Search

Begin New Search Publishing Institution Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Publication Year within 25 Years

101. Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The paper begins by examining the functions of input-oriented and output-oriented legitimating arguments in liberal democracies. At the European level, input-oriented arguments remain weak, but legitimacy problems are generally avoided since the policies which can in fact be adopted under prevailing institutional conditions are still based on broad intergovernmental consensus. For a variety of new policy challenges, however, consensus on the choice of European solutions is unlikely to be reached, even though member states are unable to cope with such challenges on their own. Among the examples discussed are the notorious problems of a common foreign, security and defense policy and the spillovers of European economic integration that are challenging national welfare regimes. The resulting problem-solving gaps, which may undermine political legitimacy nationally and in the EU, could not be legitimately overcome by moving from consensual to majoritarian governing modes at the European level. What could help are modes of differentiated integration which allow groups of member states to adopt consensual European solutions applying only to members of the group.
Topic:
International Relations and Civil Society
Political Geography:
Europe

102. A Comparative Study of Business Lobbying in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers

Author:
Pieter Bouwen
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to empirically test a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the EU multi-level system. First, I propose the theoretical framework that attempts to explain the access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of supply and demand of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. I then derive a number of specific hypotheses about the access of the aforementioned organizational forms. These hypotheses are analyzed in an extensive empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 126 exploratory and semi-structured interviews the hypotheses are checked across the three EU institutions.
Topic:
Economics, Human Welfare, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe

103. Regulatory Europeanization, National Autonomy and Regulatory Effectiveness: Marketing Authorization for Pharmaceuticals

Author:
Jürgen Feick
Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The EC harmonized market entry regulation for pharmaceuticals from the early sixties on, but it achieved neither its goal of uniform national regulatory decisions nor that of automatic mutual recognition. Subsequent attempts to Europeanize the procedures themselves resulted in two alternatives in 1995: a Centralized Procedure for innovative pharmaceutical products implemented at the EU level, and a Decentralized Procedure which tries to assure mutual recognition. First, the paper analyzes the distinctive modes of Europeanization employed in these regulatory alternatives, examining both their impact on the effectiveness of European governing and the balance they strike between European interventionism, national participation and national autonomy. Second, it tries to assess whether Europeanization furthers the goals of pharmaceutical market entry policy as defined in European regulations – public health protection, creation of a single market and the reduction of regulatory costs to industry. There is little evidence that the public's health is less well protected when regulation is Europeanized. Only the Centralized Procedure contributes significantly to the goal of establishing a single market. Regulatory costs in terms of approval time did go down especially for pharmaceutical firms using the Centralized Procedure, mainly because of efficiency-enhancing legal provisions and institutionally induced regulatory competition between national authorities.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

104. Business Interest Representation and European Commission Fora: A Game Theoretic Investigation

Author:
Andreas Broscheid and David Coen
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The relationship between business and the EU institutions has evolved from its corporatist origins into a complex elite pluralist arrangement centered around industrial fora and policy committees. We view the growth of forum politics as the direct consequence of the unprecedented boom in economic and public interest lobbying in the early 1990s: While the increase in European interest representation provided greater legitimacy for the European integration program, it put a strain on the existing open pluralist European business-government relationship. One of the European Commission's (EC) informal solutions was to create restricted-entry policy fora and select committees, which it hoped would provide fast and reliable decision-making. Employing a formal model of industrial fora and committees, we specify the mechanisms that we believe caused the establishment of the current elite pluralist system of interest representation in the EU. We argue that in the process of establishing selective-entry fora for interest representation, the European Commission acted not only as policy entrepreneur, but also as a political entrepreneur, fostering collective action.
Topic:
Government, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

105. The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality. National welfare states are legally and economically constrained by European rules of economic integration, liberalization, and competition law, whereas efforts to adopt European social policies are politically impeded by the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic development and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, even more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional structures. In response, the "Open Method of Coordination" is now applied being in the social-policy field. It leaves effective policy choices at the national level, but tries to improve these through promoting common objectives and common indicators and through comparative evaluations of national policy performance. These efforts are useful but cannot overcome the constitutional asymmetry. Hence there is reason to search for solutions which must have the character of European law in order to establish constitutional parity with the rules of European economic integration, but which also must be sufficiently differentiated to accommodate the existing diversity of national welfare regimes. The article discusses two such options, "Closer Cooperation" and a combination of differentiated "framework directives" with the Open Method of Coordination.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

106. Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism

Author:
Colin Crouch and Henry Farrell
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The concept of path dependence is being used in highly deterministic ways in neo-institutionalist analysis, so that studies using this framework have difficulty in accounting for, or predicting, change. However, the original Polya urn model from which path dependence theory draws predicts that alternative paths will be possible. It can be argued that actors will be able to use these when they perceive a need to change. This article seeks to capture this possibility through accommodating a Bayesian parametric decision maker, interacting with an environment. This makes it possible to examine how change may involve such processes as: the use of past or redundant institutional repertoires; transfer of experience across action spaces; or from other agents, through networks of structured relationships; the emergence of perceived “one best” solutions. This approach points to the need to change how typologies are used in neo-institutionalist research, so that those features of cases which do not fit the pre-conceived framework of a type are not disregarded as “noise”, but properly evaluated as potential resources for change.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance

107. How Reliable is Pooled Analysis in Political Economy? The Globalization-Welfare State Nexus Revisited

Author:
Bernhard Kittel and Hannes Winner
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Panel data analysis has become very popular in comparative political economy. However, in order to draw meaningful inferences from such data, one has to address specification and estimation issues carefully. This paper aims to demonstrate various pitfalls that typically occur in applied empirical work. To illustrate this, we refer to the debate on the globalization-welfare state nexus. We reexamine a model by Garrett and Mitchell (2001), a leading study in this regard. Utilizing a data set of 17 OECD countries and the time period 1961 to 1993, they find evidence that globalization and partisan composition have a significant impact on the extent of public activity. However, because they apply a dynamic specification in levels, they do not adequately take into account both the dynamic and spherical nature of the data. In contrast, we propose an autoregressive model in first differences that is shown to perform well in statistical terms. Further, we explicitly pay attention to the time pattern of the globalization-welfare state nexus. Substantively, we find evidence that government spending is primarily driven by the state of the domestic economy. Neither partisan effects nor the international economic environment have affected public expenditure considerably.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy

108. Political Parties, Institutions, and the Dynamics of Social Expenditure in Times of Austerity

Author:
Herbert Obinger and Bernhard Kittel
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The containment of social expenditure growth has been (and still is) a core issue of public policy in advanced industrial countries since the 1980s and has received much academic attention during that period. Among the most extensively discussed explanatory factors of social expenditure are partisan politics and political institutions, as well as the dependency of the real impact of the former on the latter. The paper distinguishes five competing theoretical perspectives and explores their power to explain the empirical variation in the period 1982–1997 in 21 OECD countries. The empirical analysis of short-term dynamics is performed in a time-series cross-section framework while long-term level effects are explored in a cross-sectional setting. By using an interactive model specification the authors show that there is empirical evidence for this conditional effect, albeit it is neither thoroughly convincing nor leading to lasting long-term level effects. Extensive specification tests show that the 1990s witnessed a weakening of partisan effects which were still present in the 1980s. In total, the evidence tends to give most support to the “growth-to-limits” and the “new politics” perspectives.
Topic:
Economics, Government, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy

109. The Politics of Pensions in European Social Insurance Countries

Author:
Martin Schludi
Publication Date:
11-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This paper analyzes national processes of pension reform in countries with systems of old-age provision largely following the Bismarckian type (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden). Operating on a defined benefit/pay-as-you-go basis and mainly financed out of wage-based social contributions, pension systems in these countries are highly vulnerable to demographic and economic pressures. Therefore, pension reform has emerged as a major issue in these countries since the early 1990s. Although there are substantial similarities in the direction of reform, the degree of policy change varies considerably even among countries with similar legacies in pension policy. As a closer inspection of national patterns of pension policy-making shows, the political feasibility of pension reforms and the degree of adjustment in pension policy critically depends on the government's ability to orchestrate a reform consensus either with the parliamentary opposition or with the trade unions. The paper tries to identify the conditions under which a “pension pact” between those actors is likely to emerge.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance

110. Do Affluent Countries Face an Incomes-Jobs Tradeoff?

Author:
Lane Kenworthy
Publication Date:
10-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
A commonly-held view suggests that affluent nations face a tradeoff between incomes and jobs. According to this view, in the United States pay for workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution (relative to those in the middle) is very low and government unemployment-related benefits (the “replacement rate”) are stingy, but this facilitates the creation of lots of new jobs and encourages such individuals to take those jobs. The result is a high rate of employment and low unemployment. In much of Western Europe relative pay levels are higher for those at the bottom and benefits are more generous, but this is said to discourage job creation and to reduce the willingness of the unemployed to accept low-wage jobs. The consequence is low employment and high unemployment. I undertake a comparative assessment of this tradeoff view, based on pooled cross-section time-series analyses of 14 OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The findings suggest that greater pay equality and a higher replacement rate do reduce employment growth in low-productivity private-sector service industries and in the economy as a whole. However, these effects are relatively weak. The results point to a variety of viable options for countries wishing to maintain or move toward a desirable combination of jobs and equality.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States and Europe