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71. Making the Case: North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Efforts

Author:
Mieke Eoyang and Aki Peritz
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The U.S. is currently leading the effort to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program and protect our allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Here is how to discuss this important issue: North Korea's missile and nuclear programs threaten our interests and our allies. We will defend our friends—and ourselves—starting with our planned deployment of more missile interceptors in Alaska. The U.S. has been making progress toward convincing the international community to crack down on Pyongyang even further. Given the threat, we must maintain a robust military presence in Asia to maintain the peace in the Asia-Pacific region. We must work with China—North Korea's only ally—to achieve a lasting end to Pyongyang's continuing nuclear intransigence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

72. China's Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Schell
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Since the death of Kim Jong Il, in December 2011, the new leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has taken important steps to further develop its nuclear weapon programme and to consolidate the programme's political status. These developments, which culminated in a nuclear test explosion in February 2013, suggest that the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is a strategic goal, rather than a tactical bargaining chip for North Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

73. The Japan-US Military Alliance and the Asia-Pacific Challenges: Prospects for Deep Changes

Author:
Antonio Marquina
Publication Date:
05-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
In the last fifteen years a fundamental shift in the strategic balance in Asia – Pacific has taking place. The article aims at discussing the difficulties the Japan-US military Alliance has adaptating to this new regional strategic environment. It also explains the new strategy that President Obama´s Administration is trying to implement, initially called “Pivot to Asia” and later “Rebalance”. The article tries to show the challenges that this new strategy implies for both Japan and the United States, enumerating different scenarios some of them not very likely and highlighting on the contrary the possibility of a more assertive and military independent Japan.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

74. The Nuclear Security Summit and South Korea’s Growing International Role

Author:
Sang-Hyun Lee
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On March 26-27, 2012, South Korea successfully held the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. This was the largest diplomatic gathering ever held in South Korea with fifty-three countries and four international non-governmental organizations participating. Alongside the summit, President Lee Myung-bak held twenty-seven bilateral talks which helped to elevate South Korea’s international role. The Seoul Summit has been judged to have produced a more concrete outcome that has strongly supported the achievements made at the Washington Summit in 2010. The result is the Seoul Communiqué, which states that nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are the shared goals of humanity while also reconfirming the commitment to seeking a safer world for all and sharing the objective of nuclear security. Moreover, the communiqué stresses the fundamental responsibility of all countries, consistent with their respective national and international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which includes nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities under their control, as well as to prevent non-state actors from acquiring such materials and from obtaining information or technology required to use them for malicious purposes. The communiqué further reaffirms that measures to strengthen nuclear security will not hamper the rights of states to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. With North Korea’s nuclear threat still overshadowing the Korean Peninsula, the summit had some meaningful implications. South Korea will have undoubtedly enhanced its national image from passive recipient to an active rule-maker in international norms. In preparing for the summit, the South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) focused on comprehensive and action-oriented measures under the belief that by only transforming political commitments from the Washington Summit into action would guarantee the success of the summit. As a result, the Seoul Summit has demonstrated that the promises from the 2010 Washington Summit have now advanced to fruitful outcomes. The seventy-two commitments from that summit have now been almost realized with only a few still to be finalized. In addition, the Seoul Summit has proven itself to be the transition point for global nuclear security moving from political declaration to concrete implementation. The summit itself has also widened its agenda including nuclear safety, the safe use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials, therefore able to address some of the key issues raised following the Fukushima accident. Despite the achievements, some limitations are evident when looking at the preparations for the summit and its aftermath. In the build-up to the summit in South Korea, there were problems in communication between state and people. While the summit is dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism, some questioned why South Korea was hosting a summit that did not address issues closer to home such as the North Korean nuclear issue or the U.S.-Korea nuclear energy agreement controversy. Such criticism required strong justification of why South Korea was hosting the summit. Another area of difficulty was that nuclear security itself actually lacks a clear definition even among experts. To cope with such questions, MOFAT sought for advice and creative ideas by hosting advisory board meetings during the preparation for the summit.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Summit
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

75. Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

76. The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Author:
Mark Hibbs
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After the first Indian nuclear explosive test in 1974, seven nuclear supplier governments were convinced that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) alone would not halt the spread of nuclear weapons—a view that developments in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and elsewhere would later underscore. The seven governments formed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and over the course of more than three decades, it has become the world's leading multilateral nuclear export control arrangement, establishing guidelines that govern transfers of nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology. Yet, as a voluntary and consensus- based organization of 46 participating governments, the NSG today faces a host of challenges ranging from questions about its credibility and future membership to its relationship to the NPT and other multilateral arrangements.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, India, Asia, and North Korea

77. Iran Turns to China, Barter to Survive Sanctions

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Sanctions and China's growing economic clout have altered Iran's trading patterns in ways that are reducing Iran's access to hard currency but may also be insulating the Iranian government and political elite from further US unilateral pressures.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

78. Bleak Outlook for 2011 Conference on Disarmament

Author:
Brian Rose
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The 2011 Conference on Disarmament (CD) began contentiously when Ambassador Zamir Akram, Pakistan\'s permanent representative to the United Nations, criticized United States\' support of India\'s membership in export organizations that would allow it to engage in nuclear trade. Pakistan believes such membership would further favor India and accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles of the two states. Strategic and security concerns drive Pakistan\'s commitment to block negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. Progress during the CD seems unlikely if the United States and Pakistan remain entrenched in their respective positions.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, India, and Asia

79. Going Critical: Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Reactor Starts Up

Author:
Simon Henderson and Stefanie Peterson
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
At a ceremony near the southern Iranian coastal city of Bushehr this Saturday, Russia will begin the process of loading fuel rods into Iran's first civilian nuclear reactor. Theoretically distinct from the rest of the regime's disturbing nuclear program, the Bushehr plant nevertheless remains a major international concern. The low-enriched uranium in the fuel rods would, if diverted, substantially increase Iran's existing stock of the material, which many suspect is already being used to develop nuclear weapons. Even if they were used solely for electricity generation, the rods would eventually produce plutonium-rich residue that could also be reprocessed for use in a weapon. For Iran, the Bushehr event will be a gesture of defiance against U.S.-led international pressure; for Russia, a sign of Moscow's different diplomatic approach to the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran; and for the United States, an exception to the tightening sanctions regime, which officials claim is forcing Tehran to reconsider the wisdom of its policies.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and Moscow

80. Deter and Assure: Charting a Course for America's Asian Alliances in a New Nuclear Age

Author:
Tim Sullivan
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
As home to a number of the world's most dynamic economies, two rising powers, and six nuclear states, Asia is a region of enormous strategic importance to the United States. For over six decades, America has functioned as the preeminent power in Asia, playing a vital role in providing security and ensuring a stable balance of power that has allowed the region's states to flourish politically and economically. The U.S. security framework in the region has rested historically upon a series of bilateral alliances and strategic partnerships. The arrangement has impressively stood the test of time despite concerns that the lack of an overarching, multilateral security architecture would lead to inefficiencies in the United States' pursuit of regional stability.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Emerging Markets, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Asia