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Begin New Search Political Geography Africa Publication Year within 25 Years

421. he Democratic Republic of Congo: The Great Electoral Robbery (and how and why Kabila got away with it)

Author:
Kris Berwouts and Filip Reyntjens
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Although the election of Félix Tshisekedi as president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was hailed as ‘the first peaceful transition since independence’, the election was anything but a democratic exercise. Indeed, Martin Fayulu was the real winner, not Tshisekedi. Suspected electoral fraud at the legislative elections has returned a parliament in which Kabila’s Common Front for Congo coalition (Front commun pour le Congo – FCC) holds a large majority. This will allow Kabila to keep real power in most domains of government. By endorsing this outcome in the knowledge that it was fraudulently obtained, the West and Africa have robbed the Congolese people of their choice.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Rigged Elections, and State Abuse
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

422. Returnees in the Maghreb: Comparing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

Author:
Thomas Renard
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The conflict in Syria and Iraq has mobilised an unprecedented number of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). More than 50,000 individuals travelled to the Levant to join jihadi groups. While fighters have flocked from virtually every corner of the world, a significant contingent came from North Africa. This has created an unprecedented challenge for individual countries, as well as for the broader Maghreb and Mediter- ranean regions. The ‘Caliphate’ has now been defeated with the loss of its remaining territories. While many people were killed, thousands of fighters and family members are either in detention in Syria or in Iraq – or still on the run. Authorities worldwide are contem- plating – or should be contemplating – the possible return of these fighters in the short to medium term and how to deal with them. In fact, more than a thousand North African fighters have already returned home since 2012. Following this unprecedented number of jihadi volunteers, countries must now handle an unprecedented number of jihadi veterans who present a multi-faceted security and societal challenge from prosecution to detention and rehabilitation. Arguably, whether they return or not, some of these fighters are likely to have a lasting effect on the global jihadi movement and on local dynamics in their country of origin. As highlighted in this report, history is a reminder that even small numbers of veteran fighters can have a significant impact on local, regional and global security. There has been a growing amount of research into (returning) foreign fighters recently.1 This research was needed to better understand the phenomenon, either in general terms or at a country-specific level. Most of this research focused on departures rather than returns, and it focused often more on the individual dynamics and motivations rather than on governments’ debates and responses. Yet, as most governments still grapple with returnees, it is important to look into governments’ responses, with a view to opening a discussion and possibly making some recom- mendations. In this report, we have therefore decided to focus on governments’ responses to the issue of returning foreign fighters in North Africa, in light of the unprecedented regional mobilisation. Tunisia, notably, has often been described as the largest provider of foreign fighters to the Levant, or certainly one of its top purveyors. Egypt and Morocco have also seen a significant mobilisation for jihad, justifying their inclu- sion in our study. We offer a comparative analysis of the situation in these three North African countries: Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Such an approach, using similar guidelines for all contributing authors, allows for interesting comparisons between the circum- stances that led to the departure of fighters and the responses to dealing with their return. Contributors were asked to look into domestic perceptions and debates related to the threat from returnees, and the specific policies developed to handle them. They were also asked to compare current perceptions and responses with previous jihadi mobilisations.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia

423. Belgian Special Forces in the Sahel: A Minimal Footprint with Maximal Output?

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In a shifting geopolitical context, the Belgian Defence has intensified its presence in the Sahel region and developed a new strategic military collaboration with Niger through Operation New Nero. This policy brief critically examines the strategy and identifies three challenges for the future of the operation: Niger’s democratic development, the asymmetry between the Western Partner Nation’s capabilities, and diverging agendas within the Belgian Defence. To counter these challenges, it is suggested that the minimalist approach and the social networks which enable horizontal collaboration among partners are maintained, while new civil-military opportunities are explored. On a broader level, it is recommended that Belgium aligns its political and military agendas to achieve long- term strategies geopolitical regions of importance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Belgium, Sahel, and Niger

424. Security Forces’ Strategies of Resistance to Transitional Justice

Author:
Valerie Arnould
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Security forces are key actors in transitional justice, with the ability to hamper or upend the process. While concerns have often centred on their possible violent responses to transitional justice, security forces are generally more likely to mobilise more discrete forms of resistance. Drawing on transitional justice experiences in Brazil, Chile, Sierra Leone and Uganda this policy brief identifies six types of resistance strategies used by security forces: threatening violence, obstructionism, de-legitimation, strategic cooperation, disengagement and appropriation. It also examines which contextual factors may influence which strategies the security forces are more likely to pursue.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Violence, and Justice
Political Geography:
Uganda, Africa, Brazil, South America, Sierra Leone, and Chile

425. Burundi on the Brink Again? Identifying Risks Before the 2020 elections

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In less than a year Burundi will hold its first elections since the 2015 political crisis was triggered by the president’s bid for a third term. Almost five years after the start of the crisis, Burundi is still stuck in a political impasse with strong authoritarian undertones and with little hope of conducting free and fair elections. This policy brief identifies four developments which could turn the current situation into a high- intensity violent crisis: forced refugee return; repression of the opposition; implosion of the ruling party CNDD-FDD and the threat of an Ebola outbreak. Given the tense climate and the limited space available to foreign actors, it is suggested that external actors scale down expectations for democratic elections. Instead, focus should be on keeping options open to provide humanitarian assistance in the event of a large-scale outbreak of violence or Ebola, while maintaining political pressure for democratic space.
Topic:
Elections, Ebola, Refugees, Election watch, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Africa and Burundi

426. The Use of Aid to Counter China's "Djibouti Strategy" in the South Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China has gradually militarized its facilities in the horn of Africa (Djibouti) under the pretense of anti-piracy operations and development aid since 2017, which has forced the U.S., France, and Japan to accept a permanent Chinese military presence in the same 14,400 square-mile African territory, where China is now holding live-fire exercises. Dubbed the “Djibouti strategy,” Beijing is now executing this tactic across the South Pacific, one of the most aid-dependent regions of the world. China, one of the highest contributors to Official Development Assistant (ODA) in the South Pacific, uses that tool at first under the guise of aid while actually employing it to shape the islands’ infrastructure to its own strategic military advantage. China is currently building infrastructure capable of dual economic and military use in Fiji, the Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, and other Pacific islands. These projects support China’s aim to break through the First and Second Island Chains, a series of pro-U.S. countries that limit Chinese naval access to the Philippine Sea and Pacific Ocean. Meanwhile, U.S. ODA is deployed inefficiently and inconsistently through 19 separate agencies. The design, delivery, and administration of U.S. development assistance must be reformed. ODA is a national security issue, not just a humanitarian one. The U.S. defense community needs to embrace the strategic potential of ODA and its capacity to strengthen democracies and counter malign influence abroad.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Aid, Infrastructure, Alliance, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, Djibouti, Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, United States of America, Fiji, and South Pacific

427. Leveraging the BRI for Africa’s Industrialisation and Intra-Trade (Opportunities for the AfCFTA)

Author:
Mwanda Phiri and Nakubyana Mungomba
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Two initiatives have recently gained prominence, one on the global stage and the other in Africa: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The former initiative’s primary aim is to build economic infrastructure in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors in the countries through which the BRI will pass, which has come to include several African countries. Concurrently, the objective of the AfCFTA is to deepen economic integration amongst African states by creating a unified market for goods and services and in the process, propel Africa’s industrialisation and structural transformation. Although seemingly independent, these initiatives converge and present two economic diplomacy instruments that can be leveraged to address Africa’s industrialisation challenge and the bottlenecks to intra-African trade for inclusive and sustainable development. On the back of secondary data sources, this paper explores how the BRI can be leveraged to advance the objectives of the AfCFTA by addressing the financing, infrastructure and productive capacity challenges constraining Africa’s industrialisation and intra-trade
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Free Trade, and Industrialization
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia

428. A Review of Pillar I & II of Zambia’s Economic Stabilisation and Growth Programme 2017-2019

Author:
Florence Banda-Muleya, Shebo Nalishebo, Mbewe Kalikeka, Nakubyana Mungomba, Ignatius Masilokwa, and Caesar Cheelo
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
The economic crisis of 2015 destabilised Zambia’s economic performance. The depreciation of the Kwacha and its pass-through effects led to inflation of as high as 22% and growth, at 2.9%, was far below the 5% target. The overall Budget deviation was 15% of Parliamentary appropriations in 2015, disrupting planned activities and attainment of set macroeconomic objectives. There were huge variations between what the consequent national Budgets committed to do and what they actually did. To fix this and nudge the country back towards high sustained economic growth, the Economic Stabilisation and Growth Programme (ESGP) was crafted in 2017. The five-pillar plan aimed to ensure prudent fiscal management by providing a system of accountability and a standard against which results could be measured, among other things. The aim of this paper is to review the ESGP, particularly, its performance in 2018. The paper sets out to understand how well Zambia faired in implementing the ESGP as well as to highlight the broader fiscal trends recently. It ultimately seeks to make recommendations about how Zambia can revive its path to economic stability and growth. The paper focuses tightly on the first two pillars of the ESGP, i.e. (i) restoring budget credibility; and (ii) enhancing domestic resource mobilisation and refocusing public expenditure. The remaining three pillars are slated to be reviewed in the second half of 2019.
Topic:
Budget, Finance, Economic growth, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia

429. In Further Pursuit of an IMF-Programme: Possible Pathways for Zambia and Lessons for Africa

Author:
Caesar Cheelo and Nakubyana Mungomba
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Since 2015, Zambia’s real GDP growth has declined markedly, its local currency has depreciated notably with episodes of serious volatility, and the risks of fiscal and debt distress have mounted. As the country searches for solutions, one viable international economic diplomacy instrument might be the IMF. Since its creation in 1945, the IMF has fostered global monetary cooperation, secured financial stability, international trade, high employment, sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction, mainly through: lending, surveillance and capacity building. Zambia has been pursuing an IMF-supported economic programme since about 2016, but with dismal success. In contrast, other economies like Ghana and Zimbabwe appear to be making headway. Key questions emerge from the foregoing: what does the evidence say about the relevance and significance of an IMF-supported programme for Zambia? Why has the country’s recent quest for an IMF deal failed? Does Zambia have feasible pathways to an IMF deal? This paper tackles these issues using simply descriptive statistical analysis, stylized facts and a political economy lens. We highlight a number of specific pathways that Zambia could follow in further pursuit of an IMF-support programme.
Topic:
Political Economy, GDP, Economy, Macroeconomics, Currency, and IMF
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia

430. Towards 2022: Options for paying back Zambia's Eurobond Debt

Author:
Mbewe Kalikeka, Shebo Nalishebo, and Florence Banda-Muleya
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
On 20th September 2022, Zambia’s first Eurobond will mature. The Government will be required to settle its principal payment amounting to US$750 million in full. Twenty months later in April 2024, the Government will have to settle the second Eurobond worth US$1 billion. The third US$1.25 billion Eurobond will be paid back in three instalments in July of 2025, 2026 and 2027. With less than three years before the first Eurobond matures, there is no clear indication of how and where the money to pay back these Eurobonds is going to come from. This paper considers several options that will mitigate the possibility of a default when the principal payments on the Eurobonds are due. The lack of a payment strategy has made the bondholders jittery about whether they will get their money back. Bondholders have communicated their consternations by dumping the Zambian bonds which are perceived to be risky. With increasing yield rates on the three Eurobonds, of about 17% by end-September 2019, the market seems to have already priced in a default – only nations already in default, such as Venezuela, have yields as high as Zambia’s1. The yield rate is the barometer used to assess the risk inherent in the bond. In general, higher yields mean the bond has higher risk and corresponds to a decline in the value of the bond. There have been efforts made towards establishing a Eurobond Redemption Strategy, but its contents are yet to be publicised. Also, the failure to release the 2020-2022 Medium Term Expenditure Framework by September 2019, and the absence of the 2020-2022 Medium Term Debt Strategy to show a clear borrowing plan have added to the market apprehension. By just about every measure, the Zambian economic fundamentals are fragile. Growth is ailing, prompting the authorities to revise their growth projection targets from 4% to 2% in 2019. Agriculture has been in recession for several quarters now. The 2019 mining fiscal regime that has significantly raised the tax burden on mining companies to unsustainable and uncompetitive levels, coupled with reduced ore grades, has resulted in 8.4% reduction in mining value added in the second quarter of 2019. The electricity load management which commenced in mid-2019 continues to have adverse economy-wide effects. This has implications on revenue targets. Tax revenues in September 2019 were 17% lower than projected, a trend likely to continue at least up to the end of the year. Further, the recent weakness of the Kwacha is not helping either as it has increased the cost of external borrowing and debt servicing, making it prohibitively more expensive to service foreign-currency denominated loans, which include the Eurobonds.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Markets, Public Debt, and Eurobonds
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia