Search

Begin New Search Topic Corruption Political Geography Africa

21. Corruption, Underdevelopment and the Masses in Africa

Author:
Ibrahim Bangura, Temitope Oriola, and Henry Mbawa
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
The central argument of this paper is that ignoring the role of the masses makes for an incomplete understanding of the vignettes of corruption and the crisis of development in Africa. The paper argues that corrupt practices by elites and the actions, beliefs, expectations and demands of the masses on the elites are mutually reinforcing, co-referential and ultimately co-constitute the processual pro- duction of corruption and consequent underdevelopment in Africa. This is further reinforced in what we have couched as "the irony of the African masses" in the fight against corruption and underdevelopment in Africa. The irony is too compelling to ignore. The African masses demand their share of the national cake through appendages of, or association with political elites who loot the state — one of the major causes of poverty and underdevelop- ment in Africa.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Poverty, Elites, and Underdevelopment
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

22. Enhancing the credibility of the public office holders asset declaration regime

Author:
E. Gyimah-Boadi
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Abstract:
A credible and effective asset declaration regime is an essential component of the ensemble of rules and structures necessary for democratic governance. It helps to: • Prevent abuse of power by holders of public office • Protect public assets and the public interest • Deter public corruption • Promote the integrity of public officials • Foster public accountability and trust as well as governmental legitimacy. A credible asset declaration regime is also good for public officials. It helps to: • Protect the private assets of public officials from wrongful and extra-legal confiscation • Protect public officials from undue suspicion, baseless allegations of wrongdoing, and all manner of calumny.
Topic:
Corruption, Government, and Reform
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

23. The Impact of Corruption on Nigerian Enterprises' Performance: An Empirical Study

Author:
Mohamed Zakaria Fodol
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Bilgi
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
This study aims to assess the effects of corruption on Nigerian enterprises performance using data from the World Bank's Enterprises Survey, (Panel Data) for the years 2007, 2009, 2014. The Pooled Regression Model was applied. The corruption measured by six indicators divided into two groups, graft incidence and perceived need to make bribe payments. Graft incidence measures enterprises experienced request for a bribe payment across five types of applications, namely (1) an electrical connection, (2) water connection, (3) phone connection, (4) construction-related permit, and (5) total annual informal payment to public officials. While the perceived need to make bribe payments based on the answer to the question: (6) It is said that establishments are sometimes required to give gifts to public officials to ‘get things done’. The study found that the enterprises experienced a statistically insignificant bribe payment for the water connection and construction-related permit are statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, the level of firms expected to give gifts to public officers "to get things done", especially related to the sale and purchase of fixed assets significant and positively affect the enterprises' performance. As for the total payments to the public officers is significant and has negative effects, which indicates the medium or long terms impacts. This may be explained by the fact that developing economies are characterized by formal institutional flaws such as ineffective public administration and weak rule of law. It can also be explained by the theory of transaction cost, which states that the high transaction cost leads to a decrease in profits and thus poor performance. Unlike other studies, this study indicates that corruption represents an obstacle to Nigerian enterprises’ performance. The argument is that public authorities should move away from increasing the costs of corruption by improving the performance of public officials and implementing standards of transparency. Entrepreneurs also must search for alternatives to avoid paying bribes, such as leasing financing and so on.
Topic:
Corruption, Economy, Business, and Performance Evaluation
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

24. An assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Author:
Busisipho Siyobi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Secretariat should take the lead in developing intervention mechanisms that ensure a strong civil society representation in the multi-stakeholder groups, to enable real public participation and obtain local legitimacy of the Initiative: This can be done through actively identifying and partnering with relevant grassroot civil society organisations that work directly with mining-affected communities. Implementing countries should work more collaboratively with the EITI to investigate any reported revenue discrepancies highlighted in the country-specific EITI reporting: This can be enforced by implementing countries in alignment with their guiding principles of regulatory bodies and the national EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) in the effort to fight against corruption and ensure local ownership of the EITI process.
Topic:
Civil Society, Corruption, Natural Resources, Governance, Regulation, Mining, and Extractive Industries
Political Geography:
Africa

25. West African Elites’ Spending on UK Schools and Universities: A Closer Look

Author:
Matthew Page
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Political, business, and cultural elites from around the world have a strong affinity for the United Kingdom (UK) education system. Nowhere is this truer than in West Africa, where some families in Nigeria and Ghana have a long tradition of sending their children to private boarding schools and universities in the UK. These institutions are especially popular destinations for the offspring of prominent politically exposed persons (PEPs) from the region. Immigration officials, admissions staff, and UK law enforcement are not likely to scrutinize the conditions under which the children of PEPs enroll in British schools, even though the PEPs themselves may have modest legitimate earnings and opaque asset profiles that in other circumstances would raise serious financial concerns. This relative lack of review has allowed some West African PEPs to channel unexplained wealth into the UK education sector. It is not easy to estimate the overall value of this flow, yet it likely exceeds £30 million annually.1 Most of these funds emanate from Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Ghana; compared with these two countries, only a handful of students from elsewhere in West Africa seek an education in British schools. Tackling this small but significant illicit financial flow should be a priority for UK policymakers. In doing so, they would be helping to realize the UK’s global anticorruption objectives, advance its International Education Strategy, and close a troublesome anti–money laundering (AML) loophole. Failing to do so would exacerbate existing corruption challenges both at home and abroad and increase the UK education sector’s reputational liabilities.
Topic:
Corruption, Education, Law Enforcement, Higher Education, and Elites
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and West Africa

26. Corruption Crossroads? Rising Perceptions of Graft Weaken Citizen Trust, Threaten Botswana’s Democratic Standing

Author:
Thomas Isbell and Batlang Seabo
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Corruption is widely considered one of the greatest impediments to sustainable development in African countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). Corruption hinders macro-economic growth by weakening governance structures and diluting the positive effects of investments. At the micro level, corruption can trap the poorest, who are least likely to have alternatives to state provision of services, in a downward spiral (Peiffer & Rose, 2014). Botswana has long been considered one of Africa’s least corrupt countries and top performers in democratic practice and good governance. But while Transparency International’s (2019) Corruption Perceptions Index continues to rank Botswana as best on the continent, other observers have questioned this reputation (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017; Good, 2017). Allegations have focused on, among other things, high-level corruption in military procurement contracts under former President Ian Khama, close ties between members of the ruling party and the agricultural sector, and charges that well-connected suspects are often cleared by the courts (Motlogelwa & Civillini, 2016; Konopo, 2017; Good, 2017; Norad, 2011; Sebudubudu 2014; Gasennelwe, 2018). Recent corruption scandals have reached the highest levels of government, including the alleged looting of the National Petroleum Fund (Kgalemang, 2019; Motshegwa, Mutonono, & Mikazhu, 2019), and are still before courts of law (Shuma, 2020). In this paper we use Afrobarometer survey data to explore citizens’ perceptions of corruption in Botswana. We find that far more people see corruption increasing than decreasing and that perceptions of corruption in the Presidency and Parliament have risen sharply over the past decade. Fewer Batswana approve of how the government is handling the anti-corruption fight, and while many believe ordinary people can help fight corruption, a majority say that people risk retaliation if they report corruption to the authorities. A correlation analysis suggests that perceptions of corruption, especially in the Presidency, are strongly associated with less popular trust in public institutions and less satisfaction with democracy.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Democracy, and Citizenship
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

27. Moment of truth: Mali teeters between President Keïta and the protest movement

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
President Keïta is currently facing a mass movement demanding he step down. Decrying rampant corruption, election rigging, a collapsing economy and rising unemployment, a lack of security, and ethnic conflict, the movement sees his ouster as the first step toward a fourth republic and democracy.
Topic:
Corruption, Democracy, Protests, and Unemployment
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

28. Whistleblowing in Botswana's Construction Industry : A Public and Private Sector Perspective

Author:
Marumo Omotoye
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:
The construction industry (CI) is considered one of the most corrupt both internationally and regionally. Therefore, this study examined the views and attitudes of professionals in Botswana’s CI towards the role whistleblowing (or protected disclosure) can play in curbing corruption in the sector. A convergent mixed methods approach was adopted. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders from the construction industry. Furthermore, a self-administered survey was utilised to collect quantitative data from 117 construction firms. Data revealed that there was little awareness of whistleblowing legislation. Fear of retaliation or punishment and job loss, and a lack of education on whistleblowing were identified as some of the most substantial barriers to effective whistleblowing in the industry. From a public policy perspective, it is recommended that an emphasis be placed on improving levels of education and awareness on whistleblowing in the construction sector. In addition, there should be consideration to amend the Whistleblowing Act 2016 to include construction industry regulators, the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board, and private media amongst the list of institutions authorised to receive reports of impropriety in order to extend the scope of legal protection to whistleblowers in the sector. Recommendations for further research are provided.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Economics, Public Sector, Manufacturing, Economic Development, Private Sector, Industry, and Whistle Blowing
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

29. Dubai Property: An Oasis for Nigeria’s Corrupt Political Elites

Author:
Matthew Page
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For politically exposed persons (PEPs) with ill-gotten wealth, Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an alluring destination for investing their gains. Although certainly not the only place to stash money, Dubai—dubbed the commercial capital of the Middle East—exercises minimal oversight and has few legal or logistical obstacles to transferring large amounts of cash or purchasing property. PEPs, defined as individuals who are or have been entrusted with a prominent public function, are at higher risk of involvement in unlawful activity due to their positions of influence and access to assets.1 In some cases, government officials and associates who succumb to the temptation become front-page news, but in many other cases, their activities go undetected or uncorroborated, despite the efforts of local authorities and intergovernmental bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force. As a result, billions of dollars are siphoned away to the detriment of both prosperous and struggling economies and societies. The case of Nigeria—home to Africa’s largest economy and the world’s seventh most populous country—offers valuable insights into this phenomenon.2 For Nigerian PEPs in particular, Dubai is an accessible oasis far away from the political drama in their capital, Abuja, or the hustle and bustle of their biggest city, Lagos. But a dearth of specific information about Nigerian PEPs’ property in Dubai has long precluded a deeper analysis of the share of illicit financial outflows from Nigeria; that is, until 2016, when the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (now known as C4ADS) acquired the data of a private database of Dubai real estate information (dubbed the “Sandcastles” data). At least 800 properties were found to have links to Nigerian PEPs or their family members, associates, and suspected proxies. With such information and continued monitoring, Nigerian and Emirati authorities and national and international actors could ramp up their scrutiny on high-end property transactions involving Nigerian elites to ensure that these purchases are not being made with pilfered public funds. The two countries could also deepen bilateral law enforcement cooperation by sharing information and assisting investigations more responsively and routinely. For their part, Western governments, the United Nations, and other international organizations could press the UAE to make its property and corporate records more transparent.
Topic:
Corruption, Economy, Financial Crimes, Elites, and Property
Political Geography:
Africa, Nigeria, Dubai, and Gulf Nations

30. Truth, Accountability, and Asset Recovery: How Transitional Justice Can Fight Corruption

Author:
Ruben Carranza
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
On March 2 and 3, 2020, two weeks before the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a COVID-19 global pandemic, transitional justice and anti-corruption policymakers, experts, and activists from the Gambia, Kenya, South Africa and Armenia met with their counterparts in Tunisia for a two-day conference entitled, “Truth, Accountability and Asset Recovery: How Transitional Justice Can Fight Corruption,” organized by ICTJ with the support of Tunisia’s National Anti-Corruption Commission (INLUCC) and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This diverse group of leaders came together to share solutions to a common problem: How can countries emerging from dictatorship, war, or political transitions hold corrupt ex-rulers accountable, recover their ill-gotten assets, and ensure that those harmed the most by human rights violations and large-scale corruption can achieve justice, obtain reparations, and overcome marginalization? For many countries pursuing transitional justice, including those represented by participants in the conference, the health and economic impact of the pandemic has made it more urgent to find and design solutions that advance accountability for both human rights violations and corruption. In Kenya, for example, citizens questioned the government’s use of $12 million in COVID-19-related aid from the World Bank, “amid reports that the lockdown intended to curb the spread of the virus had worsened poverty, even forcing a mother to cook stones to make her eight children believe she was preparing food for them.” In Tunisia, INLUCC “identified 11 instances of suspected corruption and conflicts of interest” related to a government deal to acquire millions of facemasks. At the conference, participants brought up the role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in enabling corruption during dictatorship or in facilitating state capture through privatization. Ninety-seven human rights and anti-corruption groups have jointly reminded the IMF, which has offered loans to pandemic-hit countries even as it continues to set austerity as a condition, that “transparency and accountability are key to making sure the money the IMF is disbursing actually goes to protecting lives and livelihoods.” This report gives an overview of the conference and its five panel discussions. It presents the thematic questions posed in each panel and summarizes the panelists’ statements and the comments and questions from moderators, other panelists, and participants in the audience. By design, the premise of the conference was clear: The practice by mainly global South countries of including accountability for corruption in their transitional justice processes has settled the debate over whether accountability for corruption should be part of transitional justice. In 2008, the Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission began investigating land-grabbing, large-scale corruption, and violations of economic and social rights. Soon after the Arab Spring in 2011-2012, Tunisia took the most significant steps when it established the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) with a mandate that covered violent political repression as well as corruption under former President Ben Ali. In its recently released final report, the commission examines the extent of the corruption and how the development policies and austerity measures imposed by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF enabled it. In 2016, the post-dictatorship government in the Gambia created a truth commission to examine human rights violations as well as a separate commission of inquiry to investigate ex-dictator Yahya Jammeh’s corruption and identify his ill-gotten wealth. The latter commission is now considering using part of those assets to fund reparations. Although corruption was excluded from the mandate of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, activists in 2017 created the People’s Tribunal on Economic Crime that linked the continuity of post-apartheid corruption to the failure to address it in earlier transitional justice processes. In 2018, the South African government then created the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture to investigate specific economic crimes during and after apartheid. After the 2018 revolution in Armenia that ended a decade of authoritarian rule in the post-Soviet state, the new government embarked on prosecutions for corruption and human rights violations and is now considering a truth commission that would examine specific cases of corruption and human rights violations since 1991. These processes informed the conference, and the panelists who were directly involved in them discussed the challenges, successes, and lessons learned. This report’s original intent was to highlight the most important lessons from these experiences and promote South-South exchanges on transitional justice and accountability for corruption. However, the unprecedented global pandemic during which the conference took place has given it another equally relevant purpose. As ICTJ pointed out in a recent special report on COVID-19, “The pandemic is bringing to the surface underlying inequalities, including the unequal access to health care.” With this in mind, the author hopes this report will also offer policymakers practical approaches to transitional justice that can help address those underlying inequalities, such as measures aimed at improving access to health care for the most vulnerable, and initiatives to use recovered ill-gotten assets to fund reparations for victims.
Topic:
Corruption, Reform, Criminal Justice, Institutions, Reparations, COVID-19, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Kenya, Europe, Armenia, North Africa, Tunisia, Gambia, and Africa