Search

Begin New Search Publishing Institution Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

21. The Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How Real Is It?

Author:
Michael Brian Jenkins and John Lauder
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
NPEC Working Paper 1602, “The Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How Real Is It?” presents two opposed views on the threat of nuclear terrorism. Brian M. Jenkins, a Rand analyst and a leading expert on nuclear terrorism, argues that the threat is overblown. John Lauder, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Nonproliferation Center, argues the opposing case that the threat is growing and we need to be hedging against it now.
Topic:
Terrorism, International Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. How Dark Might East Asia’s Nuclear Future Be?

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
NPEC Working Paper 1601, “How Dark Might East Asia’s Nuclear Future Be?” contains detailed projections of what the future holds for a more nuclear-armed China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea. None are predictions. The volume’s purpose is to encourage deeper debate about the security implications of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Topic:
International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Alternative North Korean Nuclear Futures

Author:
Shane Smith
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
On February 12, 2013, North Korea’s state media announced that it had conducted a third nuclear test “of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power…demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK's nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.”[1] Since then, there has been renewed debate and speculation over the nature and direction of North Korea’s nuclear program. Can it develop weapons using both plutonium and uranium? How far away is it from having a deliverable warhead and how capable are its delivery systems? How many and what kind of weapons is it looking to build? These are not easy questions to answer. North Korea remains one of the most notoriously secret nations, and details about its nuclear program are undoubtedly some of its most valued secrets. Yet, the answers to these questions have far reaching implications for U.S. and regional security.
Topic:
International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

24. If Japan and South Korea Go Nuclear: Two Military-Technical Scenarios

Author:
Ian Easton and Charles Ferguson
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
America's security alliances with Japan and South Korea made headlines last month. In addition to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's address to a joint session of Congress, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter visited both Japan and South Korea. Their main focus was on how to fortify Seoul's and Tokyo's security alliance ties with the US against possible Chinese and North Korean military threats.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. "Japanese Strategic Weapons Programs and Strategies: Future Scenarios and Alternative Approaches

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The balance of power in Northeast Asia is shifting in ways that are dangerous to the security of Japan. That is certainly how the picture has appeared to the eyes of many observers in recent years.The reasons are many, and they are compelling. First, China’s emergence as a regional military power has taken place in a far more disruptive fashion than was expected. Attempts to shape China into a “responsible stakeholder” have failed. Beijing now threatens Tokyo with a growing number of coercive air and maritime operations around the Japanadministered Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Chinese fighters, bombers, ships, and submarines have greatly expanded the scope of their training operations. They now frequently pass through Japan’s Ryukyu Island Chain on their way out into the Philippine Sea where they conduct exercises that undermine confidence in the ability of the U.S. Navy to intervene in a regional conflict.
Topic:
International Affairs and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan

26. How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons

Author:
James Fergusson
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Political leaders and defense planners in the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, are cognizant that worsening security in Northeast Asia could lead to additional states, including the ROK, to consider and even develop nuclear weapons. In particular, Korean President Park Geun-hye warned in May 2014 that another nuclear bomb test by North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) would be “crossing a Rubicon” and would make it “difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring in this area
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
South Korea

27. Ensuring the Iran Negotiations Do Not Promote the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Gregory S Jones
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program have been extended to November 24, 2014 from the original July 20, 2014 deadline. Recently there has been much discussion regarding the merits of various proposals relaxing the requirement that Iran restrict its centrifuge enrichment capacity. It has been suggested that perhaps Iran would only reduce its number of centrifuges by 50% instead of 85% or that when Iran reduces its enrichment capacity, instead of removing the centrifuges entirely, it would just disconnect some of the piping.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Preventing Iranian Nuclear Weapons—Beyond the “Comprehensive Solution”

Author:
Gregory S Jones
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program are continuing in an effort to produce a follow-on agreement, termed the “Comprehensive Solution,” to the November 2013 “Joint Plan of Action” (JPA). Much of the discussion of the Comprehensive Solution has focused on the terms such an agreement should include to prevent Iran from being able to produce nuclear weapons. However, this objective will not be attainable unless the agreement addresses key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, fixes the flaws in the JPA which seriously constrain any agreement and recognizes fundamental problems with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as currently implemented.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Global Focus

29. Iran’s Enriched Uranium Stocks Can Produce Enough HEU for 3 to 5 Nuclear Weapons The World’s Commitment to Nonproliferation is in Doubt Centrifuge Enrichment and the IAEA August 28, 2013 Safeguards Update

Author:
Gregory S Jones
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons.2 On August 28, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran is continuing to expand its enrichment program.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Global Focus