Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
This article focuses on the sankin kotai, or alternate attendance, system instituted in Japan during the Tokugawa period. Most traditional accounts of the sankin kotai system–which included an important hostage element–portray it as a product of Tokugawa statecraft devised primarily for the coercion and exploitation of daimyo, or territorial lords, and control over a feudal order. In addition, these accounts tend to take the distinctive stability of this era for granted. Given the chaos and bloodshed of the "warring states" period which preceded it, however, the phenomenon of 267 years of peace deserves a stronger explanation.
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
From 1971 through mid-1995, the yen continually appreciated against the U.S. dollar because the Japanese and American governments were caught in a mutual policy trap. Repeated threats of a trade war by the United States caused the yen to ratchet up in 1971-73, 1977-78, 1985-87, and 1993 to mid-1995. While temporarily ameliorating commercial tensions, these great appreciations imposed relative deflation on Japan without correcting the trade imbalance between the two countries. Although resisting sharp yen appreciations in the short run, the Bank of Japan validated this syndrome of the ever-higher yen by following a monetary policy that was deflationary relative to that established by the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The appreciating yen was a forcing variable in determining the Japanese price level. After 1985, this resulted in great macroeconomic instability in Japan--including two endaka fukyos (high-yen-induced recessions).
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, America, Israel, and East Asia
Donald Emmerson, Henry Rowen, Michel Oksenberg, Daniel Okimoto, James Raphael, Thomas Rohlen, and Michael H. Armacost
Publication Date:
01-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, the power and prestige of the United States in East Asia have suffered a worrisome degree of erosion. The erosion is, in part, the by-product of long-run secular trends, such as structural shifts in the balance of power caused by the pacesetting growth of East Asian economies. But the decline has been aggravated by shortcomings in U.S. policy toward East Asia, particularly the lack of a coherent strategy and a clear-cut set of policy priorities for the post-Cold War environment. If these shortcomings are not corrected, the United States runs the risk of being marginalized in East Asia--precisely at a time when our stakes in the region are as essential as those in any area of the world. What is needed, above all, is a sound, consistent, and publicly articulated strategy, one which holds forth the prospect of serving as the basis for a sustainable, nonpartisan domestic consensus. The elements of an emerging national consensus can be identified as follows:
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Economics