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61. Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry

Author:
Gretchen Peters
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The purpose of this report is to understand and outline the financial architecture that sustains the Haqqani faction of the Afghan insurgency. The Haqqani network (hereafter “the network” or “the Haqqan is”) is widely recognized as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban and as the deadliest and most globally focused faction of that latter group. What gets far less attention is the fact that the Haqqan is also appear to be the most sophisticated and diversified from a financial standpoint. This report will illustrate that the Haqqani business portfolio mirrors a mafia operation, and illustrate why an understanding of the illicit business side of the network is critical to enriching our understanding of the group. In addition to raising funds from ideologically like minded donors, an activity the Haqqan is have engaged in since the 1980s, information collected for this report indicates that over the past three decades they have penetrated key business sectors, including import-export, transport, real estate and construction in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Arab Gulf and beyond. The Haqqan is employ violence and intimidation to extort legal firms and prominent community members, and engage in kidnap for ransom schemes. According to investigators, they protect and engage in the trafficking of narcotics and the precursor chemicals used to process heroin (although to a much lesser degree than other factions of the Afghan Taliban). The Haqqan is also appear to operate their own front companies, many of which appear to be directed at laundering illicit proceeds. The broad range of business activities in which the Haqqan is engage suggests that the pursuit of wealth and power may be just as important to net work leaders as the Islamist and nationalistic ideals for which the Haqqan is claim to fight.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Taliban, and Arabia

62. Afghanistan from 2012-2014: Is A Successful Transition Possible?

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The key issue in evaluating the prospects for a successful Transition in Afghanistan is not whether a successful transition in Afghanistan is possible, it is rather whether some form of meaningful transition is probable — a very different thing. The answer is a modest form of strategic success is still possible, but that it is too soon to know whether it is probable and there are many areas where the current level of planning, analysis, and action combined to sharply reduce the chances for success.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, War, Counterinsurgency, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

63. Mutual Accountability: Lessons and Prospects for Afghanistan Post-Tokyo

Author:
William Byrd
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
At the Tokyo conference on July 8, donors committed to provide massive civilian aid to Afghanistan and improve aid effectiveness, while the Afghan government committed to a number of governance and political benchmarks. The outcome at Tokyo exceeded expectations, but a review of Afghan and international experience suggests that implementing the Tokyo mutual accountability framework will be a major challenge. The multiplicity of donors could weaken coherence around targets and enforcing benchmarks, and undermine the accountability of the international community for overall funding levels. Uncertain political and security prospects raise doubts about the government's ability to meet its commitments, and political will for needed reforms understandably may decline as security transition proceeds and the next election cycle approaches. It is doubtful whether major political issues can be handled through an articulated mutual accountability framework with benchmarks and associated financial incentives. The civilian aid figure agreed upon at Tokyo ($16 billion over four years) is ambitious and exceeded expectations; if the international community falls short, this could be used to justify the Afghan government failing to achieve its benchmarks. Finally, given past experience there are doubts about how well the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) process (mandated to oversee implementation), and the series of further high-level meetings agreed at Tokyo, will work.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Development, Economics, Governance, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

64. Avoiding Meeting Fatigue: How to make the numerous international meetings on Afghanistan more effective

Author:
William Byrd
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The numerous high-profile international meetings on Afghanistan since 2001 have helped keep attention focused on Afghanistan, elicit financial support, give a “seat at the table” to all partners, generate good strategic documents, and provide a forum for the Afghan government. However, the meetings often have raised excessive expectations; lacked meaningful follow-up; undermined their own objectives; prioritized diplomacy over substance; focused more on donors' issues than Afghan problems; oriented the Afghan government toward donors; diverted resources toward meetings; resulted in meeting fatigue; and sometimes seemingly substituted for action. These meetings can be made more effective by: (1) keeping to realistic expectations; (2) not expecting meetings to substitute for difficult decisions and actions; (3) having substantive, disciplined agendas and avoiding co-optation by diplomatic priorities; (4) matching objectives with the issue(s) the meeting is supposed to address; (5) ensuring quality background work; (6) focusing follow-up on key areas and a few simple, monitorable benchmarks; and (7) keep­ing the number and frequency of meetings manageable.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Peace Studies, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

65. Preparing Advisers for Capacity-Building Missions

Author:
Nadia Gerspacher
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
As part of their efforts to support the rebuilding and reform of postconflict and transitional states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, and other members of the international community are sending international advisers to work alongside high-level officials in national institutions. Advisers are recruited for their strong professional expertise in fields such as logistics and human resources. However, they have had little preparation in transferring that knowledge to others, especially in a transitional or postconflict environment. If they are to contribute to sustainable reforms, advisers need to be taught how to transfer knowledge in a complex and alien environment, how to operate without formal authority, and how to cultivate local ownership. Launched in 2010, a U.S. Department of Defense program to train advisers for institution-building activities in Afghanistan—Ministry of Defense Advisors, or MoDA—has incorporated lessons learned by former advisers and emphasized four principles originally developed for a USIP training course: supporting local ownership; designing for sustainability; doing no harm; and demonstrating respect, humility, and empathy. As of March 2012, five MoDA cohorts have been deployed and have performed effectively. The MoDA experience, together with insights gained from teaching courses at USIP and other venues, suggests that a good curriculum for training high-level advisers in any sector of government should include four parts: lessons on about how to be an effective adviser, including techniques for building relationships and communicating across cultures; briefings on the situation in the country; substantive information about the sector in which the adviser will work; and preparation through practice.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, NATO, Peace Studies, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

66. Toward a Sovereign Afghanistan

Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD) convened the conference, “Toward a Sovereign Afghanistan,” October 20-22, 2011, in the Cecilienhof Castle of Potsdam near Berlin, Germany. More than 40 leading experts from Afghanistan and 14 other states participated in the private, off-the-record conference. The colloquium was opened by Ambassador Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy for Afghanistan of the UN Secretary-General; Dr. Rangin Spanta, Afghanistan National Security Advisor; Ambassador Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the Germany for Afghanistan and Pakistan; and Ambassador Vygaudas Ušackas, Special Representative and Head of Mission of the EU's Mission for Afghanistan. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, LISD Director, chaired the colloquium.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Civil Society, Economics, Islam, Peace Studies, and Self Determination
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Germany

67. Seeking Solutions for Afghanistan

Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have accepted a generous proposal from the government of Abu Dhabi to host a series of meetings facilitated by the East West Institute (EWI) to complement existing channels of communication between the two countries. Participants in the series, known as the Abu Dhabi Process, discuss areas of their relationship they believe will help build confidence, ensure greater stability, and enhance sustainable development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The meetings are off-the-record, consultative in nature, and governed by the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Abu Dhabi

68. Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan

Author:
Caroline Hartzell
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Afghanistan's disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program sought to enable the Afghan government to establish a monopoly on the use of force by helping break the linkages between former Afghan Military Forces (AMF) commanders and their troops, helping former combatants make the transition from military to civilian life, and collecting weapons in the possession of the AMF. Although Afghanistan presented an extremely challenging environment in which to implement DDR, a window for carrying out this task arguably existed for a couple of years after the signing of the Bonn Agreement. During this time the security situation throughout much of the country was relatively calm, the population generally supported efforts to establish peace, and the politicization of the security sector that began in the wake of the agreement was not yet entrenched. Unfortunately, the failure to include DDR in the Bonn settlement was the first in a series of missteps that limited the program's contributions to security sector reform. Delays in the design and initiation of a DDR process, combined with the international community's initial decision to leave only a light footprint in Afghanistan, left armed Afghan actors to contend with the type of security dilemma that has proven detrimental to other efforts to stabilize the peace. Competing militias' efforts to provide security as well as some groups' attempts to gain control of the security sector apparatus generated mistrust among the militias and reinforced the power of commanders and warlords. This situation was exacerbated by the coalition's reluctance to check the growing factionalization of the DDR process and a civilian-implemented DDR program that lacked the coercive capacity to contend with spoilers. DDR provisions should be part of a peace settlement. If armed groups prove unwilling to agree to such measures, their commitment to the settlement and to a durable peace must be considered suspect. Once such settlement measures have been agreed to, third-party actors—international or regional peacekeeping forces, third-party armies—should commit to providing security before, during, and after DDR; this sends a message to civilians and combatants that DDR will not endanger their safety.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

69. Creating New Facts on the Ground

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Although meaningful cooperation in the region surrounding Afghanistan is of vital importance, it has been elusive because Afghanistan\'s key neighbors have significantly divergent aims. Engineering a successful regional solution would require the United States to fundamentally transform either these actors\' objectives or their dominant strategies. Achieving the latter may prove more feasible, most crucially vis-à-vis Pakistan. The region\'s history of discord is mainly rooted in the troubled relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistan\'s involvement in Afghanistan is colored by its rivalry with India, its relations with Afghanistan are a geopolitical challenge independent of India because of its fears of disorder along its western borders, the unwelcome idea of “Pashtunistan,” and a related long-standing border dispute. Pakistan\'s reaction to these problems has only exacerbated them. As Islamabad, by supporting the Taliban insurgency, has sought to exercise preponderant, if not overweening, influence over Kabul\'s strategic choices, it has earned Kabul\'s distrust, deepened the Kabul–New Delhi partnership, and increased the risk to its relations with Washington—not to mention threatening the lives of U.S. and other coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. Despite widespread support in Afghanistan for ending the war through a negotiated settlement if possible, the Afghan Taliban leadership is unlikely to consider reconciliation unless it is faced with the prospect of continued losses of the kind sustained as a result of coalition military operations in 2010. A regional solution is similarly unlikely as long as Afghanistan and its neighbors, including India, perceive Islamabad as bent on holding Kabul in a choking embrace. Solving these problems lies beyond the capability of American diplomacy, and right now even of the promised diplomatic surge. The best hope for progress lies in continuing military action to alter the realities on the ground— thereby inducing the Taliban to consider reconciliation, while simultaneously neutralizing the Pakistani strategy that is currently preventing a regional solution. To increase the probability of military success, however, President Obama will need to forgo the politically calculated drawdown of combat troops this summer and instead accept the advice of his field commanders to maintain the largest possible contingent necessary for the coming campaign in eastern Afghanistan. Hard and unpalatable as it might be for the president, this course alone offers a solution that will protect the recent gains in Afghanistan and advance American interests over the long term.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, America, and Washington

70. Measuring peacebuilding: challenges, tools, actions

Author:
Svein Erik Stave
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
How can the effectiveness of peacebuilding operations in countries marked by conflict be better measured? This policy brief examines the steps needed to improve the measurement of peacebuilding work, highlights the technical and political problems this work faces, and makes recommendations for action by organisations in the field.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Non-Governmental Organization, Peace Studies, War, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Afghanistan