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81. Statement by Col. Joseph Felter (Ret.) before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee

Author:
Joseph Felter
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
My testimony draws on experience and perspective gained during my career as a US Army Special Forces officer with deployments to Afghanistan most recently in 2010- 2011 as commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) deploying experienced counterinsurgency advisors across all five ISAF regional commands and reporting directly to COMISAF. It is also informed by participation in efforts to build host nation security force capabilities in the Philippines and elsewhere as well as by scholarly research on the effective employment of state security forces to combat insurgency.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Terrorism, War, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

82. The FY2013 Defense Budget, Sequestration, and the Growing Strategy-Reality Gap

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of “independence,” including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP -- in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- versus 6 - 7% during the Cold War.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

83. Assessing the Asia Pivot

Author:
Walter Lohman
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of International Security Affairs
Institution:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Abstract:
In the course of two months in the fall of 2011, the President and his administration—particularly the Secretary of State—conducted a political and diplomatic offensive to prove American staying power in Asia. It marked a 180-degree turn from where the White House had begun three years earlier. The fall offensive began with the long-awaited passage of the Korea-U.S. FTA (KORUS), an agreement of major economic importance. After years of accumulated opportunity costs, in October, the administration finally pushed the agreement forward and arranged for South Korean President Lee Myun-bak to be in Washington for the occasion of its passage. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton framed the new approach in her November “America's Pacific Century” speech, wherein she declared the Administration's “Asia Pivot.”1 President Obama gave the approach authority and economic substance at APEC, where the U.S. secured a game-changing commitment from Japan to join the Transpacific Partnership trade pact (TPP). The President then embarked on his third visit to the Asia Pacific. In Australia, he announced new training rotations of up to 2,500 U.S. Marines through Australia's northern shore, a move with obvious implications for the security of our allies and sea lanes, and in Indonesia, he became the first American president to participate in the East Asian Summit (EAS). At the EAS meeting of 18 regional leaders, President Obama raised the importance of maritime security and freedom of navigation and “expressed strong opposition to the threat or use of force by any party to advance its territorial or maritime claims or interfere in legitimate economic activity”—thereby tying American interests to regional concerns about China. For her part, Secretary Clinton headed to Manila to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)—and then on to America's other treaty ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand. In Manila Bay, she signed a reaffirmation of the U.S.-Philippines MDT on the deck of a U.S. Navy destroyer and essentially declared America ready to “fight” for the Philippines. She also announced the dispatch to Manila of the second (of what will likely be four) refurbished coast guard cutters. En route to Indonesia, President Obama phoned long-suffering Burmese human rights icon Aung San Suu Kyi to get her blessing for a Burma visit from Secretary Clinton. Clinton arrived in Burma by the end of November, meeting Suu Kyi and the Burmese president and beginning a careful, “action for action” process of normalization that could have major implications for the U.S. strategic position in the region. The Chinese have long taken advantage of Burma's isolation from the U.S. If Burmese political reform proves to be real, it will offer an opportunity for the U.S. to reassert itself there. It will also remove a roadblock in America's relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with which it has long disagreed on Burma. A democratic Burma would tip the scales in ASEAN—a hodgepodge of governing systems—in favor of democracy, a state of play that improves the sustainability of American engagement.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Human Rights
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Japan, America, Washington, Asia, Australia, and Korea

84. Afghanistan from 2012-2014: Is A Successful Transition Possible?

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The key issue in evaluating the prospects for a successful Transition in Afghanistan is not whether a successful transition in Afghanistan is possible, it is rather whether some form of meaningful transition is probable — a very different thing. The answer is a modest form of strategic success is still possible, but that it is too soon to know whether it is probable and there are many areas where the current level of planning, analysis, and action combined to sharply reduce the chances for success.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, War, Counterinsurgency, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

85. Mutual Accountability: Lessons and Prospects for Afghanistan Post-Tokyo

Author:
William Byrd
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
At the Tokyo conference on July 8, donors committed to provide massive civilian aid to Afghanistan and improve aid effectiveness, while the Afghan government committed to a number of governance and political benchmarks. The outcome at Tokyo exceeded expectations, but a review of Afghan and international experience suggests that implementing the Tokyo mutual accountability framework will be a major challenge. The multiplicity of donors could weaken coherence around targets and enforcing benchmarks, and undermine the accountability of the international community for overall funding levels. Uncertain political and security prospects raise doubts about the government's ability to meet its commitments, and political will for needed reforms understandably may decline as security transition proceeds and the next election cycle approaches. It is doubtful whether major political issues can be handled through an articulated mutual accountability framework with benchmarks and associated financial incentives. The civilian aid figure agreed upon at Tokyo ($16 billion over four years) is ambitious and exceeded expectations; if the international community falls short, this could be used to justify the Afghan government failing to achieve its benchmarks. Finally, given past experience there are doubts about how well the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) process (mandated to oversee implementation), and the series of further high-level meetings agreed at Tokyo, will work.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Development, Economics, Governance, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

86. World Grows More Peaceful - Except for the Middle East

Author:
Dana McKelvey
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
The Institute for Economics and Peace's annual Global Peace Index (GPI) reported an increase in world peace after two consecutive years of decline. The change was driven by slight reductions worldwide in terrorist acts, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, military sophistication, and aggregate number of heavy weapons per capita. As the sixth edition of the study, the 2012 GPI ranked the peacefulness of 158 nations, marking an increase from the 2011 ranking of 153 nations. As Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter of Princeton University remarked at the GPI’s release, the study has great potential for “draw[ing] correlations” and encouraging collaboration between think tanks, universities, policymakers, and civil society in their study of global peace. The IEP will distribute the study to the World Bank, the OECD, the U.S. Congress, American University, and Club de Madrid, among other leading organizations. Professor Slaughter explained that researchers defined peacefulness not only as the absence of war or violence, but also as the absence of fear. The study addresses three major themes: the level of safety and security in society; the extent of domestic or international conflict; and the degree of militarization. The IEP researched these themes in the context of both “positive peace,” a “culture of peace” that values human rights, gender equality, democratic participation, and open communication, as well as “negative peace,” or the absence of violent conflict. In its study of “negative peace,” the GPI used twenty-three indicators, spanning topics from deaths in organized conflict, to political instability, to perceived criminality. The IEP’s Positive Peace Index (PPI), which addresses 108 countries, used twenty-one indicators categorized into eight “pillars of peace” that researchers identified as key to a peaceful society. The IEP emphasized the contrast between the PPI and other studies’ extensive focus on conflict and civil unrest. According to the IEP’s executive summary, the PPI becomes especially important during state-building, as in the recent cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. “The pillars of peace,” the summary states, “provide a foundation for thinking about how to establish the optimal environment for human wellbeing and potential to flourish.”
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Human Rights, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Middle East

87. Toward a Sovereign Afghanistan

Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD) convened the conference, “Toward a Sovereign Afghanistan,” October 20-22, 2011, in the Cecilienhof Castle of Potsdam near Berlin, Germany. More than 40 leading experts from Afghanistan and 14 other states participated in the private, off-the-record conference. The colloquium was opened by Ambassador Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy for Afghanistan of the UN Secretary-General; Dr. Rangin Spanta, Afghanistan National Security Advisor; Ambassador Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the Germany for Afghanistan and Pakistan; and Ambassador Vygaudas Ušackas, Special Representative and Head of Mission of the EU's Mission for Afghanistan. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, LISD Director, chaired the colloquium.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Civil Society, Economics, Islam, Peace Studies, and Self Determination
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Germany

88. Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan

Author:
Caroline Hartzell
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Afghanistan's disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program sought to enable the Afghan government to establish a monopoly on the use of force by helping break the linkages between former Afghan Military Forces (AMF) commanders and their troops, helping former combatants make the transition from military to civilian life, and collecting weapons in the possession of the AMF. Although Afghanistan presented an extremely challenging environment in which to implement DDR, a window for carrying out this task arguably existed for a couple of years after the signing of the Bonn Agreement. During this time the security situation throughout much of the country was relatively calm, the population generally supported efforts to establish peace, and the politicization of the security sector that began in the wake of the agreement was not yet entrenched. Unfortunately, the failure to include DDR in the Bonn settlement was the first in a series of missteps that limited the program's contributions to security sector reform. Delays in the design and initiation of a DDR process, combined with the international community's initial decision to leave only a light footprint in Afghanistan, left armed Afghan actors to contend with the type of security dilemma that has proven detrimental to other efforts to stabilize the peace. Competing militias' efforts to provide security as well as some groups' attempts to gain control of the security sector apparatus generated mistrust among the militias and reinforced the power of commanders and warlords. This situation was exacerbated by the coalition's reluctance to check the growing factionalization of the DDR process and a civilian-implemented DDR program that lacked the coercive capacity to contend with spoilers. DDR provisions should be part of a peace settlement. If armed groups prove unwilling to agree to such measures, their commitment to the settlement and to a durable peace must be considered suspect. Once such settlement measures have been agreed to, third-party actors—international or regional peacekeeping forces, third-party armies—should commit to providing security before, during, and after DDR; this sends a message to civilians and combatants that DDR will not endanger their safety.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

89. Refugees and IDPs after Conflict: Why They Do Not Go Home

Author:
Patricia Weiss Fagan
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Programs to return refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes after conflict, implemented by national authorities with international support, frequently leave far too many without viable futures. The measures are often inadequate for three reasons: a widely shared but flawed assumption that the need to create a future for returnees is satisfied by restoring them to their prior lives; a lack of long-term engagement by implementing authorities; and a focus on rural reintegration when many refugees and IDPs are returning to urban areas. These arguments are illustrated in four country cases—Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Burundi. In each case, the places that refugees and IDPs were forced to flee have been greatly reshaped. They often lack security and economic opportunities; governance is weak and services are inadequate. Returnees have made choices about their futures in large part on the basis of these factors. While reclaiming land or receiving compensation for losses is important, the challenge for many returnees is to settle where they can maintain sustainable livelihoods; find peaceful living conditions; have access to health care, education, and employment opportunities; and enjoy full rights of citizenship. This may mean a move from rural to urban areas and a change in the source of income generation that has to be accounted for in the design of reintegration programs. Returning refugees and IDPs should be assisted for a sufficient amount of time to determine which location and livelihood will suit them best. For international organizations, this may involve greater creativity and flexibility in supporting returnees in urban settings. To accommodate inflows of returnees and their general mobility, national and local governments should develop urban planning strategies to manage the growth of their cities, coupled with regional development plans in rural areas that may involve investment in commercial agriculture. Linking rural and urban areas by strengthening government institutions can also provide returnees with more livelihood options and promote development.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Refugee Issues, and Labor Issues
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Middle East, Balkans, and Burundi

90. No Time to Lose: Promoting the Accountability of the Afghan National Security Forces

Author:
Rebecca Barber
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
By the end of 2014, the Afghan national army and police – under the authority of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, respectively – are expected to assume full responsibility for the protection of Afghan civilians. But, as international military actors prepare for withdrawal, there are serious concerns regarding the professionalism and accountability of the security forces they will leave behind..
Topic:
Security and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
Afghanistan