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391. Ceasefire Monitoring and the U.S. Role: What Powell Did and Didn't Say

Author:
Robert Satloff
Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As car bombs inside Israel and the Israeli targeting of Islamic Jihad operatives postpones for another day the start of the seven-day "no incident period" arranged by Secretary of State Colin Powell last week, yesterday's retaliatory attack by Israeli F-16 aircraft against a Syrian radar station in the Bekaa Valley highlights another theme of the Powell visit — the role of third-party monitors in the Arab-Israeli arena. Indeed, Israel's reprisal for Hizballah's missile attacks in the Shebaa Farms area across the international border provides a timely reminder about the limitations of monitoring conducted by peacekeeping forces such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Moreover, it underscores the key missing ingredients in virtually all Middle East monitoring arrangements: the willingness to engage in open, public, truthful, and non-politicized verification of compliance/non-compliance and the creation of effective enforcement mechanisms.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, and Arab Countries

392. The Saudi Fatwah Against Suicide Terrorism

Author:
Reuven Paz
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On April 21, the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdallah Aal al-Shaykh, said that Islam forbids suicide terrorist attacks. This has raised a storm of criticism from supporters of the Palestinian intifada against Israel. However, the mufti may have been thinking more about Osama bin Ladin than recent Palestinian actions.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arab Countries, and Saudi Arabia

393. The State Department's Annual Terrorism Report: Politics As Usual

Author:
David Schenker
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On April 30, the Department of State issued its comprehensive annual report Patterns of Global Terrorism, describing incidents and trends in international terrorism in the year 2000. This year's report covers the first three months of accelerated Palestinian-Israeli violence. It is also marks the first time the Bush administration State Department has been compelled to publicly comment on the nature of Lebanese Hizballah attacks against Israel in the post-withdrawal era.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries

394. Special Soref Symposium Report: Israel's Search for Security and Peace

Author:
Limor Livnat
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
" . . . The political road that brought us to the crossroads we are now at was one replete with navigational errors, steering miscalculations, and poor vision, traveled by fatigue-driven guides driving under the influence of reckless idealism and senseless naïveté . . . On February 6 of this year, the people of Israel made it eminently clear that they know it, and have left the road that led from Oslo to chaos and bloodshed in their homes and on their streets. The best of Israel's political pundits could not have imagined that Ariel Sharon would ever be elected prime minister of Israel, let alone with a plurality unprecedented in democratic nations. But they did not understand the people of Israel, and probably still don't. It was the most potent statement imaginable in favor of a new road and a more promising future."
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Security
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Middle East, Israel, and Arab Countries

395. Iran: More Fuel on the Israeli-Palestinian Fire

Author:
Reuven Paz
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The last two days have witnessed "The International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada" in Tehran. The conference was a major step in Iran's drive to accelerate terrorist attacks on Israel. Delegates to the conference came from thirty-four countries, including Syrian vice president Muhammad Zahir Mosahareqa, Lebanese National Assembly Speaker Nabih Berri, and representatives from many parliaments (e.g., Irish Senator Mick Lanigan). Palestinian participants included Palestinian Authority (PA) minister in charge of Jerusalem affairs Faisal Husseini and Palestinian National Council head Salim Za'noun (Abu Adib), one of the founding generation of Fatah and for many years the main link between Yasir Arafat and Islamic fundamentalist circles.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Tehran, Palestine, Arab Countries, and Syria

396. Special Policy Forum Report: Palestinian Attitudes During the Bush/Sharon Era

Author:
Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, there are three perspectives as to why violent confrontations began in September: The Camp David II negotiations uncovered underlying differences in Israeli and Palestinian interests that are simply unbridgeable. Recent confrontations are basically the product of these differences. In this scenario, no return to negotiations is going to improve the situation. The current situation reflects domestic political constraints in both societies. Weak leaders, populations that are not prepared for the compromises needed for a final settlement, coalition politics, and questions of legitimacy are working against a solution. In this scenario, a permanent settlement is possible but certainly not easy. The two negotiating teams could have wrapped up the talks if they had had more time; indeed, they came very close to a compromise at Taba in January. According to this scenario, a matter of procedural difficulty — a miscalculation, misperception, or simply a lack of time — probably impeded the finalization of an agreement at Taba, while violence was still flaring in the territories. Most Palestinians are of the second school of thought. They did not believe that a deal was imminent at Camp David II or at Taba. Indeed, the belief that a comprehensive deal is imminent has eroded over time. Yet most Palestinians continue to hope that strong leaders in Israel and among the Palestinians can make essential compromises. Recently, a prominent perception among the Palestinian public was that Israel's weak government initiated the violence after Camp David II because Israel wanted the Palestinians to accept something that they had rejected. This perception, plus the heavy causalities and the collective punishment sustained over the past few months, has helped to radicalize Palestinian society.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Arab Countries

397. Special Policy Forum Report: The Brink of Peace? And Inside Look from Camp David to Taba

Author:
Gilead Sher
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Yasir Arafat is responsible for the collapse of the peace process and for the extreme violence of the last seven months. In the year and a half of negotiations with the Palestinians under the leadership of former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, the objective was a permanent peace settlement: Israel would withdraw from a large part of the occupied territories, and, in return, there would be an official end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The intention was to fashion an alternative to occupation, since this situation was not only untenable, but was also a strategic burden to Israel. Arafat, however, would only accept an agreement in which all of his demands were met; failing this, he would and did resort to imposing an arrangement through violent confrontation. Consequently, the peace process collapsed. Arafat was never ready — mentally, personally, or historically, at Camp David or afterwards — to conclude a deal; he is a leader of a national movement and not a statesman.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries

398. The Arab League Summit: Opportunities Amid The Vitriol?

Author:
Rovert Satloff
Publication Date:
03-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the Middle East, this week witnessed a series of events occurring at such breakneck speed that it is important not to lose the significance of each: On Thursday, President Bush issued an unprecedented statement calling on Chairman Yasir Arafat to "stop the violence," a statement that could lay down a marker by which the administration judges the efforts of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and which could determine the direction of the U.S.–Palestinian relationship under the new administration. On Wednesday, Israel's national unity government launched retaliatory attacks against Arafat's personal guard, Force 17, underscoring Israel's intent to hold the chairman personally responsible for the terrorism emanating from within his close circle. On Monday and Tuesday, bombs went off inside the heart of Israel — responsibility for which was claimed by the Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad, suggesting that Tehran is eager to tap pro-Hizballah sympathy and compete with the Tanzim and other Fatah elements for the pacesetter's role in the Palestinian uprising. Also on Tuesday, the PA chose an all-or-nothing option at the United Nations, demanding a Security Council vote on a resolution that the United States had no trouble vetoing — one calling for an international protection force for Palestinians — rather than pursuing diplomacy to bring to a vote a watered-down, but still problematic, resolution on which Washington was prepared to compromise. And on Sunday, Israel's Likud-led government issued a communique affirming its intent to seek the full implementation of signed agreements with the Palestinians, specifically citing its willingness to fulfill the requirement for a third "further redeployment" — territorial withdrawal in the West Bank — in the context of full compliance with the Wye River Memorandum. Each of these items alone has significant ramifications for the direction of Arab–Israeli relations, the Palestinian uprising, and U.S. policy toward the peace process. Taken together, they suggest a situation in great flux with emerging trends that are both ominous (e.g., Iran's deepening role) and positive (e.g., Bush's forthrightness on violence, Israel's balance of diplomacy and force).
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and International Organization
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Tehran, Palestine, and Arab Countries

399. Inspections in Iraq: A Test For Saddam, Not A Good Solution for WMD

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
12-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Like that of its predecessor, the Bush administration's policy toward Iraq appears to focus on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of Saddam Husayn's regime. Some suggest that U.S. policy should emphasize the resumption of inspections, suspended since 1998. However, there are strong reasons to doubt that inspections would reduce the threat of Iraqi WMD.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arab Countries

400. How to Unseat Saddam (Part 2 of 2)

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:
12-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Psyops and propaganda activities that aim to diminish Saddam in the eyes of his supporters, exacerbate existing strains between his inner circle and the military, stir up popular discontent, and embolden opponents of the regime are a crucial component of any policy that seeks regime change in Baghdad. Such efforts could keep Saddam on the defensive and create an atmosphere of crisis and tension, forcing the regime to divert assets to deal with internal security, and leaving fewer resources available for clandestine technology procurement or trouble-making elsewhere. Such efforts could transform the psychological environment in the country, creating an atmosphere in which a coup or uprising might occur.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Religion, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arab Countries