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2001. Confronting Ghosts: Thailand's Shapeless Southern Insurgency

Author:
Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The violence that has plagued the predominantly Malay provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala in southern Thailand (not to mention four Malay-speaking districts in the upper southern province of Songkhla) over the past few years has become one of the most closely watched security situations in Southeast Asia. Like Thailand, many other states in the region are still struggling with key nation-building challenges that are potentially prone to involvement by regional and global terrorist groups, posing threats to these countries' hubs of international engagement and undercutting attempts at regional confidence and community building. The significant and sustained upsurge in violence in southern Thailand in the last few years, across numerous administrations in Bangkok, and the nebulous nature of the insurgency itself, make it a particularly important conflict to understand for those with interests in Thailand and Southeast Asian security and stability and in the evolution of internal conflicts. A decade ago, many hoped that the insurgency in the south of Thailand had melted away. Instead it has come back in a more powerful and threatening manner.
Topic:
Political Violence, Demographics, Islam, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Asia, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

2002. China versus the Washington Consensus: The Anomaly for World Bank Advocacy Research (pdf)

Author:
Dic Lo
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
Abstract:
The Chinese experience of economic transformation has presented a serious challenge to the Washington Consensus. Since the mid-1990s, institutions upholding the Washington Consensus have mostly excluded the Chinese experience – because of its conspicuous anomaly – in their attempts to interpret worldwide transition and development in line with their policy doctrines. Yet, China did in fact rigorously implement the policy doctrines in the years 1993-1997, but only to result in severe social and economic problems. Since 1998, in the face of the problems and because of increasingly social resistance to the mainstream policies, China has progressively turned to focus on “constructing a harmonious society”. This turn represents a quest for a model of social and economic development that deviates fundamentally from the Washington Consensus.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, World Bank, and Social Policy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2003. Continental Drift: China and the Global Economic Crisis

Author:
Sangaralingam Ramesh
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
Abstract:
The economic prosperity associated with the Coastal regions of China has not ‘trickled’ down to the Western and Central regions sufficiently enough to eliminate the disparities in income between the regions. Indeed, the disparities between China’s Coastal regions and its other regions continue to deepen. In the Mao period, central planners held the mistaken belief that investment in the railways and development of heavy industry in the interior parts of China would bring prosperity. In the reform period and beyond, the focus of economic development in China has been to take advantage of China’s low labour costs. In the earlier part of the reform era the focus of economic reforms centred on the development of Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) .In the second phase of reform policies were centred on the High Technology Development Zones [NHTIDZ’s].A characteristic feature of both SEZ’s and NHTIDZ’s is that they represent a concentration of infrastructure within a predefined spatial area. The current global economic crisis has presented China with a unique opportunity to deepen the economic transformation of the coastal regions by shifting the focus of economic development to its interior regions. Indeed, the government’s efforts to stave off the effects of the global crisis on the Chinese economy by attempting to maintain economic growth above 8% by utilising an expansive fiscal stimulus has had the effect of initiating the transformation of the interior Chinese economy. This then represents China’s third stage of economic development since 1949. This paper will examine the factors leading to China’s third stage of economic development which has resulted from the global economic crisis – the Continental drift of the economic development of China.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Global Financial Crisis, Investment, Stimulus, and Prosperity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2004. China and World Development beyond the Crisis

Author:
Dic Lo
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London
Abstract:
Recent international opinions on China and world development have focused on the Sino-US economic nexus. The neo-liberal theory of “China causing global imbalances” claims that the particular way through which China has integrated itself into the world market is to the detriment of the economies of the advanced countries. The critical theory of “China facing internal and external dependence”, in contrast, claims that the real victim has been the economic development of China itself and the majority of developing economies. The objective of this paper is to clarify the analytical efficacy of these two theories, and, on that basis, to assess the validity of their implied policies. The paper also seeks to explore into the construction of an alternative policy line that suits better the needs of the social and economic development of China and the developing world.
Topic:
Development, Inequality, Social Policy, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2005. Lessons from the Cheonan Incident and South Korea’s Response

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the tragic sinking of the ROK Navy corvette, the Cheonan, on March 26 2010, there has been an unprecedented level of unconfirmed suspicion, speculation, and criticism over the incident. Not only has this focused on the cause of the sinking but also on the Lee Myung-bak administration’s handling of the incident and its response in the immediate aftermath. The major challenge ahead is to build a domestic consensus on how to perceive and characterize the Cheonan incident and muster global support to punish North Korea. Pyongyang’s sinking of the South Korean warship has raised fundamental questions in the five most critical areas of the state; the military, diplomacy, economy, politics, and intelligence. Rather than narrowly focusing on one single area within which to muster a response, the Lee administration needs to take a comprehensive approach across all five areas and prevent further provocations from threatening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2006. Kim Jong-il’s Visit to China and Its Implications

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il embarked on a secretive trip to China on May 3, 2010. The five day visit was his first to China in four years and his fifth so far. Kim’s recent visit to China does not seem to be that much different from previous summit meetings between North Korea and China. Although North Korea’s nuclear test in 2009 did not provoke a longer than normal suspension in bilateral exchanges, in essence, progress has been made since the resumption of bilateral diplomatic visits in 2000. The key agenda of the recent summit has been consistent with the principle in which China provides economic assistance in exchange for North Korea’s return to the Six-Party Talks. This principle has been the backbone of Beijing’s North Korea policy, which has been in place since the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 2003. Furthermore, this secretive trip to China looks very similar to Kim Jong-il’s last four visits to China, where he toured the industrial regions that have benefited from China’s economic reform and opening. There has been a lot of controversy and diverse assumptions on the reason for Kim’s visit to China. This is particularly attributable to the complicated and delicate nature of inter-Korean relations even though this China-DPRK summit shares many similarities with those of the past. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the political and security environment of the Korean Peninsula in which Kim Jong-il decided to make such a critical strategic decision to travel to China. The visit and the resulting bilateral summit were a successful conclusion to the longest gap in China-DPRK relations since the revival of bilateral ties at the beginning of 2000. Similarly, this summit carries special meaning considering the current deadlock of the Six-Party Talks that has gone on for the past eighteen months. What is more significant is the fact that Kim Jong-il’s trip immediately followed South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s official visit to China on April 30, amid the escalating tensions in inter-Korean relations over the North Korean torpedo attack on the Cheonan. Moreover, North Korea is facing dire domestic circumstances primarily caused by the health problems of Kim Jong-il, the succession issue, instability following the disastrous currency reform of late 2009, and its failing economy struggling under United Nations sanctions. The fact that the China-DPRK summit took place in such a complex environment indicates that a wide range of current issues were involved and it would have a greater impact for stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s actions immediately following the bilateral summit with China should be closely examined as it could help South Korea predict how the Cheonan incident will develop. There were no official reports or any specific details of the conversation available for the public due to the opaque nature of the talk. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize as well as analyze any subtle moves by both countries that might reflect any possible major agreements between the two sides. There are three major questions that need to be answered when evaluating this recent summit in China. First, what is the significance of the summit regarding China-DPRK relations and Beijing’s policy toward North Korea? Second, did North Korea and China agree on the North’s return to the Six-Party Talks in exchange for Chinese support for its regime? If so, what is the prospect for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks? Third, what impact will this summit have on ROK-China relations in light of the fact that the summit meeting took place while the South Korean-led international investigation into the cause of the Cheonan sinking was in progress?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

2007. How Can an Inter-Korean Summit Contribute to the Denuclearization of North Korea?

Author:
Sung Bae Kim
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only a few months ago, a third inter-Korean summit and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks both seemed likely. With contacts for an inter-Korean summit under way since last year and the Chinese proposals for the Six-Party Talks having been warmly accepted by the United States and North Korea, the prospects were positive. The sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan on March 26, 2010, however, destroyed this optimism. A two-month multinational investigation, led by South Korea, uncovered clear evidence of North Korea’s involvement, and the South Korean government imposed strong and comprehensive sanctions against the North on May 24. The punishments included the suspension of inter-Korean trade, the resumption of psychological warfare operations, and strengthening naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. In response, North Korea announced that it would sever all inter-Korean relations and threatened war with the South. The whole situation on the Korean Peninsula has been deteriorating day by day, worsening already high tensions so that even military clashes seem potentially possible. The prospects for the Six-Party Talks are now also very negative. The Cheonan incident has proved to be a black hole absorbing all other critical issues. Kim Jong-il 's visit to China in May 2010 seemed to signal that the Six-Party Talks might be resumed, but this possibility could not appease Seoul’s fury over the sinking of the Cheonan. Diplomatic efforts for the resumption of the talks have been replaced with new moves to initiate additional sanctions against North Korea. Of course, the North Korean nuclear crisis, which is after all an urgent problem with both regional and global consequences, cannot be forever tied to the Cheonan incident. After a cooling-off period, diplomatic mediations to resume the Six-Party Talks can be restarted by China. But the concern at this time is that North Korea, in light of the Cheonan incident, might insist on excluding South Korea from the talks. Given the current situation, is there any possibility for an inter-Korean summit? A summit might, paradoxically, be the only means of exit from the crisis. Interestingly, in 1993, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis had broken out and military tensions were extremely high, a proposal for an inter-Korean summit was accepted. The meeting was only canceled because of Kim Il-sung's sudden death on July 8, 1994. Today, for inter-Korean relations to resume, a whole new framework is needed, given that all existing North-South agreements have been nullified. Such a rebuilt relationship can only be achieved through a third inter-Korean summit. Moreover, progress on the North Korean nuclear issue is impossible until the current state of North-South relations is improved. Were the Six-Party Talks to resume that occurs, they would end up at best as a diplomatic battle between the two Koreas. In the end, the only solution is an inter-Korean summit, which could achieve a breakthrough both in relations between North and South and on the nuclear issue at the same time.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Conference, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2008. Coping with the North Korean Survival Game: The Cheonan Incident and Its Aftermath

Author:
Seong-Ho Sheen
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
While on a routine patrol along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a South Korean Navy corvette, Cheonan was hit by an external explosion and rapidly sunk at 9:22pm on March 26, 2010. Of the one hundred and four South Korean crew members on board, forty six were found dead or remain missing (Cha 2010). After weeks of a scientific investigation supported by an international team of twenty four American, British, Australian, and Swedish experts, the South Korean government announced on May 20, that the ship was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean midget submarine. The South Korean government and the public are now weighing the various measures in how to respond to this major North Korean provocation. Experts, on the other hand, are trying to understand what might have been the cause of such a bold aggression by the North Korean regime. While some have suggested a combination of various reasons for the alleged attack, a prominent North Korean insider has argued that the Cheonan incident may have to do with the North Korean leadership succession issue. Cho Myung-chul, a former professor at Kim Il-sung University, has suggested that the Cheonan incident was the work of the emerging leadership surrounding the young and unknown Kim Jong-eun, the son of Kim Jong-il and possible future successor. The motivation then would be for Kim Jong-eun and his supporters to prove themselves to Kim Jong-il and North Korean people. Leadership succession in a dictatorship tends to create a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion for its governance and the state apparatus. There will be competition and rivalry among different groups and factions for survival and to take a lead in the power transition. In that process, hard liners tend to command a stronger voice. Given the mounting pressures of a deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation since the famine of 1995-98, sinking a South Korean warship could score an important political victory domestically, inducing the North Korean people to be proud of its regime and new leadership. At the same time, it could teach a lesson to the Lee Myung-bak government which has insisted on linking the nuclear issue with North-South exchanges. Indeed, North Korea issued a series of warnings to South Korea after criticizing the Lee administration for refusing to restart the Mount Kumkang Tours that had been canceled after a South Korean tourist had been shot by a North Korean guard on July 11, 2008. Pyongyang was further upset by alleged contingency planning for a sudden collapse of the regime and the hosting of military exercises with the United States. In particular, just a couple of weeks before the Cheonan incident, the Korean People’s Army issued a statement that it would no longer remain bound by the Korean War Armistice or the 1992 North-South Non-Aggression Agreement, therefore it “will legitimately exercise their force for self defense, unhindered, just as they had determined to do.” The worry now is that such provocations may eventually be aimed at the Obama administration which has hardened its position toward North Korea since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. While not completely excluding the possibility for bilateral dialogue, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must return to the multilateral Six-Party Talks by implementing its obligations under previous agreements. North Korean demands for nuclear arms control and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization has only strengthened Washington’s deep mistrust of Pyongyang’s true intentions. Considering that the Obama administration has adopted a policy of wait and see, or what it calls “strategic patience,” the North Korean leadership might have concluded that there is not much to gain from making a deal with Washington for now. Furthermore, President Obama’s designation of North Korea along with Iran as an outlier in his drive for a “World Without Nuclear Weapons” and a possible target of U.S. nuclear weapons in the recently published 2010 Nuclear Posture Review can only have made Pyongyang’s conviction even more pessimistic. The problem is that the sinking of the Cheonan may not be an isolated incident. North Korea may become more desperate and brazen as they face increasingly harsher measures from South Korea and the international community, particularly the United States. The race for completing succession by 2012 may further strengthen the voice of hardliners who wish to heighten tensions with South Korea and the United States. More importantly, the Cheonan incident could be a sign of increasing instability in North Korea. The regime there faces the critical question of Kim Jong-il’s health and the issue of succession amidst a deepening economic crisis and international isolation. The Cheonan incident not only presents the immediate challenge of crisis management but also poses a medium to long-term question about the regime’s future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

2009. From “Primordial” to “Pragmatic” Identity: A Search for Regional Identity in East Asia

Author:
Jun-Seok Kim
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2009, two interesting proposals for community building in East Asia were put forward: Kevin Rudd, then serving as Australia’s prime minister, proposed the creation of an Asia Pacific Community (APC) and then-Japanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed an East Asian Community (EAC). Claiming that Australia should get more deeply involved in Asia, Rudd described his vision of what an APC should look like. Of the most importance, it should be all-embracing. All the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region should take part, including the United States, Australia, Japan, China, South Korea, India, and Indonesia. The APC should also focus on both security and economic issues. In the meantime, Hatoyama, in a New York Times op-ed, came up with the idea of an East Asian Community as the cornerstone of his administration’s Asia policy. While the idea of the EAC was not totally fleshed out, he indicated that the group would include China, Japan, and South Korea as its core members. Hatoyama did not make it clear whether the United States would be invited, although he made no secret of his perception that the era of U.S.-led unilateralism and globalism was coming to an end. In this new period of growing multipolarity, he seemed to believe, it was imperative for Japan to reconceptualize East Asia, the world’s fastest-growing region which now accounts for one quarter of the total GDP of the world, as its own “basic sphere of being.” Prime Minister Hatoyama tried his best not to give the impression that he favored East Asia over the United States (or over the West as a whole). But, it seemed quite obvious that he wanted to see Japan more consciously autonomous from the United States than had been the case under the prolonged rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments. What prompted Rudd of Australia and Hatoyama of Japan to propose the creation of Asia Pacific and East Asian communities upon taking office? A probable cause can be found in the shift in relative power, especially between China, Japan, and the United States, that has long been in progress over the last decade. Both Rudd and Hatoyama were aware of this change. Rudd, for instance, explained that global economic and strategic weight was now shifting to Asia. Hatoyama has also conceded that China would surpass Japan in economic size “in the not-too-distant-future.” One might suspect, therefore, that their initiatives were nothing more than temporary expedients designed to cope with the recently changed international environment. That might be the case—or not. But whatever the two leaders’ underlying intent, their initiatives no doubt constituted significant contributions to a series of efforts to bring about community-type regional organizations in East Asia. From 1989 on, when APEC was first created, and especially in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, a succession of regional organizations came into being in East Asia, with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993, ASEAN+3 in 1997, and the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005 being the most representative. Since the first meeting of the EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2005, in particular, interest in the possibility of building an East Asian Community has become widespread. Although controversies over the proper geographical scope of such a community remain far from settled, with some countries favoring extensive, elastic membership and others favoring a limited, restrictive one, community-building in East Asia is now looked upon as a goal that is worthy of being pursued for its own sake. Australia’s and Japan’s initiatives, probably spurred by geostrategic considerations and not immediately realizable, will surely strengthen the case for an East Asian Community. At the very least, two initiatives have demonstrated the continued interest in an East Asian Community among politicians and decision-makers of East Asian countries.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Community, and Identity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, East Asia, Asia, and South Korea

2010. Debunking Chinese Thinking on a Peace Agreement and Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
At least for the time being, China’s foreign policy goals are focused on the preservation of the status quo in its peripheries, including the Korean Peninsula. China sees its long absence of war or military conflict as evidence of the well-preserved peace and stability of its security environment. Conversely, it conceives that this status quo has been conducive to achieving its foremost national goal, economic modernization. It continues to strive to improve its security environment within the equilibrium. There seems to be one growing exception, however, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, however. China’s support for the replacement of the Korean War Armistice with a peace agreement and a peace regime is in stark contrast to its status quo policy. Given China’s long advocacy as a peace-loving nation, it seems only logical that putting an end to Korea’s current technically-at-war status would make sense. Beijing has its own reasoning and logic behind its supportive call for a new peace arrangement on the peninsula. A confrontational international structure around the peninsula, for instance, can only be overcome by a peace agreement, a precondition necessitated by the Armistice. Hence, a peace agreement before normalization of this structure is perceived to be path-dependent. However, serious challenges arise if a call for a peace agreement and regime is put forth without much thinking regarding the strategic implications. Chinese scholars and experts tend to overlook this factor in their appraisal. On the surface, theirs is a just and righteous call that a peace agreement must replace the Armistice. It is critical to the installment of “perpetual peace” on the peninsula. It is also logical that such peace can be guaranteed by forging a peace regime, an assurance mechanism that will supplement the “peace” endowed by the agreement. If Chinese claims are correct, why are they not embraced by others? There must be something wrong in what the Chinese widely believe. Although their analysis of the imperatives for a peace agreement and regime is undeniable, as we shall see, their call for a peace agreement and regime still remains contradictory to the status quo orientation of their mother country’s foreign policy. Moreover, their work seems to lack insight regarding the strategic and structural implications of the full implementation of such a peace arrangement. Furthermore, Chinese pundits must define the meaning of a new peace in a more articulated way in the context of a new regional order to effectively defend their nation’s support for a peace agreement and regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea