The Cato Institute has coined a fresh phrase—"financial harmony"—to describe the challenge we face in the aftermath of the biggest financial mess since the Great Depression. But what is financial harmony? Does it prize innovation or stability, the absence of crises or the efficient intermediation of credit?
In the early 1980s, I was working as the research administrator at the World Bank, while the Third World was engulfed by a debt crisis. The current global financial crisis has eerie similarities, but different outcomes. Why?
For much of the past 15 years, my assistants and I have been read- ing minutes and papers in the National Archives, the Board of Governors, and the New York Federal Reserve Bank. I owe a debt of appreciation to the Board's librarians, to the achivists at the New York bank, to my several assistants, and to many at the Fed who cooperated helpfully to make this project come to completion. The result has now been published in two volumes of more than 2,000 pages. Volume 1 covers the 1913–1951 period and has been in print several years (Meltzer 2003). Volume 2, published in February, is in two parts: part one (Meltzer 2010a) covers the 1951–69 period, and part two (Meltzer 2010b) chronicles the 1970–86 period.
As we contemplate the raft of regulatory reforms currently being proposed, it is important not only to consider the content of regulation, but also its structure. In particular, it is important to ask how the role of the Fed as a regulator should change, and how the targets and the tools of monetary and regulatory policy should adapt to new regulatory mandates. For example, some reform proposals envision a dramatic expansion of Fed regulatory authority, while others do not, and some proposals envision the Fed's using monetary policy to prick asset bubbles, while others do not. This article considers the desirability of various financial reforms, the proper future role of the Fed, and the proper use of monetary and regulatory policy tools in light of proposed regulatory reforms. What regulatory and overall policy structure would help us best achieve legitimate policy objective.
Sometimes it helps to contemplate economic predicaments by seeking wisdom from definitively noneconomic sources. Consider this passage from Book III of Milton's Paradise Lost , where God answers the question of why He created men and angels who could rebel against Him. Of man, He responds: I made him just and right, Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. Such I created all th' ethereal Powers And Spirits, both them who stood and them who failed; Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
It has become commonplace in the current crisis to refer to the Federal Reserve as the economy's lender of last resort (LLR). Typical is the observation of Glenn Hubbard, Hal Scott, and John Thornton (2009) that "Over many decades and especially in this financial crisis, the Fed has used its balance sheet to be a classical lender of last resort."
If there is a role for the government to play in restoring financial harmony it would have to be quite the opposite from the role Washington has played over the last decade, which has produced financial chaos. But the chances at this point that Washington will reverse its past practices and quietly withdraw to the sidelines so that the markets can make necessary corrections are quite slim, or, more precisely, non-existent. It is the nature of governments to first interfere with market forces and then make the problem worse by addressing the resulting confusions and dislocations by interfering still more.
Officially, the United States has a strong-dollar policy, whatever that is supposed to mean. In practice, what we see is a benign dollar policy, by which I mean that the United States is very unlikely to take any action to attempt to affect the value of the dollar on the foreign exchanges that it would not take for other reasons. My title asks the question "Is a Benign Dollar Policy Wise?" My answer is a resounding "yes."
In early 2009, the world economy seemed to be headed into an irreversible decline. But a strong dose of stimulative monetary and fiscal policies—perhaps with an assist from the natural resilience of the market economy—seem to have done the trick in stabilizing the financial system and setting the stage for global recovery. Flows of private capital to emerging markets have revived and world trade has begun to rise back to levels seen before the crisis hit. Consumer and business confidence are back on the rise.
The story of the financial crisis will be retold endlessly as one of widespread corruption and incompetence, enabled by a policy agenda fixated on deregulation. But to accept this story, one would have to believe that if the marketplace had been confined to ethical and informed individuals, and if their activities had been carefully scrutinized by diligent regulators, we would have avoided a major financial boom and bust.