mind in South Korea’s technology policymaking calculations; (3) the country’s political leadership largely defers to private industry on the use of Chinese equipment; and (4) South Korean privacy regulations remain relatively fluid and are evolving both to meet domestic pressures and to generate new market opportunities. These trends are evident in the history of South Korea’s economic entanglement with China and the risk of coercion carried with it. Ongoing entanglement with digital infrastructure—and 5G networks in particular—increases the potential for and reach of adverse economic statecraft by Beijing and will make it more difficult and costly to unravel.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Bilateral Relations, COVID-19, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

38. The Razor’s Edge: Liberalizing the Digital Surveillance Ecosystem

Author:
Kara Frederick
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating global trends in digital surveillance. Public health imperatives, combined with opportunism by autocratic regimes and authoritarian-leaning leaders, are expanding personal data collection and surveillance. This tendency toward increased surveillance is taking shape differently in repressive regimes, open societies, and the nation-states in between. China, run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is leading the world in using technology to enforce social control, monitor populations, and influence behavior. Part of maximizing this control depends on data aggregation and a growing capacity to link the digital and physical world in real time, where online offenses result in brisk repercussions. Further, China is increasing investments in surveillance technology and attempting to influence the patterns of technology’s global use through the export of authoritarian norms, values, and governance practices. For example, China champions its own technology standards to the rest of the world, while simultaneously peddling legislative models abroad that facilitate access to personal data by the state. Today, the COVID-19 pandemic offers China and other authoritarian nations the opportunity to test and expand their existing surveillance powers internally, as well as make these more extensive measures permanent. Global swing states are already exhibiting troubling trends in their use of digital surveillance, including establishing centralized, government-held databases and trading surveillance practices with authoritarian regimes. Amid the pandemic, swing states like India seem to be taking cues from autocratic regimes by mandating the download of government-enabled contact-tracing applications. Yet, for now, these swing states appear responsive to their citizenry and sensitive to public agitation over privacy concerns. Open societies and democracies can demonstrate global surveillance trends similar to authoritarian regimes and swing states, including the expansion of digital surveillance in the name of public safety and growing private sector capabilities to collect and analyze data on individuals. Yet these trends toward greater surveillance still occur within the context of pluralistic, open societies that feature ongoing debates about the limits of surveillance. However, the pandemic stands to shift the debate in these countries from skepticism over personal data collection to wider acceptance. Thus far, the spectrum of responses to public surveillance reflects the diversity of democracies’ citizenry and processes.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

39. Open Future: The Way Forward on 5G

Author:
Martijn Rasser and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Communication networks are the central nervous system of the 21st century economy. The fifth generation of wireless—5G—will be essential to and inseparable from all we do. In many ways, we are already there. What for most was an abstract concept became all too real during the COVID-19 crisis. The coronavirus pandemic has underscored the critical importance of communication networks: They are integral to our daily lives and our ability to function economically and as a society. Shutdowns of offices, schools, and stores have meant turning to apps to work, learn, and buy. Frontline medical workers and vaccine researchers have consulted colleagues via teleconference to get the latest insight and advice on combating the virus. Being connected means resilience, coping, surviving. Getting 5G right is all the more urgent. Next-generation 5G networks will enable telemedicine, self-driving cars, and a proliferation of Internet of Things devices to fuel the future digital economy. Secure, reliable 5G networks will be essential elements of national infrastructure. Policymakers in Australia, Japan, and Vietnam understood this early on and took decisive action to secure their 5G networks. U.S. officials, slower out of the gates, are now the loudest voice on the risks of having equipment from untrusted vendors in 5G networks. The spotlight is brightest on the risks that Huawei poses to national security, including the threat of espionage or disruption. Given the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to exercise control over Huawei, there is justifiable concern over data integrity on networks that deploy Huawei equipment. More serious is the potential to use 5G equipment as a vector to cripple critical infrastructure. Such risk is not only about communications—5G will be the backbone of controls needed for power grids, water supplies, and transportation infrastructure. Despite this, the United States has had only limited success convincing its allies to join it in banning Huawei. The United States has the opportunity to regain momentum by taking a fresh approach to 5G in the aftermath of the pandemic. In addition to the broader appreciation for the criticality of reliable communication networks, Beijing’s coronavirus cover-up and clunky attempts at soft power have hardened public opinion toward China around the world. The economic fallout of the pandemic will likely slow 5G deployments globally, curtailing the urgency with which many operators approached the issue. At the same time, the first commercial projects centered on technological alternatives to the predominant 5G approach are being deployed. This confluence of events presents the United States and like-minded countries an opening to promote an alternative approach that could lead to a paradigm shift in the industry: wireless infrastructure built on a modular architecture with open interfaces. A modular architecture allows an operator to choose multiple vendors for a range of offerings, rather than being locked in with a single large integrated vendor. Open interfaces—the ability of equipment from any vendor to work with that of another—make that possible. Such a shift means upending the industry status quo that is dominated by four telecommunications equipment providers: China’s Huawei, Finland’s Nokia, Sweden’s Ericsson, and South Korea’s Samsung. Whereas other proposed responses to the Huawei dilemma and the problematic current state of competition in the telecommunications industry fiddle at the margins, switching to an industry centered on open interfaces would change the game altogether. A restructured industry based on open interfaces would directly address the prevailing concerns over untrusted vendors such as Huawei and the broader inefficiencies of the industry. There are distinct advantages to be gained in security and interoperability, supply chain resiliency, probable cost savings, and the opportunity to stimulate much-needed competition in the sector. Taken together, these advantages do much to blunt Beijing’s industrial policies that have enabled Huawei’s predatory anti-competitive practices.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Communications, COVID-19, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

40. Dangerous Synergies Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Influence Operations

Author:
Daniel Kliman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Kristine Lee, Joshua Fitt, and Carisa Nietsche
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2018 and 2020 Taiwanese local and presidential elections crystallized that Russia and China are using digital interference to shape the contest between democracies and autocracies. While foreign information operations are time-tested methods of authoritarian influence, the digital space has increased the scope and speed with which these operations can be waged. Although there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Beijing and Moscow explicitly coordinate their information operations, the two countries are increasingly finding common cause as their interests align on a number of issues and in strategic regions.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia