This PolicyWatch is the third in a three-part series. Part I, by Michael Eisenstadt, examined the political and military challenges of preventing an Iranian nuclear breakout; Part II, by Michael Knights, examined the operational challenges of preemptive action.
This PolicyWatch is the second in a three-part series. Part I (PolicyWatch No. 760, "The Challenges of U.S. Preventive Action," by Michael Eisenstadt) examined the political and military challenges of preventing an Iranian nuclear breakout; Part III, by Jeffrey White, will examine potential Iranian responses to preemption.
This PolicyWatch is the first in a three-part series. Future PolicyWatches by Michael Knights and Jeffrey White will examine the operational challenges of prevention, and potential Iranian responses.
The recent bombings in Riyadh and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's remarks condemning them have raised expectations that U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation will improve so that such tragedies can be averted in the future. What internal dynamic will guide the Saudis' handling of this crisis? What sort of counterterrorism cooperation are they likely to provide in the aftermath of the bombings?
Successfully shaping Iraqi public perceptions is vitally important, particularly since other well-known means of influencing the public -- creating stability and reestablishing water, power, and other public welfare services -- are taking longer than expected. Yet, the coalition has arguably been slower to shape the Iraqi media environment than either indigenous political actors or Iranian state-sponsored media networks.
The difficulties facing Iranians who want to express their opinions freely in print are legion. In an atmosphere where journalists and pollsters are often detained without trial, it is easy to assume that pollsters do not ask important questions and that respondents do not give serious answers. Yet, some very interesting polls are in fact conducted in Iran.
In almost all of his speeches, Hizballah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah has spoken about the pride that his organization brought to Arabs by forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000. Now, however, the coalition forces have trampled on this pride: the Iraqi regime collapsed, and Baghdad fell without offering much resistance. Speaking on April 24, Nasrallah warned that "the most dangerous challenge now facing Arabs is the sense of hopelessness and stupor that has followed in the wake of Iraqi occupation." Indeed, on a variety of fronts, Hizballah is suddenly facing a new regional landscape that is inimical to its interests.
As Secretary of State Colin Powell prepares to visit Syria and Lebanon on May 3, his agenda will most likely address the war on terrorism. The most active support for terrorism from both Damascus and Beirut is for Hizballah. To understand what the group's aims and ambitions are, few sources are better than al-Manar, Hizballah's Lebanese television station. The channel broadcasts messages calling for death to America and suicide bombings against American forces in Iraq.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Iraq, America, Middle East, Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Beirut
Today, the State Department releases the 2002 edition of Patterns of Global Terrorism, its congressionally mandated annual accounting of international terrorism. The report chronicles a year marked by both devastating terrorist attacks and remarkable progress targeting al-Qaeda in the war on terror. However, against the backdrop of the increasingly successful international campaign to prevent such attacks by targeting terrorist groups, what stands out is the lack of a similar effort in 2002 to target state sponsors -- a problem that continues today.
The end of Saddam Husayn's regime offers several key benefits with regard to U.S. interests. World oil supplies will increase as Iraq -- which has not been a major oil exporter since the beginning of the 1980-1988 war with Iran -- raises its oil production capacity to its full potential, which may amount to 5-6 million barrels per day. Cheap oil will boost the global economy, reduce Arab control of the oil market, and allow the United States to become less dependent on Saudi Arabia and better positioned to demand reforms from Middle Eastern regimes. In addition, postwar Iraq will no longer pose a weapons-of-mass-destruction threat to the region. The end of Saddam's regime will also reduce Russian and French influence in the region.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, and Saudi Arabia