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191. The Process of ASEAN's Institutional Consolidation in 1968-1976: Theoretical Implications for Changes of Third-World Security Oriented Institution

Author:
Kei Koga
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper, focusing on the 1968-1976 institutional changes of ASEAN, a Third World Security-Oriented Institution (SOI), attempts to develop a theoretical model of institutional transformation by utilizing a punctuated equilibrium model. This theoretical model illustrates interactions between structure and agent to explain both why and how institutional transformation occurs: first, changes in the external security environment foster or hinder SOI's functions, and thus, they trigger internal political discussions among member states; and second, internal political discussions define the direction of SOI's institutional transformation. Focusing on changes in the regional balance of power in Southeast Asia from 1968 to 1971 and from 1972-1976, this paper examines the process of ASEAN's creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Bali Concord in 1976.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Political Theory, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Asia and Southeast Asia

192. World Trade 1970-2010: Globalisation, Regionalisation and Reallocation

Author:
Arne Melchior
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Using data for more than 200 countries, split into nine regions, we study world trade in goods during 1970-2010. The largest changes are the declining relative importance of Western Europe, and the increasing role for Asia. The intra-regional trade of Asia grew particularly fast; from 4 to 16% of world trade. Due to growing intra-regional trade in Europe and Asia, world trade became more intra-regional until 1995. Manufacturing trade is more regionalised, whereas commodity trade is more globalised. After 1995, extra-regional trade flows grew faster so there was “globalisation” with trade travelling longer distances and a rising share for commodities. From 2000, smaller trade regions such as Africa and Latin America have increased their shares of world trade; reversing the trend over the 30 preceding years.
Topic:
Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Regional Cooperation, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Western Europe

193. Conventional Arms Control in Europe and Related Regional Security Concerns

Author:
Isabelle Francois
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Conventional arms control in Europe remains relevant more than two decades after the singing of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). Today, it could serve as a useful vehicle for collaboration with Russia on a broad range of security issues, and productive movement forward would also do much to reassure and secure smaller NATO allies and regional partners. Ultimately, what is needed is a paradigm shift away from "mutual assured destruction" and towards a concept of "mutual assured stability."
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

194. Stuck in the Middle? U.S.-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Not since the visit of Deng Xiapoing in 1979 has a Chinese state visit attracted so much attention as President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States on January 19, 2011. After a rocky year in U.S.-China relations following President Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing in November 2009, attention naturally focused on the future direction of the relationship between the two countries. Further attention imbued with curiosity also centered on how a relatively declining United States and a rapidly rising China would shape the world order in the long-run. Also following North Korea’s provocations in 2010, the world carefully looked for any strong emphasis on the issue of the Korean Peninsula as a regional challenge. There have been two different interpretations in regards to the results of the U.S.-China summit: an optimistic outlook that the two countries will become cooperative partners and move forward as underscored in the Joint Statement, and pessimistic views that the two powers will merely continue the repeated pattern of conflict and check that they have been doing since November 2009. A similar mix of opinions prevails in regards to the Korean Peninsula. Some expect immediate improvement in inter-Korean relations and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, while others criticize the U.S.-China summit for barely papering over the cracks. However, neither hasty optimism nor gloomy pessimism is appropriate at this time. There is a need to utilize a comprehensive response strategy, which goes beyond narrow political understandings, based on a precise analysis of the results of the summit.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Summit
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

195. South Korea in the Chinese Political Imagination

Author:
Sook-Jong Lee
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
States form images of each other based on assessments of each other’s material capabilities or on interpretations of each other’s intentions. Images matter in the foreign policy making process since they form popular public opinion on official policies and, in more basic ways, construct people’s identity toward other countries. Some images are more transient and therefore manageable. Remarks by foreign leaders, official documents, or media coverage tend to belong to this category. States try to make their images favorable in the minds of a foreign audience through their public diplomacy efforts. On the other hand, some images are more fundamental and hard to change, so that foreign policies are pressed to operate within their perimeter. Political ideology, religious orientation, and accumulated bilateral historical experiences tend to form these more durable images. Today’s globalized world has witnessed the rise of the Internet as an important medium constructing popular images of a foreign country. As mass communication across countries becomes more open and instant, foreign policy makers face the increasing challenge of controlling information flows and separating foreign policy agendas from domestic interests. Citizens with less direct contact are more prone to embracing popular images mediated by mass media. Elites, in contrast, who have more direct contact and knowledge, tend to have more rationally interpreted images of foreign countries. Formerly, elites used to monopolize foreign policy inputs. In the porous world of today, however, it is difficult for elites to resist and persuade popular opinion, which is more emotionally driven. This challenge is felt in China, where the leadership is sometimes at odds with irrational populism. In this respect, it is important to understand Chinese images of South Korea. How do elites and ordinary citizens of China hold South Korea in their political imagination? What are the implications of Chinese images of Korea for Seoul’s China policy?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, and Populism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

196. Still Lips and Teeth? China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-il`s Visit to China

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only nine months after the visits in May and August of 2010, Kim Jong-il yet again made an unofficial visit to China on May 20, 2011. Although it is uncommon for three visits to take place within the span of a year, there exists some precedent for this within the history of China-North Korea relations. Before and after the Korean War in 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively. In 1964 as the Sino-Soviet split was intensifying, it is said that five meetings took place in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Both times were strategically critical moments within China-North Korea relations. It is generally assumed that Kim Jong-il has been motivated by urgent concerns to make such consecutive visits to China that from a distance look hasty. The issues that North Korea and China currently share can be categorized into three areas: economic aid and cooperation, the leadership succession process in North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks. These issues are not so different from the agenda that was set during Kim’s previous two visits to China in 2010. In fact, economic aid and the Six-Party Talks has been a regular feature of China-North Korea meetings since the Second Nuclear Crisis broke out in 2002. The speculation that Kim Jong-il visited China three times in order to obtain the Chinese leadership’s support for the succession process is unbalanced. Neither side would want the appearance of China intervening in North Korea’s domestic affairs. For Beijing, such actions would contradict its own policy of non-intervention as well as weaken its position on Taiwan. North Korea, for its part, would not wish to appear to be publicly seeking China’s support that would question the legitimacy of its own Juche ideology that emphasizes independence from great powers. There is a need to focus on the fact that all these three different issues actually resulted in maintaining and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Compared to his previous visits to China, Kim Jong-il’s latest visit in 2011 would appear to be no different. However, during this visit there was stronger public emphasis on the “DPRK-Chinese friendship and traditional alliance.” Notably, upon his arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an unprecedented welcoming party and highlighted the successful results of the visit. Kim even heralded China-North Korea relations by declaring it as the “immortal long march.” Despite this rhetoric, there was a subtle difference between the two countries in the way that they emphasized the strengthening of China-North Korea relations. With the pressure of meeting its declared objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, Kim Jong-il appears to have judged that the only alternative in resolving the problem of increasing regime instability is through China. In other words, with this visit to China, North Korea sought to mutually reconfirm the reinforcement of China-North Korea relations7and at the same time, it tried to actively display this friendship. In contrast, China is taking precautions against the possibility that other countries will overestimate China-North Korea relations. For example, the Chinese government made the very unusual gesture of briefing South Korea and other related countries on the contents of the China-DPRK summit immediately following Kim’s visit to China. Furthermore, at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, China’s Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie emphasized that "We have been advising North Korea, via different channels, not to take the risk." While both North Korea and China are greatly concerned about the reaction of other countries, the message the two countries are trying to send are slightly, but clearly different. Such a difference reflects the complicated and delicate nature of China-North Korea relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Intervention, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

197. Lost in Translation? The Clash of Core Interests and the Future of U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In studying the dynamics of U.S.-China relations, one of the most important questions is what data should be used. A review of all classified documents from the two countries may be the ideal way to secure reliable data, but it is not viable. Interviews with key officials in the two governments could be the next best choice but it is still extremely hard to know whether that person is telling the truth or not. In this regard, the official statements of the two countries are the only reliable and authoritative source for research. Of course in official statements, propaganda may be included and they cannot always be taken at face value. However, as information is ubiquitous in this era of globalization, a government would pay a tremendous cost if it expresses contradictory policies in its own official statements. We can therefore assume that official statements provide information on the general direction of the two country’s policies. Which documents can be accepted as official statements? The United States, of course, makes its policies well known throughout the world and has shown high levels of consistency across different departments of the government over its foreign policy. The official statements of the United States are therefore easily accessible through various official government websites including the State Department. On the other hand, China maintains a rather closed socialist system and there are not many documents that could be identified as official statements except for the regular press conferences of the Foreign Ministry. Even with these press conferences, the spokesperson usually responds to selected questions raised by the media. This brings a considerable limitation in collecting official statements from China. In order to address this difficulty, U.S.-China Relations (UCR) Statement Factsheets include editorials of the news outlets run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as official statements. Data collection began from November 2010. This period is important because first, it marks one year since the U.S.-China summit in November 2009 and second, it coincides with the G20 Seoul Summit held in November. Particularly the G20 summit was meaningful as it “clearly demonstrated that we are in a period of transition where the United States is no longer the world’s hegemon, yet no new power emerges.” (Sohn and Cho 2010, 1) Third, Xi Jinping was appointed as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission on 18 October, 2010 and is expected to be the next leader of China. This appointment then signals a new period where the next generation of leaders in the CCP will begin to assert their influence and views. For both the statements from the United States and China, English texts are used presented by either the official government department or a CCP-affiliated media outlet. The reason for not using Chinese language sources is that official statements in Chinese tend to be directed at a domestic audience, and the focus here is on the international messages that are being conveyed. The data is collected everyday and published as a monthly report, UCR Statement Factsheet. The UCR Briefing will analyze the UCR Statement Factsheets and summarize what has happened during the period in narrative form. The UCR Briefing will also focus on critical factors and issues in understanding the present and future of U.S.-China relations. This UCR Briefing No. 1 covers official statements of the United States and China from November 2010 to February 2011.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

198. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 and Its Implication to South Korean Security Policies

Author:
Young-June Park
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On December 17, 2010, the government of Japan updated its most strategically important document entitled “National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), FY 2011-” following confirmation from both the Security Council and the Cabinet. The new defense plan released along with the “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2011-2015” addresses the objectives and the methods of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Moreover, the plan also outlines Japan’s future military strategies as well as the fundamental tenets of its defense policy. Whereas in the United States, the White House, Pentagon, and Joint Chiefs all release new guidelines each time a new administration comes to power, Japan does not have such a regular format for its defense plan. This makes the National Defense Program Guidelines a comprehensive strategic document that covers every aspect of Japan’s military defense. First introduced in 1976, the Guidelines has only been updated twice in 1995 and 2004. The NDPG in 1976 reflected Japan’s security and military strategy during the Cold War, while the 1995 and the 2004 guidelines reflected strategies for the post-Cold War era and the beginning of 21st century after 9/11, respectively. What then do these updated guidelines in 2010 signify? And in what context should this defense plan be seen? Firstly, the structural changes that have occurred in the security environment of East Asia should be taken into consideration. North Korea conducted nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009. In 2010, it displayed new levels of provocation by sinking the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. These actions not only threaten the Korean Peninsula but also the entire region. Added to that, China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy after the United States and has become more assertive over maritime disputes with Japan. How all these military and economic changes are projected in the document deserves close analysis. Secondly, unlike previous NDPGs that were written during the long years under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 2010 Guidelines are part of the first strategic document that reflects the strategic outlook and security approach of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Since the DPJ assumed power, it has long tried to differentiate itself from LDP in its decision making procedures and actual policies. Such tendencies are naturally reflected in its security policies as well. How do these guidelines differ from the NDPGs issued under the LDP? In short, the National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 is the best resource with which to understand how Japan perceives the changed security environment, and what strategic concepts and military capability it is preparing for in face of future security challenges.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

199. China’s Strategic Shift and North Korea’s Open-Door to China Policy

Author:
Seung-Yul Oh
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In the first half of 2011, bilateral trade volume between China and North Korea doubled compared to the same period of the previous year. On August 2, North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Guan concluded his week-long visit to Washington at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Furthermore, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, during his first visit to Russia since 2002, met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at a military base on the outskirts of the eastern Siberian city of Ulan-Ude to talk about bilateral economic cooperation on August 24. Seemingly, North Korea’s hectic diplomatic efforts shed light on the long-stalled Six-Party talks, and it tries to counterweigh its heavy dependency on China. Is North Korea changing its attitude toward the outside world? In order to answer the question, this paper delves into the strategic motivation of the North and China for expanding Korea-China economic relations in terms of China’s strategic shift and North Korea’s open-door to China policy. Since the global financial crisis, China’s hierarchical status in the world economic order in terms of economic volume and influence improved so fast that even China itself has been facing some difficulties in accommodating the changes in its domestic sociopolitical sphere as well as its external strategies. Premier Wen’s repeated emphasis on the imperativeness of political reform in China is, to some extent, related to the discrepancies in the speed of changes between China’s political institutions and economic power, that is, imbalances in the basis and the superstructure in terms of the political philosophy of Karl Marx. For Marx, the stubborn capitalistic superstructure was a big problem. But in today’s China, the bureaucratic and closed superstructure is in contradiction with its globalized market economy as the world’s workshop. China’s gains from its peaceful rise have not been free from the pains of growth. Such a dilemma might be understood from the example of the contradiction in China’s external political gestures: it categorically argues that it is a member of developing countries when meeting with representatives from those developing countries; nevertheless, at the same time, it deliberately releases news about its achievements in military technologies, for example, those of the J-20 stealth fighter and the super-aircraft carrier. In addition, at the news conference after the closing ceremony of the third China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington in May 2011, the Chinese delegation used the phrase “two leaders” frequently, designating the two giants, China and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

200. Russia’s “Return” to Asia: How Should South Korea Respond?

Author:
Beom-Shik Shin
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On August 24, 2011, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a joint summit in Eastern Siberia, the first such meeting between the two countries since 2002. After the summit, many speculated upon the impact this meeting would have upon the current stalemate on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea’s nuclear program. Although some experts viewed Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia as merely a form of begging bowl diplomacy, such analysis underestimates recent efforts by Russia to engage Northeast Asia. Moreover, the strategic significance of the summit is reflected in the agreement reached between the two leaders which would imply that the summit could be a watershed moment in bringing about new dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and among neighboring countries. Particularly, the proposed Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project would have a strong impact on the political geography of Northeast Asia. In November 2011, South Korea and Russia held their own summit in St Petersburg where the Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline project was reconfirmed. Moscow even expressed its willingness to build the pipeline, passing through North Korea, at its own expense. Such a very active participation from Russia though could provoke certain competition with China in the region. The future course of this project is expected to be decided during the negotiation process between Russia’s Gazprom and South Korea’s KOGAS. Yet in South Korea, domestically, this issue of building a gas pipeline could be controversial in many ways. There are concerns regarding security matters related to North Korea as well as a lack of trust in Russia. At the same time, the responses from the United States and China must be taken into account. As 2012 is the year of leadership change for many countries in the region, it is also possible that the project will become unnecessarily politicized and eventually jeopardized. Therefore, South Korea should carefully prepare an action plan for realizing this project in order to take advantage of this opportunity amid changing dynamics in the region. In recent years there has been much talk of the United States “returning” to Asia, but Russia is also making its own return. This gas pipeline project shows how Russia intends to use its vast energy resources to facilitate its ambition to play a new role in Northeast Asia. This Issue Briefing addresses the impact of Russia’s reengagement and how South Korea should respond by considering both the positive and negative effects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and South Korea