Search

Begin New Search Topic War Publishing Institution Project on Defense Alternatives

11. QDR 2006: Do the forces match the mission? DOD gives little reason to believe

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
As originally conceived the Quadrennial Defense Review was meant to help ensure the internal consistency of mid-and longer-term US defense planning. By “internal consistency” I here mean a concordance of strategy, assets, and budgets. As critics often put it in the past: the point is to show how the force fits the strategy and the budget fits the force. The exercise is supposed to “connect” our military strategy with our force development plans and, in turn, connect these with current and future budgets. In this regard, the 2006 QDR is long on assertion and short on quantification – “short” as in utterly lacking.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and War
Political Geography:
United States

12. The Iraqi Insurgency & Iraq Security Force Development

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Progress toward a stable peace in Iraq and the withdrawal of US troops begins with the painful recognition that America's recent troubles are largely self-inflicted. This is due principally to the adoption of mission objectives that far exceed what is necessary or pragmatic.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, and Middle East

13. Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The key to enabling total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days is achieving a political accord with Sunni leaders at all levels and with Iraq's neighbors - especially Syria and Iran. The proximal aim would be to immediately lower the level of conflict inside Iraq by constricting both active and passive support for the insurgency, inside and outside the country. This would allow the United States to shift resources to the training mission and to adopt other de-escalatory measures - most importantly: a withdrawal time line. The strategic price of this diplomatic initiative would be a return to self-governance in Sunni areas, a guaranteed level of representation for these areas in the national assembly, an end to broad-brush measures of de-Baathification, an amnesty for most indigenous insurgents and for most former Baathists, and a de-escalation of the US confrontation with Syria and Iran regarding a range of issues. In conjunction with these diplomatic initiatives, the United States would announce a tentative time line for withdrawal of its troops from Iraq -- associated with training milestones. Also: US forces would end major offensive sweeps inside the country, adopt a defensive posture, and shift the emphasis of their activity to training Iraqi security forces. Finally: the Iraqi government would re-activate portions of the old army -- partly as a confidence-building measure, but also in order to (i) rob insurgent organizations of their recruiting base, (ii) augment the power of the new Iraqi security forces, and (iii) produce a better ethnic balance in the new forces (which are currently dominated by Kurds and Shiites). As new forces increase in capacity, US forces would be removed, further reducing a stimulus of insurgent action. Four hundred days - 57 weeks - is sufficient time to complete several Iraqi training cycles, including field exercises for many units at the battalion and brigade levels. Some division level training also can occur. Given sufficient resources (24,000 training personnel), 100,000 Iraqi security personnel can receive remedial training and another 80,000 new personnel can be trained and exercised during this period. Together with the full provision of all appropriate equipment, this development effort can yield Iraqi security forces that are several times more capable than those it controls in mid-2005. After thirteen months, the only foreign military assets remaining in Iraq would be a small monitoring and training mission with a security detail: less than 10,000 foreign civilian and military personnel in all. US troops should constitute no more than one-third of the military component -- that is, approximately 2,000 troops. This mission should be conducted under a three-year UN mandate and joint NATO-international command. In addition, the United States might maintain a 25,000-person rapid reaction task force in the region, but outside either Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Government, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

14. Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a "New Warfare

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Among those endeavors that a state or a people may undertake, none is more terrible than war. None has repercussions more far-reaching or profound. Thus, a grave responsibility to one's own nation and to the global community attends any decision to go to war. And part of this responsibility is to estimate and gauge the effects of war, including the collateral damage and civilian casualties that it incurs.
Topic:
Defense Policy and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, and Middle East

15. The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003 Conflict

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
10-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The motivating premise of this study is that nations cannot wage war responsibly or intelligently without careful attention to its costs. The broader context in which "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was conducted -- that is, the campaign against terrorism -- makes attention to the repercussions of war even more urgent. Effective action against terrorism depends in fair part on an effort to win hearts and minds. Success in this effort turns significantly on issues of legitimacy and responsible action, especially with regard to the use of force. And the first principle of responsible action is to take account of its effects.
Topic:
Human Welfare and War
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

16. Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Why the inadvertent effects of the war are now overtaking the intended ones. Includes appendices addressing: the war’s impact on the humanitarian crisis; the missing political framework for American action; the source of power and the strategy of the Taliban; and the limits of the Bonn agreement and the challenges facing the interim government.
Topic:
Government, Treaties and Agreements, War, Taliban, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Operation Enduring Freedom
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. The Sometimes You Win and Sometimes You Lose Hypothesis: Some Comments on the Use of Models in Force Comparisons

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
03-1988
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
In this previously unpublished paper from 1988, the author reviews various models for simulating war along the Central Front in Germany and their relevance for finding a stable conventional force balance in Europe (and elsewhere.) Force structures that tend to produce stable outcomes in battlefield simulations are likely to have more deterrent value in the real world.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany