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11. Maneuver and Manipulation: On the Military Strategy of Online Information Warfare

Author:
Tim Hwang How
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
How should the defense community best organize to combat modern campaigns of propaganda and disinformation? Without a broader strategic concept of the nature of the challenge posed by these techniques, current efforts and investments run the risk of simply chasing the latest tactics without establishing enduring security. This monograph offers a way forward, proposing a cohesive strategic framework for thinking about modern information warfare and its effective conduct.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, and United States of America

12. Parameters VOL. 48 NO. 4 Winter 2018-19

Author:
Antulio J. Echevarria II, Thomas N. Garner, Buddhika Jayamaha, Jahara "Franky" Matisek, David J. Katz, Ash Rossiter, Adam Jay Harrison, Bharat Rao, Bala Mulloth, and Donn A. Starry
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
After an intense period of internal reorganization, Parameters opens its long-awaited Winter 2018–2019 issue with a Special Commentary, “Civil-Military Relations and Today’s Policy Environment” by Thomas Garner. Garner suggests US civil-military relations may have come to a crossroads where the rift between American citizens and their military has grown too great to be ignored any longer. Our first forum, Coercion: New Means & Methods, features two articles that discuss underexplored ways of achieving strategic coercion. The first contribution, “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace” by Buddhika Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, explains how certain hostile parties have created a new battlespace consisting of the internet, social media, and other means of communication to foment social and political discontent within Western-style democracies. No less novel, David Katz’s contribution, “Multidimensionality: Rethinking Power Projection for the 21st Century,” explains how American military strategists might incorporate multidimensional power projection into their planning processes to counter gray-zone adversaries. The second forum, Technological Innovation: Problems & Prospects, addresses the double-edged nature of technology. The first article, “High-Energy Laser Weapons: Overpromising Readiness” by Ash Rossiter, discusses some of the facts and fictions associated with modern laser weapons within the context of today’s great-power competition. An essential point in this discussion is how the excessive promises of those responsible for developing (and selling) high-tech weapons can severely undermine military readiness. In quite a different vein, the forum’s second article, “Innovation Tradecraft: Sustaining Technological Advantage in the Future Army” by Adam Jay Harrison, Bharat Rao, and Bala Mulloth, identifies the components needed to build an innovation ecosystem. This ecosystem would include organizational culture, awareness of emerging technologies, a capacity for leveraging resources, and a strategy for absorbing external information. Ideally, such an ecosystem would help channel technological innovation in positive directions while reducing bureaucratic inertia. Our third forum, Technological Change & War’s Nature, consists of a contribution by a historical figure of some renown. The article entitled “Profession at the Crossroads” written by Donn A. Starry while he was still a lieutenant colonel. Among other things, Starry reveals how he and his contemporaries understood the relationship between technological change and the nature of war. His views provide an interesting contrast with those of today. This contribution is separated by nearly 50 years; yet it deals with a timeless and, for the military professional, a fundamentally inescapable question.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Social Media
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

13. Command Decision: Ethical Leadership in the Information Environment

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Big data amplifies a classical problem of military leadership, namely, making critical decisions based on limited and often unreliable information. This monograph considers three leadership models that provide an alternative to an overreliance on technological solutions to address new challenges emerging at the various stages of the intelligence process.
Topic:
Intelligence, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Leadership
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History

Author:
Tami Davis Biddle
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
In this monograph, Tami Davis Biddle analyzes the historical record of air power over the past 100 years. Her monograph, designed for the student of strategy, is intended to provide both a concise introduction to the topic and a framework for thinking intelligently about air power, particularly aerial bombing. Her primary aim is to discern the distinction between what has been expected of air power by theorists and military institutions, and what it has produced in the crucible of war. Aerial bombing, Biddle argues, is a coercive activity in which an attacker seeks to structure the enemy’s incentives—using threats and actions to shape and constrain the enemy’s options, both perceived and real. It is an important and much-utilized military instrument for both deterrence and compellence. In addition, it is a powerful tool in the arsenal of the joint warfighter. Its ability to achieve anticipated results, however, varies with circumstances. Students of strategy must be able to discern and understand the conditions under which aerial bombing is more or less likely to achieve the results expected of it by those who employ it.
Topic:
War, History, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Air Force
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Examining the Roles of Army Reserve Component Forces in Military Cyberspace Operations

Author:
Jeffrey L. Caton
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Cyberspace operations have become pervasive in the United States, and they enable many aspects of modern life for the average citizen, such as entertainment, communication, education, transportation, banking, and voting. The continuing development of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) Reserve component cyberspace units can leverage the capabilities and experience of industry and academia to help protect critical information infrastructure and enhance national security. What opportunities and challenges surround the integration of these forces into a still-evolving joint cyberspace force?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Army
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

16. Scenario Planning and Strategy in the Pentagon

Author:
Michael Fitzsimmons
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Scenario planning should be one of the Pentagon’s most important tools for developing strategy for an uncertain future. However, the formalized joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development—Support for Strategic Analysis—has faced many challenges over the past 2 decades, and has ultimately proven less influential than intended on strategic decision-making. Explaining why is the main purpose of this monograph. It argues that scenario analysis has been most effective in supporting capability and program development, while it has fallen short in shaping strategy and force structure. The reasons for this are numerous and are rooted in intrinsic, structural characteristics of decision-making in large organizations. The monograph concludes with several recommendations for rejuvenating scenario planning in the Pentagon.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, and Army
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

17. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006

Author:
Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army’s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country’s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to “surge” additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the “surge” and its aftermath in the second volume. This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of hand-picked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, represents the U.S. Government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.
Topic:
Defense Policy, History, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Army
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

18. Parameters VOL. 48 NO. 3 Autumn 2018

Author:
Antulio J. Echevarria II, Eric B. Setzekorn, Richard G. Malish, Kelly A. Grieco, Vinay Kaura, Paul E. Vera Delzo, Richard Milburn, and Brandon T. Euhus
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The Autumn issue of Parameters opens with a forum featuring two contributions that highlight some important Challenges for USCivil-Military Relations. The first contribution, “Policy Revolt: Army Opposition to the Korea Withdrawal Plan” by Eric Setzekorn, argues senior US Army leaders adopted a Fabian strategy of indirect resistance to Carter’s desire to reduce the number of troops stationed in Korea. The strategy worked. But the author leaves us wondering whether that success was a positive development for US civil-military relations. The second article, “The Walter Reed Scandal and the All-Volunteer Force” by Richard Malish, provides intriguing evidence that the American public might have put the AVF on a pedestal high enough that it harms civil-military relations. Our second forum, On Alliances and Coalitions, offers three essays addressing the importance of integrating disparate perspectives under a common strategy. The first article, “Fighting and Learning in the Great War: Four Lessons in Coalition Warfare” by Kelly Grieco, describes the key insights the United States and its allies drew, or ought to have drawn, during the First World War. All of these, as Grieco shows, have immediate relevance today. The second contribution to the forum, Vinay Kaura’s article “India-US Relations: From Distant Partners to an Alliance” suggests American and Indian interests are converging in a manner that makes an alliance between them, hitherto inconceivable, now a worthy objective. Paul Vera Delzo’s “Toward a Whole-of-Government Approach: Revamping Peru’s Strategy Process” describes how Peru can obtain greater efficiency and effectiveness from its strategies by integrating all government agencies. The final forum, On Clausewitz, presents two articles that challenge nontraditional interpretations of On War. Richard Milburn’s “Reclaiming Clausewitz’s Theory of Victory” takes on Emile Simpson’s “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict” (Parameters Winter 2017–18). Milburn rejects Simpson’s view and maintains Clausewitz’s theory of victory remains relevant in the twenty-first century. Brandon Euhus’s “A Clausewitzian Response to ‘Hyperwarfare’ ” urges military planners to remember the human dimension of war, as expounded upon by military writers from Thucydides to Mao Zedong, is ultimately the decisive one.
Topic:
Security, International Affairs, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Army
Political Geography:
India, North America, Korea, and United States of America

19. Executive Summary: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Vol. 1

Author:
Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Originally commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army’s interim examination of military operations in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. This study, published in two volumes, is a narrative history that tells the story of U.S. forces in Iraq, mainly from the perspective of the theater command in Baghdad and the operational commands immediately subordinate to it. It focuses at the operational level of war, exploring the decisions and intent of the senior three- and four-star commanders and how these decisions effected the course of the war over time. This work was built from over 30,000 pages of previously unavailable declassified documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with senior defense leaders. While the Army will eventually publish a comprehensive, official “Green Book” history that describes Operation Iraqi Freedom in greater depth, this study is being released now in order that key lessons, insights, and innovations from this period of the conflict are available to the next generation of Soldiers and leaders to study, learn from, and adapt to ensure the future readiness of our Army and the Joint Force.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Army, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America