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81. Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability

Author:
Vipin Narang
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba—a group historically supported by Pakistan—laid siege to Mumbai in November 2008, crippling the city for three days and taking at least 163 lives. But India's response was restrained; it did not mobilize its military forces to retaliate against either Pakistan or Lashkar camps operating there. A former Indian chief of Army Staff, Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury, bluntly stated that Pakistan's threat of nuclear use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, and Asia

82. Spin-On for the Renaissance? The Current State of China's Nuclear Industry

Author:
Jing-dong Yuan
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
China's nuclear industry has undergone rapid growth in recent years and is projected to further expand in the coming decades. Accounting for almost 40 percent of all nuclear reactors either under construction or that have been approved globally, the expansion of China's nuclear capacities has largely been driven by increasing demands for energy to support continued economic growth. Constraints include human resources, fuel supply, and the extent to which China can develop indigenous nuclear power capacities. The role of civil-military integration in this industry is yet to be determined partly as a result of the deliberate decision by Beijing to keep its nuclear weapons segment separate from its civilian operations.
Topic:
Economics, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
China and Asia

83. Regional Overview

Author:
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US profile in Asia appears to be on the rise following Secretary of State Clinton‟s highly publicized presentation at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial in Hanoi in July and President Obama‟s New York meeting with ASEAN leaders at quarter‟s end. Meanwhile Beijing‟s image took a few hits as it tried to bully Japan (successfully), the US and ROK (unsuccessfully), and ASEAN (TBD) on maritime-related issues, while seemingly having nothing but kind thoughts and gestures for the DPRK, essentially serving as its defense attorney during UN Security Council deliberations regarding the attack on the Cheonan. Prospects for a resumption of Six-Party Talks remained low, despite a professed willingness by Pyongyang to return to the table (albeit as a recognized nuclear weapon state). New faces appeared in the North‟s general officer ranks but the (seemingly nonexistent) prospects for Korean Peninsula denuclearization remained unchanged.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

84. North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
On November 12, during my most recent visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex with Stanford University colleagues John W. Lewis and Robert Carlin, we were shown a 25 to 30 megawatt-electric (MWe) experimental light-water reactor (LWR) in the early stages of construction. It is North Korea's first attempt at LWR technology and we were told it is proceeding with strictly indigenous resources and talent. The target date for operation was said to be 2012, which appears much too optimistic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

85. Coping with the North Korean Survival Game: The Cheonan Incident and Its Aftermath

Author:
Seong-Ho Sheen
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
While on a routine patrol along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a South Korean Navy corvette, Cheonan was hit by an external explosion and rapidly sunk at 9:22pm on March 26, 2010. Of the one hundred and four South Korean crew members on board, forty six were found dead or remain missing (Cha 2010). After weeks of a scientific investigation supported by an international team of twenty four American, British, Australian, and Swedish experts, the South Korean government announced on May 20, that the ship was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean midget submarine. The South Korean government and the public are now weighing the various measures in how to respond to this major North Korean provocation. Experts, on the other hand, are trying to understand what might have been the cause of such a bold aggression by the North Korean regime. While some have suggested a combination of various reasons for the alleged attack, a prominent North Korean insider has argued that the Cheonan incident may have to do with the North Korean leadership succession issue. Cho Myung-chul, a former professor at Kim Il-sung University, has suggested that the Cheonan incident was the work of the emerging leadership surrounding the young and unknown Kim Jong-eun, the son of Kim Jong-il and possible future successor. The motivation then would be for Kim Jong-eun and his supporters to prove themselves to Kim Jong-il and North Korean people. Leadership succession in a dictatorship tends to create a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion for its governance and the state apparatus. There will be competition and rivalry among different groups and factions for survival and to take a lead in the power transition. In that process, hard liners tend to command a stronger voice. Given the mounting pressures of a deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation since the famine of 1995-98, sinking a South Korean warship could score an important political victory domestically, inducing the North Korean people to be proud of its regime and new leadership. At the same time, it could teach a lesson to the Lee Myung-bak government which has insisted on linking the nuclear issue with North-South exchanges. Indeed, North Korea issued a series of warnings to South Korea after criticizing the Lee administration for refusing to restart the Mount Kumkang Tours that had been canceled after a South Korean tourist had been shot by a North Korean guard on July 11, 2008. Pyongyang was further upset by alleged contingency planning for a sudden collapse of the regime and the hosting of military exercises with the United States. In particular, just a couple of weeks before the Cheonan incident, the Korean People’s Army issued a statement that it would no longer remain bound by the Korean War Armistice or the 1992 North-South Non-Aggression Agreement, therefore it “will legitimately exercise their force for self defense, unhindered, just as they had determined to do.” The worry now is that such provocations may eventually be aimed at the Obama administration which has hardened its position toward North Korea since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. While not completely excluding the possibility for bilateral dialogue, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must return to the multilateral Six-Party Talks by implementing its obligations under previous agreements. North Korean demands for nuclear arms control and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization has only strengthened Washington’s deep mistrust of Pyongyang’s true intentions. Considering that the Obama administration has adopted a policy of wait and see, or what it calls “strategic patience,” the North Korean leadership might have concluded that there is not much to gain from making a deal with Washington for now. Furthermore, President Obama’s designation of North Korea along with Iran as an outlier in his drive for a “World Without Nuclear Weapons” and a possible target of U.S. nuclear weapons in the recently published 2010 Nuclear Posture Review can only have made Pyongyang’s conviction even more pessimistic. The problem is that the sinking of the Cheonan may not be an isolated incident. North Korea may become more desperate and brazen as they face increasingly harsher measures from South Korea and the international community, particularly the United States. The race for completing succession by 2012 may further strengthen the voice of hardliners who wish to heighten tensions with South Korea and the United States. More importantly, the Cheonan incident could be a sign of increasing instability in North Korea. The regime there faces the critical question of Kim Jong-il’s health and the issue of succession amidst a deepening economic crisis and international isolation. The Cheonan incident not only presents the immediate challenge of crisis management but also poses a medium to long-term question about the regime’s future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

86. North Korea: Getting Back to Talks

Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The motivations for North Korea's second nuclear test are, as with many of its actions, mostly impenetrable. It may be the latest step in an unrelenting drive to become a permanent nuclear state or it could be advertising nuclear wares to potential buyers. It may be driving up the price others will pay for the North to give up its weapons or it might be about ensuring that the military will accept whatever decision Kim Jong-il has made on his successor. Most likely, North Korea's nuclear weapons program serves multiple purposes for the leadership. Whatever the rationale, there are no good options in response. Finding a way to resume talks on ending the nuclear program may appear to reward Pyongyang's bad behaviour, but diplomacy is still the least bad option. At the same time, the UN Security Council's strong and united condemnation of the test in Resolution 1874 must be enforced, while containment of proliferation and deterrence of North Korean provocations need to be boosted.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Israel, Asia, and North Korea

87. Achieving Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia: A New U.S. Diplomatic Strategy toward North Korea

Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Atlantic Council promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the international challenges of the 21st century.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, and Korea

88. Prospects for Change in the Beijing-Pyongyang Nexus

Author:
Sukhee Han
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Having detonated its first nuclear device in October 2006, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Having consistently attempted to dissuade the North from such tests, China has been infuriated by the North’s defiance of Chinese advice and interests. Immediately after the 2009 test, China released a statement almost identical to the one it announced in the wake of the 2006 test. Beijing’s unprecedented wrath and “resolute opposition” to Pyongyang’s unmannerly behavior had been clearly expressed in the 2006 statement. In the 2009 statement, the Chinese government “strongly demands” that Pyongyang abide by its non-nuclearization commitments, “stop actions that may lead to a further deterioration of the situation,” and “return to the track of the Six-Party Talks.” Furthermore, China’s subsequent vote in favor of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which was designed to impose tougher sanctions on the Pyongyang regime than its previous resolution passed in 2006, seemed to indicate that China may implement a strategic shift away from North Korea and may also increase its strategic cooperation with the international community in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Witnessing China’s stern behavior toward the North, some China watchers in Washington and Seoul have argued that North Korea’s second nuclear test, along with a series of other provocations in the first half of 2009, which included a rocket launch and a complete withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, have prompted China to reconsider its long-standing policy of amity toward North Korea. In contrast to its traditional policy, China since the 2009 nuclear test has not hesitated to make it clear in its official statements that North Korea has become a liability than a strategic asset, and that it was not satisfied with North Korea’s arbitrary behavior threatening the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Remarkably open discussions about North Korea have also been permitted in the Chinese academia and media. In the debates, some Chinese analysts have criticized their government for its failure to get tough with North Korea; others have also advocated for Beijing to take a firmer stance toward North Korea. These debates seem to be a departure from the traditional brotherly attitudes many Chinese have shared concerning North Korea, and also serve as convincing reasons for many experts to argue that China may change its policy toward North Korea. At the same time, however, China has made clear that it intends to continue its traditional policy of friendship toward North Korea. U.S. foreign policy circles have frequently commented that the Chinese leadership has become increasingly angry at the Kim Jong-il regime, especially in the wake of the second nuclear test, and that Beijing is willing and able to use its leverage to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. In contrast, however, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to Pyongyang to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of PRC-DPRK(People’s Republic of China-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) diplomatic relations, reassured North Korea of its economic patronage by providing a number of economic measures for expanding China’s economic exchanges with the North. Furthermore, the recent visit of Liang Guanglie, China’s defense minister, to North Korea has also consolidated the Sino–North Korean military alliance. His avowal of “China’s willingness to have closer military contacts with the DPRK” must have provided more confidence for the North Korean leaders in dealing with post–nuclear test reactions. Given this situation, that China’s national interest concerning North Korea has been the maintenance of peace and stability is reconfirmed. On the one hand, in order to keep Pyongyang from further undermining peninsular security, Beijing has resolutely opposed North Korea’s provocations. China’s statements have emphasized its diplomatic pursuit of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and have also underscored that China, as a great power, acknowledges that it shares responsibility for preserving regional order and stability. On the other hand, China still places more importance on the maintenance of the status quo, in the sense of supporting the North Korean regime itself. China has exerted much more effort on behalf of the North’s survival than on behalf of its denuclearization. While China has in principle supported the UN economic sanctions on the North, it has never been sympathetic to the implementation of realistically effective sanctions. In facing Kim Jong-il’s presumed health concerns and subsequent contingencies in the North, however, China has realized that the status quo on the Peninsula cannot always guarantee regional peace and stability. Given that the demise of Kim Jong-il himself is relatively imminent and certainly inevitable, China has to adopt a new approach to North Korea. China’s chief concern is to strengthen its economic and military grip over the North with the intention of keeping the regime afloat and its leadership under China’s control even after Kim Jong-il has passed from the scene.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

89. Nuclear security: what else can Australia do?

Author:
Rory Medcalf
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australia's Labor government, elected in November 2007, has a strong policy platform on many aspects of the nuclear security agenda of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. And Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has announced Australian sponsorship, with Japan, of an independent panel of international experts and eminent persons to generate new thinking about nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, in the 'second track' tradition of the Canberra Commission and Japan's Tokyo Forum.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, Australia, and Tokyo

90. Designing a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia

Author:
Peter Van Ness
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian National University Department of International Relations
Abstract:
The current Six Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear programs, if successful, could provide an opportunity to build new and unprecedented multilateral institutions to enhance strategic stability and security in Northeast Asia, historically one of the most volatile, geopolitical regions in the world. After working with colleagues on the linkage between historical reconciliation and cooperative security over the past several years, I attempt in this paper to pull together ideas about the possible component parts for a multilateral security institution in Northeast Asia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and Northeast Asia