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1. Crime in the Northern Triangle

Author:
Mark L Schneider
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Violence and crime in the Northern Triangle Countries (NTC) of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras continue to endanger citizen security in those countries, as well as in Mexico and in the United States. The extent, conditions, and policy responses are important in and of themselves, but also because this violence constitutes one of the significant factors driving migration toward the United States.
Topic:
Security, Crime, Human Rights, and Migration
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador

2. Challenges Technologies Pose to U.S.-Russia Arms Control: A Conversation with Dr. Heather Williams

Author:
Fletcher Security Review Staff and Heather Williams
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Dr. Heather Williams is a lecturer in the Defence Studies Department and Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College London. She also does research for the Institute for Defense Analyses on Strategy, Forces, and Resources, and previously was a Research Fellow at Chatham House. Williams received her doctorate from King’s College London for her dissertation on U.S.-Russia arms control from 1968-2010.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Weapons, and Interview
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

3. The Intelligence Cycle of Targeted Killing in the United States

Author:
Christine Sixta Rinehart
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The United States has been using Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) to assassinate terrorist targets since its first RPA strike on November 3, 2002, when a U.S. Predator fired a hellfire missile at a car traveling through the Mar’ib province of Yemen. The intelligence cycle of this targeted killing process is murky at best, and the policy has changed throughout the successive administrations of U.S. presidents. Details exist but there is no defined tangible chain of analysis concerning the selection of the target, the monitoring of the target, and finally, the assassination of the target. This paper attempts to elucidate the intelligence chain of analysis concerning American targeted killing and examine how the intelligence cycle of targeted killing varies through successive presidential administrations. ​ This paper will begin with a short analysis of relevant literature, although sources concerning this topic are scarce. The occurrence of targeted killings of U.S. citizens will also be explained in the literature section. The paper will continue with an elaboration of a generic intelligence cycle model, which will be used to illustrate the intelligence cycle of U.S. targeted killings using both the Reaper and the Predator RPA.[1] The paper will then address differences in the intelligence cycles and processes that have occurred between successive presidents since targeted killing first began in 2002 with President George W. Bush. Lastly, the paper will provide policy prescriptions in reference to improving targeted killing in the Middle East and Africa...
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Drones, and Targeted Killing
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

4. The Need for Countries to Establish Robust and Transparent Vulnerabilities Equities Processes

Author:
Sharon Bradford Franklin
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In 2017, leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community warned that “more than 30 nations are developing offensive cyberattack capabilities.”1 This means that more than 30 countries may be conducting hacking operations as a method for surveillance, disruption, or destruction. Unregulated cyber surveillance and cyberattacks by government actors can pose risks not only to a government’s foreign adversaries, but also to its own citizens. Thus, as the United States and other nations work to enhance their own offensive cyber capabilities, as well as to develop strategies to defend against potential attacks, it is critical that these countries establish legal regimes to govern such conduct in cyberspace. Although Germany has established a legal framework to regulate government hacking activities,[2] few countries have done so.[3] ​ To bring government hacking operations within the rule of law, a crucial step is to design rules regarding the management of vulnerabilities that governments discover or acquire. As with other cyber actors, when governments conduct hacking operations, this frequently involves exploiting vulnerabilities in computer hardware and software systems. But these same flaws can also be manipulated by a government’s foreign adversaries or other malicious actors. Therefore, when countries consider their abilities to rely on hacking as an investigative tool, as well as their interests in exploiting vulnerabilities for military and intelligence operations, they must also evaluate the capacity of information and communications technology providers to repair bugs and protect the cybersecurity of all users. Determining whether to exploit a vulnerability or disclose it to a vendor for patching involves balancing a variety of different security concerns against each other. ​ Some countries have made progress in formalizing the rules for making these decisions and in publicizing these rules to promote public accountability. In November 2017, the United States released a charter governing its Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP), which outlines how the U.S. government weighs the various competing equities.[4] The charter delineates which components of the government will participate in determinations regarding whether to disclose or retain each newly discovered vulnerability, and it sets forth the criteria to be used and the process to be followed in making such assessments. One year later, the United Kingdom (UK) announced its Equities Process, which follows a similar approach.5 Most recently, in March 2019, Australia released its “Responsible Release Principles for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities,”[6] and Germany is currently working to develop a VEP and is expected to make information about its process public in early 2019.[7] However, as described below, the VEP procedures revealed to date need further improvement,[8] and most of the nations with offensive cyber capabilities have not developed—or at least have not announced—any such framework...
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age by David Sanger

Author:
David Sanger and Travis Frederick
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In The Perfect Weapon, David Sanger argues that the nature of global power itself is undergoing dramatic changes, brought about by the proliferation of highly advanced cyber capabilities. Today, internet access is nearly ubiquitous, the cost of entry is low, and, particularly in the domain of cyberwarfare, there is one fundamental fact: offensive capabilities have critically outpaced cyber defenses. A weak and impoverished nation like North Korea can hold large swaths of public and private infrastructure in America at risk, steal military OpPlans, and pilfer millions of dollars from foreign banks. A Kremlin reeling from sanctions, low oil prices, and historically low public trust is able to threaten the very foundations of American democracy through targeted social media campaigns and hacking and leaking the emails of a major political party. But while the offensive advantage has given weaker powers greater capacity to pursue their geopolitical objectives, U.S. leadership has found that their response options have not similarly benefitted. America’s offensive cyber prowess so exceeds its own defensive capabilities that officials often hesitate to strike back for fear of establishing norms of retaliation against vulnerable infrastructure or inciting unintended escalation. Sanger argues that without an open public debate among government policy makers, military planners, and academics to coordinate a grand strategy, the United States will be forced to accept a world of constant cyberattacks, limited response options, and the greater risk of capitulating to foreign coercion...
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Book Review
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. Obstacles to IT Modernization: The New National Security Imperative

Author:
Richard Beutel and Andrew Caron
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
As the December 2018-January 2019 government shutdown pressed forward into unexplored territory, no one asked what impact the continuing funding delays might have upon information technology (IT) modernization. This should be a significant concern, as IT modernization is now widely recognized as a national security imperative. The cumbersome and lengthy acquisition process stifles innovation and allows U.S. adversaries such as China to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies far faster than the United States is able. The loser is the U.S. military, which is often saddled with obsolete capabilities. The recently released Third Volume of the Section 809 Panel report states this explicitly—we are on a “war footing”—and the government’s cumbersome acquisition policies are a primary culprit. The shutdown certainly did not help any of this. The authors can offer no solution regarding how to solve the threat of another shutdown. The issues are no longer substantive—both parties see “the wall” as emblematic to their political base. But we can talk about recent green shoots in addressing the IT acquisition. Without mincing words or exaggeration, the government has a dismal record of successful IT modernization.[1] The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), a respected government watchdog, has exhaustively documented the government’s dependence on outdated legacy IT and the billions of U.S. dollars wasted by agencies in failed modernization attempts.[2] The causes are numerous: a compliance-oriented acquisition workforce, perverse incentives that reward “box checking” rather than end-user outcomes, and an entrenched cultural fear of “doing things differently” caused by an overblown concern about potential bid protests and increased congressional oversight.[3] Recently, however, a new awareness has arisen across the government that the old ways of IT procurements no longer serve the country. Current acquisition techniques are relics of an age before commercialized internet services even existed; they were not designed to keep pace with the rapid evolution of IT technologies.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Resilient Power: A New Model for Grid Security

Author:
Lewis Milford and Samantha Donalds
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In the last few years, Washington has been preoccupied with a debate about the security of the nation’s electric grid. The debate is as old as the grid itself: as electrification has come to drive all commerce and government, making it a key element of the country’s national security, what is the best way to protect the grid from terrorist, weather, or cyber-related threats or attacks? ​ As with most things of a political nature, where you stand depends on where you sit. ​ Proponents of coal, oil, and nuclear make the argument that traditional large-scale power plants are not only vital to grid stability, but also that this centralized generation model is the only economically or techno- logically feasible option.[1] It’s an old argument wrapped in new national security rhetoric, and it’s increasingly straining against the facts. More and more analysis and real-life examples show that distributed renewable energy, combined with energy storage technologies, can provide reliable power more affordably and reliably than the centralized generation alternatives...
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, and Electricity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8. In a World of War, Could it Be ‘From Russia with Love’: A Conversation with Igor Istomin

Author:
Igor Istomin and Akshobh Giridharadas
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Igor A. Istomin is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Applied Analysis of International Issues at MGIMO University. He holds Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from MGIMO University as well as an undergraduate degree from Saint Petersburg State University. Istomin teaches undergraduate and graduate classes in methods of applied analysis of international affairs. He is an executive editor at International Trends, a leading Russian academic journal. He is also a visiting fellow at the School of International and Public Affairs at Jilin University in China. Istomin is the author of more than 50 publications on U.S. foreign policy, relations in the Euro-Atlantic space, and international security. His most recent book is The Logic of State Behavior in International Politics (2017). He has also prepared policy reports and papers for the Russian International Affairs Council, the Valdai Discussion Club, the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow, and the European Leadership Network.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

9. The Future of Strategic Intelligence

Author:
Robert Hutchings
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
We begin with a puzzle: the need for strategic analysis is more important than ever in this period of great flux and uncertainty, but the disdain for analysis of any kind has never been greater than under the administration of President Donald J. Trump. The very premise that leaders need reasonably objective intelligence analysis to inform their policy decisions – a premise that has guided every U.S. administration since World War II – is under assault. If we are to rebuild our capacity for strategic thinking, we need to go back to the beginning. When President Harry Truman created the strategic intelligence function at the end of World War II, he understood that the United States had been thrust into a global role for which it was not prepared. The world was simply too complex, and American interests too extensive, to operate on the basis of impulse or ad hoc decision making. Moreover, when Truman issued National Intelligence Authority No. 5 on July 8, 1946, instructing the Director of Central Intelligence to “accomplish the evaluation and dissemination of strategic intelligence,” he deliberately set up this function outside of the White House, the Department of State, and the military, so that strategic analysis would be kept at a critical distance from policy making. Yet Truman, like every president since, was ambivalent about the role of strategic intelligence and the degree of autonomy it ought to have. ​ The story actually begins earlier, when President Franklin Roosevelt, in a military order of June 13, 1942, formally established the Office of Strategic Services with William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan at its head, and directed it to “collect and analyze... strategic information” and to “plan and operate special services.” The cloak- and-dagger wartime operations of the OSS are the stuff of legend, as are the notable figures recruited to serve, including the poets Archibald MacLeish and Stephen Vincent Benét, the banker Paul Mellon, the psychologist Carl Jung, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, the anthropologist Margaret Mead, and the movie director John Ford. Less well known is its role in strategic intelligence analysis through its Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch, led initially by James Phinney Baxter III, president of Williams College, and after 1943 by Harvard historian William Langer, identified in war correspondence as “OSS 117.”
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, History, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

10. Historical Trajectory of the U.S.-Russia Relationship: Perception and Misperception: A Conversation with Professor Tatiana Shakleina

Author:
Tatiana Shakleina and Ryan Rogers
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Professor Tatiana Shakleina sat down with the Fletcher Security Review in November 2017 in conjunction with the Conference on U.S.-Russia Relations between The Fletcher School and Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). In a detailed and engaging conversation that spanned over 25 years of history, Professor Shakleina traced the post-Cold War origins of the current tension between the United States and Russia. While personnel within the Trump Administration have moved on to new positions or left government altogether since the interview, Professor Shakleina’s rich historical overview of post-Cold War U.S.-Russia relations remains extremely relevant in understanding the recent trajectory and current state of the bilateral relationship. ​
Topic:
Security, Cold War, Government, History, Bilateral Relations, and Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America