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111. Uzbekistan's Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?

Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Since October 2001, Uzbekistan has been a key ally of the U.S. in the military campaign in Afghanistan. A U.S. base has been established and a far-reaching Agreement on Strategic Partnership was signed in March 2002. Uzbekistan, however, sits uncomfortably in a campaign known as “Enduring Freedom.” It is one of the most authoritarian of the post-Soviet states, with a poor record on human rights and an economy that still owes much more to Soviet central planning than the market.
Topic:
Development and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Central Asia, and Uzbekistan

112. Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice

Publication Date:
01-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Afghanistan's legal system has collapsed. Never strong to begin with, it has been nearly destroyed by 23 years of conflict and misrule. There are few trained lawyers, little physical infrastructure and no complete record of the country's laws. Under successive regimes, laws have been administered for mostly political ends with few protections of the rights of individuals to a fair trial. Although the country has signed up to most international agreements on human rights, abuses have been widespread, and military commanders have enjoyed impunity.
Topic:
Democratization, Development, and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Central Asia

113. Through the Fog of Peace Building: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

Author:
Barnett Rubin, Abby Stoddard, and Humayan Hamidzada
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
A year and a half after the defeat of the Taliban, anger is rising in Afghanistan at the slow pace of reconstruction. Success in reconstruction means meeting goals, not fulfilling pledges or being generous. The overriding goal is enabling Afghans to build a country that contributes to, rather than threatens, their own and global security. As the government of Afghanistan becomes better organized and articulates both this goal and what is needed to reach it more clearly, it has become evident that donors underestimated the amount of assistance required. Initial pledges fell short even of underestimates of the needs and were far less than in other comparable cases. Initial disbursements, which in past cases have always exceeded subsequent ones, came relatively quickly and nearly met pledges, as donors have highlighted (see figure 1). But most of these disbursements went for emergency humanitarian needs, not reconstruction. Implementation of those reconstruction projects that have been funded has been exceedingly slow, leaving little to show on the ground. As of May 2003, donors reported that in 17 months they had completed reconstruction projects with a total expenditure of only $191 million, out of $2.1 billion pledged to reconstruction for the first twelve months. Furthermore, according to Afghan government figures, only 16 percent of the total disbursements (including for humanitarian purposes) had passed through channels controlled by the struggling Afghan government and had thus failed to build that government's capacity or legitimacy. The pervasive insecurity outside of Kabul prevented implementation of major projects and sapped the public's confidence in the new authorities. Failure to strengthen the government and provide security will doom the reconstruction effort even if contributions increase. The government has articulated an ambitious policy framework for reconstruction and asked for both reconstruction and security assistance. Success is possible, and at a modest cost. Failure by the US and other major states to respond will doom Afghanistan, the region, and the world to a repetition of anarchy that gave birth to the Taliban and refuge to al-Qaida.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Asia, and Taliban

114. The Politics of Center-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan

Author:
Barnett Rubin and Helena Malikyar
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The relationship of the central government of Afghanistan to the other units of government is in many ways a proxy for the relationship of state to society. It would not be so if the state were more institutionalized and in control of the territory and population of the country. But the current situation, where the direct administrative control of the government is largely limited to the capital city and environs, and in which the government relies on international support (“foreign” support to its opponents) to exercise that control, has precedents in other eras of Afghan history.
Topic:
Democratization, Development, and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

115. Good Intentions Will Not Pave The Road to Peace

Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The Afghan people have been promised a lot in the last two years. New rules for a new world would be written in their country. Regime change would deliver Afghans, finally, from oppression and violence, while a Marshall Plan would give them a chance to rebuild their lives.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

116. Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality

Author:
Anatol Lieven and Marina Ottaway
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Afghanistan after the Taliban may easily turn into a quagmire for the international community, and the wrong kind of international strategies may easily worsen both its problems and ours. In particular, to begin with a grossly overambitious program of reconstruction risks acute disillusionment, international withdrawal, and a plunge into a new cycle of civil war and religious fanaticism.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Democratization, and Development
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

117. Preventing New Afghanistans: A Regional Strategy for Reconstruction

Author:
Martha Brill Olcott
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Now is the time to learn the lessons of the past decade in Afghanistan: how it declined from a failing state into a cesspool drawing in Islamic malcontents from all over the world as well as those, like Osama bin Laden, who could bankroll them. If we fail to do so, our freedom may regularly be challenged by threats emerging from the heart of Eurasia, from Afghanistan itself, or from the neighboring states whose fates are being reshaped by their troublesome neighbor.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Democratization, and Development
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Eurasia

118. Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building

Author:
Simon Chesterman
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Afghanistan represents a radically different model in the panoply of UN peace operations. On paper it resembles earlier assistance missions that provided governance and development support to post-conflict societies. In practice, however, the UN mission remains intimately involved with the Afghan Transitional Administration and therefore with the peace process that put it in place. This disjunction between formal authority and practical influence poses a challenge not only for the specific operation in Afghanistan but also to accepted models of UN peace operations more generally. Most analyses of UN peace operations suggest that the more complex the political environment, the larger the amount of resources required to complete the mandate. On any such measure, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) faces an uphill battle. UNAMA is instead pursuing a high-risk strategy that requires two conceptual leaps from the normal mould of peace operations. The first is that it is possible to blur the normal distinction between negotiating a peace agreement and implementing it. The second is that the UN can make up for its small mandate and limited resources through exercising greater than normal political influence. There is widespread agreement among UNAMA and most of its Afghan partners that expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul would be an important stabilizing factor in this process. If it is to be done, it should be done urgently, while all parties are still buying into the Loya Jirga process. Given the reaction of the United States and potential troop-contributing nations, however, expansion now appears highly unlikely. Every UN mission and development programme now stresses the importance of local 'ownership'. This may be the first mission where some of the local population themselves are truly taking charge. Development, however, is notoriously supply- rather than demand-driven; donor countries are infamous for pledging one thing and delivering another. Agencies must therefore take this into account when constructing fictional budgetary targets that they know will not be met, making responsible financial planning still more difficult. Compounding these problems is confusion in Afghanistan as to what projects are actually going to be funded and when. This is partly caused by the refusal of some of the largest donors to have their money pooled into a trust fund for the whole of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga was intended to encourage Afghans from all parts of the country to 'buy into the peace process'. This phrase was used metaphorically, but should also be understood literally. Encouraging Afghans to see the solutions to their problems as lying in the embryonic institutions of the state is good politics internationally. It is also Afghanistan's best chance for stability and relative prosperity.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, Peace Studies, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

119. Central Asia: Water and Conflict

Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Competition for water is increasing in Central Asia at an alarming rate, adding tension to what is already an uneasy region. Agriculture is the mainstay of the region's economy, and thirsty crops such as cotton and rice require intensive irrigation. Water use has increased rapidly since the Central Asian states became independent in 1991 and is now at an unsustainable level. Irrigation systems have decayed so severely that half of all water never reaches crops, and several years of drought have cut available water by a fifth even as demand continues to soar. Efforts to rebuild Afghanistan will now put yet more strain on supplies.
Topic:
Agriculture, Development, and Environment
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Central Asia

120. The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward?

Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The immensity of the task of rebuilding Afghanistan into something resembling a coherent state cannot be over-estimated. Nearly three decades of political instability – including many years of savage warfare, the wholesale destruction of political and physical infrastructure and the inflammation of ethnic divisions – are layered on top of a nation that was among the poorest and weakest governed even in its "golden age" before King Zahir Shah was deposed in 1973. Afghanistan's transition back to a minimum level of political and economic stability will require many small but crucial steps to keep it on course.
Topic:
Democratization, Development, and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Central Asia