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91. Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia

Author:
Lahra Smith
Publication Date:
08-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Assistant professor at Georgetown University, where she teaches courses on African politics, civil society and democracy in Africa, and peace and conflict in East Africa. The pardon and release of thirty-eight political detainees, mostly from the leadership of the main opposition party, may give impetus to political negotiations in Ethiopia after more than two years' crisis and stalemate. Contentious and previously unresolved national issues, such as land and economic development; the institutional and constitutional structure of the Ethiopian state; and the best way to ensure equality of ethnic and religious communities, were brought to the fore during the past election cycle. However, after the election, much- needed national dialogue on these matters ended. It must be reinvigorated now that the political opposition's leaders have been freed. Citizen discontent has grown with the caretaker administration in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa and repressive local administrations. Elections for city and local government must be held. Further delays will undermine any democratic progress. The current Parliament includes members of several opposition political parties, though not the leaders who were imprisoned. Both the ruling party and the main opposition parties should make as many visible and meaningful concessions as possible to their political opponents. Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia in December 2006, its ongoing military presence in that conflict, and its unchanged, tense border stalemate with Eritrea have contributed to growing violence in the Horn of Africa and stymied domestic democratization.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Democratization, and War
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, Somalia, and East Africa

92. Some Assembly Required: Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Author:
Timothy Carney
Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Regional mediators and international facilitators helped the two main opposing forces in Sudan's fifty-year civil war, the National Congress Party (NCP) of the North and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) of the South, to reach a detailed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) after two-and-a-half years of negotiation, from 2002 to 2005. The United States served as the catalyst for the peace process and then became part of a group of facilitators including the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy. At different points during negotiations, each of these countries exerted influence on the Sudanese parties. Kenya took the lead in mediating the negotiations under General Lazaro Sumbeiywo. Sudan Vice President Ali Osman Taha, representing the North, and Dr. John Garang, representing the South, spent fifteen months negotiating the final agreement in Naivasha, Kenya. Implementation of the CPA requires continuing good security with minimal fighting, agreement on the boundaries of North and South that affect the distribution of Sudan's oil wealth, completion of midterm elections, and a referendum in the South. Slow implementation of key provisions of the CPA is causing Sudanese to question the political will and even the good faith of the northern government. Failure to provide an immediate peace dividend, lack of competence in managing southern expectations, and corruption have led to public criticism of the southern authorities. Hope is waning that the CPA will pave the way to a modern, united Sudan with a government responsive to all its peoples. The SPLM/A leadership is focusing on developing the South rather than creating a national political movement. The crisis in Darfur has diverted the international community's attention. Implementing the CPA will require sustained international pressure and imagination to help resolve numerous political, economic, and social problems.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, United States, United Kingdom, Sudan, Norway, and Italy

93. Nigeria's 2007 Elections: The Fitful Path to Democratic Citizenship

Author:
Jibrin Ibrahim
Publication Date:
01-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In Nigeria 2007 will mark the first time a third consecutive presidential election will take place and the first time one elected leader will succeed another. Many observers fear, however, that the upcoming elections, like so many previous ones, will be marred by electoral fraud and rigging. Because of the country 's history of electoral fraud, elections often have been associated with political tension, crisis, and even violence. The road map for the 2007 elections appears to be in jeopardy. The National Assembly has not reviewed the constitution to give real autonomy to the electoral commission. In addition, preparations such as registration of voters and issuance of voter identity cards still have not been completed. The major political parties are intensifying internal wrangling and elimination of rivals. The president and vice president are exchanging acrimonious allegations of corruption, further raising political tension in the country. Interethnic and regional tensions and conflicts also are increasing. Southern politicians are exerting pressure to retain power, while northern politicians insist that a long-standing pact says power should revert to their region. Over the past fifteen years, political tension has risen significantly in the petroleum-rich Niger Delta. Insurgency has spread and ethnic and youth militias have emerged. The state has lost the capacity to exercise authority effectively. The international community has played a major role in Nigerian elections since 1999, especially in monitoring activities. It is important that this help include effective monitoring of the whole election process. While the integrity of the elections can be protected effectively only by a vigilant citizenry, the international community has an important supporting role. In May 2006 the National Assembly threw out constitutional reform proposals designed to allow President Olusegun Obasanjo a third term in office. As soon as he began his second term in 2003, it was evident that plans were afoot to prolong his rule beyond the constitutionally determined tenure. The fact that he was stopped in his tracks gives hope that Nigerians will continue to struggle for democracy. A new consciousness is rising in the country that people must organize to defend their franchise. If a plan for a programmed failure of the 2007 elections does exist, chances are that Nigerians will combat it and try to salvage the elections. Observers are waiting to see if they can succeed.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Democratization, and Politics
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

94. Responding to Crisis in Nigeria

Author:
Paul Wee
Publication Date:
04-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Nigeria currently faces a three-pronged crisis involving Muslim-Christian relations, the Niger Delta region, and presidential term limits. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) held a public workshop in March 2006 for the purpose of assessing the situation in Nigeria and considering ways in which the international community might respond.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Religion
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, and Nigeria

95. Overcoming Obstacles to Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur

Author:
Dorina Bekoe and Kelly Campbell
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Civilians and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur, western Sudan, are increasingly being attacked by militia groups. At the same time, it is progressively more difficult to deliver humanitarian assistance to Darfur as aid agencies are hampered by increased banditry and continued obstruction by the government of Sudan (GOS). Moreover, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) does not offer adequate protection as it continues to operate with severe budgetary constraints, inadequate amounts of military officers and equipment, and a limited mandate that does not allow it to prevent incidents or respond sufficiently to attacks. On December 14, 2005, the Sudan Peace Forum of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) convened to address the continuing challenges facing the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. Firsthand accounts of the humanitarian crisis were presented by Sloan Mann of the United States Agency for International Development; Michael Heller Chu of the United Nations Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance; and Jonathan Morgenstein of USIP. Ambassadors Chester Crocker and Francis Deng co-chaired the meeting. This USIPeace Briefing summarizes the discussion on the rising insecurity faced by civilians in Darfur, the challenges facing AMIS, the response by the GOS, and the opportunities for the international community to facilitate humanitarian assistance in Darfur.
Topic:
Civil Society, Government, and Humanitarian Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, and Sudan

96. Creating a More Inclusive Peace in Côte d'Ivoire

Author:
Kelly Campbell and Adams Fusheini
Publication Date:
08-2006
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
On June 19-20, 2006, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), in partnership with the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), hosted a workshop entitled "Challenges to Peace and Reconstruction in Côte d'Ivoire" in Accra, Ghana. Fourteen representatives of diverse Ivoirian civil society organizations (CSOs) attended the conference, as well as representatives from the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and other nongovernmental organizations.
Topic:
International Relations, Development, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Africa and United States

97. Democratization in Mali: Putting History to Work

Author:
Robert Pringle
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Since the 1991 uprising, which saw the ouster of the country's long-standing military dictator and ushered in a democratically elected government, Mali has achieved a record of democratization that is among the best in Africa. This process has been driven by multiple factors. External observers often point to broader Africa-wide change and a remarkable constellation of “founding fathers” who demonstrated vision and self-sacrifice following the change of government. But if you ask Malians why their country has successfully democratized, most of them will respond by stressing Mali's heritage of tolerance and decentralized government, dating back more than a millennium to the Ghana Empire and its two successor states. For Malians, democratization combined with decentralization is a homecoming rather than a venture into uncharted waters. But they recognize that the country's democratization process continues to be a difficult one, inevitably laced with controversy. Although satisfaction levels remain generally high, there is a near-universal desire for more rapid progress toward improved quality of life. This unease suggests the possibility that despite their legendary patience, Malians may eventually lose hope and faith in democracy unless economic growth accelerates.
Topic:
Democratization, Development, and Government
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

98. Morocco: Betting on a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Author:
Pierre Hazan
Publication Date:
07-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Facing the Atlantic and Mediterranean, just nine miles from the Spanish coast, Morocco is essential for stability in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and American interests in these regions. The United States and the European Union fully recognize its strategic importance. Its proximity, large diaspora, and extensive trade with Europe place it at the top of the EU's Mediterranean strategy agenda. The United States has designated Morocco a major non-NATO ally; it also was one of the first Arab countries to sign a free-trade agreement with the United States. The Kingdom of Morocco is facing four challenges: weak economic growth; a social crisis resulting from social inequalities, with 20 percent of the population in absolute poverty and 57 percent illiterate; lack of trust in the governing institutions because of the high level of corruption; and an unstable regional and international environment. These factors strengthen the appeal of various Islamist movements, from moderate to more radical groups such as the authors of the deadly bombings in Casablanca in 2003 and Madrid in 2004. Moreover, the conflict over the Western Sahara places Morocco's and Algeria's armies, the two most powerful in North Africa, toe to toe. Unlike Tunisia and Algeria, since the end of the Cold War Morocco has taken steps toward political liberalization, and its pace has accelerated since Mohammed VI came to the throne in 1999. As part of the process of liberalization, the king established a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) in January 2004. This is one of very few cases in which a TRC was created without a regime change. Thousands of victims tortured during the reign of King Mohammed's father, King Hassan II, have been given the opportunity to voice their sufferings publicly and have been promised financial compensation. Such outcomes are unprecedented in a region known for its culture of impunity. Morocco is the first Arab Islamic society to establish a TRC. Its experience shows that political factors play a primary role in the functioning of such a body, while religious and cultural factors are of secondary importance. Although the Moroccan TRC is not an exportable model, it could inspire other majority Muslim societies, such as Afghanistan and Lebanon, which are envisaging or might set up TRCs to confront crimes of past regimes. Some security experts hoped the TRC would be effective in the “soft war” against terrorism by winning the hearts and minds of the population. The actual experience in Morocco shows the limits of this approach. The tension is too strong between the perceived requirements of the antiterrorist struggle and a process to establish accountability for past crimes and advance democratization. In the final analysis, the “war against terrorism” has limited the TRC's impact in Morocco. The report of the Moroccan TRC, published in early 2006, recommended diminution of executive powers, strengthening of parliament, and real independence for the judicial branch. The king and the political parties must decide in the coming years if they will permit the transformation of the “executive monarchy” of Morocco into a parliamentary monarchy. This decision will affect the stability of the kingdom, North Africa, and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the Middle East.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Development
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, United States, America, Europe, Middle East, Arabia, Algeria, Spain, North Africa, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia

99. The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-ending Affair

Author:
Anna Theofilopoulou
Publication Date:
07-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
This study examines the efforts of the United Nations (UN) to resolve the dispute over Western Sahara from August 1988, when Secretary-general Pérez de Cuellar submitted the settlement proposals to the two parties—the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario—until June 2004, when James A. Baker III, the secretary-general's personal envoy on Western Sahara, resigned. The settlement proposals were to lead to the holding of a referendum on self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, offering a choice between integration with Morocco or independence. A crucial element in the implementation of the plan was the identification of voters for the referendum, which both sides considered the key to producing an outcome in their favor. The Polisario had a restricted view, expecting the 1974 Spanish census of the territory to be the framework for the identification, while Morocco took an expansive view by trying to include tens of thousands of applicants of Saharan origin now living in Morocco. Both parties found reasons to interrupt the identification process. Throughout the process, the UN tried to break the impasses created by the parties through technical solutions that addressed the problem at hand without addressing the underlying political problem, which was the determination by both sides to win the referendum. After six years of trying to move forward the identification process, Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked James Baker to become his personal envoy in order to steer the parties toward a political solution and away from the “winner-take-all” approach of the referendum. However, because both parties insisted that they wanted to proceed with the plan, Baker helped them negotiate the Houston Agreements, which allowed for the completion of the identification process. In September 2000, seeing that the referendum was not likely to work in its favor, Morocco offered to discuss a political solution aiming at autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The Polisario, which until the conclusion of the identification had been interested in meeting directly with Morocco, now believed that it could win the referendum and therefore said it would talk only about the settlement plan. After two more years of trying to get the parties to agree to a political solution, Baker informed the Security Council that a consensual approach would not work and requested that the Council ask the parties to choose one of four options, none of which would require the parties' consent, to resolve the conflict. The Security Council was unable to agree on any of the four options and asked Baker to prepare another political proposal that would include self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. Baker's final attempt was the Peace Plan for Self- Determination of the People of Western Sahara, which provided for a period of autonomy followed by a referendum on self-determination. Morocco rejected the plan and refused to accept a referendum in which the independence of Western Sahara would even appear as an option. The Security Council, while having expressed support for Baker's efforts in its resolutions, proved unwilling to ask the parties to make the difficult decisions required to solve the conflict. When Morocco rejected the peace plan, the Council, despite having unanimously supported it, did nothing. The study concludes that Western Sahara will remain on the UN agenda for many years to come and offers a number of lessons learned from this failed mediation effort.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Politics, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Africa and Morocco

100. Resolving the Boundary Dispute in Sudan's Abyei Region

Author:
Dorina Bekoe, Kelly Campbell, and Nicholas Howenstein
Publication Date:
10-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Arab Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka ethnic groups have long held competing claims for access to the cattle grazing pastures and resources of the oil-rich Abyei region in Sudan. Unable to resolve the dispute during negotiations on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the government and southern representatives agreed to the establishment of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) and tasked it with evaluating historical and conflicting claims to the land and demarcating a border between the groups. The final report of the ABC was completed in July 2005, but the Government of Sudan has yet to publicly release the document or accept its findings, as stipulated in the CPA. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), in contrast, supports the release of the ABC's findings. While the decision by the Government of Sudan to remain silent on the ABC report is unlikely to derail the peace process, releasing the findings of the ABC, one of the first steps in the CPA's implementation process, is an important component of the government's credibility to abide by its commitments in the peace agreement.
Topic:
Ethnic Conflict, Government, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan