So many well-deserved tributes have been paid to the memory of Milton Friedman that I propose to pay him tribute in a special way by talking about my long association with him. Before I do so, I note his activities before the 1950s, when we started working together. For the record, Friedman was not a monetarist when our collaboration began.
Milton Friedman did not like the euro. In early 1999 I wrote to him mentioning my daughter Erika's thesis and, in a letter dated March 12, 1999, he wrote back: Erika's thesis on “The Euro and the Dollar” is one of the subjects I have been maintaining a real interest in. As you know, I am very negative about the euro and I am very doubtful about how it will work out. However, I am less pessimistic about it now than I was earlier simply because I never expected that the various countries would display the kind of discipline that was required in order to qualify for the euro. The convergence in inflation rates, interest rates, and so on was greater and more rapid than I would have expected.
With the passing of Milton Friedman on November 16, 2006, we lost one of the great champions of free markets. Friedman's obituaries and commentaries on his life's work and enormous influence have invariably mentioned his advocacy of floating exchange rates, leaving the impression that he always favored floating rates. This was not the case.
A longstanding tradition in economics, dating back at least to Adam Smith, looks askance at statutory monopolies, condemning almost all of them as unnecessary barriers to economic progress. Thanks largely to this tradition most of the monopolies present in Smith's day are no longer tolerated. The few exceptions are found mainly in less developed countries, where they remain a cause of impoverishment. Needless to say, economists have also generally opposed the monopolization by fiat of undertakings that were already at least somewhat competitive in Smith's day.
Milton Friedman liked to recall that his experience with the Great Depression as a young man living in New York had a major effect on his career decision to study economics. So, we can count at least one good thing that came out of that tragic, unnecessary experience.
This article is concerned with the determinants of economic growth, and, in particular, with the role of policy in directing the pattern of growth in developing economies. Over the years, economists and policymakers have focused primarily on fiscal and exchange rate policy. While the role of fiscal deficits is well understood, the same agreement does not hold with regard to exchange rate policy.
Trade policy has become a partisan affair in Washington. Major trade bills in Congress typically pit pro-trade Republicans backed by big business against trade-skeptic Democrats aligned with labor unions. And as the two major parties arm themselves for the 2008 general election, trade policy promises to provide one of the sharper contrasts between them.
How do many scientific disciplines estimate and report results? Practitioners estimate regression models or conduct difference-of means tests through experiments. And they report which results are significant and which are not (i.e., different from zero with 95 percent confidence). In this important book, Ziliak and McCloskey have three objectives: to remind us that such research may be mindless, unscientific, and costly; to explicate the intellectual history of significance testing and the struggles among those professors who developed sampling and statistical testing; and to illustrate the correct way to conduct research and praise those few who report their research properly.
Whatever you think of his politics or jurisprudence, Clarence Thomas is a remarkable man. Born into desperate poverty in the Jim Crow South and raised by his illiterate grandfather, he would graduate from (and be completely disillusioned by) Yale Law School while battling personal and political demons that would have felled lesser mortals many times over. Now on the Supreme Court bench for over 15 years, Justice Thomas has established himself as a force to be reckoned with, a strong voice who has accepted and transcended his unfortunate notoriety.
Donald Rumsfeld will go down in history as one of the worst secretaries of defense since the end of World War II. This is the conclusion reached by Dale Herspring, a political science professor at the University of Kansas, in a new book transparently titled Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power. Without much effort to give the former secretary any benefit of the doubt, Herspring blames him directly for causing our military to become “demoralized” and “broken.”