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141. Russian Perception of European Security

Author:
Yuri Nazarkin
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Historically, Russia was always threatened from three sides: from the West it was threatened and invaded at different periods of its history by Poland, Sweden, France and Germany; from the South, its traditional rival and enemy was the Ottoman empire; from the East, China and Japan. Throughout its history Russia had to be on the alert along all its borders. Though at present there are no direct military threats from any of the three directions, the current Russian security planning takes into account all the three directions. However, the problem of European security is the highest priority in Russian foreign and security policy. There are a number of reasons for this.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

142. Recoiling from Russia

Author:
André Liebich
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The above manifesto, entitled "A Horror is Haunting Europe," was published on the front page of one of Europe's premier newspapers in the thick of this year's presidential campaign in Russia. It was signed by some two hundred intellectuals and public figures, the French being the most strongly represented but including signatories from fifteen other European countries and a number of Americans. Among the recognisable names are those of media and cultural personalities such as Costas Gavras, Jean-Luc Godard, John Le Carré, Bernardo Bertolucci, Jane Birkin, Vanessa Redgrave and Barbara Hendricks. Many of the others are widely known academics, such as Umberto Eco and Noam Chomsky, as well as a minor galaxy of familiar Parisian personalities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, America, and Europe

143. Russia's Eurasian Security Policy

Author:
Roland Dannreuther
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Ever since Catherine the Great pronounced that 'Russia is a European country', Russia has been an inescapable part of the European balance of power. Russia's European credentials are indisputable. The larger majority of the Russian population, and most of the major economic centres, are located in the European part of Russia. Russians are Christian, if of the eastern orthodox faith, and Russian poets, novelists, artists and composers have made an extraordinary contribution to European culture. Russians perceive themselves as part of European civilisation, not least when confronted with other ancient civilisations, such as Iran, India and China. Moreover, other European actors have recognised Russia as an intrinsic part of the European order, even if at times this recognition has been mixed with strong doses of suspicion and fear. But, Russia is not only in Europe. Geographically, the larger part of Russia's territory, however inhospitable and poorly populated, lies in Asia. Culturally, Russia has periodically been hermetically sealed from mainstream developments in Europe. During the medieval period, Russia lay under Tartar rule; during the Soviet period, the borders were, in Stalin's words, under 'lock and key' and Western influences were rigorously excluded. The consequent backwardness of Russia, which has been a consequence of these intermittent linkages with the more developed West, has diluted Russia's European credentials. Russia's Asian destiny was also a deliberate act of state policy with Russia's borders being continually expanded into Asian territory. Russia had a similar experience to the United States with a continental expansion to the Pacific, which was driven, as in America, by entrepreneurial colonists who subsequently decimated the local populations. Towards the South, Russia followed European imperial practice and engaged in a mission civilisatrice to bring European-style rule over purportedly backward peoples. The Russian imperial experience differed from the British and French examples in one critical element: no division was made between the metropolitan centre and empire and thus no clearly demarcated border existed between the Russian state and its imperial appendages. The Tsarist military historian, Mikhail Vernukov, argued that this absence of a separation involved a different imperial practice when compared with 'Englishmen in India who do their utmost to avoid mingling with the natives . . . Our strength lies in the fact that . . . we have assimilated subject races, mingling affably with them'. For these and other reasons, Russia's European credentials have been questioned, not only by other Europeans but by Russians themselves. For west Europeans, the vast geographical expanse, the relative backwardness and large population, the heady mix of despotism and mysticism, has made Russia an alien entity, the 'other' from which the enlightened rational West can be contrasted. The well-known French proverb - 'Grattez le Russe, et vous trouverez le Tartare' - illustrates this European scepticism well. Russians themselves have often been drawn to emphasising the exceptionalism of Russia, not as in America because Russia represents the 'new' rather than the 'old' world, but because Russia's unique position between Europe and Asia makes it belong to neither and the fusion of East and West preserves the benefits of Western civilisation but without its decadent rationalism and materialism. The notion of Moscow as the Third Rome has been a continual source of attraction to the more mystical members of Russian society. This complex set of historical experiences, mutual perceptions and attitudes have contributed to the frequent shifts in Russia's policy towards the rest of Europe. At times, Russia has fully embraced the West so as to 'catch up' and modernise; at other times, Moscow has retreated into its citadels so as to preserve its uniqueness and the universality of its message. In terms of security policy, Russian leaders have been consistent in promoting as fluid and weak a set of alliance structures in Europe as possible. Alexander I, at the Congress of Vienna, was arguably the first to conceive of the notion of collective security and this legacy has been followed in more recent times with Gorbachev's promotion of a 'common European home' and the Soviet and post-Soviet predilection for defining the CSCE/OSCE as the overarching framework for the European security order. These collective security proposals, which have consistently baffled and irritated other Europeans powers, have had a strong realpolitik dimension, alongside the requisite dose of mysticism. Such schemes are designed to exclude a concentration of power in Europe, which might be directed against Russia, and to prevent the type of direct aggression which Russia suffered through the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions. Such flexible arrangements are also the most favourable mechanism for promoting Russian influence in Europe and to securing Russia's consistent desire, even obsession, to be treated as an equal with the other European great powers. It is clear that the West's rejection of the proposed collective security arrangement for the post-Cold War European order, and the corresponding expansion of NATO, has been viewed in Moscow as a humiliating geopolitical defeat. The sense of betrayal, of promises made by the West and then reneged upon, has been profoundly felt. With the perception of a Europe excluding and marginalising Russia, there has been a turn towards the East in the search for alternative avenues for projecting Russia's power and influence. Again, there are historical parallels with the nineteenth century when the concerted European effort to block Russian expansion into the Balkans, with its ultimate pan-Orthodox goal of capturing Constantinople, led to Russian energies being re-directed towards expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a similar vein, in March 1997, the Russian Presidential Spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, stated at the Russian-USA Helsinki summit: 'If NATO expansion is going to continue . . . Russia will be confronted with a need to reconsider its foreign-policy priorities. Our relations with China, India . . . and Iran are developing well'. The objective of this paper is to assess the nature, complexities and the relative success and failure of Russia's purported 'turn' to the East. Three areas will be briefly surveyed: recent Russian policy towards the Middle East, to Central Asia and to China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

144. European Political Considerations on Operations Beyond Europe

Author:
Klaus Becher
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The nations of the European Union represent not only one of the two most important economic actors in the world, but also include some countries of world-wide political importance. Half of the G-8 membership is from the EU, as are two permanent members of the UN Security Council. The responsibilities and obligations that, historically, European powers accumulated in all continents still have many remnants. The two big European wars of the 20th century were also fought in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. Europe, while enjoying the benefits of a large, expanding internal market, depends for its prosperity on a secure and functioning global order.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Lebanon, Iceland, Nagasaki, and Taipei

145. The Persian Gulf

Author:
Shahram Chubin
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In the past fifty years five US President's from Truman to Clinton have directly or indirectly, affirmed US interests in the Middle East. The 'doctrines' in the case of Carter (1979) and Reagan (1981) specifically addressed the security of the Persian Gulf. The same period has seen the withdrawal of imperial powers. Three decades ago Britain managed the security of the Persian Gulf. Two decades ago France had the largest naval force in the Indian Ocean. The contraction of these commitments was encouraged by the US, which was unwilling to be associated with colonialism and its evils. Yet since Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf which occasioned the Nixon doctrine, the US has been grappling with how best to assure security. Reliance on regional states ("twin pillars") was upset by the Iranian revolution. In the 1980's the long Iran-Iraq war underscored the need for a Western role, but neither its shape nor its duration were clear. Local forces were reluctant to envisage any thing beyond an "over the horizon presence."
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Britain, United States, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and France

146. Emerging European Power Projection Capabilities

Author:
Francois Heisbourg
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Kosovo air war was an eye-opener for many Europeans, particularly for those who normally follow defence issues at a distance. There was no escaping the realisation that close to three-quarters of the aircraft and more than four-fifths of the ordnance released against Serbian targets were American. America's massive dominance in C31 was similarly spectacular, with media commentators using the over-simplified but effective equation: "Fifty U.S. military satellites, a single European satellite". Under such circumstances U.S. influence on all strategic and operational aspects of the war could only be overwhelming, for better or for worse, a situation summarised by the syllogism "no capability-no responsibility". Despite deep strategic flaws, questionable tactics and occasional rank incompetence (the Apache episode, the China Embassy bombing), the U.S. edge is so great that it can afford even serious blunders.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
America, Europe, and Middle East

147. US Perceptions of NATO Deployments Beyond Europe and of European Capabilities

Author:
Stuart Johnson
Publication Date:
07-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The United States and its NATO allies have engaged in two high intensity conflicts in this decade, Desert Storm in the Gulf and Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia. Both campaigns were characterized by a strong, and successful, effort to maintain broad coalition participation and cohesion. But the story is more complex than the press releases from NATO Headquarters, Washington, and other NATO capitals would have us believe. Both operations revealed differences in US and European allies' capabilities and styles of prosecuting warfare. These forced the commanders to adopt an ad-hoc, inefficient division of labor in what, to the public, was presented as a seamless coalition operation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Middle East

148. How Will the European Union Meet the 21st Century

Author:
Pal Dunay
Publication Date:
08-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The story of post-World War 2 European integration had started before integration theory gained popularity. One has to bear in mind, however, that the idea of European integration was launched with modest objectives in the 1950s. Except for some visionary statesmen, like Jean Monnet and some others, both the subject matters to be covered by integration and the geographical scope was limited. Six countries aimed at establishing a free trade zone and not much else was on their "plate" when they signed the Rome Treaty on 25 March 1957.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

149. Muddling Through? A Strategic Checklist for the United States in the Post-Cold War World

Author:
John Lewis Gaddis
Publication Date:
08-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The single most striking feature of the post-Cold War environment is the diffusion, not the disappearance, of threats. The half-century extending from 1941 to 1991 was, for the United States, one in which threats were both focused and obvious. From the time of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor until the final collapse of the Soviet Union exactly fifty years later, we knew who our enemies were, or at least might be. As a consequence, we abandoned the isolationism that had characterized most of our history in favor of an unaccustomed but - as it turned out - highly effective internationalism.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

150. Prospects for Europe and the Atlantic Alliance at Century's End

Author:
William I. Hitchcock
Publication Date:
08-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Ever since the end of the Cold War, analysts have engaged in long discussions about what sort of international order would replace it. Though these discussions have ranged widely in their assessments, they usually took as their starting point a common assumption: that the Cold War order and the basic structure of international relations it represented, was over and done for. From 1989 until about 1995, this assessment seemed accurate: the alliance was falling apart, war broke out in Europe, the western economies were in a tailspin, and the delicate architecture that bound Germany to the states of Western Europe seemed to be in jeopardy, overburdened by the arrival of a united, powerful Germany. Whatever order we had, it didn't seem like anything we had seen before.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe