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1. What Growth Strategies Do Citizens Want? Evidence from a New Survey

Author:
Lucio Baccaro, Bjorn Bremer, and Erik Neimanns
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
While research on the economic characteristics of growth models across countries is now extensive, research on the politics of growth models is still in its infancy, even though governments routinely pursue different strategies to generate growth. In particular, we lack evidence on (1) whether citizens have coherent preferences towards growth strategies, (2) what growth strategies citizens prefer, and (3) what shapes their preferences. We address these questions through a new survey of public opinion in Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which exemplify different models. We find that preferences for growth strategies are consistent with other policy preferences and are meaningfully structured by class and retirement status, and to a lesser extent by sector of employment. At the same time, differences across class and sector are small, and a large majority of respondents across countries favor wage-led growth. This suggests there is a “representation gap,” since this particular growth strategy is in crisis everywhere.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Economic Growth, Representation, Macroeconomics, Comparative Capitalism, and Growth Models
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Germany, Italy, and Sweden

2. An Obituary for Austerity Narratives? An Experimental Analysis of Public Opinion Shifts and Class Dynamics during the Covid-19 Crisis

Author:
Emanuele Ferragina and Andrew Zola
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic is disrupting the international political economy context unlike any event since World War II. As a consequence, the French government has, at least momentarily, reversed decades of fiscal consolidation policies sedimented around austerity narratives by instating a costly emergency furlough scheme for a third of the workforce. This crisis provides a natural setting to investigate the relations among an emerging “critical juncture” in political economy, public preferences, and the salience of austerity narratives. We collected panel data and administered two experiments to test if citizens’ viewpoints are sensitive to the trade-off between health and economics, still receptive to austerity narratives, and conditioned by socioeconomic status in supporting them. We find public viewpoints were highly swayable between health and economic concerns at the first peak of the epidemic outbreak in April 2020, but they were not influenced by the austerity narratives during the phase-out of the lockdown in June, with the exception of the upper class. Overall, public support is shifting in favor of increased social spending, and austerity might no longer inhabit the majority’s “common sense.” We conclude with further implications for the study of class and conflict in a post-pandemic world.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Public Opinion, Class, Macroeconomics, and Austerity
Political Geography:
Europe and France

3. The Ambiguous Consensus on Fiscal Rules: How Ideational Ambiguity Has Facilitated Social Democratic Parties’ Support of Structural Deficit Rules in the Eurozone

Author:
Andreas Eisl
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
In recent years, all eurozone member states have introduced national fiscal rules, which put limits on public deficits and debt. Fiscal rules reduce the fiscal policy discretion of politicians and affect their capacity to use public budgets for macroeconomic steering and redistribution. While such institutional discretion constraints run against the traditional policy preferences of social democratic parties, it is puzzling why they supported national fiscal rule reforms during the European debt crisis. This paper argues that the concept of structural deficit rules, central to reform efforts across the eurozone, allowed for the formation of an ambiguous consensus between center-right and center-left parties. While conservative and liberal parties are generally supportive of institutional discretion constraints, structural deficit rules – in contrast to nominal deficit rules – allowed social democratic and other left-wing parties to link such rules with their broader policy preferences of Keynesian countercyclical policymaking and the protection of tax revenues across the economic cycle to ensure the state’s capacity for redistribution. Drawing on three country case studies (Germany, Austria, France), this paper shows how the concept of structural deficit rules facilitated – at least discursively – the support for discretion-constraining institutions among social democratic and other left-wing parties. In theoretical terms, this study also advances research on the role of ambiguity in political decision-making, (re-)conceptualizing three forms of ambiguity underlying ambiguous consensus: textual ambiguity, institutional ambiguity, and ideational ambiguity
Topic:
Economics, Macroeconomics, Fiscal Policy, Eurozone, Political Parties, Public Debt, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
France, Germany, and Austria

4. Growth Models and the Footprint of Transnational Capital

Author:
Patrick Kaczmarczyk
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The definition of various growth models is the latest innovation of comparative capitalism (CC) research. Yet, the literature has its weaknesses in explaining the dynamics within and the interdependencies between different growth models. I argue that this weakness stems inter alia from an inadequate conceptualization of transnational corporations (TNCs). I provide empirical evidence on the footprint of international capital in the global economy and outline how including TNCs as a unit of analysis can help us to better understand economic outcomes. This leads to several implications for the growth models literature, which I conclude my argument with.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Global Political Economy, Economic Growth, Transnational Actors, Multinational Corporations, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Primary Dealer Systems in the European Union

Author:
Jenny Preunkert
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
States require money to function and therefore every government has to continuously raise new funds. On the financial markets, governments cannot be sure that auctions of their debt will be sufficiently attractive to financial investors, which is why governments usually enter into cooperative agreements with selected banks. The best known and most widespread form of cooperation is the primary dealer system. Primary dealers are banks that agree to participate regularly in government debt auctions and to act as formalized market makers on government debt markets. The article analyzes European primary dealer systems and asks why banks are willing to participate in these systems. I will show that both domestic and foreign banks use their status as primary dealers to build long-term relationships with one or more European governments and to gain an advantage on the global stage. In Bourdieu’s terms, primary dealer banks use their financial capital to accumulate social and symbolic capital.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Banks, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

6. Explaining Variation in Public Debt: A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of Governance

Author:
Andreas Eisl
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
This paper examines the main political influence factors accounting for the variation in public debt accumulation on a global scale. This allows for a reassessment of the recent focus on a regime type theory of public debt and for a test of an alternative governance theory. I argue that political stability, the rule of law, the control of corruption, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality promote lower public debt accumulation by reducing the incentives for governments to “borrow from the future,” by increasing state capacity to collect taxes and effectively use public funds, and by providing more security and equity to private investment, inducing higher economic growth and tax revenues. Both theories are tested against a number of controls stemming from theories of public choice, theories of governmental distributional conflict, as well as from politico-institutional and macroeconomic explanations of public debt accumulation. Applying different specifications of quantitative models, the two governance indicators political stability and regulatory quality show consistent effects on public debt accumulation, partly confirming the proposed governance theory. Furthermore, the paper can reproduce a public debt-reducing effect of more democratic regime types across a number of model specifications – though without a high degree of robustness.
Topic:
Corruption, Economics, International Political Economy, Regulation, Rule of Law, Macroeconomics, and Public Debt
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. How to Make a Deal: The Role of Rankings and Personal Ties in Creating Trust in the M&A Market

Author:
Valérie Boussard, Olivier Godechot, and Nicolas Woloszko
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
This paper examines the selection of intermediaries in the French mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market, which is an opaque environment. Buyers and sellers cope with uncertainty as to the value of exchanged assets. They thus rely on the help of experts in order to secure deals. But as the valuators might be prone to opportunism, firms need to find a way to trust them. We identify two trust devices: social ties and public rankings. We explore whether these personal and impersonal devices are substitutes, independent or complementary. We study the French M&A market through a mixed-method approach, with both an ethnographic study (76 interviews) and the statistical analysis of 694 M&A deals in France in 2010. We show that both previous contacts and league table rankings of firms contribute to trust and to dealmaking. These trust devices are all the more likely to be used if the deal is risky, especially within the sell side (more at risk). We also find that firms tend to make deals only with other firms at the same level in the league tables: high-status firms tend to make deals together. Finally, we find some evidence of substitution between rankings and personal ties, especially for low-value deals.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Macroeconomics, and Corporations
Political Geography:
France

8. The Power of Weak Interests in Financial Reforms: Explaining the Creation of a US Consumer Agency

Author:
Lisa Kastner
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Dodd-Frank, the US financial reform law passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which proponents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decisionmakers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalitionbuilding among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals.
Topic:
Economics, Government, Political Economy, Regulation, Finance, Economic Policy, Macroeconomics, and Consumerism
Political Geography:
United States