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1. Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Afghanistan Without Government Revenues or Development Benefits

Author:
William A. Byrd and Javed Noorani
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Case studies of five ongoing mining operations show that Afghan mining companies are wantonly exploiting easily extractable mineral resources with little or no taxes and royalties going to the government. Revenue losses from just two sources —royalties and land rent —at the five mines are more than US$50 million per year. Total revenue losses from all sources for the hundreds of mines contracted to different companies easily could be hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The tendering processes, awards, and contents of contracts issued, contract implementation, and actual operations at the mines all showed clear signs of political interference, favoring bidders that often had no prior mining experience. Companies usually began extracting resources soon after mining contracts were awarded, without paying any taxes and royalties —even though the contract called for an initial exploration period. Companies did not provide the legally and contractually required documents, such as exploration reports and environmental and social impact assessments. Effective inspections of mines were not conducted, and companies were not held accountable for payments due. Sometimes mining activities precipitated local conflicts, resulting in violence and deaths; weaker local communities called on Taliban elements for support in one such dispute. Serious reforms are needed to ensure that mining activities are developmentally beneficial and that revenues generated are paid to the government.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Natural Resources, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

2. Electoral Offensive: Taliban Planning for Afghanistan's 2014 National Elections

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi and Casey Garret Johnson
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Taliban have more resources and are better organized to disrupt Afghanistan's 2014 national elections than was the case in any of the country's last four elections. Still, there are disagreements between insurgent leaders about carrying out a campaign of violence and intimidation. One group, led by Akhtar Mansur and tied to the Quetta Shura, favored, at least for some time, a more conciliatory approach and in the spring met informally with Afghan government officials to discuss allowing the polls to go forward. Another Group, led by Taliban military commander Zakir and the Peshawar Shura, favors disrupting the election. These upper-level divisions may have little consequence on the ground since rank-and-file fighters are either vowing to carry out attacks regardless or, as has happened in the past, may strike local deals with political entities to look the other way and allow voting to take place.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Democratization, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Taliban

3. Afghanistan's Civil Order Police

Author:
Robert M. Perito
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In 2006, a day of deadly riots in Kabul dramatized the need for an Afghan constabulary force capable of controlling outbreaks of urban violence. In response, the U.S. military and Afghan authorities created an elite gendarmerie, the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). Although ANCOP was conceived of as a riot control force, it was assigned to the Focused District Development Program to replace district-level Afghan Uniformed Police who were away for training. The high demand and constant transfers required by this duty resulted in rates of attrition among ANCOP units of 75 to 80 percent. In 2010, ANCOP's superior training, firepower, and mobility were recognized in its assignment, along with a “surge” of U.S. military forces, to reverse the Taliban's hold on key areas in southern Afghanistan. In heavy fighting in Marja, Helmand province, ANCOP was demonstrably unprepared to serve as a counterinsurgency force, particularly in areas that had not been cleared by coalition and Afghan military forces. Subsequent improvements in training and partnering with U.S. forces improved ANCOP's performance in Kandahar, where ANCOP was used to hold areas that had been cleared by the military. By 2011, ANCOP had firmly established its place as an elite rapid reaction and counterinsurgency force with a positive reputation among coalition troops and Afghan citizens.
Topic:
Security, NATO, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

4. Making Peace in Afghanistan: The Missing Political Strategy

Author:
Minna Jarvenpaa
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The proposition that a political settlement is needed to end the war in Afghanistan has gained increasing attention in recent months. Channels for preliminary talks with Taliban leaders have been sought and a High Peace Council created. However, despite upbeat military assessments, the insurgency has expanded its reach across the country and continues to enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan. Afghans increasingly resent the presence of foreign troops, and the Taliban draw strength from grievances by ordinary Afghans against their government. External money to supply military bases and pay for development projects often ends up fueling conflict rather than creating stability. For their part, President Karzai and many Afghan political elites lack genuine commitment to reform, calling into question the viability of a state-building international strategy and transition by 2014. Missing is a political strategy to end the conflict that goes beyond dealing with the Taliban; it must define the kind of state that Afghans are willing to live in and that regional neighbors can endorse. Knowing that such a settlement could take years to conclude does not diminish the urgency of initiating the process. Given doubts about Karzai's ability to manage the situation effectively, the international community needs to facilitate a peace process more pro-actively than it has. To be sustainable, the process will need to be inclusive; women's rights, human rights, and media freedoms cannot become casualties of negotiations. Afghanistan's international partners should commit to a peace process and lay the groundwork to appoint a mediator. This includes gauging the interests of parties, identifying actual participants in talks, and structuring an agenda. In the meantime, international military efforts must be realigned to avoid action that contradicts the ultimate aim of a peace settlement.
Topic:
NATO, Treaties and Agreements, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

5. Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy Elite

Author:
Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf, and Salman Zaidi
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
This brief summarizes the perceptions of Pakistani foreign policy elite about Pakistan's strategy and interests in Afghanistan, its view of the impending “end game”, and the implications of its policies towards Afghanistan for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. These perceptions were captured as part of a project, co-convened by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and Jinnah Institute (JI) in Pakistan, aimed at better understanding Pakistan's outlook towards the evolving situation in Afghanistan. A full report carrying detailed findings will be launched in August 2011 in Pakistan. Pakistani foreign policy elite perceive their country to be seeking: (i) a degree of stability in Afghanistan; (ii) an inclusive government in Kabul; and (iii) to limit Indian presence in Afghanistan to development activities. They perceive America's Afghanistan strategy to date to be largely inconsistent with Pakistan's interests. Pakistan insists on an immediate, yet patient effort at inclusive reconciliation involving all major Afghan stakeholders, including the main Afghan Taliban factions. Other issues that Pakistan's policy elite view as impediments to a peaceful Afghanistan settlement include: questionable viability of a regional framework; lack of clarity on Taliban's willingness to negotiate; the unstable political and economic situation in Afghanistan; and concerns about Afghan National Security Forces adding to instability in the future. Project participants felt that greater clarity in U.S. and Pakistani policies is critical to avoid failure in Afghanistan, to convince the Taliban of the validity of a power-sharing agreement, and to urge regional actors to play a more constructive role.
Topic:
International Relations
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

6. Promoting Stability and Resolving Provincial Disputes in Afghanistan

Author:
Noah Coburn and Shahmahmood Miakhel
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Currently numerous disputes at the local level are unresolved in Afghanistan, leading to local instability, a growing distance between the government and people and encouraging communities to turn to the Taliban. In March 2010, USIP began working with local elders, government officials (particularly governors and officials from the Ministry of Tribal Affairs) and religious figures to address a range of disputes in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces in eastern Afghanistan. These networks of elders, working closely with government officials and, in some cases, the international military, have addressed conflicts that include land disputes, criminal cases, and disputes involving the Taliban. Since 2010, USIP's Dispute Resolution Project has participated in and recorded the resolution of over 120 cases. The project suggests several methods for facilitating dispute resolution that rely on flexible networks of locally legitimate political figures which will strengthen the government, promote rule of law and decrease the appeal of the Taliban.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

7. Afghan Perspectives on Achieving Durable Peace

Author:
Hamish Nixon
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Afghans across different groups see the United States as a key party to the conflict whose direct participation in a peace process is crucial to its success, and therefore question the effectiveness of U.S. emphasis on an “Afghan-led” reconciliation strategy. The U.S. must engage directly in negotiating a settlement because of its control over the issue of withdrawal of NATO forces. The Taliban demand for full withdrawal prior to talks appears to be an opening position. A challenge will be linking a structure for drawdown to necessary steps by insurgents to allow a cessation of violence and prevent Afghanistan's use for terrorism. A settlement process will entail discussion of the composition and future of the Afghan National Security Forces, and the current “transition” strategy of a large army and expanding local defence initiatives will almost certainly need re-examining during such a process. The conflict is not only a struggle for power and resources; it is also a legitimacy crisis stemming from a system of power and patronage that feeds conflict. From this perspective, a settlement should address the concentration of powers in the presidency through incremental reform to appointments, elections, or farther-reaching changes to the structure of government over time. There is a tension between reform and using political appointments to accommodate power-sharing demands. A durable settlement will need to involve political and social agreements among Afghans taking into account the views of a range of stakeholders. To manage this tension, the intra-Afghan peace process should be oriented toward broad inclusion of non-combatants while balancing the secrecy required to make progress.
Topic:
NATO, Government, and National Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

8. Defying Expectations: Polio Vaccination Programs Amid Political and Armed Conflict

Author:
Leonard S. Rubenstein
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Defying expectations, successful polio vaccination campaigns have taken place in well over two dozen armed conflicts, and continue today. Polio vaccination campaigns amid war have often succeeded in gaining the cooperation of anti-government forces such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru, multiple rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Diplomatic means have also been employed to overcome severe political obstacles to such campaigns, even when the campaigns have become a flashpoint in places of political turmoil. Such campaigns face many challenges because vaccinators need to reach all villages without threats to their own lives or the programs' implementation. They require security for safe passage for immunizations and sometimes temporary cease-fires. The many successes of vaccination campaigns can be attributed to the programs' exclusive focus on the immunization needs of children; the use of interlocutors who are credible because they demonstrate neutrality; transparent discussions with opposition groups about the reasons for the campaigns; a role for opposition groups in facilitating the campaigns; limits on the number of days vaccinations take place; and the absence of any strategic or political goals for the effort beyond polio eradication.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Armed Struggle, and Health Care Policy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Taliban, and Peru

9. When Should We Talk to Terrorists?

Author:
Audrey Kurth Cronin
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The longer a terrorist group has been in existence, the more likely it is to engage in negotiations. Even so, only about 18 percent of terrorist groups engage in talks on strategic issues at all. When groups do enter talks, the most common pattern is for negotiations to drag on, with the conflict occupying a middle ground between a stable cease-fire and high levels of violence. Negotiations do not necessarily result in a cessation of the violence: about half of the groups that have entered negotiations in recent years have continued to be active in their violence as the talks unfolded, typically at a lower level of intensity or frequency. A wide range of variables can determine the efficacy of negotiations. A crucial element in the success or failure of such talks is the ability of policy makers to devise a plan in advance for what will happen when violence does again occur. Those policymakers who are able to unite with their non state negotiating partners in condemning violence are more likely to sustain talks and make progress. Talks with some global affiliates of al-Qaeda, as well as some smaller factions of the Taliban, may hold promise. Talks should not be seen as a “silver bullet” but rather as a way to manage and channel the violence over the long term, a process that often contributes to the decline of groups or their demise, along with other factors.
Topic:
Terrorism
Political Geography:
Taliban

10. Special Report No. 212: Thwarting Afghanistan's Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation

Author:
Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Afghanistan is at a crucial stage of transition. The Taliban, with sanctuaries and a support base in the tribal areas, has grown stronger, relying on a wide network of foreign fighters and Pakistani extremists who operate freely across the Afghan- Pakistani border. Present trends raise serious doubts about whether military solutions alone can defeat the insurgency and stem the expansion of terrorism. In short, reconciliation must also be a key element of comprehensive stabilization in Afghanistan. A multitude of factors suggest that the time is ripe for a reconciliatory process. The Taliban and the Hekmatyar Group will be key challenges to any reconciliation process as long as they enjoy sanctuaries and support outside of Afghanistan. An examination of past attempts at reconciliation with the Taliban reveals that the process has lacked consistency. The Afghan government and its international partners have offered conflicting messages, and there has been no consensual policy framework through which to pursue reconciliation in a cohesive manner. The goal of reconciliation in Afghanistan must be to achieve peace and long-term stability under the Afghan Constitution with full respect for the rule of law, social justice, and human rights. To successfully meet this goal, Afghanistan's reconciliation program must be carefully targeted and guided by a clear set of principles. A comprehensive and coordinated political reconciliation process must be started. At the same time, significant progress must be made on the security front and on the international (regional) front. Without security and stability or cooperation from Afghanistan's neighbors, reconciliation will not occur.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban