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21. Book Talk. Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb by Togzhan Kassenova

Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Please join the Harriman Institute for a discussion with author Togzhan Kassenova about her new book, Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022). Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how the obscure country of Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the marginalized Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons—or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present. For Soviet officials, Kazakhstan's steppe was not an ecological marvel or beloved homeland, but an empty patch of dirt ideal for nuclear testing. Two-headed lambs were just the beginning of the resulting public health disaster for Kazakhstan—compounded, when the Soviet Union collapsed, by the daunting burden of becoming an overnight nuclear power. Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Kazakhstan and Asia

22. Time for a NATO strategy on North Korea?

Author:
Tina J. Park
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg puts it, North Korea remains a "global threat that requires a global rsponse". The threats posed by North Korea are arguably imminent, with the potential to cause serious harm to the security of NATO member states. Since 2006, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, in clear defiance of the Treaty on Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that the regime withdrew from in 2003. To date, the international community has failed to tame North Korea's nuclear ambitions, despite various diplomatic and political efforts. In addition to its nuclear capabilities, Pyongyang has made significant advances with conventional weapons, both chemical and biological, as well as with its cyber capabilities. North Korea's substantive linkages to China and Russia, and non-state terror groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in the Middle East, amplify their threats beyond the borders of the Asia-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Diplomacy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

23. Risk Realism: The Arms Control Endgame for North Korea Policy

Author:
Van Jackson
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
While the reasons for seeking North Korean denuclearization are sensible, continuing to pursue that goal makes the United States and its allies less secure. In word and deed, North Korea has shown it has no interest in nuclear disarmament. Because denuclearization is antithetical to Kim Jong Un’s bottom line, U.S. attempts at diplomacy to that end are self-sabotaging. As long as disarmament of North Korea remains America’s professed goal, Kim Jong Un has every incentive either to avoid the negotiating process or favorably manipulate it at America’s expense—by stalling for time, making unfulfilled promises, and securing concessions without reciprocity. Worse, as the 2017 nuclear confrontation showed, making denuclearization an actionable goal of U.S. policy creates real risks of crisis instability—justifying extreme measures and extreme rhetoric in the name of what has become an extreme aim. But policymakers can avoid the pitfalls of the past by attempting something more realistic than denuclearization—an arms control approach to North Korea. The United States has significant unexploited margin to take diplomatic and political risks aimed at probing and potentially shifting North Korea’s approach to its nuclear arsenal. An arms control approach would seek to reorient U.S. North Korea policy to prioritize what matters most: reducing the risk of nuclear or conventional war without forsaking other U.S. interests at stake in Korea. Using diplomacy to enhance regional stability and foreclose the possibility of an avoidable nuclear war requires pursuing a negotiated outcome that both sides can accept, and that tests North Korea’s willingness to uphold commitments short of disarmament. U.S. policy often seeks to test North Korean intentions, but without offering the accommodations and concessions that would serve as a meaningful test. Remedying this problem through an arms control approach requires taking considerable unilateral actions consistent with U.S. interests before proceeding to a phased negotiating process.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Risk, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

24. Korea, the JCPOA, and the Shifting Military Balance in the Gulf

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The analysis concludes that the sudden breakdown in the latest round of U.S.-Korean nuclear arms control talks in Vietnam should scarcely come as a surprise to anyone. Both sides sought too much too soon and did so despite a long history of previous failures. Heads of state engaged before their staffs had reached a clear compromise and did so seeking goals the other leader could not accept. It is not clear that an agreement was reachable at this point in time, but each side's search for its "best" ensured that the two sides could not compromise on the "good." This failure sent yet another warning that agreements like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear arms agreement with Iran that offers major progress in limiting a nation's nuclear weapons efforts can be far better than no agreement, and of the danger in letting the perfect become the enemy of the good. The failed U.S. negotiations with Korea sends a warning that any set of compromises that preserves Iran's compliance with the JCPOA, and creates a structure where negotiation can continue, will be better than provoking a crisis with Iran that can end in no agreement at all and alienate America's European allies in the process.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

25. From Failed Economic Interfaces to Political Levers: Assessing China-South Korea Competition and Cooperation Scenarios on North Korean Special Economic Zones

Author:
Théo Clément
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
While North Korea has developed Special Economic Zones for several decades now, these zones have attracted little attention from foreign investors, due to a mix of lack of economic reforms in the DPRK, the tense geopolitical situation, and China’s peculiar economic engagement towards North Korea. With the denuclearization process and North-South dialogue moving forward, this situation could change as South Korea’s announced policy of economic engagement with the North could provide Pyongyang the opportunity to play Beijing against Seoul to maximize its interests and attract foreign investment in Special Economic Zones from partners keen to maintain close ties with the DPRK.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

26. Hypothesizing Kim Jong-un: A Framework for Analyzing North Korean Behavior

Author:
Bryan Port
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
A coherent North Korea strategy must proceed from a theory of North Korean politics, strategy, and decision-making. Structured analytic techniques, particularly the analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH), are instrumental in developing a theory and strategy. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs serve a blend of internal and external purposes. A successful strategy that renders North Korean denuclearization must account for both types of purposes, determining which of the two are predominant. Applying ACH can assist in making such an assessment, setting a level of confidence, designing a strategy, and determining measures to assess the analytic foundation of the strategy and the measures used in executing the strategy. This paper tees up four potential hypotheses intended to explore North Korean intentions and assist in developing strategy. However, the intention of the paper is not primarily to make a case for a given hypothesis, but rather to explore the method in the hope that others may find the method useful and apply it to the important undertaking of North Korean denuclearization.
Topic:
International Relations, Weapons, Kim Jong-un, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and Korea

27. Converting Maximum Pressure to Maximum Leverage: The Role of Sanctions Relief in Negotiations with North Korea

Author:
Daniel Wertz
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign has led to the imposition of a nearly comprehensive international sanctions regime targeting North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. With negotiations underway, the question of whether to provide North Korea with partial sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions on its nuclear program has been a major point of dispute between Washington and Pyongyang. This paper looks at sanctions as a form of coercive bargaining and examines the logic and challenges behind a strategy of incrementally exchanging relief from pressure for compliance with the sanctioner’s demands. It argues that taking an “all-or-nothing” approach to sanctions relief risks missing an opportunity to reduce the threat of North Korea’s nuclear program and squandering hard-won negotiating leverage, and outlines a framework for how a step-by-step approach might proceed.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

28. After Hanoi: Where do Trump and Kim Go from Here?

Author:
Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
There were high expectations at the second meeting of American and North Korean leaders in Vietnam last month after the absence of progress on denuclearization commitments made at the first summit in Singapore last summer. Yet at Hanoi, not only were the two leaders unable to deliver an agreement with tangible steps on denuclearization, but they also dispensed with the joint statement signing, cancelled the ceremonial lunch and skipped the joint press conference. In a solo presser, President Donald Trump said that sometimes you “have to walk, and this was just one of those times.”[2] The President indeed may have avoided getting entrapped into a bad deal at Hanoi. What North Korea put on the table in terms of the Yongbyon nuclear complex addresses a fraction of its growing nuclear program that does not even break the surface of its underlying arsenal and stockpiles of fissile materials, not to mention missile bases and delivery systems. And what North Korea sought in return, in terms of major sanctions relief on five UN Security Council resolutions that target 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, would have removed one of the primary sources of leverage, albeit imperfect, on the regime. In this instance, no deal was better than a bad deal for the United States. Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit has left the United States with no clear diplomatic road ahead on this challenging security problem, a trail of puzzled allies in Asia and the promise of no more made-for-television summit meetings for the foreseeable future. The question remains, where do we go from here? When leaders’ summits fail to reach agreement, diplomacy by definition has reached the end of its rope. President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put on the best face they could in Hanoi, talking about closer understanding and continued good relations between the two sides as a result of the meetings, but the failed summit leaves a great deal of uncertainty going forward. South Koreans will frantically seek meetings with Washington and Pyongyang to pick up the pieces. The North Koreans already have sent an envoy to China to chart next steps. While I do not think this will mean a return to the “Fire and Fury” days of 2017 when armed conflict was possible, we have learned numerous lessons from Hanoi for going forward.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

29. Comparative Nuclear Policy: A Case Study of U.S. Impact on India and Brazil Programs (1946-2018)

Author:
Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo and Artur Cruz Bertolucci
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The knowledge regarding nuclear technology represented a new reality for the generation of energy and international security. The nuclear attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 represented the beginning of the so-called nuclear era and of the “balance of terror” as presented by many analysts such as Raymond Aron, deepened by the arms race in the US-Soviet bipolarity after 1947. Besides the superpowers, different countries had begun to develop their nuclear programs. The cases of Brazil and India stand out, since they develop their research agendas n the 1950s and 1960s, in the Cold War context, as a path to enhance their autonomy and bargaining power. The spread of the nuclear knowledge represented a challenge for the superpowers, and the talks for mechanisms of nuclear proliferation control such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) started. This is the context in which Brazil and India develop their nuclear programs under the impact of its bilateral relations with the US. Although, these programs were convergent at first, in the search for nuclear autonomy, adjustments are going to be observed on both policies after the end of the Cold War. The article aims to understand the importance and history of Brazil and India nuclear programs and US weight on these agendas.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
India, Asia, Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

30. Technical Note on a Timeline for North Korean Denuclearization

Author:
Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On May 28, 2018, the New York Times reported on a technical roadmap for North Korean denuclearization written by Stanford University professor and scientist Siegfried S. Hecker and colleagues Robert L. Carlin and Elliot A. Serbin. While we greatly respect the work of Dr. Hecker and colleagues, we disagree on the up to 15-year timeline put forth for completing full denuclearization. Our assessments are based on verified dismantlement in other countries. If North Korea agrees to denuclearize and to cooperate fully, admittedly big “ifs,” then verified dismantlement of the key parts of its nuclear weapons program can happen in parallel and be accomplished in as little as about two years. Gaining assurance that North Korea is not hiding relatively small but significant amounts of plutonium, enriched uranium, or nuclear weapons will take longer than two years and will likely fall to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to handle as part of bringing North Korea into compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state. This whole process could take several more years, as the IAEA insists on accounting for even grams of nuclear explosive materials, as it should. Decommissioning operating reactors and plutonium separation plants will also take years longer. But within a few years, all the declared nuclear weapons and stocks of plutonium and enriched uranium could be verifiably eliminated, and all key facilities identified and rendered unable to operate. Moreover, the verification process can include a sufficient estimate of the amount of plutonium and enriched uranium North Korea has produced, allowing a first order check on whether North Korea has declared all its nuclear weapons. Of course, this process could take longer, but such a process should not be structured in a way that invites North Korea to go slowly and delays the date when North Korea demonstrates it intends to get rid of its nuclear weapons. The past two major negotiations with North Korea are a cautionary tale for avoiding a drawn-out process, where the most difficult decisions are left to the future.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea