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91. The Abbottabad Documents: Bin Ladin's Security Measures

Author:
Liam Collins
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Within a mere week of his death, Usama bin Ladin asserted that “reality has proven that American technology and its sophisticated systems cannot arrest a mujahid if he does not commit a security error.” Although Bin Ladin witnessed numerous senior al- Qa`ida members killed or captured by the United States and its coalition partners over the years, his words suggest that he attributed these losses not to superior U.S. technology, but to error or carelessness on the part of individuals. He was of the view that adhering to “the required security precautions [for people] in our situation” is feasible and human error is avoidable if the mujahid is “conscious of the importance of the mission he is fulfilling and is capable of staying in hiding until the situation opens up.”
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States

92. Beware of Imitators: al-Qa' ida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary

Author:
Nelly Lahoud
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
“I should write a history of the jihadis in my time as I witnessed it and not as it is perceived by the West or those who disagree with us,” explains Fadil Harun regarding his motivation to publish his two-volume manuscript al-Harb `ala al-Islam: Qissat Fadil Harun (The War against Islam: the Story of Fadil Harun). Posted on the jihadi website Shabakat Ansar al-Mujahidin on 26 February 2009, the manuscript constitutes Harun's autobiography, in which he presents an intimate account of his life in the context of his career with al-Qa`ida. Harun (also known as Fazul `Abdallah Muhammad) was an al- Qa`ida operative who was killed in June 2011 by Somali government forces. Among the operations in which he played a key role are the 1998 East Africa bombings that targeted U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, following which he claims to have been appointed al-Qa`ida's “Confidential Secretary” (amin sirr al-qa`ida).
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Somalia, Nairobi, and East Africa

93. Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari'a and the Struggle for Yemen

Author:
Christopher Swift
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
THE MAY 21, 2012, suicide attack on Yemeni soldiers parading in Sana`a's al-Sabin Square marked a turning point in Yemen's struggle against al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its subsidiary, Ansaral-Shari` a. Coming two weeks after Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi's pledge to purge terrorists from “every district, village, and place,” the perpetrators cast the bombing as a retaliatory strike. “The primary target of this blessed operation was the defense minister of the Sana`a regime and his corrupt entourage,” proclaimed Ansar al-Shari`a's Madad News Agency. “It came in response to the unjust war launched by the Sana` a regime's forces in cooperation with the American and Saudi forces.”
Topic:
Regime Change
Political Geography:
Yemen, Arabia, and Sinai Peninsula

94. Between Islamization and Secession: The Contest for Northern Mali

Author:
Derek Henry Flood
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
ON JANUARY 17, 2012, a rebellion began in Mali when ethnic Tuareg fighters attacked a Malian army garrison in the eastern town of Menaka near the border with Niger.1 In the conflict's early weeks, the ethno-nationalist rebels of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)2 cooperated and sometimes collaborated with Islamist fighters of Ansar Eddine for as long as the divergent movements had a common enemy in the Malian state.3 On March 22, disgruntled Malian soldiers upset about their lack of support staged a coup d'état, overthrowing the democratically elected government of President Amadou Toumani Touré.
Topic:
Islam
Political Geography:
Northern Mali

95. Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry

Author:
Gretchen Peters
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The purpose of this report is to understand and outline the financial architecture that sustains the Haqqani faction of the Afghan insurgency. The Haqqani network (hereafter “the network” or “the Haqqan is”) is widely recognized as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban and as the deadliest and most globally focused faction of that latter group. What gets far less attention is the fact that the Haqqan is also appear to be the most sophisticated and diversified from a financial standpoint. This report will illustrate that the Haqqani business portfolio mirrors a mafia operation, and illustrate why an understanding of the illicit business side of the network is critical to enriching our understanding of the group. In addition to raising funds from ideologically like minded donors, an activity the Haqqan is have engaged in since the 1980s, information collected for this report indicates that over the past three decades they have penetrated key business sectors, including import-export, transport, real estate and construction in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Arab Gulf and beyond. The Haqqan is employ violence and intimidation to extort legal firms and prominent community members, and engage in kidnap for ransom schemes. According to investigators, they protect and engage in the trafficking of narcotics and the precursor chemicals used to process heroin (although to a much lesser degree than other factions of the Afghan Taliban). The Haqqan is also appear to operate their own front companies, many of which appear to be directed at laundering illicit proceeds. The broad range of business activities in which the Haqqan is engage suggests that the pursuit of wealth and power may be just as important to net work leaders as the Islamist and nationalistic ideals for which the Haqqan is claim to fight.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Taliban, and Arabia

96. Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda

Author:
Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011 represents the culmination of a decade long fight to bring the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks to justice. Sustaining the effort needed to arrive at this point is a testament to the resilience of the counterterrorism community and nation, but it subsequently raises a series of questions regarding the future of al‐Qa'ida and the violent social movement spawned by bin Laden and fellow entrepreneurial jihadis. It is tempting to view his death as the end of a long struggle, but the violent extremists radicalized and mobilized by al‐Qa'ida's global jihadi narrative regard this as the end of the opening act. The terrorist threat that the United States and its allies face today has evolved in the years since September 11. Over that time, experts have engaged in heated debates over al‐Qa'ida's strategic center of gravity, with some stressing the importance of central leadership while others emphasize the threat from radicalized individuals unconnected with any formal organization. This seemingly academic debate about the nature of al‐Qa'ida is crucial to understanding the possible manifestations of the threat following bin Laden's death, as well as guiding the way forward for policymakers, practitioners, and the general public. The attached article tries to assess the threat al‐Qa'ida poses by looking across the different operational levels: the core, periphery, and movement. The core represents those in a hierarchical organization, marked by a leadership cadre tied to their followers. Those connected to the al‐Qa'ida network, but outside the control of core leadership, are the peripheral actors. For al‐Qa'ida, this is often best represented by affiliated or associated groups such as al‐Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or al‐ Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The final level is made up of those who are unconnected from the larger network, but motivated to action through the principles espoused by the ideological leaders. These individuals are part of a broader social movement that adheres to the narrative and perpetrates violent action, but remains distinct from the core or connected affiliates.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, War, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

97. Bin Ladin's Killing and its Effect on Al-Qa'ida: What Comes Next?

Author:
Bruce Hoffman
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Confronted with the sudden death of a leader, terrorist groups become cornered animals. When wounded, they lash out. Not only in hopes of surviving, but also to demonstrate their remaining power and continued relevance. Al-Qa`ida is no different. As its statement issued on May 6, 2011 confirming Usama bin Ladin's death declared, “The soldiers of Islam, groups and individuals, will continue planning without tiredness or boredom, and without despair or surrender, and without weakness or stagnancy, until they cause the disaster that makes children look like the elderly!”
Topic:
Islam
Political Geography:
Pakistan and America

98. Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence

Author:
Hassan Abbas
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has been accustomed to conflict, but in recent years the regime in Islamabad had to contend with new waves of militancy, including violence that directly challenges the country's leadership from within. Among groups involved in internal conflicts in Pakistan, Shia militant groups have received relatively scant attention, even though sectarian violence can have direct ramifications on the security of the country, and South Asia at large. This Occasional Paper examines the sectarian landscape in Pakistan, the growing potential for Shia-Sunni violence, and the implications of simmering sectarian tension for domestic Pakistani and regional security.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

99. The Death of Usama bin Ladin: Threat Implications for the U.S. Homeland

Author:
Philip Mudd
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
With the death of Usama bin Ladin in May 2011, Americans will be safer in the long-term. Without Bin Ladin's magnetic appeal, al-Qa`ida's revolutionary movement will likely wither and its message, combined with the peaceful revolutions in the Arab world, will lose credibility. In the short-term, however, the U.S. homeland remains at risk. In many ways, U.S. security services today face more challenges than ever before because the threat profile has become so diverse, with multiple terrorist groups and individuals—many with no connection to established terrorist organizations—intent on striking the United States.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
United States and Arabia

100. The JRTN Movement and Iraq's Next Insurgency

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The stabilization of iraq has become wedged on a plateau, beyond which further improvement will be a slow process. According to incident metrics compiled by Olive Group, the average monthly number of insurgent attacks between January and June 2011 was 380. The incident count in January was 376, indicating that incident levels remained roughly stable in the first half of 2011. One reason behind this stability is the ongoing virulence of northern and central Iraqi insurgents operating within Sunni Arab communities. Five predominately Sunni provinces and western Baghdad were responsible for an average of 68.5% of national incidents each month in 2011.
Topic:
Insurgency
Political Geography:
Iraq, Baghdad, and Arabia