Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Asia Publication Year within 1 Year

121. Unaccountable Adaptation: The Asian Development Bank’s overstated claims on climate adaptation finance

Author:
Sunil Acharya, Rasmus Bo Sørensen, and Hans Peter Dejgaard
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Despite positioning itself as the ‘climate bank of Asia and the Pacific’, it is difficult to ascertain the Asian Development Bank’s claims of climate adaptation finance. Oxfam analysed the bank’s 2019–2023 climate finance portfolio and conducted a detailed assessment of 15 climate adaptation projects, comprising 43% of reported adaptation finance for FY 2021 and 2022. Oxfam found that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) hugely overstates the reported amounts with potential over-reporting of 44% in average for the assessed projects. This briefing paper calls for a transformative shift in the ADB’s adaptation finance strategies. The ADB must improve the accuracy and transparency of climate finance reporting and realign financial flows with the needs of the region's most vulnerable communities.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Finance, Accountability, Transparency, Adaptation, and Development Finance
Political Geography:
Asia

122. Decoding China’s Technology and Industrial Policy: Seven Terms You Need to Know

Author:
Barry Naughton, Siwen Xiao, and Yaosheng Xu
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
China’s technology and industrial policy programs have grown in scope and intensity since 2020, but the vocabulary used to describe them is vague and often misleading. This policy brief decodes seven essential terms and shows that they have concrete and complementary meanings. When understood in concert, they reveal the establishment of a large-scale, government-directed program of mission-oriented research, development, and application. Together these terms outline a substantial expansion of the Chinese government’s direct role in organizing economic activity, and hint at some of the limits of that expansion.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Research and Development, and Terminology
Political Geography:
China and Asia

123. The Quantum Race: U.S.-Chinese Competition for Leadership in Quantum Technologies

Author:
Juljan Krause
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Quantum computing is poised to unleash innovation across various sectors, from materials science to pharmaceutical and medical research, finance, logistics, and even climate change management. Quantum computing also has the potential to provide the backbone for future artificial intelligence and autonomous systems that cannot be realized with digital hardware alone, while quantum communication can strengthen security in cyberspace. For these reasons, quantum technologies feature prominently in the emerging technologies race between the United States and China. In this policy brief, IGCC postdoctoral fellow Juljan Krause analyzes China’s advances in quantum communication, which aim to signal China’s technological leadership while protecting Chinese communications from foreign surveillance. He argues that Chinese leadership in quantum communication will have strategic repercussions, particularly as it is likely to give China’s efforts to shape global industry standards additional momentum. Even if quantum communication has no immediate military implications, policymakers should consider how the technology could embolden China further.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

124. Unpacking China’s industrial policy and its implications for Europe

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
China is often credited with a successful application of industrial policy. One important particularity of China’s industrial policy is that it aims at levelling the playing field between the state economy and the private economy in access to finance, yet within a framework of strategic goals. This aim is not relevant for market economies, such as those of the European Union, but only for those where state enterprises are clearly privileged. Notwithstanding the difficulties in making valid comparisons, our analysis of how China conducts industrial policy in a variety of sectors points to success in some sectors but not all. More importantly, productivity growth in China has already been declining for two decades. Given the very large resources that China has put into industrial policy, with subsidies being only one part, it is surprising that success is not more evident. This relates partly to factors including cronyism and regional protectionism. While the former might be less relevant for the EU given the different institutional background, the latter certainly is relevant since the EU faces the potential consequences of member country-level industrial policy for its single market. A lesson from China seems to come from the sectoral focus, with a long-term and economic-security mindset. The EU is far from this, but it is in the process of linking economic security to industrial policy. Finally, responding to China’s industrial policy involves diverse investigations and challenges in measuring subsidies accurately. Understanding China’s very diverse and complex approach to helping companies achieve the government’s industrial policy goals is crucial for anticipating the consequences of China’s actions. These could be positive, such as cheaper imports of green technology, or negative, such as Chinese overcapacity spilling over to the EU single market.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Markets, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

125. Mongolia’s Electoral Reform and the State Great Khural (Parliamentary) Elections

Author:
Ganbat Damba and Byambakhand Luguusharav
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the transition to a democratic systеm and market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia has held its 9th parliamentary election. In a historic first, the election held on June 28 was carried out under the new electoral systеm. A total of 78 members of parliament (MPs) were elected from 13 majoritarian districts, with an additional 48 MPs elected through proportional representation in a nationwide constituency (General Election Commission of Mongolia 2024). The new parliament consists of 126 seats, in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution introduced in 2023. The election results demonstrated that the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured 68 seats, followed by the Democratic Party (DP) with 42 seats, the HUN Party with 8 seats, and both the National Alliance and the Civil Will-Green Party with 4 seats each. It is noteworthy that the MPP won 50 constituency seats and 18 from the party list, thereby ensuring a majority presence in parliament alongside three other parties that surpassed the legal threshold for representation (Oyunchimeg 2024). This distribution of seats underscores the diversity of representation in parliament, reflecting the electorate’s support for multiple political entities and ensuring a legislative body that is balanced and representative of the political spectrum. Over the past 34 years, various electoral systеms have been employed, including majoritarian voting systеms with single or multiple mandates and mixed systеms that combine majoritarian and proportional representation voting elements. Each systеm has its strengths and weaknesses. However, the criticism from both the public and political parties of the contemporary electoral systеm has resulted in frequent changes to it. Before the new systеm was introduced, the Mongolian parliament had maintained 76 seats since 1990. The number of seats in the parliament was increased by approximately 40 percent, from 76 to 126. Since 1990, Mongolia’s population has grown from 2.15 million to 3.5 million, an increase of about 40 percent. As a representative institution of the people, there has been significant debate in recent years regarding the potential expansion of the parliamentary seats. The proposed increase in seats has prompted a considerable number of individuals to seek election. In the first democratic election held after new democratic Constitution in 1992, only 293 individuals representing 10 parties and independents ran for the parliament. The 2024 Election saw the largest number of candidates to date, with the highest number of candidacies. A total of 372 individuals from 22 parties and coalitions contested the election through party lists, while 969 candidates ran in constituencies, resulting in a total of 1,341 candidates, marking a record high.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Voting, and Parliament
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia

126. The 4IR and the Future of the North Korean Police State

Author:
Ken Gause
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The term Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has gained widespread acceptance as the overarching concept used to describe the impact of new technologies on various aspects of society in the early 21st century. Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), 5G networks, 3D printing, cloud computing, robotics, drones, VR, AR, IoT, genomics, biometrics, and blockchain are commonly associated with this revolution. The speed, scope, and profound influence of 4IR technological advancements are unprecedented in human history. This revolution is rapidly progressing and transforming nearly every industry globally, as well as all aspects of societal life (Watson 2020). The technologies listed are often considered part of the current wave of emerging technologies that are expected to help human societies tackle global issues such as disease, poverty, and ignorance. Despite its promise, there are also shadowy aspects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It is widely acknowledged that technology has the potential to foster human progress and advancement, but it also has the capability to exert control over individuals. In George Orwell’s novel 1984, the character Winston takes precautions to avoid detection by the telescreen in his home while writing in his diary out of fear of facing severe consequences. The concept of being monitored by a “Big Brother” figure is not a new one, yet in today’s era of the 4IR, this dystopian narrative may resonate with a sense of unease and familiarity. The rapid advancements in technology could pave the way for, or may already be facilitating, a form of surveillance and control reminiscent of totalitarian regimes seeping into the daily lives of certain nations. In nations like China and Russia, we have witnessed widespread implementation of increasingly advanced surveillance systеms in order to maintain control, monitor the activities of citizens, and suppress opposition and threats to their authority. These countries have also established an international model for the utilization of digital technologies for such purposes. This paper will briefly examine how coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment by the North Korean Police State will change in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the AI revolution. Will new technologies make the Kim regime’s control more effective, or will they enforce reforms and shifts in North Korean society? Will 4IR lead to transformation inside North Korea and create a pathway to reunification?
Topic:
Artificial Intelligence, Police State, and Fourth Industrial Revolution
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

127. Knowledge State in the Era of Generative AI and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Chaesung Chun
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Korea failed to transform into a fully modern sovereign state when modern international politics was being established. Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula was a single nation and state. However, as the Westphalian modern state systеm, originating in the West, was introduced in the form of imperialism, Korea failed to become a fully sovereign state, ultimately leading to its division. The causes of this division include external factors such as the competition among surrounding empires and Cold War rivalry, as well as internal factors like the fragmentation of state-building capabilities. However, the most significant reason was the civilizational gap, as Korea could not fully absorb and follow the new civilizational standards set by the West after the Industrial Revolution. The current world order is at a turning point following the unipolar era of the United States. While the Western Westphalian domain is maintained, the core element of the liberal international order is being significantly challenged by revisionist states like China and Russia, as well as countries from the Global South. It is uncertain whether global politics will form and maintain a single integrated sphere (권역) or divide into multiple regions experiencing fundamental conflicts. If modern international politics, standardized by Western civilization, were to fragment again, the division of the Korean Peninsula could deepen based on this regional separation. The recent intensification of strategic alliances between North Korea, China, and Russia illustrates this situation. A crucial phenomenon in this process is that the Fourth Industrial Revolution and emerging technologies are redefining the international political order. Unlike previous technological advancements, current technological progress is characterized by enabling technologies or meta-technologies that define the direction of technological development. Generative artificial intelligence, in particular, exemplifies the innovation of these foundational technologies. The role and function of generative artificial intelligence, which significantly impacts military, economic, social, cultural, and governmental governance capabilities, are just beginning. The future development of foundational technologies will have a critical impact on the international political order and the development of various diverging regions. Countries, companies, societies, and international organizations that quickly adapt to these technological changes will advance further, while those that do not will face deepening material and perceptual gaps. Considering the unification of the Korean Peninsula, the current stage of digital technology development in the North and South has maintained ethnic homogeneity and power balance to a level that can aim for unification. However, as new foundational technologies like generative artificial intelligence grow, the development paths, power balance, ethnic homogeneity, and differences in state forms and functions between South and North Korea will likely deepen. If unification is a goal based on a certain degree of homogeneous historical experience and similarity in state systеms and societies, the possibility of such similarity is decreasing. South Korea, as a liberal democratic state with the world's tenth-largest economy, a close alliance with the United States, and an innovative social and corporate atmosphere, has the capacity to rapidly absorb and disseminate artificial intelligence advancements throughout society. In this context, South Korea strives for economic development, international cooperation, and social and cultural innovation. In contrast, North Korea is an exceptionally poor country on a global scale, an unprecedentedly dictatorial state, and maintains its state through strong repression of society. In this context, it is difficult to expect societal innovation, and the acquisition and dissemination of new technologies are solely state-driven, with technological innovation also being state-led. In the increasingly polarized international technology supply chain, North Korea will find it challenging to find alternatives other than relying on China and Russia. North Korea is also striving to develop foundational technologies like artificial intelligence, but its direction will be very different from South Korea's. North Korea utilizes artificial intelligence for strong repression, control, and surveillance of society and aims to use open-source artificial intelligence for political intervention in South Korea and hacking and illegal manipulation in the international community. As the civilizational standards and technological gaps, political systеms, and socio-cultural perceptions between the South and North widen, what will be the future of the power balance and systеmic homogeneity between the two Koreas? Will South Korea's advanced national capabilities increase the possibility of unification with North Korea, or will artificial intelligence act as a larger element of conflict between the two Koreas? It is necessary to recognize and respond to these issues.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Artificial Intelligence, and Unification
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

128. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Gary Samore
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

129. Horizontal Accountability Requires More than Legal Checks and Balances Systеm: Ten Asian Country Cases

Author:
Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Most countries, except closed autocracies, conduct popular elections. However, the quality of global democracy has been deteriorating. One of the most significant illiberal trends is the aggrandizement of executive power led by a popularly elected political leader. Strongmen often bend or simply violate democratic rules by abusing their executive power. The electoral mandate gives them legitimacy, making the efforts to check their executive power difficult. In this context, horizontal accountability based on the checks and balances systеm and oversight institutions is important to prevent the emergence of strongmen. However, horizontal accountability cannot function effectively unless its legal mechanisms are implemented in practice. Ten Asian country cases, presented in previously published ADRN working papers, demonstrated that horizontal accountability perform better when the legislature is not politically captured by the executive power and the judiciary is independent. Oversight institutions also require both political independence and institutional capacity. The electoral accountability of elected elites to voters helps the legislative branch to fulfill its role of constraining the excessive executive power. Independent media and civil society participation always assist both electoral and horizontal accountability.
Topic:
Law, Democracy, Accountability, Civic Engagement, and Political Participation
Political Geography:
Asia

130. Panel Survey on the 22nd Legislative Election

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The East Asia Institute (EAI) presents key insights from a web-based public opinion survey conducted following the 22nd general election in 2024. The survey aimed to analyze the factors influencing voter behavior and the landscape of political perceptions. The findings indicate that controversies involving the President`s family and close associates, and policy issues?such as rising costs of living and the proposal to increase medical school admission quotas?were pivotal in shaping voter decisions. Furthermore, the survey reveals a prevalent sentiment among voters that Korean society is characterized by inequality and significant intergroup conflicts. A consensus also emerged on the necessity of electoral systеm reforms to mitigate political polarization and more accurately reflect public opinion.
Topic:
Reform, Elections, Conflict, and Survey
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea