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Begin New Search Topic Parliamentarism Political Geography Asia

1. The Contribution of Parliament's to Sustainable Development Goal 16 Through Security Sector Governance and Reform

Author:
Merle Jasper
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
The United Nations’ 2030 Agenda is a global action plan for sustainable development and a key priority for the UN and its member states. Within the 2030 Agenda, SDG 16 has a pivotal role highlighting the security-development nexus and emphasizing the need for strong institutions which adhere to good governance principles. The achievement of SDG 16 requires that national security sectors are well governed, subject to civilian oversight, and respectful of human rights and the rule of law. Against this background, this case study compilation circles in on parliaments, as key oversight actors, and questions how they contribute to SDG 16 through their role in security sector governance and reform. It is based on an explorative review of four country studies on Colombian, Georgia, Nigeria and the Philippines, written by regional experts. Their observations form the foundation for a comparative analysis of common challenges and effective practices of parliaments contributing to the achievement of SDG 16.
Topic:
Security, Development, Governance, Reform, Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainability, and Parliamentarism
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Asia, Philippines, Colombia, South America, Georgia, Nigeria, and Oceania

2. Parliamentary Oversight of Constitutional Bodies in the Maldives

Author:
Alexandra Brown, Erica Shein, and Katherine Ellena
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:
After decades of power centralized in the executive, the Maldives’ 2008 Constitution introduced separation of powers and created “independent institutions to monitor the three branches of power and safeguard human rights.” The Election Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission and other independent institutions must have sufficient autonomy to operate effectively and carry out their mandates without susceptibility to undue influence. However, they are not immune from corruption, poor leadership or partisan behavior, and still require oversight to ensure accountability. Finding the correct balance between accountability and autonomy can be challenging, but it is essential to ensure that the institutions appropriately fulfill their mandates. In response to a request from Parliament, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) conducted an extensive literature review, analyzed comparative practices and consulted stakeholders to develop a set of recommendations for effective parliamentary oversight of independent institutions. The resulting paper, Parliamentary Oversight of Constitutional Bodies in the Maldives, explores how parliamentary tools and mechanisms can be effectively tailored to provide the appropriate level of oversight. The paper has recommendations and lessons that are broadly applicable outside the Maldivian context, and helped inspire the development of IFES’ Autonomy and Accountability Framework. Because constitutional bodies have a unique role to play in bolstering good governance, any improvement to their performance will improve the quality of democracy as a whole and help prevent corruption, improve service delivery and increase transparency and rule of law. IFES’ Autonomy and Accountability Framework helps countries achieve this in practice.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Constitution, Transparency, Autonomy, and Parliamentarism
Political Geography:
South Asia, Asia, and Maldives

3. Turkey’s Parliament

Author:
Alan Makovsky
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The combination of post-coup emergency rule and the phasing in of the new presidential system has reinforced President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s role as the virtually unassailable ruler of Turkey. Emergency rule has now been extended five times since the attempted coup in July 2016, with no end in sight. But even without emergency rule, the new presidential system affirmed in the April 16 referendum promises the hollowing out of institutions that once, for better or worse, were fairly autonomous. The judiciary is now little more than an arm of the Justice and Development Party, better known as AKP, government; its key positions are appointed by Erdoğan—who is AKP leader as well as president of the nation—and by the AKP-dominated Parliament. The military, too, is now mostly under the thumb of the government—unlike the judiciary, appropriately so, if not politicized. Following the next election, the prime ministry will be abolished. The president will stand alone atop the executive branch, his power of appointment unreviewable. The reach of the executive branch itself will be significantly broadened, including increased authority even over civil society.1 Many observers expect that Erdoğan’s position will remain unchallenged and that the AKP will hold onto power for many years to come. But AKP dominance of Turkish governance actually could be limited or removed entirely in elections that must be held by November 3, 2019—assuming those elections are conducted fairly.2 The winning presidential candidate must win with a majority of votes cast, at least by the second round. This requirement is enshrined in the constitution; unlike the rules on parliamentary elections, it is not changeable without a constitutional amendment. And, although the polarizing Erdoğan is far ahead of other potential candidates in popularity thus far,3 it is by no means clear that he would win a majority of votes in a fairly conducted, head-to-head second round.4 As for Parliament, the AKP has won a sizable majority of seats in 4 of the 5 elections it has contested since its founding—winning a clear plurality of seats in the other election. The AKP has also captured more than 49 percent of the popular vote in 2 of the last 3 elections.5 Yet, the next election will be Turkey’s first in which voters cast separate, simultaneous votes for president and Parliament. It is difficult to predict how that may affect voter preferences. Significantly, the result of the parliamentary vote could still affect how Turkey is governed. As suffocating as presidential power is likely to be under the new system, there may nevertheless be some breathing room for a meaningful Parliament, and some measure of parliamentary checks and balances on the presidency, depending on the preferences of the Turkish voter. The following briefly details the duties and responsibilities of Parliament under the new system.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Leadership, Legislation, Parliamentarism, and Power
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia